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2018 DIGILAW 431 (HP)

Kusum Sood v. Kapoor Palace (Pvt. ) Limited

2018-03-22

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2018
JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This regular first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Kullu, H.P. on 30.11.2005 in Civil Suit No.20/2002, whereby the suit filed by the respondent No.1/plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) came to be decreed and the appellants/defendants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) were restrained from causing any interference with the ownership and possession of the plaintiff over the suit land or from raising any sort of construction over the same. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff claimed a decree for declaration to the effect that it be declared owner in possession of the land measuring 1-16-0 bighas out of the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 207min/372min, Khasra No.2992/840, measuring 2-2-0 bighas, as described in jamabandi for the year 1992-93, situated in Phati Nasogi, Kothi and Tehsil Manali, District Kullu, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) and sale deeds No. 245 and 246 dated 23.10.2001 executed by defendants No.3 and 4 in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 are void ab initio and ineffective qua the rights of ownership of plaintiff over the suit land. Further, a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from causing any sort interference with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land and from raising any construction over the same and the plaintiff in the alternative claimed a decree for possession of the suit land. 3. It was averred that the plaintiff is a private limited company having Dutt Pal Kapoor, Jitender Kapoor, Smt. Surekha Kapoor and Ashok Kapoor as its Directors which has been duly registered under the Companies Act with the Registrar of Companies and the said company had authorized its Director Jitender Kapoor to file the suit. The plaintiff by virtue of sale deed No.740 dated 25.05.1987, sale deed No.756 dated 28.05.1987 and sale deed No. 822 dated 30.05.1987 purchased the suit land from Shri Jindu Ram and Smt. Revti Devi, as a result of which, the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land and on the strength of said sale deeds, the suit land was mutated in favour of the plaintiff vide mutation Nos. 2483, 2484 and 2485. 2483, 2484 and 2485. It was further averred that plaintiff after purchasing the suit land raised boundary wall and was taking steps to get approval for the construction of a hotel on the suit land, but in the month of November, 2001, the plaintiff came to know that defendants No.1 and 2 started raising height of boundary wall raised by the plaintiff around the suit land and when the plaintiff enquired from them about the said illegal acts, they disclosed that they had purchased the suit land from defendants No.3 and 4 and were not aware that plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land. The plaintiff disclosed to defendants No.1 and 2 that defendants No.3 and 4 had already sold the suit land to the plaintiff in the year 1987, therefore, they could not have sold the same to defendants No.1 and 2 nor defendants No.1 and 2 could have acquired any title in the suit land, but they did not pay any heed to the request of the plaintiff. The plaintiff checked and enquired about the revenue entries and found that the defendants in connivance with the revenue officials have tampered with the revenue record and got mutation Nos. 2483, 2484 and 2485 rejected in the mutation register and entries thereof deleted in connivance with the revenue officials and got the fictitious sale deeds of the suit land executed in their favour and mutations Nos. 3628 and 3629 dated 27.10.2001 sanctioned and attested in their favour. It was also averred that the defendants No.3 and 4 had no title in the suit land and to execute the sale deeds of the suit land in favour of defendants No.1 and 2, hence, the sale deeds No.245 and 246 dated 23.10.2001 executed in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 by defendants No.3 and 4 are illegal and void ab initio and thus does not create any right in their favour. The plaintiff further averred that the defendants have no right, title or interest over the suit land, but they started causing interference with the ownership and possession of the plaintiff over the suit land, hence the suit. 4. The plaintiff further averred that the defendants have no right, title or interest over the suit land, but they started causing interference with the ownership and possession of the plaintiff over the suit land, hence the suit. 4. Defendants No.1 and 2 resisted and contested the suit filed by the plaintiff by filing joint written statement wherein they took preliminary objections to the effect that the suit has not been properly and legally instituted because Jitender Kapoor had no right or authority to institute the suit. The suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. They also took preliminary objections qua estoppel, maintainability, limitation, suppression of material facts, cause of action and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred to entertain and try the suit in view of the provisions contained under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. On merits, defendants No.1 and 2 termed the averments made in the plaint as wrong and incorrect. It was averred that the sale deeds as set up by the plaintiff are forged, fictitious and otherwise void ab initio in view of the provisions contained in Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, therefore, the alleged sale deeds do not confer any right, title or interest upon the plaintiff. The possession of the suit land was never delivered to the plaintiff nor the plaintiff ever possessed or occupied the suit land, as a result of which, mutations entered in favour of the plaintiff were rejected. It was further averred that defendant No.2 vide sale deed No.246 dated 23.10.2001 purchased 3/7 th share measuring 0-18-0 bigha out of the land comprised in Khasra No. 2992/840 measuring 22-2-0 bigha from defendant No.3 through his general power of attorney i.e. defendant No.4 for a sale consideration of Rs.4,00,000/-. Further, defendant No.1 by virtue of sale deed No. 245 dated 23.10.2001 purchased 3/7 share out of the land comprised in Khasra No.2992/840 measuring 0-18-0 bighas from defendant No.3 through his general power of attorney defendant No.4 for a consideration of Rs.4,00,000/- and on the basis of aforesaid sale deeds, defendants No.1 and 2 were delivered possession of 1-16-0 bighas of land and as such they came in possession of the so purchased land and on the basis of the sale deeds, mutation Nos. 3629 and 3628 dated 27.10.2002 have been sanctioned and attested in favour of defendants No.1 and 2. It was also averred that besides making payment of sale consideration of Rs.8,00,000/-, defendants No.1 and 2 also bore expenses of stamps and registration fee fo r the execution of said sale deeds. After purchase of the said land, defendants No.1 and 2 constructed stone and brick boundary wall around the suit land and barbed wire on the top of boundary wall has also been laid and they constructed three structures of steel angle iron and besides this they have laid the slab of R.C.C. pillars over the suit land which are being used by them for storage of lubricant of petrol pump and for other purposes. Defendants No.1 and 2 further averred that the process of construction took sufficient time which was in the notice and knowledge of plaintiff and its Directors, but they never raised any objection, hence, they are estopped by their acts and conduct from raising any objection or filing the suit. It was also averred that before purchasing the suit land, defendants No.1 and 2 made local investigation and had also searched revenue records and made investigation regarding ownership and possession of defendant No.3, who was recorded as owner in actual possession of the suit land and after satisfying themselves regarding the possession of defendants No.3 and 4, they finalized the purchase of suit land, hence, defendants No.1 and 2 are bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration. In case the sale deeds set up by the plaintiff are held to be valid, in that eventuality, defendants No.1 and 2 are in open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of suit land with effect from 25.05.1987, 28.05.1987 and 30.05.1987 from the date of alleged sale deeds to the complete ouster of plaintiff and had never allowed the plaintiff or any body else to occupy the suit land and dispossess them therefrom by denying the title of the plaintiff, as a result of which, defendants No.1 and 2 have acquired title in the suit land by way of adverse possession and right, title and interest of plaintiff, if any, had already been extinguished in favour of defendants No.1 and 2, who have become owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession. Lastly, it was further averred that the alleged sale deeds in favour of the plaintiff are in contravention of provisions contained in Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree of possession in its favour and thus prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 5. Defendants No.3 and 4 resisted and contested the suit filed by the plaintiff by filing joint written statement wherein they took preliminary objections qua limitation, maintainability, valuation and suppression of material facts. On merits, locus standi of Jitender Kapoor to institute the suit on behalf of plaintiff is disputed. They termed the averments made in the plaint as wrong and incorrect. It was pleaded that plaintiff intended to purchase the suit land and sale deeds were scribed by the plaintiff and signatures of defendant No.4 were obtained on the same, but when the same were produced before the Sub Registrar, he asked the plaintiff to produce permission of H.P. Government for purchase o f suit land because plaintiff being non-agriculturist and outsider, was not competent to purchase the land in H.P. without prior permission of the H.P. Government under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. But, the said permission was not available with the plaintiff, as a result of which, sale deeds were not registered and as the sale transaction was not complete, no possession was delivered to the plaintiff by defendants No.3 and 4. Later on, plaintiff approached defendants No.3 and 4 and represented that as the Sub Registrar had refused to register the sale deeds without the permission from the H.P. Government, which is likely to take sufficient time and even the plaintiff was not sure if the permission would be granted by the H.P. Government in its favour and as such defendants No.3 and 4 returned the sale consideration to the plaintiff. Since, bargain between the parties was not finalized and sale was not complete, defendants No.3 and 4 had not delivered possession of the suit land to the plaintiff and they remained owners in possession of the suit land. Since, bargain between the parties was not finalized and sale was not complete, defendants No.3 and 4 had not delivered possession of the suit land to the plaintiff and they remained owners in possession of the suit land. It was also averred that the plaintiff in connivance with the revenue officials and Sub Registrar illegally got the sale deeds registered without permission, notice and knowledge of defendants No.3 and 4 in violation of the provisions of Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and got mutations attested and sanctioned behind the back of defendants No.3 and 4 on the basis of the void sale deeds, but later on said mutations were set aside by the revenue Officer and plaintiff never possessed or occupied the suit land. It was disputed that the plaintiff purchased the suit land and was put in possession or raised any boundary wall around the suit land and took steps for the approval of construction of hotel. Defendants No.3 and 4 admitted that they sold the suit land in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 on the strength of which defendants No.1 and 2 are the owners in possession of the suit land, hence question of dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit land does not arise and thus they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 6. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statements filed on behalf of the defendants and thereby reaffirmed and reasserted the averments made in the plaint and controverted the contrary averments made in the written statements. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the Court below on 16.04.2003:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land as alleged? OPP. 2. If issue No.1 is decided in favour of the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction, as prayed for? OPP. 3. Whether Mr. Jitender Kapoor has got no locus standi to file the present suit and the suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court, if so, its effect? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the suit due to own act and conduct? OPD. 7. OPP. 4. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court, if so, its effect? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the suit due to own act and conduct? OPD. 7. Whether the suit is not within time, as alleged? OPD. 8. Whether the defendants No.1 and 2 are bonafide purchasers, as alleged, if so, its effect? OPD. 9. Relief.” 8. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court on 30.11.2005 decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff and it is against this judgment and decree that the present appeal came to be filed by the defendants. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 9. Admittedly, this is a first appeal and the jurisdiction of this Court while hearing the same is very wide like the learned trial Court and it is open to the defendants to attack all findings on fact and/or on law in the first appeal and would have to be decided on the basis of following exposition of law as propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shasidhar and others versus Ashwini Uma Mathad and another, (2015) 11 SCC 269 , wherein it was observed as under:- “10. The powers of the first appellate Court, while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code, are indeed well defined by various judicial pronouncements of this Court and are, therefore, no more res integra. 11. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge - V.R. Krishna Iyer, J (as His Lordship then was the judge of Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in Kurian Chacko vs. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316, reminded the first appellate Court of its duty as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned judge held as under: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 1-3) "1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned judge held as under: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 1-3) "1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final Court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate Court. 3. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation." (Emphasis supplied) 12. This Court in a number of cases while affirming and then reiterating the aforesaid principle has laid down the scope and powers of the first appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions. 13. In Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) "15..........the appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court......while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it." The above view has been followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar & Ors. v. Sangram & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 756 , wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 14. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 , this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) "3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title." 15. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa & Anr., (2005) 12 SCC 303 , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code this Court observed as follows: (SCC p.303, para 2) "2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion........." 16. Again in B.V Nagesh & Anr. vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 , this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words:(SCC pp. 530-31, paras 3-5) "3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 at p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 at p. 758, para 5.) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we se t aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law." 17. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we se t aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law." 17. The aforementioned cases were relied upon by this Court while reiterating the same principle in State Bank of India & Anr. vs. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr., (2011) 12 SCC 174 . This Court has recently taken the same view on similar facts arising in Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar, 2014(12) Scale 171 .” 10. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that issues No.1, 2, 6 and 8 were clubbed by the learned trial Court and issues No.1 and 2 were answered in the affirmative, whereas, issues No.6 and 8 were answered in the negative. Strong exception is taken to the aforesaid findings on the ground that the same are factually and legally incorrect and are perverse and, therefore, deserve to be set aside. 11. What is ‘perverse’ was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another (2009) 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under:- “26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined ‘perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8 "8…We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of ‘perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re -appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 12. What is ‘perverse’ has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ‘Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- “25….. What is ‘perverse’ has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ‘Rubi Sood and another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- “25….. A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated.” 13. What is ‘perversity’ recently came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal vs.Sohan Devi and others (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- “8. “Perversity” has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: SCC pp. 192-93) “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: SCC pp. 192-93) “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect.” 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram (2010) 15 SCC 530, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) “10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent.” 11. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondent-defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Material alteration of a property is not a fact confined to the exclusive/and personal knowledge of the owner. It is a matter of evidence, be it from the owner himself or any other witness speaking on behalf of the plaintiff who is conversant with the facts and the situation. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. Even the witnesses on behalf of the defendant, partially admitted that the defendants had effected some structural changes. 12. Be that as it may, the question whether there is a structural alteration in a tenanted premises is not a fact limited to the personal knowledge of the owner. It can be proved by any admissible and reliable evidence. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs-1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That finding has been endorsed by the first appellate court on re-appreciation of the evidence, and therefore, the High Court in second appeal was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of fact. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man’s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 13. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278-79) “34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278-79) “34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication — what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ‘103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,— (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100.” The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with.” 14. In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case, SCC p. 615) “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 ], Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429 : AIR 1999 SC 677 ], Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [ (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372 : AIR 2010 SC 589 ] and Babu v. State of Kerala [ (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179].)” This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity.” 14. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that the learned District Judge has held the suit to be properly instituted by holding that Jitender Kapoor had an authority to file the suit on behalf of the plaintiff. However, it would be noticed that the learned trial Court ignored the fact that the plaintiff was a Private Limited Company and could have, therefore, acted only through resolution duly passed in accordance with law. 15. However, it would be noticed that the learned trial Court ignored the fact that the plaintiff was a Private Limited Company and could have, therefore, acted only through resolution duly passed in accordance with law. 15. No doubt, resolution Ex.PW2/A and power of attorney Ex.PW2/B have been produced on record, however, neither the original records of resolution nor the original power of attorney was produced by the plaintiff. This was despite the specific objection taken at the time when PW-2 Datt Pal Kapoor was being examined. The defendants had specifically objected to the production of the aforesaid documents in the statement of PW-2 and it was specifically observed by the learned trial Court at that time that both these objections will be considered and decided at the time of arguments. However, the learned trial Court did not even bother to consider much less decide these objections at the time of disposal of the suit. Now, in case, the resolution Ex.PW2/A is seen, it would be evident that the same is a copy of resolution alleged to have been passed in the meeting of Board of Directors held on 10.09.2003, whereas, the suit admittedly was instituted nearly a year prior to that i.e. on 23.09.2002. 16. That apart, in case the contents of the resolution are perused, authority was sought to be granted to Shri Dutt Pal Kapoor and Shri Ashok Kapoor, Directors, of the Company for further pursuing “action against person involved in fraud or illegal sale of company’s land measuring approx. 36 biswas situated behind Sood Petrol Pump, Manali (District Kullu).” 17. In this background, if the plaint is perused, it would be noticed that the same had been filed by Jitender Kapoor and not by anyone of the so-called authorized Directors of the Company. Unfortunately, the learned trial Court has ignored all these material aspects which go to the root of the case. 18. Further, in case, the special power of attorney Ex.PW2/A, that has been placed on record, is perused, it would be noticed that the same was executed only on 08.01.2004 that too before the Notary Public, whereas, as already observed earlier, the suit had been instituted on 23.09.2002. 19. Above all, the learned trial Court has gravely erred in ignoring the fact that the records of the company which would otherwise constitute primary evidence have not been produced before the Court. 19. Above all, the learned trial Court has gravely erred in ignoring the fact that the records of the company which would otherwise constitute primary evidence have not been produced before the Court. There is practically no legal evidence on record to show that the plaintiff is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, certificate of incorporation and memorandum of association showing that the company could invest funds in land or undertake business for running a hotel, resolution authorizing the Directors or persons in this behalf, to purchase the land was neither pleaded nor proved on record. 20. Further, no evidence was led by the plaintiff to prove that the suit land had been purchased by the plaintiff for valuable consideration as neither the method nor the mode of payment neither pleaded nor proved. Even, the books of accounts of the Company which are statutorily required to be maintained had not been produced in evidence and, therefore, not proved. 21. Once, this is the factual position, obviously the learned trial Court has erred in holding that the genuineness, authenticity, validity, due execution and registration of the sale deeds have not been disputed on behalf of the defendants. 22. Intriguingly, all the aforesaid findings have been arrived at only on the basis of the statement of the registration Clerk, Office of Sub Registrar, Kullu, who had produced the records of the sale deeds. However, sale deeds were not the primary evidence and at best were secondary evidence for which specific permission had to be sought for and obtained from the Court. Even if, this aspect of the matter is ignored for the time being, even then, it would be noticed that while being cross examined this witness had categorically stated that no permission from the State Government side in favour of the plaintiff to purchase the land was available there on the record and there was no document/evidence attached with the summoned record to prove that the plaintiff was paying revenue to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. In her further cross examination by defendants No.3 and 4, it was categorically admitted by this witness that there was no resolution of the plaintiff-company to purchase the suit land in the records so summoned. Further, it was admitted that there was no certificate of registration of the company. 23. In her further cross examination by defendants No.3 and 4, it was categorically admitted by this witness that there was no resolution of the plaintiff-company to purchase the suit land in the records so summoned. Further, it was admitted that there was no certificate of registration of the company. 23. Above all, the plaintiff has led no evidence whereby it could be established that they were ever put in possession of the suit land after execution of the alleged sale deeds. Rather, PW-2 has candidly admitted the possession of the defendants over the suit land. 24. It would also be noticed that the learned trial Court negated the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff was not entitled to purchase the suit land in view of the specific bar contained in Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (for short the ‘Act’). Without even caring to go through the principal Act, the learned trial Court relied on Section 5 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms (Amendment), Act, 1987 which reads thus:- “Section :5: Savings:- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any transfer of land, situated within the territorial jurisdiction of a municipal corporation, municipal committee of a notified area committee, for any of the purposed, i.e. for the construction of a dwelling house, a shop or a commercial establishment or office or industrial unit, made before the day which the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1987, is published in the official Gazette after its assent, shall be deemed always to have been made in accordance with the law as if sub-section(2) of Section 118 of the Principal Act had not been amended by Section 4 of this Act.” 25. Now, in case the Act as was promulgated and notified on 15th February, 1974 is seen, it would be noticed that Section 118 thereof originally read as under:- Transfer of land to non-agriculturists barred “118. (1) Save as provided in this Chapter, no transfer (including sales in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue) by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage with possession shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist. (1) Save as provided in this Chapter, no transfer (including sales in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue) by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage with possession shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to prohibit the transfer of any land by an agriculturist in favour of,- (a) landless labourers; or (b)landless persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes; or (c) village artisans; or (d) landless persons carrying on an allied pursuit; or (e) State Government; or (f) Co-operative Societies and new Banks constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970.” The term “agriculturist” was defined in Section 2 (2) in the following terms:- “(2) “agriculturist” means a person who cultivates land personally in an estate situated in Himachal Pradesh;” 26. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions leave no manner of doubt that there could be no valid transfer in favour of a person, who was not an agriculturist even through a decree of a Civil Court, or a proceeding for recovery of arrears of land revenue, by way of sale gift, exchange, lease or mortgage with possession unless such transfer was protected under sub-section (2) of Section 118. 27. The principal Act came to be amended for the first time vide H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No.15 of 1976) whereby, for the first time, a non-agriculturist was permitted to purchase land within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committees, Notified Area Committees, up to extent of 500 square meters for a dwelling house and 300 square meters for a shop, commercial establishment and in case of industrial units such area as was certified by the Department of Industries of the State Government. It is apt to reproduce the amendment carried out in the second proviso of Section 118 of the principal Act which reads thus:- “21. It is apt to reproduce the amendment carried out in the second proviso of Section 118 of the principal Act which reads thus:- “21. In second proviso of Section 118 of the principal Act, (a) in clause (f) of sub-section (2) for the words brackets and figures “new banks” constituted under the banking Companies (Acquisition And transfer of undertakings) Act, 1970” the word “bank” shall be substituted; (c) after clause (f) the following clause shall be added namely:- (1) a non-agriculturist with in the limits of municipal corporation, municipal committees notified area committees for any one of the purpose i.e., for the construction of a ‘dwelling’ house a shop or commercial establishment of office or industrial unit subject to condition that transfer to land for such purpose shall not exceed:- (i) in case of dwelling house 500 square meters; (ii) in case of a shop commercial establishment or office-300 square meters; (iii) in case of an industrial units such areas as may be certified by the department of industries of the State of the Government; (iv) a non-agriculturist with permission of the State of the Government for the purpose to be prescribed.” 28. The principal Act thereafter came to be amended subsequently vide H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1987 (Act No.6 of 1988) wherein again the provisions of Section 118 were completely substituted in the following manner:- “4. Substitution of section 118.- In the principal Act, for section 118, the following section shall be substituted, namely:- “118(1). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, contract, agreement, custom or usage for the time being in force, but save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, no transfer of land (including sales in execution of a decree of a civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue), by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease; mortgage with possession or creation of a tenancy shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist. (2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to prohibit the transfer of land by any person in favour of- (a) a landless labourer; or (b) a landless person belonging to a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe; or (c) a village artisan; or (d) a landless person carrying on an allied pursuit; or (e) the State Government; or (f) a co-operative society or a bank; or (g) a person who has become non-agriculturist on account of the acquisition of his land for any public purpose under the land Acquisition Act, 1894; or (h) a non-agriculturist who purchases or intends to purchase land for the construction of a house or shop, or purchases a built up house or shop from the Himachal Pradesh State Housing Board established under the live Himachal Pradesh Housing Board Act, 1972 or from the Development Authority constituted under the Himachal Pradesh Town and Country Planning Act, 1977 or from any other statutory corporation set up under any State or Central/ enactment; or (i) a non-agriculturist with the permission of State Government for the purpose that may be prescribed; Provided that a person who is a non-agriculturist but purchases land with the permission of the State Government under Clause (i) of this sub-section shall, irrespective of such permission, continue to be a non-agriculturist for the purposes of this Act: Provided further that a non-agriculturist in whose case permission to purchase land is granted by the State Government, shall put the land to such use for which the permission has been granted, within a period of two years or a further such period, not exceeding one year, as may be granted by the State Government to be counted from the day on which the deed covering the sale of the land is registered and if he fails to do so, the land so purchased by him shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. (3) No Registrar or the Sub-Registrar appointed under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 shall register any document pertaining to a transfer of land, which is in contravention to Sub-section (1) and such transfer shall be void abinitio and the land involved in such transfer, if made in contravention of Sub-section (1), shall, together with structures, buildings or other attachments, if any, vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Registrar or the Sub-Registrar may register any transfer- (i) where the lease is made in relation to a part or whole of a building; or (ii) where the mortgage is made for procuring the loans for construction or improvements over the land either from the Government or from any other financial institution constituted or established under any law for the time being in force or recognized by the State Government. (4) It shall be lawful for the State Government to make use of the land which is vested or may be vested in it under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) for such purposes as it may deem fit to do so. Explanation--For the purpose of this Section, the expression "land" shall include (i) land, the classification of which has changed or has been caused to be changed to "Gair-mumkin", "Gair-mumkin Makan" or any other Gair-mumkin land by whatever name called, during the past five year countable from the date of entry in the revenue records to this effect: (ii) land recorded as "Gair-mumkin", "Gair-mumkin Makan" or any other Gairmumkin land, by whatever name called in the revenue records, except constructed area which is not subservient to agriculture; and (iii) land which is a site of a building in a town or a village and is occupied or let out not for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture. 5. 5. Savings.--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any transfer of land, situate within the territorial jurisdiction of a municipal corporation, municipal committee or a notified area committee, for any of the purposes, i.e. for the construction of a dwelling house, a shop or a commercial establishment or office or industrial unit, made before : the day on which the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1987, is published in the Official Gazette after its assent, shall be deemed always to have been made in accordance with the law as if Subsection (2) of Section 118 of the principal Act had not been amended by Section 4 of this Act.” 29. It was in this Act that the “savings” were introduced vide Section 5 as has been reproduced hereinabove. In this background, the reliance placed by the learned trial Court on Section 5 of the Amendment 1987 is totally misplaced as the transfer in question was not at all protected vide aforesaid section. Rather, it is evidently clear that it was in the amendment carried out, for the first time, in the year 1976 that the non-agriculturist was permitted to purchase the land up to 500 square meters for construction of a residential house and up to 300 square meters for construction of a shop or commercial establishment. Whereas, in the instant case, admittedly, the land had been purchased to raise/construct a hotel, as has been categorically stated by PW-2 Dutt Pal Kapoor, in the last lines of his examination-in-chief. 30. That apart, it would be noticed that the suit land was purchased vide three separate sale deeds i.e. exhibits P-1 to P-3 and in each of the sale deeds the land sold is 12 biswas (1 biswa=40.46 sq.meter, 12 biswas =480 sq. meters) which is in excess of 300 square meters and, therefore, could not have been purchased by the plaintiff without seeking an express permission of the State Government (Section 118, sub-section (2)(i) (supra). Thus, the contrary findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse and, are therefore, liable to be set aside. 31. meters) which is in excess of 300 square meters and, therefore, could not have been purchased by the plaintiff without seeking an express permission of the State Government (Section 118, sub-section (2)(i) (supra). Thus, the contrary findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse and, are therefore, liable to be set aside. 31. However, learned counsel for the plaintiff would argue that prohibition on transfer of land under Section 118 is not absolute as his client even now can seek permission of the State Government and would place strong reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manzoor Ahmed Magray versus Ghulam Hassan Aram and others, (1999) 7 SCC 703 , M/s Murudeshwara Ceramics Ltd. and another versus State of Karnataka and others, AIR 2001 SC 3017 and a judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of our own High Court in Rahul Bhargava versus Vinod Kohli and others, 2008 (1) Shim. LC 385. 32. I have minutely gone through the aforesaid judgments and find that none of them are applicable to the facts situation as obtaining in the instant case. 33. In Manzoor Ahmed Magray’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with a somewhat similar provision where there was a prohibition on transfer of orchard held that this provision was not absolute and the question of obtaining previous permission as contemplated in the Act would arise at the time of execution of the sale deed on the basis of decree for specific performance and Section 3 of the Act therein did not bar the maintainability of the suit and such permission could be obtained by filing proper application after the decree had been passed and, therefore, it could not be stated tha t the decree for specific performance was not required to be passed. 34. In M/s Murudeshwara Ceramics Ltd.’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was seized of a matter wherein again transfer of land could not be effected without seeking exemption from the State Government and it was held that such exemption could be granted subsequent to the sale. 35. In Rahul Bhargava’s case (supra), the facts before the Court were that plaintiff entered into an agreement for sale with the defendants, but the defendants refused to execute the sale deed and, therefore, a suit for specific performance was filed. 35. In Rahul Bhargava’s case (supra), the facts before the Court were that plaintiff entered into an agreement for sale with the defendants, but the defendants refused to execute the sale deed and, therefore, a suit for specific performance was filed. Since, the plaintiff was not an agriculturist, he sought for and granted permission to purchase the land which was valid for 180 days, but the said permission expired during the pendency of the litigation. It was in this background that this Court held that the permission to purchase the land could again be obtained and accordingly decreed the suit. 36. As observed above, none of the aforesaid cases deal with the facts situation obtaining in this case because admittedly the plaintiff herein neither at the time of the alleged purchase nor thereafter at the time of filing of the suit or for that matter even till date has not applied for permission for purchase of the land in accordance with law which clearly proves that the plaintiff had got these three sale deeds registered in his favour in violation of the law. Thus, the contrary findings rendered by the learned trial Court cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and are thus liable to be set aside. 37. As regards the findings on issue No.8 regarding the question whether defendants No.1 and 2 are bonafide purchasers for consideration the learned trial Court has held that there is no evidence on record to hold and conclude that defendants No.1 and 2 are bonafide purchasers. Such findings are based upon correct appreciation of pleadings as also evidence available on record and, therefore, warrant no interference. 38. It would be noticed that in the suit filed by the plaintiff, specific averments had been made in para-2 thereof to the effect that the sale deeds were duly registered by the Sub Registrar and thereafter mutations Nos. 2483, 2484 and 2485 were also attested in favour of the plaintiff on 03.09.1987. Now, in case the written statement qua these averments is perused, it would be noticed that the same have been answered in the following manner:- “it is further submitted that the mutations No.2493, 2484 and 2485, got entered by the plaintiff on the basis of the forged and fictitious sale deeds, were dismissed by the concerned Revenue Officer, vide orders dated 19.7.88” 39. Thus, it is admitted by the defendants that on the basis of the sale deeds exhibits P-1 to P-3, mutations No.2483, 2484 and 2485 had been attested in favour of the plaintiff and this fact is not denied by the defendants and the only plea put forth by them was that these mutations were dismissed by the concerned Revenue Officer vide his order dated 19.07.1988. Admittedly, the alleged order dated 19.07.1988 has not been produced on record by the defendants and, therefore, an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the defendants. 40. That apart, once the defendants were aware of the aforesaid mutations, then obviously, they knew that the plaintiff had already purchased the suit land and, therefore, admittedly, being the subsequent purchasers, their plea of being bonafide purchasers for consideration is false and is rather not available to them. 41. Now adverting to the findings qua issue No.6 with regard to the plea of estoppel raised by the defendants, the learned trial Court is absolutely correct in coming to the conclusion that there is no evidence available on record to hold that the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit by their own act and conduct. That apart, the learned trial Court has observed that the defendants on the one hand were raising a plea based on title while, on the other hand, were claiming ownership on the basis of the adverse possession which was not available to them as these were mutually destructive pleas. 42. In view of the aforesaid discussion, though this Court has no difficulty in affirming the findings rendered by the learned Court on issues No.6 and 8, however, in view of the detailed discussion as aforesaid, this Court has no difficulty in concluding that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court on issues No.1 and 2 are grossly perverse and thus are liable to be set aside. 43. Now, adverting to the findings on issue No.3 regarding Mr. Jitender Kapoor, having no locus standi to file the present suit, the said question has been answered in favour of the plaintiff. However, such findings again cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and are liable to be set aside for the reasons already stated in paragraphs 14 to 20 (supra). 43. Now, adverting to the findings on issue No.3 regarding Mr. Jitender Kapoor, having no locus standi to file the present suit, the said question has been answered in favour of the plaintiff. However, such findings again cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and are liable to be set aside for the reasons already stated in paragraphs 14 to 20 (supra). The findings on remaining issues i.e. issues No.4, 5 and 7 have not been assailed or challenged by any of the parties and, therefore, such findings call for no interference. 44. Even though, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court on issues No.1 and 2 are perverse and are liable to be set aside, yet no relief can be granted to the defendants as even they have failed to prove that they are bonafide purchasers and have further failed to prove that their possession with efflux of time has ripened into adverse possession. It is duly proved on record that the so-called purchase made by the plaintiff was in violation of provisions of Section 118 of the Act. Therefore, in terms of sub-section (3D) of Section 118, the suit land along with structure, buildings or other attachments, if any, are liable to be vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances and it shall be lawful to the State Government to make use of the land so vested in it. Ordered accordingly. The State Government is directed to take possession of the land within 7 days and thereafter use the same for such purposes as it may deem fit to do so. 45. Consequently, the appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid manner, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.