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2018 DIGILAW 427 (MP)

Amjad Gani v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2018-04-26

J.K.MAHESHWARI, S.A.DHARMADHIKARI

body2018
JUDGMENT : This appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyaylaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been filed being aggrieved by the order dated 23.2.2018 dismissing the Writ Petition No.5708/2017 (Amjad Gani Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Others) wherein the charge sheet issued by the Additional Commissioner, Urban Administration & Development Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal was challenged on the ground of competence. 2. The learned Single Bench while dismissing the writ petition has referred the definitions of ''Director'' ''Disciplinary Authority'' and Rule 32 of the Madhya Pradesh State Municipal Service (Executive) Rules, 1973 (hereinafter shall be referred to as “Executive Rules” and concluded that issuance of the charge sheet by the Additional Commissioner, Urban Administration & Development Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner (appellant herein) is within its competence because under the Executive Rules, the Director includes the Additional Director and the said post of Commissioner is replaced to the post of Director, therefore, held that the Additional Commissioner is competent to issue charge sheet and dismissed the writ petition by the order impugned. 3. Shri M.P.S.Raghuwanshi, learned counsel representing the appellant submits that it is a case wherein the charge sheet has been issued to the appellant holding the post of Chief Municipal Officer by the Additional Commissioner, Urban Administration & Development Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal and the Commissioner has not been defined under the Executive Rules as disciplinary authority, however, it may not include the Additional Commissioner within the definition of Commissioner in parlance to the definition of Director. It is also submitted that Annexure R/2 dated 25.8.2010 relied by the respondent/State to show that the Director and the Commissioner are equivalent and conferred the power of the disciplinary authority in the light of the Circular dated 12.9.1983 of the General Administration Department is of no help to the respondent/State. It is urged by the executive instructions issued by the Government without amending the “Executive Rules” the power of disciplinary authority conferred to the Director cannot be given to the Commissioner of the Department. It is urged by the executive instructions issued by the Government without amending the “Executive Rules” the power of disciplinary authority conferred to the Director cannot be given to the Commissioner of the Department. It is further contended that under the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the ''MPCSCCA Rules''), the power has been conferred for issuance of the charge sheet either to the appointing authority or to the disciplinary authority but it do not apply to the cases to which Executive Rules applies because of exclusion by Rule 3(1)(d) of the MPCSCCA Rules on account of having specific provision in the Executive Rules. However, issuance of the charge sheet by the Additional Commissioner, who does not have power under the Executive Rules is without jurisdiction. 4. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Arun Prakash Yadav Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Others reported in 2013 (III) MPJR 131 to contend that by way of the executive instructions, the declaration of a post as gazetted without amendment in the Rules cannot give the status to such employee as a gazetted employee and such person cannot be equated in issuance of the charge sheet by the authority who can issue such charge sheet to the gazetted officer, however, applying the same analogy, without amendment in the rules, change of nomenclature may not acquire competence by the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner to issue the charge sheet to the appellant. He has further placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ajaya Kumar Das Versus State of Orissa & Others reported in (2011) 11 SCC 136 to contend that without amending the Executive Rules, by way of a notification, no executive orders or circulars or instructions can supersede those rules. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Others Versus Prabhash Chandra Mirdha reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565 on the proposition that in absence of having any order of authorization in general or any rule permitting the competent authority to delegate its power to conduct an inquiry, the action taken by the authority, who is not legally delegated the power, cannot exercise such power. Reliance has also been placed on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India (ALPAI) & Others Versus Director General of Civil Aviation & Others reported in (2011) 5 SCC 435 to contend that the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone can pass such an order or take action none else. Under such circumstances, the prayer is made to set aside the impugned order dated 23.2.2018. 5. On the other hand, Shri Raghvendra Dixit, learned Government Advocate representing the respondent/State has raised a preliminary objection, regarding maintainability of the writ petition challenging the charge sheet placing reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Special Director & Another Versusw Mohammad Ghulam Ghouse & Another reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440 to contend that the writ petition is not maintainable before the High Court. Learned Government Advocate referring the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge submitted that under Rule 32 of the Executive Rules, the Appointing Authority, the Divisional Commissioner, the Director may impose the penalty as specified in Clause (i)(ii)(iii) wrongly mentioned as Clause (i)&(ii) of Rule 31. As the charge sheet has been issued by the Additional Commissioner of the Department and the word ''Director'' has been replaced with the word ''Commissioner'' as reveal from the document Annexure R/2 dated 25.8.2010, therefore, the definition of Director as specified under the Rules must be read including the Commissioner and whatever power has given to the Director may be presumably exercised by the Commissioner and the same would be the position in case of the Additional Director and Additional Commissioner because the word ''Additional Director'' is included in the word ''Director'' as defined in Rule 2(d) of the Executive Rules. It is contended that if the Additional Commissioner whose post is equivalent to the post of the Additional Director being disciplinary authority has issued the charge sheet, it would not give any cause to the appellant to knock at the door of this Court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, therefore, this appeal may be thrown out as the writ petition is not maintainable, however, urged interference in this appeal is not warranted. 6. 6. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the facts of this case, it is not in dispute the appellant is holding the post of the Chief Municipal Officer, therefore, he is the member of the Madhya Pradesh State Urban Administration Services and his service conditions are governed by the Executive Rules. The said Rules provides the complete procedure for appointment, promotion, grant of time scale of pay, termination of employment by way of imposition of the penalty following the procedure as prescribed therein including the suspension. The MPCSCCA Rules shall apply to any of the member of the service, who holds a civil post under the State and to the persons as specified in the definition of the Government servant. As per Rule 3(1)(d), it is apparent that any person for whom special provision is made in respect of the matters covered then the MPCSCCA Rules shall not apply. The MPCSCCA Rules have been framed to deal with the Government Servant with a disciplinary proceeding that includes the suspension, penalties and its procedure. Under the Executive Rules, the special provisions regarding the penalties, suspension and procedure for imposition of the said penalty have been specified, therefore, it can safely be held that the applicability of MPCSCCA Rules is ousted to the member of the State Urban Administration Services and the procedure as specified in the Executive Rules shall apply in the case of the appellant. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the service condition of the appellant and the procedure for penalty shall be governed as per the Executive Rules, 1973. 7. In the said context, the relevant provisions of the Executive Rules in the matter of imposition of penalties are required to be taken note, including the authority on whom such powers are vested. Rule 31 of the Executive Rules specifies penalties whereby Sub-Rule (i)(ii)(iii) specifies the minor penalty while Sub-Rule (iv)(v) (vi) of Rule 31 specifies the major penalties. 7. In the said context, the relevant provisions of the Executive Rules in the matter of imposition of penalties are required to be taken note, including the authority on whom such powers are vested. Rule 31 of the Executive Rules specifies penalties whereby Sub-Rule (i)(ii)(iii) specifies the minor penalty while Sub-Rule (iv)(v) (vi) of Rule 31 specifies the major penalties. The provisions of Rules 2(d) defines Director, 2(d-i) Disciplinary Authority, 2(d-ii) Divisional Commissioner, 2(f) Member of the Service and the provisions of Rule 32 specify the authority who may impose penalties and Rule 33 prescribes the procedure for imposition of the penalties, however, all those provisions are relevant, therefore, reproduced as under:- ''2(b)"Appointing Authority" means State Government in respect to Additional Director, Joint Director, Chief Municipal Officer Class-A, Chief Municipal Officer Class-B and Chief Municipal Officer Class-C. 2(d) "Director" means Director of Local Bodies, and includes Additional Director. 2(d-i)"Disciplinary Authority" means the authority competent under these rules to impose upon a member of the service any of the penalties specified in Rule 31. 2(d-ii)"Divisional Commissioner" means the Officer appointed by the State Government under Section 14 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. 2(f) "Member of the service" means a member of the Madhya Pradesh State Urban Administrative Service. 8. On careful reading of the said provisions, it is apparent that as per Clause 2(b), in the case of the appellant, for the post of Chief Municipal Officer, the appointing authority would be the State Government. It is also apparent that the Director as defined in Rule 2(d) includes the Additional Director. The disciplinary authority is specified in Rule 2(d-i) i.e the appointing authority, the Divisional Commissioner, the Director and may impose any of the penalties as specified in Rule 31. The Divisional Commissioner has also been defined as per Section 14 of the M.P.Land Revenue Code, 1959. 9. Rules 32 and 33 specify the power for imposition of penalty and its procedure, however, all those provisions are also relevant, therefore, reproduced as under:- 32. Authorities who may impose penalties-(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules the penalties mentioned in clauses (i) to (ii) of Rule 31 may be imposed on a member of the service by the [appointing authority or Divisional Commissioner or Director]. Authorities who may impose penalties-(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules the penalties mentioned in clauses (i) to (ii) of Rule 31 may be imposed on a member of the service by the [appointing authority or Divisional Commissioner or Director]. (2) Subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules, the penalties mentioned in clauses (iv) to (vi) of Rule 31 shall not be imposed on a member of the service except by the appointing authority and in consultation with the Public Service Commission. 33. Procedure for imposing certain penalties -(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Enquiry Act, 1850 no order shall be passed imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vi) of Rule 31 on a member of the service unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. (2) The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the member of the service charged together with a statement of allegations on which each charge is based and on any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. (3) The member of the service shall be required within such time, as may be specified by the appointing authority, to submit a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person and produce witness. (4) The member of the service charged may request for an access to municipal record for the purpose of preparing his written statement provided that the appointing authority may, for reasons, to be recorded in writing, refuse him such access, if in its opinion such records are not strictly relevant to the case or it is not desirable in the public or municipal interest to allow him access thereto. (5) After the written statement is received from the member of the service in accordance with sub-rule (3) or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the appointing authority may, if it considers it necessary, appoint an Enquiry Officer to inquire into the charges framed against the member of the service and shall have the charges inquired into as provided in sub-rule (6). (6) If the member of the service desires to be heard in person, he shall be so heard. If he desires that an oral inquiry be held or if the appointing authority so directs, an inquiry shall be held by the Enquiry Officer. At such enquiry, evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as arc not admitted and the member of the service charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witness who gives evidence in person and to have such witness called as he may wish; Provided that the Enquiry Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness whose evidence is, in the opinion of the Enquiry Officer, not relevant or material. (7) At the conclusion of the enquiry, the authority inquiring into the charges shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with the reasons therefor. If in the opinion of such authority the proceeding of the inquiry establishes charges different from those originally framed, it may record its findings on such charges: Provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the member of the service, charge has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. (8) The record of the inquiry shall include : (i) the charges framed against the member of the service and the statement of allegations furnished to him under sub-rule (2); (ii) his written statement of defence, if any; (iii) the evidence recorded in the course of inquiry; (iv) the orders, if any, made by the State Government and the report of the authority making the inquiry, in regard to the inquiry; and (v) a report setting out the findings on each charge and the reasons therefor. (9) The appointing authority shall consider the record of the enquiry and determine which of the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it accepts. (9) The appointing authority shall consider the record of the enquiry and determine which of the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it accepts. (10) If the appointing authority having regard of the findings recorded or accepted, has arrived at any provisional conclusion in regard to one of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vi) of Rule 31 to he imposed, it shall- (a) furnish to the member of the service concerned, a copy of the report of the enquiry together with a statement of such findings; and (b) give him a show-cause notice stating the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time, such representation as he may wish to make against the proposed action. (11) The appointing authority shall determine having regard to the findings recorded or accepted by it, and the representation, if any, made by the member of the service under sub-rule (10), what penalty, if any, should be imposed on the member of the service and subject to Rule 32 pass appropriate orders on the case and the orders so passed shall be communicated to the member of the service.'' 10. Rule 32 of the Executive Rules are in two parts. As per Sub-Rule (1), the penalties mentioned in Clause (i)(ii)(iii) of Rule 31 may be imposed on the member of the service by the Appointing Authority or Divisional Commissioner or the Director but as per Sub-Rule (2), the penalties mentioned in Clause (iv)(v)(vi) of Rule 31, which are major, shall not be imposed on the member of the service except by the Appointing Authority. Meaning thereby the Divisional Commissioner or the Director, as the case may be, would have authority and may impose the minor penalties specified in Clause (i) (ii)(iii) of Rule 31 but they cannot impose the major penalties specified in Sub-Rule (iv)(v)(vi) of Rule 31 and the said penalties can only be imposed by the Appointing Authority i.e. State Government after consultation with the Public Service Commissioner. 11. Rule 33 prescribes a procedure for imposition of the penalties which are major as specified in Clause (iv)(v)(vi) of Rule 31 on the member of the service. 11. Rule 33 prescribes a procedure for imposition of the penalties which are major as specified in Clause (iv)(v)(vi) of Rule 31 on the member of the service. However, as per Sub-Rules (1) & (2), the member of the service ought to be informed in writing on the ground on which the action is proposed, which shall be reduced to the form of definite charge and be communicated together with the statement of allegation on which each charge is based upon and any other circumstances necessary for the proposed action. On reducing the definite charge, “Appointing Authority” may ask to submit a written statement of the defence from the member of the service showing his desire of personal hearing or producing the witness. On asking the access to the municipal record for preparing the written statement, it may be refused by the “Appointing Authority” by reason to be recorded in writing, if it is not relevant to the case or not desirable in the public interest as per the opinion formed by him as per Sub-Rule (4). After going through the written statement, if it considers necessary, the “Appointing Authority” may appoint an Enquiry Officer to inquire into the charges framed against the member of the service and after giving a personal opportunity of hearing or oral inquiry, as may be held by the Enquiry Officer, affording an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or to give the evidence as directed by Sub-Rules (5) & (6). As per Sub-Rules (7) & (8), the Inquiring Officer shall record its finding on each charge and it be placed before the “Appointing Authority”. As per Sub-Rules (9) & (10), on receiving the report of the Inquiring Officer, the “Appointing Authority” may arrive at a conclusion on which of the finding of the Inquiring Officer may be accepted and the provisional conclusion in regard to the penalties specified in Clause (iv)(v)(vi) of Rule 31 may be imposed to which a show cause notice may be given to the member of the service for such proposed action and to submit his representation. Thereafter, as per Sub-Rule (11), a decision can be taken by the “Appointing Authority” concluding that what penalty may be imposed on the member of the service. 12. Thereafter, as per Sub-Rule (11), a decision can be taken by the “Appointing Authority” concluding that what penalty may be imposed on the member of the service. 12. A conjoint reading of Sub-Rule (1) to Sub-Rule (11) of Rule 33 makes it clear that from reducing the charges asking the written statement forming an opinion of the inquiry to appoint the Inquiring Officer or to supply or refuse to access the record and after receiving the report from the Inquiring Officer till issuance of the notice of the proposed penalty on acceptance of those charges and forming the provisional opinion for the proposed penalty, the action can be taken only by the Appointing Authority. The said rules do not contemplate that any of the action can be taken by the authority other than the appointing authority, on the contrary as per Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 32, subject to the provisions of these rules, the penalties specified in Clause (iv)(v)(vi) of the Rules can be imposed only by the “Appointing Authority” and not by the Divisional Commissioner or the Director as specified in Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 32, though defined as Disciplinary Authority in Rule 2(d-i) of the Rules. In view of the discussion made hereinabove and looking to the scheme of the Executive Rules, it can safely be observed that the Divisional Commissioner or the Director may be a disciplinary authority for the purpose of Rule 2(d-i) because they may impose the penalties as specified in Clause (i)(ii)(iii) of Rule 31 (minor penalty), upon a member of the service for the purpose of Rule 32(1) of the Executive Rules. But for the purpose of Rule 32(2) under which the penalty mentioned in Clause (iv)(v)(vi) of Rule 31 shall not be imposed on a member of the service except by the Appointing Authority in consultation the Public Service Commission. The proverb used in Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 32 'the penalties mentioned in Clause (iv)(v)(vi) of Rule 31 shall not be imposed on a member of the service except by the Appointing Authority in consultation with the Public Service Commissioner'' excludes the disciplinary authority to take action in imposition of the penalties of Clause (iv)(v)(vi) of Rule 31 in the terms as specified in Rule 33 of the Executive Rules. 13. 13. After careful reading of the Executive Rules as well as the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966, the distinction, which can be culled out is that under the MPCSCCA Rules, 1966, the disciplinary authority has been specified in Rules 12 & 13. Rule 12 further specifies which authority can institute a proceeding in Rule 13. On perusal thereof, it is apparent that initiation of the proceedings may be made by a disciplinary authority even competent for the minor penalties or by the authorities as specified by the general or special order. The said rule further specifies that in case of minor penalties, if the disciplinary authority is of the opinion to conduct an inquiry, it may be conducted but no similar provision is available in the Executive Rules, 1973 therefore, in the matter of issuance of the charge sheet to the employees governed by the MPCSCCA Rules, the action can be taken by the disciplinary authority as specified but the said analogy would not ipso facto apply to the member of the Municipal Service in view of the discussion made in the provisions of the Executive Rules. On applicability of the Executive Rules to the members of the Municipal Service, the applicability of the MPCSCCA Rules is ousted, therefore, the analogy, which may be drawn applying the provisions of the MPCSCCA Rules, is not applicable looking to the specific provisions made under Rule 32(2) & 33 of the Executive Rules. 14. In view of the comparative discussion to the provisions of MPCSCCA Rules and the Executive Rules in the context of the facts of the present case, which relates to an employee of the State Urban Administrative Services, the charge sheet for imposition of the penalty specified under Rule 32(2) of the Executive Rules ought to be issued by the “Appointing Authority” in view of Rule 33(1)(2)(3) asking the written statement or defence from the delinquent. Upon following the procedure as contemplated under Rules 33(5) & 33(6) and on receiving the report of the Inquiring Officer on following the procedure as prescribed in Sub-Rules (9) & (10), the penalty may be imposed under Sub-Rule (11) of Rule 33 by the Appointing Authority, and not by the disciplinary authority, those are the Divisional Commissioner or the Director. Upon following the procedure as contemplated under Rules 33(5) & 33(6) and on receiving the report of the Inquiring Officer on following the procedure as prescribed in Sub-Rules (9) & (10), the penalty may be imposed under Sub-Rule (11) of Rule 33 by the Appointing Authority, and not by the disciplinary authority, those are the Divisional Commissioner or the Director. Therefore, the issuance of the charge sheet for imposing the major penalty either by the Divisional Commissioner or by the Director is incompetent and it can only be issued by the Appointing Authority as per Rule 33(1)(2)(3) of the Executive Rules. 15. In view of the said legal position, the finding as recorded by learned Singh Judge that the Director of Local Body shall include the Additional Director of Urban Administration may be correct for the purpose of taking an action under Rule 32(1) only to impose the minor penalty; but under Rule 32(2) of the Rules to impose the penalties specified under Rule 31(iv)(v)(vi), the initiation of the proceedings and imposition of the penalty by them is ousted and such action can only be taken by the Appointing Authority following the procedure as prescribed in Rule 33 of the Rules. 16. It is not in dispute that the Appointing Authority to the post of the Chief Municipal Officer is the State Government as apparent from the definition 2(b) of the Rules, therefore, the charge sheet must be issued by the Appointing Authority and not by the Director. In such circumstances, the analogy drawn by the learned Single Judge showing the competence of the ''Additional Commissioner'' equating him from the word ''Additional Director'' which falls within the definition of ''Director'' is of no relevance and not inconformity to the spirit of the Executive Rules. 17. In addition to the aforesaid, the perusal of the GAD Circular dated 12.9.1983 relied by learned Government Advocate makes it clear that it was issued in exercise of the power of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 12 of the MPCSCCA Rules and not under the Executive Rules, conferring the power to impose the minor penalties to the departmental heads to Class-II Civil Servants. It does not ipso facto apply in the case of a member of the Municipal Service because the applicability of the MPCSCCA Rules is ousted, however, the circular issued by the GAD under those rules would not apply to this case. It does not ipso facto apply in the case of a member of the Municipal Service because the applicability of the MPCSCCA Rules is ousted, however, the circular issued by the GAD under those rules would not apply to this case. By way of subsequent notification Annexure R/2 dated 25.08.2010 conferring a power to the Commissioner or Urban Administration Department to take an action to the employees of the Urban Administration and Development Department is also not valid that too for conferment of the disciplinary action in the context of Rules 32, 33, 34 coupled with Rules 2(b), 2(d-i) & 2(d-ii) of the Executive Rules. Therefore, the respondent/State cannot derive the benefit of said Circulars. 18. Insofar as the replacement of the word ''Director'' with the word ''Commissioner'' is concerned, it is apparent that under the said Circular, the Government has issued clarification in this regard but looking to the scheme of the Executive Rules where the power of the disciplinary authority conferred to the Director has not been amended replacing the word ''Commissioner'' and merely mentioning the said replacement in the Circular dated 25.8.2010 is of no help to the respondent/State. In this regard guidance can be taken by the Division Bench Judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Arun Prakash Yadav (supra). 19. It is a trite law that if a disciplinary power is conferred by the statute on the authority, it ought to be exercised by such authority and it cannot be assigned to any other authority by way of executive instructions. In this regard, guidance can be taken from the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots' Association of India (ALPAI) (supra) whereby the Apex Court has said that ''the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone can pass the order and no other person even a superior authority can interfere with the functioning of the statutory authority''. 20. In the case of Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that in absence of having any authorization in general or any rule permitting the competent authority to delegate its power for conducting the inquiry, the said issue cannot be dealt with by other authority and it would not be dealt to be desirable by such other authority. 21. 21. In the case of Ajaya Kumar Das (supra), Hon'ble the Apex Court has made it clear that the Rules, if any, framed ought to be amended by way of notification and no change can be made under those Rules by way of Circular or by way of Executive Instructions. Similarly, in the case of State of Punjab & Others versus Anita & Others reported in (2015) 2 SCC 170 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that any executive instruction, which is in violation of statutory rule is nullity in law. 22. In the present case, nothing has been brought on record to substantiate that by way of an amendment in the Executive Rules the word ''Director'' has been replaced with the word ''Commissioner'' replacing the definition of the ''Director'' with the word ''Commissioner'' therefore it would include the ''Additional Commissioner''. In absence thereto, the issuance of the charge-sheet to the Chief Municipal Officer, who is a member of the Urban Administrative Services of the State by the Additional Commissioner is without any authority under the law. In the light of the Circular Annexure R/2 dated 25.8.2010, the conclusion arrived at by learned Single Judge that issuance of the charge sheet by the Additional Commissioner is within his competence is incorrect equating the word ''Additional Commissioner'' with ''Additional Director'' therefore concluded that either by Annexure R/2 dated 25.8.2010 or by the executive instructions issued on 12.9.1983, the power of the disciplinary authority under the Executive Rules cannot be conferred to the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner to the employee of the Urban Administrative Services. As specified under the Rules, the power of the disciplinary authority for imposition of the minor penalty has been given to the ''Director'' which includes the ''Additional Director'' therefore issuance of the charge-sheet by the Additional Commissioner is without any authority of law, illegal, and is without jurisdiction. 23. At this stage, the argument as advanced by the learned Government Advocate for the respondent/State to not to entertain the Writ Petition No.5708/2017 is also required to be considered. In this regard, the reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Special Director & Another Versus Mohammad Ghulam Ghouse & Another reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440 . In this regard, the reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Special Director & Another Versus Mohammad Ghulam Ghouse & Another reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440 . In the said case, the Apex Court has clarified that the interference against the notice of issuance of the charge-sheet is not warranted but in case the said notice is without any authority of law then the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised. As discussed herein above that the Additional Commissioner do not have any power to issue the charge sheet, therefore, such argument is hereby repelled. 24. Accordingly, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove setting aside the impugned order dated 23.2.2018 passed in Writ Petition No.5708/2017 (Amjad Gani Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Others). The charge-sheet issued by the Commissioner, Urban Administration Development Department against the appellant also stands quashed. However, it is open to the respondent/State to initiate action against the appellant as permissible under the Executive Rules, 1973.