JUDGMENT Hon'ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. In these two connected Writ Petitions, the writ petitioner is the plaintiff in suit, being Suit No. 30 of 2017-18 and Suit No. 29 of 2017-18 seeking declaration and partition of holding invoking Section 229-B read with 176 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, lodged before Assistant Collector 1st Class/S.D.M. Sadar, Dehradun. The suit, thus, preferred by the petitioner accompanied with an application under Section 229-D of the Act for granting interim protection during the pendency of the suit to the following effect : ßvr% fuosnu gS fd okn ds fuLrkj.k rd izfroknh la0 1 ls 5 dks rFkk mlds ifjokj okyksa dks ,oa izfrfuf/k;ksa dks fookfnr Hkwfe ij dCtk djus] ml ij fuekZ.k djus] mls [kqnZ&cqnZ djus ,oa fodz; djus ls fuf'k} fd;k tkosAÞ 2. The Court of Assistant Collector, by an order dated 9th April, 2018, has passed the following order :- ßvkt ;g nkok oknh dh vkSj ls oknh vf/koDrk }kjk izLrqr gqvkA okn i= ds lkFk izLrqr fu"ks/kkKk izkFkZuk i= ij oknh vf/koDrk dks lqukA eSa oknh vf/koDrk ds rdks± ls lger gksrs gq, okn i= esa of.kZr fookfnr Hkwfe [kkrk lañ 29 ¼Qlyh o"kZ 1414&1419½ ekStk lsoykdyka ijxuk iNoknwu rglhy lnj nsgjknwu esa vfxze frfFk rd mHk; i{kksa dks Hkwfe Ø;&foØ;@[kqnZ&cqnZ o fuekZ.k djus ls fuf"k) fd;k tkrk gSA okn ntZ jftLVj gksA oknh rRdky lEeu iSjoh djsaA i=koyh okLrs bUrtkj lEeu fnuk¡d 30-05-2018 dks is'k gksosAÞ 3. The provisions of Section 229-D of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, though being a special Act, it partakes the pari materia criterion and parameters of the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the C.P.C. which has been made applicable over the proceedings under the Act as per Section 241. No doubt, the Trial Court does have the powers to grant an ex parte injunction otherwise it will negate the very purpose of Section 229-D but these powers with the Trial Court are not unfettered. The Trial Court has to adhere to certain recognized norms and is required to record satisfaction and order has to reflect an application of mind while passing the order to record a finding as to exceptional circumstances to grant an ex parte order so as to bring it within the scope of Order 39 Rule 3. 4. The Trial Court has to adhere to certain recognized norms and is required to record satisfaction and order has to reflect an application of mind while passing the order to record a finding as to exceptional circumstances to grant an ex parte order so as to bring it within the scope of Order 39 Rule 3. 4. The provision of Order 39 Rule 3 creates a check on the Courts in granting an ex parte injunction and it would only permit grant of injunction where the delay would defeat the object. It can be said that the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 is a procedure for grant of injunction and that is what has been held out in the case reported in 1994 (4) SCC 225 . The Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :- “(1) As a principle ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the Court in the grant of ex parte injunction are : (a) Whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensure to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve; (c) the Court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented; (d) the Court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for some time an din such circumstances it will not grant ex parte injunction; (e) the Court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application; (f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time; (g) general principles like prima face case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the Court." 5. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Road Flying Carrier and another Vs. The General Electric Company of India Ltd. reported in AIR 1990 Allahabad 134 has held in para 3, 4 and 6 as under : “3. Rule 3 of O. 39, C.P.C. lays down that only in case where it appears to the Court that object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay ithas no power to issue ex party order of injunction. Rule 3 of O. 39, C.P.C. lays down that only in case where it appears to the Court that object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay ithas no power to issue ex party order of injunction. In that circumstance also the court has to record reasons for its opinion that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay. Sri R.K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent has however, submitted that even if reasons have not been mentioned, yet there was material, which was enough for forming its opinion to grant ex party injunction order. We cannot agree to this submission, for the simple reasons that where law requires recording of reasons for doing a particular act, the mere presence of material on the record is not sufficient; but it must also be shown that the court has applied its mind to that material. Reasons must find a place in the order ultimately passed by a court. Reference in this, connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshay Prasad Goenka AIR 1962 SC 1694 . In para 16 of the report a similar argument was raised before the Supreme Court and was repelled in the following words: “To suggest that by a recital of the nature of the repairs required to be carried out and employing the language of S. 5-A (j) the officer has recorded his reason for invoking S. 5A is to confuse the recording of the conclusion of the officer with the reasons for which he arrived at that conclusion. Besides just as it would not be open to argument that the terms of S.5-A (1) will be attracted to cases where there is factually an emergent need for repairs of the type envisaged by the section but the Collector does not so record in his order; similarly the factual existence of reasons for the Collector's conclusion would not avail where he does not comply with the statutory requirement of stating them in his order." Besides the above case, recently in F.A.F.O. No. 293 of 1989, a Division Bench of this Court (to which one of us was a member) precisely the same question arose and it was held that the ex party injunction cannot be granted unless R. 3 of O. 39 is complied with. 4. 4. In view of this proposition of law, we are not inclined to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent, as the law requires reasons to be recorded by the court, which has not been done and, therefore, the order under appeal cannot be sustained. 6. Before parting with this appeal, it must be stressed that the subordinate courts are granting temporary injunction without having any regard to the mandatory provisions of R. 3 of O.39, C.P.C. It is of utmost importance to note that an ex party order of injunction is an exception, the general rule being that order be passed only after hearing both the parties. It is only in rare cases where the court finds that object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay, the court can issue an injunction ex party but that to only after recording reasons therefore. Ex party injunction is not routine matter and it must be borne in mind by the courts below." 6. This ratio has been propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Challanppan and others reported in 2000 (2) ARC 661. The Hon'ble Apex Court has even gone into the extent by making a remark that in an event if the Trial Court grant an ex parte injunction without recording the reasons, it would amount to be an order without resorting to procedure. Para 11 of the judgment A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) reads as under :- 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents then contended, that an order granting injunction without complying with the requisites envisaged in Rule 3 of Order 39 be void. Para 11 of the judgment A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) reads as under :- 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents then contended, that an order granting injunction without complying with the requisites envisaged in Rule 3 of Order 39 be void. Rule 3 reads thus: “The Court shall in cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: (Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant - (a) to deliver to the opposite-party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with- (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following the day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent." 7. Being aggrieved against the order dated 9th April, 2018, the defendant in the suit has preferred a revision invoking Section 333 of the Act. The said revision has been allowed and as a consequence thereto the order dated 9th April, 2018 has been quashed. However, the Revisional Court by the impugned order, has passed the direction to the Assistant Collector to consider the application under Section 229-D of the Act afresh and pass an order after considering the objections filed by the defendant to the suit. However, the Revisional Court by the impugned order, has passed the direction to the Assistant Collector to consider the application under Section 229-D of the Act afresh and pass an order after considering the objections filed by the defendant to the suit. The directions issues are as under :- ß,slh fLFkfr esa orZeku fuxjkuh dks xzkg;rk ds Lrj ij gh Lohdkj djrs gq, lgk;d dyDVj] izFke Js.kh@ijxukf/kdkjh] lnj nsgjknwu }kjk okn la[;k 29@2017&18 jktsUnz flag cuke iznhi nqXxy vkfn esa ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 09-04-2018 dks fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA voj U;k;ky; dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd i{kdjksa dks okn@LVs izkFkZuk i= esa vkifRr ,oa lquokbZ dk i;kZIr volj iznku dj ,oa okn dh iks'k.kh;rk ds fcUnq dks loZizFke fuf.kZr dj okn dk fuLrkj.k xq.knks'k ij djuk lqfuf'pr djsA rn~uqlkj xzkárk ds Lrj ij gh fuxjkuh dk fuLrkj.k fd;k tkrk gSA ckn vko';d i=koyh nkf[ky nrj gksAÞ 8. The grievance of the petitioner, as advocated in the present writ petition is from a limited perspective, it is that the revision ought not to have been decided without even issuing notices to the petitioner. Apparently, this argument may appeal to the Court, that the Revisional Court ought to have issued notices to the opposite party to the revision before passing the order. But the fact remains that the order impugned before the Revisional Court dated 5th May, 2018, the revisional Court has remanded, this remand was not an adjudication of any right of parties on merit, hence, rather the matter has been remitted to decide the application under Section 229-D afresh on merit. It is not an order by virtue of which prejudice is caused to the petitioner rather it only rectifies the error which has been committed by the Trial Court while granting ex parte injunction without recording reasons contrary to Order 39 Rule 3 and the ratio of Hon'ble Apex Court. Since the order, in question, meets the ends of justice, this Court may not while exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India interferes even in a wrong order where as a consequence of setting aside of that order, it would result into the revival of the wrong order. The said ratio has been laid down in the case of Mohd. Swalleh and others Vs. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Meerut and another reported in ARC 1987 (2) 513. The said ratio has been laid down in the case of Mohd. Swalleh and others Vs. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Meerut and another reported in ARC 1987 (2) 513. Para 7 of the said judgment reads as under :- 7. It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid before the District Judge, the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set aside by the District Judge. On that ground the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same could not be set aside. But the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set aside, no objection can be taken." 9. An identical view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (1999) 8 SCC 16 , wherein, it has been held that the Writ Courts exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when ceased with against an order under challenge, if it finds the order to be without jurisdiction and if setting aside of that order would result into revival of illegal order, the Writ Court will not set it aside so as to revive the illegality. Para 38 of the said judgment reads as under :- “38. Para 38 of the said judgment reads as under :- “38. For what has been stated above we hold that the order of the learned Member of Board of Revenue directing the action to be taken for refund of the excess compensation was valid and proper though he had no jurisdiction to pass the order. In the event it is set aside it would amount to reviving an invalid order of payment of excess compensation to the appellant." 10. In that view of the matter, this Court declines to interfere while exercising its extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the impugned order. The writ petitions would stand dismissed. However, Assistant Collector is directed to decide the application under Section 229-D within a period of three weeks from the date of filing of the certified copy of the order passed by this Court. 11. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the writ petitions stand dismissed. There would be order as to costs.