JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31. 5. 2017 passed by learned District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H. P. in Civil Appeal No. 116-CA/13 of 2016 whereby he upheld the order passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sirmaur District at Nahan on 16. 8. 2016 dismissing the objections filed by the appellant to the mode of partition suggested by the Local Commissioner and at the same time passed a final decree for partition of the suit land in accordance with such mode. 2. The facts as are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that initially respondent/plaintiff filed a Civil Suit No. 82/1 of 2009 for passing preliminary decree of partition of the suit property comprising of Khata/Khatauni No. 78 min/118 min, Khasra Nos. 106, 107, 108, 110, 2339/114, 193 and 191 total measuring 1058-54 sq. mtrs. situated in Mohal Nahan (Mohalla Chakrera), Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmaur, H. P. (hereinafter referred to as the suit property). Vide its judgment and decree dated 21. 12. 2009, the learned trial Court passed preliminary decree for partition. 3. Thereafter, respondent/plaintiff filed application No. 88/6 of 2010 under Order 20 Rule 18 CPC for passing final decree. The appellant/defendant filed objections to the mode of partition suggested by the Local Commissioner alleging that the Local Commissioner did not carry out partition in accordance with law as he disturbed the possession of the appellant on the spot. It was submitted that the total area allotted to the appellant is 49. 40 sq. mtrs. , whereas the area allotted to the respondent/plaintiff is 55. 48 sq. mtrs. Khasra No. 2339/114/1 which was allotted to the respondent/plaintiff was measuring 379. 26 sq. mtrs. and in the same way Khasra No. 2339/114/2 measuring 378. 74 sq. mtrs in which shops are allotted to the respondent/plaintiff illegally, whereas the appellant/defendant had constructed the shops after spending huge amount by taking loan from the bank. It was further asserted by the appellant that plaintiff is Government servant whereas he is without work. It was alleged that the plaintiff in connivance with the revenue officials carried out the partition proceedings in absence of the appellant/defendant, therefore, the suggested mode of partition not acceptable and liable to be set-aside. 4. It was further asserted by the appellant that plaintiff is Government servant whereas he is without work. It was alleged that the plaintiff in connivance with the revenue officials carried out the partition proceedings in absence of the appellant/defendant, therefore, the suggested mode of partition not acceptable and liable to be set-aside. 4. The respondent/plaintiff filed reply to the objections filed by the appellant/defendant wherein it was pleaded that the objections so raised are without any basis. It was asserted that the Local Commissioner had gone to the spot and carried out partition proceedings as per location, possession and feasibility of the property on the spot and also in accordance with law. Khasra No. 106 is said to be ''Gairmumkin Makan'' and it could not have been divided. Khasra No. 199 measuring 23. 68 sq. mtrs. is another ''Gairmumkin Makan'' which has been allotted to the appellant/defendant. The construction on the spot said to be done jointly, therefore, the objections of the appellant/defendant are incorrect and a prayer for dismissal of the objections was made. 5. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the objections preferred by the appellant/defendant and passed the final decree of partition. 6. Aggrieved by the order as also the final decree passed by the learned trial Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court, which was dismissed on the ground of maintainability as also on merits vide judgment and decree dated 31. 5. 2017. 7. Undeterred, the appellant has filed the instant appeal on the ground that the learned Courts below have failed to take into consideration the fact that since there were only two co-sharers of the property, therefore, the same had to be divided in equal parts and could not have been partitioned in a mode as suggested by the Local Commissioner. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Bimal Gupta, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Rubeena Bhatt, learned counsel for the respondent, would canvass that this Court can thrash the issues on merits only if it first comes to the conclusion that the appeal is maintainable in view of specific bar contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of both the parties. 9. Rubeena Bhatt, learned counsel for the respondent, would canvass that this Court can thrash the issues on merits only if it first comes to the conclusion that the appeal is maintainable in view of specific bar contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of both the parties. 9. There can be no dispute that the preliminary decree is an appealable decree, however, in case no appeal against the same is filed, then as per Section 97 of CPC, appeal against the same is not maintainable. 10. Identical issue was considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Mool Chand and others vs. Dy. Director, Consolidation and others , 1995 5 SCC 631 , wherein it was observed as under:- "25. Preliminary Decree is an appealable decree. Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as under: "97, Appeal from final decree where no appeal from preliminary decree - Where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of this Code does not appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. " 26. Thus, if an appeal is not filed against the preliminary decree and its correctness is not challenged, it becomes final and the party aggrieved thereby will not be permitted to challenge its correctness in an appeal against final decree. 27. The Privy Council in Ahmed Musaji Saleji and others v. Hashim Ebrahim Saleji and Others , 1915 AIR(PC) 116, held that failure to appeal against a preliminary decree would operate as a bar to raising any objection to it in an appeal filed against final decree. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Venkata Reddy v. Pothi Reddy , 1963 AIR(SC) 992, has held that the impact of Section 97 is that the preliminary decree, so far as the matters covered by it are concerned, is regarded as embodying the final decision of the Court passing that decree. It observed as under: "A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as embodying . . . . . . the final decision of the Court passing that decree. It observed as under: "A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as embodying . . . . . . the final decision of the Court passing that decree. " This decision was relied upon in Gyarsi Bai and Ors. v. Dhansukh Lal and Ors. , 1965 AIR(SC) 1055, in which it was observed as under : "It is true that a preliminary decree is final in respect of the matters to be decided before it is made. . . It is indisputable that in a mortgage suit there will be two decrees, namely preliminary decree and final decree, and that ordinarily the preliminary decree settles the rights of the parties and the final decree works out those rights. " 11. That apart, even if the contentions as are strongly urged before this Court by the appellant are considered, even then, this Court is not in a position to interfere. It would be noticed that the Local Commissioner appointed by the Court as far as possible tried to preserve the possession of the parties and carried out the partition in a manner so that no hardship is caused either of the parties. Noticeably, the discrepancies in the division have cropped up only because the area which was to be partitioned could not be equally divided because of the site constraints at the spot. However, still Khasra No. 106 has been divided into two parts whereby measuring 55. 48 sq. mtrs. has been given to the respondent and remaining portion measuring 49. 40 sq. mtrs has been given to the appellant. Likewise, Khasra No. 107 has also been divided into two parts, whereby lesser share of 73. 77 sq. mtrs. has gone to the respondent whereas more share has gone to the appellant. Likewise, Khasra No. 2339/114/1 and 2339/114/2 having been partitioned and the parties were given their shares. Khasra No. 106 is said to be ''Gairmumkin Makan'' and it could not be divided, however, Khasra No. 199 measuring 23. 68 sq. mtrs is another ''Gairmumkin Makan'' which has been allotted to the respondent and whereas Khasra No. 193 measuring 30 sq. mtrs which is also '' Gairmumkin Makan'' has in fact been allotted to the appellant. 12. Khasra No. 106 is said to be ''Gairmumkin Makan'' and it could not be divided, however, Khasra No. 199 measuring 23. 68 sq. mtrs is another ''Gairmumkin Makan'' which has been allotted to the respondent and whereas Khasra No. 193 measuring 30 sq. mtrs which is also '' Gairmumkin Makan'' has in fact been allotted to the appellant. 12. It can be said without fear of contradiction that howsoever well-versed and perfect, a Commissioner may be, he cannot bring about division of properties or allotment of shares with mathematical precision, and to the satisfaction of one and all. However, in this case, both the learned Courts below have found the partition to be not only in accordance with law, but have also found the same to have brought about in a just and equitable manner. 13. It is otherwise more than settled that the appellate Court continues to be a final court of fact and law and second appeal to the High Court lies only where there is a substantial question of law. Meaning thereby the pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before this Court in second appeal. It shall be apt to refer to three Judges Bench decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs , 2001 3 SCC 179 , wherein it was observed as follows: " 15. . . . . . The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one. " 14. What would be the substantial question of law was thereafter considered in para 12 of the judgment, which reads thus: " 12. The phrase ''substantial question of law'', as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. " 14. What would be the substantial question of law was thereafter considered in para 12 of the judgment, which reads thus: " 12. The phrase ''substantial question of law'', as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta & Anr. Vs. T. Ram Ditta , 1928 AIR(PC) 172, the phrase "''substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 of the C. P. C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. The Century Spinning and Manufacuring Co. , Ltd. , 1962 Supp3 SCR 549, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju , 1952 ILR(Mad) 264:- "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. " and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:- "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law. " 15. Finally, in paragraph 14, the Hon''ble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines on the test of as to what is the substantial question of law, which reads thus: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. " 16. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below are concurrent findings of fact which are binding on this Court while hearing the second appeal. It is more so, when these findings are neither found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings nor these findings have been found against the evidence nor against the pleadings and lastly, nor against any provision of law (Refer: Parminder Singh vs. Gurpreet Singh , 2017 AIR(SC) 3601). 17. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in the instant appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any.