Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 430 (MP)

S. P. Kohli v. State of M. P.

2018-04-27

NANDITA DUBEY, S.K.SETH

body2018
ORDER Seth, J--1. This criminal revision is directed against the order dated 27.1.2018 passed by the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) Bhopal in Special Case No. 07/2014 whereby charge under section 420 read with section 120B of the IPC has been framed against the applicant. 2. In brief, prosecution case is that the applicant is an auction purchaser of land. Allegation against the applicant is that he has colluded and conspired with the Officers of the Cooperative Department to purchase land of one Bhagchand which was worth Rs. 1,67,000/- for a meagre sum of Rs. 50,000/-. Thus, he not only caused revenue loss to the Government but also financial loss to the real owner of the agricultural land near the vicinity of State Capital, Bhopal. 3. On a complaint in this factual back ground, Lokayukt Organization registered a case under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B, 34 of the IPC and under sections 13 (1)(d) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against accused persons who are involved in the scam. After investigation, material collected showed prima facie case against applicant and co-accused, therefore, charge-sheet was filed against accused persons including the applicant. After going through the charge-sheet and material filed along with it, learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption) Bhopal framed charge against applicant for offence as mentioned above. Hence, this revision to quash the charge. 4. Applicant is assailing the charge framed against him basically on the ground that as an auction purchaser of land, he had nothing to do with the irregularities committed by the alleged officers of the Cooperative Department in the auction proceedings. It is also submitted that the applicant, being a bonafide purchaser is being wrongly prosecuted and roped into the controversy without there being any oral or documentary evidence against him. It is further submitted that no offence is made out against the applicant and, therefore, it is submitted that impugned order framing charge against the applicant be quashed.“ 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Lokayukt submitted that there is sufficient material on record to indicate that applicant was involved with the Officers of the CooperativeDepartment in a conspiracy to sell out and purchase costly land at a throwaway price. It is also submitted that in the instant case, land worth Rs. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Lokayukt submitted that there is sufficient material on record to indicate that applicant was involved with the Officers of the CooperativeDepartment in a conspiracy to sell out and purchase costly land at a throwaway price. It is also submitted that in the instant case, land worth Rs. 1,67,000/- was sold in an auction to the applicant for a meagre sum of Rs. 50,000/- in collusion with the Authorities of the Cooperative Department, hence no fault can be found with the impugned order framing charge against the applicant. 6. We have heard the rival submissions at length and perused the material placed on record. On a careful consideration, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the contention of counsel for the applicant. 7. Submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that there is no material to connect the applicant with the offence and learned trial court should have discharged him under section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He criticized the trial Court acting as the mouthpiece of the prosecution. This aspect has been totally ignored by the trial Court while framing the charge. Thus, according to counsel for the applicant, the trial Court committed grave illegality in framing charge against the applicant. 8. Dealing with his submission, we may point out that law in this regard is well settled in Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar and others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 1 , wherein it is held that at the time of framing of charge, the material produced by the defence cannot be considered by the Court. In view of this, the legal position is clear that no right is conferred by the Code to the accused person to prove his innocence at the stage of framing of charge. We, therefore, find no flaw with the impugned order on this count. This takes us to the first submission that there was no evidence against the applicant. 9. We find that in the present case, the trial Court did not act as the mouthpiece of the prosecution. We do not find force in this contention of counsel for the applicant for the simple reason that the Court did apply the judicial mind to see whether from the material produced on record, it could be said that the accused might have committed an offence. We do not find force in this contention of counsel for the applicant for the simple reason that the Court did apply the judicial mind to see whether from the material produced on record, it could be said that the accused might have committed an offence. In this connection, Court framing charge is not required to hold a mini trial and come to the conclusion that material produced warrants conviction. At this stage, the probative values of the material submitted along with charge sheet are not required to be examined or evaluated under a microscope. That stage would come later. Prior to it, the Court has only to see that material does make out a prima facie case. 10. At the stage of framing charges, Court is required to consider only the material placed by the prosecution, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 giving right to the accused to place material in defence at the stage of framing of charge. That stage would come later in the trial at the time of defence. We find no fault with the view taken by the trial Court. 11. In this context, we may profitably refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568 . Even in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar and others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 1 , wherein it was held that at the time of framing of charge, the material produced by the defence cannot be considered by the Court. 12. In view of this, the legal position is clear that no right is conferred by the Code to the accused person to prove his innocence at the stage of framing of charge. We, therefore, find no flaw with the impugned order. 13. It is settled law that the Court is not expected to marshal the record with a view to decide the admissibility and reliability of document on record. The trial Court is justified in framing charge against the accused. The defence of the applicant would not be considered at the time of framing of charges. It can be considered at an appropriate stage of defence evidence. 14. The trial Court is justified in framing charge against the accused. The defence of the applicant would not be considered at the time of framing of charges. It can be considered at an appropriate stage of defence evidence. 14. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, reported in [ (2017) 3 SCC 198 ], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : “The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure.” 15. In view of the aforesaid discussions and the statement of law, we do not find any merit and substance in the present criminal revision, therefore, the same being devoid of any substance is hereby dismissed. 16. Ordered accordingly.