JUDGMENT : I.P. Mukerji, J. 1. I have had the privilege to go through the draft judgment prepared by my sister Justice Amrita Sinha. I wholeheartedly agree with it. I would like to add a few observations of my own. 2. The plaintiff/appellant are the dealers of Hyundai motor cars. The business of their principal is said to be in the name and style of Mukesh Hyundai. The third and fourth defendants/respondents are husband and wife and 100% shareholders in the first and second defendants/respondents, the business of which is building and development of property. The fifth defendant/respondent is a partnership firm. The third and fourth defendants/respondents are also partners in this partnership firm. 3. The plaintiff/appellant states the following the plaint. On 1st October, 2012 they received a letter from Hyundai Motor India Ltd. They enquired of the plaintiff/appellant if they could set up a dealership for passenger cars in the Howrah district of West Bengal. Hyundai required 6000 square feet area for a showroom and 12000 square feet for a work shop and sale of spare parts. 4. On 4th October, 2012 an agreement described as a memorandum of understanding was executed between the plaintiff/appellant and the first defendant/respondent. The aggregate consideration was Rs. 2.44 crores. According to the agreement, Rs. 2 crores have to be lent and advanced by the plaintiff/appellant to this defendant/respondent. It was secured by mortgage made on 12th October, 2012 of a property at Mouza-Nibra, P.S. Domjur, District Howrah, measuring about 14 cottahs belonging to the second defendant/respondent. On 18th October, 2012 the first defendant/respondent purchased only 14.5 cottahs of another parcel of land in Howrah of a total 29 cottahs that they were supposed to purchase and develop through the third defendant/respondent according to this agreement, by constructing the showroom and workshop. On 21st November, 2012 at the request of the third defendant/respondent the plaintiff/appellant released their mortgage over the Nibra property. The newly acquired land was allegedly mortgaged by the first defendant/ respondent in favour of the appellant/plaintiff. 5. According to the averments made in the plaint the whole consideration for the agreement had failed. The first defendant/respondent had neither purchased the balance part of the property nor had commenced any development work in it in terms of the agreement. 6. The owner of the adjoining property had started proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 claiming pre-emption rights. The first defendant/respondent had neither purchased the balance part of the property nor had commenced any development work in it in terms of the agreement. 6. The owner of the adjoining property had started proceedings under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 claiming pre-emption rights. There is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that nothing happened after execution of the said memorandum. 7. The plaintiff/appellant claims the said principal sum of Rs. 2 crores against the defendants/respondents together with interest of Rs. 71,21,096/- calculated at the rate of 12% per annum from 12th October, 2012 to 30th September, 2015 together with Rs. 300 crores as damages. 8. The case in the plaint was regurgitated in the interlocutory petition where a decree for Rs. 2,71,21,096/- was claimed on admission. An injunction was sought against the defendants/respondents directing them not to alienate or encumber the said 14 cottahs of land at Mouza-Nibra, P.S. Domjur, District-Howrah. 9. An affidavit-in-opposition was affirmed was filed by Dev Anand Gupta the third defendant/respondent on behalf of the first, second and fifth defendant/respondents and partner of the fifth defendant/respondent which included the fourth defendant/respondent. At the outset he said that the suit concerned mortgage of a property in Howrah and that this court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain it. The plaintiff/appellant needed a showroom and work shop for its business of car dealership. The defendant/respondent agreed to sell the 6,000 square feet area for a showroom and lease 12,000 square feet on the ground floor to be used as a service area at a rent of Rs. 2,00,000/- per month, for 21 years. The plaint for recovery of loan as framed by the plaintiff/appellant was misconceived. Viewed correctly it was an alleged cause of action arising out of an agreement for sale of immovable property. The first defendant/respondent did not deny having taken Rs. 2,00,000/- from the plaintiff/appellant. The liability of the defendants/respondents was denied. The plaintiff/appellant ought to have filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement, according to the defendants/respondents. 10. The Hon’ble first Court before which this application came up for hearing refused to read any admission of the first defendant/respondent in favour of the plaintiff/appellant in respective of the entries of Rs. 1.25 crores and Rs. 75 lakhs in the balance-sheet of the first defendant/respondent. The learned judge also did not find any case to make an order for attachment before judgment. 1.25 crores and Rs. 75 lakhs in the balance-sheet of the first defendant/respondent. The learned judge also did not find any case to make an order for attachment before judgment. 11. This in my notion was a very erroneous argument. Let us assume that the plaintiff/ appellant had advanced Rs. 2 crores for sale and lease of the properties. It is quite clear on perusal of the available evidence that the first defendant/respondent had in fact received Rs. 2 crores from the plaintiff/appellant. It is quite undisputed that nothing significant had been done in furtherance of the contract. In such a situation it was always open to a party to a contract to plead that the whole consideration for the agreement had failed and to ask for return of the entire money paid together with interest. In such a situation, specific performance is not the proper remedy at all for a plaintiff/appellant. This seems to be the case made out by the plaintiff/appellant/appellant. 12. They have been able to make out a prima-facie case, in my opinion. 13. But the question is whether the appellant/plaintiff/appellant is entitled to judgment on admission or an attachment before judgment or any order similar to it. 14. Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhuri, learned senior advocate for the appellant/plaintiff showed me paragraph 12 of the report in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India and Others, (2000) 7 SCC 120 which reads as follows: “As to the object of the Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.” 15. He argued that failure to deal with an allegation or an evasive denial was an admission. 16. The defendants/respondents according to learned counsel Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhury had taken inconsistent pleas. At one time they admitted that an advance was taken by the first defendant/respondent whereas on another occasion they said that Rs. 2 crores were paid in furtherance of a contract. The law did not recognise approbation and reprobation. He referred to Karam Karpahi and Others vs. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and Another, (2010) 4 SCC 753 . Learned Counsel for the respondents/defendants cited Himani Alloys Limited vs. Tata Steel Limited, (2011) 15 SCC 273 . 17. He said that to qualify as an admission, it had to be clear unambiguous and unconditional. In exercising power under Order 12 Rule 6, the court had to be judicious. 18. Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, learned senior counsel for the defendants/respondents cited Raman Tech. Process Engg. Co. and Another vs. Solanki Traders, (2008) 2 SCC 302 which reaffirmed the old Calcutta case of Premraj Mundra vs. Md. Maneck Raju, AIR 1951 Cal 156 . He argued that the conditions for obtaining attachment before judgment had to be strictly fulfilled before such an order was passed. These conditions did not exist in this case. Certain passages from this ruling are most instructive and are set out below: “4. The object of supplemental proceedings (applications for arrest or attachment before judgment, grant of temporary injunctions and appointment of receivers) is to prevent the ends of justice being defeated. These conditions did not exist in this case. Certain passages from this ruling are most instructive and are set out below: “4. The object of supplemental proceedings (applications for arrest or attachment before judgment, grant of temporary injunctions and appointment of receivers) is to prevent the ends of justice being defeated. The object of order 38 rule 5 CPC in particular, is to prevent any defendant from defeating the realization of the decree that may ultimately be passed in favour of the plaintiff, either by attempting to dispose of, or remove from the jurisdiction of the court, his movables. The Scheme of Order 38 and the use of the words to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him in Rule 5 make it clear that before exercising the power under the said Rule, the court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable chance of a decree being passed in the suit against the defendant. This would mean that the court should be satisfied the plaintiff has a prima-facie case. If the averments in the plaint and the documents produced in support of it, do not satisfy the court about the existence of a prima-facie case, the court will not go to the next stage of examining whether the interest of the plaintiff should be protected by exercising power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. It is well-settled that merely having a just or valid claim or a prima-facie case, will not entitle the plaintiff to an order of attachment before judgment, unless he also establishes that the defendant is attempting to remove or dispose of his assets with the intention of defeating the decree that may be passed. Equally well settled is the position that even where the defendant is removing or disposing his assets, an attachment before judgment will not be issued, if the plaintiff is not able to satisfy that he has a prima- facie case. 5. The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is drastic and extraordinary power. Such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for the asking. It should be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with the Rule. The purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 is not to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt. 5. The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is drastic and extraordinary power. Such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for the asking. It should be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with the Rule. The purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 is not to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt. Any attempt by a plaintiff to utilize the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 as a leverage for coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim should be discouraged. Instances are not wanting where bloated and doubtful claims are realised by unscrupulous plaintiffs by obtaining orders of attachment before judgment and forcing the defendants for out of court settlement, under threat of attachment. 6. A defendant is not debarred from dealing with his property merely because a suit is filed or about to be filed against him. Shifting of business from one premises to another premises or removal of machinery to another premises by itself is not a ground for granting attachment before judgment. A plaintiff should show, prima-facie, that his claim is bona-fide and valid and also satisfy the court that the defendant is about to remove or dispose of the whole or part of his property, with the intention of obstructing or delaying the execution of any decree that may be passed against him, before power is exercised under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. Courts should also keep in view the principles relating to grant of attachment before judgment - Prem Raj Mundra vs. Md. Maneck Gazi, AIR 1951 Cal 156 , for a clear summary of the principles. 7. In this case, the suit claim was Rs. 99,200/- The notice issued before filing the suit related to dishonour of two cheques for Rs. 22,487/-. The particulars of the claim in the plaint were not specific. The trial court had rejected the application on the ground that plaintiff had failed to make out a prima-facie case. It did not, therefore, examine the question whether defendant was attempting to defeat any decree that many be passed by shifting his machinery. On the other hand, the High Court ignored the absence of prima- facie case. It granted relief under Order 38 rule 5, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, swayed by the fact that the defendants had shifted their assets to another premises.” 19. Mr. Banerjee, also drew the attention of the Court to Mohd. On the other hand, the High Court ignored the absence of prima- facie case. It granted relief under Order 38 rule 5, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, swayed by the fact that the defendants had shifted their assets to another premises.” 19. Mr. Banerjee, also drew the attention of the Court to Mohd. Mehtab Khan vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan, (2013) 9 SCC 221 which in my opinion is a very important and relevant case. It says that when the trial court on a consideration of the pleadings and documents before it was not in favour of granting an interim order in favour of the plaintiff/appellant, the appellate court should not interfere with its discretion unless the exercise of discretion by it was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The appellate court should not substitute its own view for that of the trial court when the view of the Court below was a plausible one. 20. In my opinion, when the balance sheet of the first defendant/respondent, for the year ending on 31st March, 2013 showed a liability of Rs. 1.25 crores and Rs. 75 lakhs, the defendants/respondents could not deny that they received Rs. 2 crores. Any reasonable person would believe that these sums represented the amount advanced by the plaintiff/ appellant to the defendants/respondents. Ignoring entries in the first defendant’s/ respondent’s accounts simply on the ground that the name of the plaintiff/appellant as a creditor was not mentioned was erroneous on the part of the Hon’ble first court. In my opinion, the balance sheet was prima-facie sufficient evidence of the respondent’s/ defendant’s liability. Moreover the learned judge had no substantial ground to hold that the dependants had a good defence. 21. The plaintiff/appellant has preferred this appeal against the said judgment and order of the Court below dated 25th July, 2016. After hearing both the parties the appellate Court passed an interim order pending disposal of the appeal on 16th January, 2017, inter-alia, restraining the defendants/respondents from alienating or encumbering the property of 14 cottahs in Mouza Nibra, P.S. Domjur, District-Howrah. The appeal Court, at the interim stage, has actually interfered with the discretion of the Hon’ble first court. We are told that at the time of the hearing of the appeal the trial of the suit has also commenced. 22. I see no change in circumstances at the admission of the appeal and now. The appeal Court, at the interim stage, has actually interfered with the discretion of the Hon’ble first court. We are told that at the time of the hearing of the appeal the trial of the suit has also commenced. 22. I see no change in circumstances at the admission of the appeal and now. Now, applying the principle of Mohd. Mehtab Khan vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan, (2013) 9 SCC 221 , I would not like to interfere with the discretion used by the bench presided over by the Acting Chief Justice. But, I am quite certain that considering the principal claim of the plaintiff/appellant, the order of injunction restraining the defendants/respondents from dealing with a property worth several crores is harsh on them. I direct that in the event the defendants/respondents furnish a bank guarantee for Rs. 2.50 crores given by a Nationalised Bank in favour of the Registrar (Original Side), High Court, Calcutta, by 16th July, 2018, to the satisfaction of the Registrar (Original Side), a certificate to this effect will be issued by her. 23. In that event, the order of injunction on the Nibra property dated 16th January, 2017 would stand automatically discharged. 24. This appeal (APO 44 of 2017) and the stay application (GA No. 2844 of 2016) are accordingly disposed of. Amrita Sinha, J. 25. This is an appeal filed by the appellant being the plaintiff in a civil suit filed before this Court praying for the following reliefs:- (a) Decree for Rs. 2,71,21,096.00 in terms of paragraph 20 hereof (b) Interim interest and interest upon judgment at the rate of 12% per annum (c) Decree for Rs. 300 Crores and interest thereon as per paragraph 23 hereof or in the alternative an enquiry into damages and a decree for such sum as may be found due upon such enquiry (d) Decree for Rs. 10 lacs and interest thereon as per paragraph 23 hereof (e) Injunction (f) Receiver (g) Attachment (h) Costs (i) Further or other reliefs 26. In connection with the said suit, the plaintiff herein filed an interlocutory petition seeking judgment and decree upon admission and for an order of attachment before judgment. 27. The case of the plaintiff/ petitioner is that on 4th October 2012, the petitioner entered into an agreement with the defendant no 1, a company, represented by the defendant nos. In connection with the said suit, the plaintiff herein filed an interlocutory petition seeking judgment and decree upon admission and for an order of attachment before judgment. 27. The case of the plaintiff/ petitioner is that on 4th October 2012, the petitioner entered into an agreement with the defendant no 1, a company, represented by the defendant nos. 3 and 4 being the directors whereby the petitioner was to get 6,000 square feet of constructed space on ownership basis for showroom and a further covered area of around 12,000 square eet in the ground floor on lease for service area of a car work shop. The construction would be made on the land, being about 29 cottahs at Mouja, North Nibra, P.O Bakra, P.S and Sub-Registry Domjur, District Howrah which was proposed to be purchased by the defendant no. 1. 28. A memorandum of understanding was executed by and between the plaintiff/petitioner and the defendant no. 1 on 4th October, 2012 whereby and where under the terms of payment of Rs. 2.44 crores, being the selling price of the property in question was specified. 29. At the request of the defendant no. 1 through the defendant no. 3 the plaintiff/petitioner paid Rs. 2 crore by cheque dated 11th October 2012 in favour of the defendant no 1. The defendant no. 1 encashed the said cheque. 30. In view to secure the sum of Rs. 2 crore a deed of simple mortgage was executed between the defendant No. 2 as mortgager, the defendant no 1 as developer and the plaintiff/petitioner as mortgagee in respect of a separate property at Mouja Nibra, P.S Domjur, District Howrah. 31. On 18th October 2012, the defendant no. 1 purchased 14.5 cottahs of land out of the total 29 cottahs of the land which the defendants had proposed to purchase and develop at Mouja North Nibra, P.O Bakra, P.S and Sub-registry Domjur, District Howrah. 32. At the request of the defendants, the plaintiff/petitioner released and discharged the mortgaged property at Mouja, Nibra, P.S Domjur, District Howrah by a deed of release dated 21st October 2012. On the same date the defendant no. 1 executed a separate fresh deed of mortgage with the petitioner in respect of the land purchased by the defendants at Mouja North Nibra, P.O Bakra, P.S and Sub-registry Domjur, District Howrah and mortgaged the said land in favour of the petitioner. 33. On the same date the defendant no. 1 executed a separate fresh deed of mortgage with the petitioner in respect of the land purchased by the defendants at Mouja North Nibra, P.O Bakra, P.S and Sub-registry Domjur, District Howrah and mortgaged the said land in favour of the petitioner. 33. In the said deed of mortgage, it was mentioned that the developer, i.e. the defendant no. 1 has assured the mortgagee, i.e. the petitioner herein that commercial construction shall be developed within 6 months from the date of purchase of the land and requested the mortgagee for financial assistance of Rs. 2 crore as advance payment for purchase of the said land. As per condition of the deed of mortgage, the defendant no. 1 agreed to repay the principal sum of Rs. 2 crore with interest thereon on or before completion of 11 months from the date of payment without any delay or default. The original title deeds of the property had been deposited by the defendant no. 1 with the petitioner. 34. The default clause in the said deed mentioned that in case the said sum of Rs. 2 crore along with interest at the stipulated rate is not paid within the aforesaid specified time, it shall be lawful for the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage and to cause the property or any portion thereof to be sold and appropriated and use the sale proceeds towards satisfaction of the mortgage debt. In the event of any shortfall or deficit of the claimed amount, the mortgagee shall be entitled to recover the un-realised balanced amount from the mortgager. The deed of mortgage has been registered in the office of the Additional Registrar of Assurance-I, Kolkata, on 21st November 2012. 35. In February 2013, the defendant no. 1 informed the petitioner about an order of status quo passed against the defendant no. 1 in LR Misc. Case no. 3 of 2013 in respect of the aforesaid mortgaged property. The aforesaid case had been filed under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 filed by the owner of the adjoining property claiming rights of preemption. 36. Subsequent enquiries made by the petitioner revealed that the defendant nos. 1 in LR Misc. Case no. 3 of 2013 in respect of the aforesaid mortgaged property. The aforesaid case had been filed under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 filed by the owner of the adjoining property claiming rights of preemption. 36. Subsequent enquiries made by the petitioner revealed that the defendant nos. 3 and 4 using the veil of corporate entities in collusion and in connivance with each other have perpetrated and perpetrating fraud upon the plaintiff and siphoning money in an illegal manner to defraud, avoid and evade creditors. 37. It is the further case of the petitioner that the defendant no. 1 has not purchased the balance portion of the said property and the portion of the property that had been purchased, being a litigated one, would not confer complete title upon the defendant. 38. The petitioner claims that in view of the unqualified admission as to the receipt of money which will be evident from the balance sheet of the defendant as well as the obligation to repay with interest at the agreed rate the petitioner is entitled to a judgment upon admission on account of principal and the interest accrued thereon. The petitioner claims that the defendants do not have any other asset barring the said property and the defendants are in the process of alienating all their assets. The fraudulent and collusive activities of the defendants is jeopardising the right of the petitioner. 39. The defendants have filed affidavit in opposition to the application made by the petitioner wherein the defendants have consistently denied the claim of the petitioner that the money had been paid as loan and/or financial assistance to the defendants. The defendants claim that the money was paid on account of advance part payment of the sale price of the property which the petitioner agreed to purchase being the mortgaged property. The defendants have never admitted that the money was paid by the petitioner on account of loan and/or financial assistance for construction/development of the property. The defendants also claim that the mortgage deed in question was a sham transaction which was in reality a security for part payment of the consideration money for sale and part payment of the consideration amount for lease of the property in terms of the memorandum of understanding. The defendants claim that there is no debt on their part. The defendants also claim that the mortgage deed in question was a sham transaction which was in reality a security for part payment of the consideration money for sale and part payment of the consideration amount for lease of the property in terms of the memorandum of understanding. The defendants claim that there is no debt on their part. The defendants submit that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 40. The Ld. Advocate for the defendants submit that since the money was paid on account of part payment of the sale price agreed by and between the parties the same cannot be treated as debt and is not liable to be refunded in this manner. The Ld. advocate prays for vacating the order passed by this Hon’ble Court on 16th January 2017. He further submits that the scope of judicial review in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and the pleadings made in the interlocutory application is not enough to pass any order in favour of the petitioner. 41. The Ld. advocate for the petitioner relied upon the decision passed in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal vs. Union Bank of India and Others, (2000) 7 SCC 120 wherein the Court came to the conclusion that from the averments made in the affidavit in opposition the petitioner did not deny the allegation made in the application under order 12 rule 6 CPC. The denial was evasive and the Court held that there was unequivocal admission of the contents of the documents and the liability admitted. 42. The Ld. advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the facts in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal and company (supra) are entirely different from the facts of the instant case and as such the said judgment is not applicable here. 43. The Ld. advocate for the respondents relied on the case of Karam Kapahi and Others vs. M/s Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and Another, (2010) 4 SCC 753 wherein it has been held that in an appropriate case a party on the admission of the other party can press for judgment as a matter of legal right. However, the Court always retains its discretion on the matter of pronouncing judgments. 44. The Ld. However, the Court always retains its discretion on the matter of pronouncing judgments. 44. The Ld. advocate of the respondents relies upon the case of Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. vs. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. (2000) 1 SCC 434 wherein it had been held that as per provisions of section 92 (1) Evidence Act, oral evidence to prove that document is sham is permissible and what was recorded in the document was not intended, and of no consequences what so ever. 45. The Ld. advocate for the respondents also refers to the case of Himani Alloys Limited vs. Tata Steel Limited, (2011) 15 SCC 273 wherein it had been held that it is true that a judgment can be given on ‘admission’ contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The Court on examination of the facts and circumstances has to exercise its judicial discretion keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. 46. The Ld. Advocate for the respondents relied upon the case of Mohd. Mehtab Khan and Others vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 221 wherein the Supreme Court relied upon the principle laid down in the case of Wander limited vs. Antox India (P) Ltd. and held that the appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law. The Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. 47. The Ld. Advocate for the respondents also relied upon the case of Raman Tech. & Process Engg. The Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. 47. The Ld. Advocate for the respondents also relied upon the case of Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. and Another vs. Solanki Traders, (2008) 2 SCC 302 wherein it had been held that merely having a just or valid claim or a prima-facie case will not entitle the plaintiff to an order of attachment before judgment unless he also establishes that the defendant is attempting to remove or dispose of his assets with the intention of defeating the decree that may be passed. Equally well-settled is the position that even where the defendant is removing or disposing his assets an order of attachment before judgment will not be issued if the plaintiff is not able to satisfy that he has a prima-facie case. A plaintiff should show prima-facie that the claim is bona fide and valid. 48. Lastly, the ld. Advocate for the respondents rely upon the case of Premraj Mundra vs. Md. Maneck Gazi and Others, AIR 1951 Cal 156 wherein it was held that the Court would not be justified in issuing an order for attachment before judgment, or for security, merely because it thinks that no harm would be done thereby or that the defendants. would not be prejudiced. It further held that the mere fact of transfer is not enough, since nobody can be prevented from dealing with his properties simply because a suit has been filed. There must be additional circumstances to show that the transfer is with an intention to delay or defeat the plaintiff's claim. It is open to the Court to look to the conduct of the parties immediately before the suit and to examine the surrounding circumstances and to draw an inference as to whether the defendant is about to dispose of the property and if so, with what intention. The Court is entitled to consider the nature of the claim and the defence put forward. 49. In reply to the submissions made by the respondents the Ld. The Court is entitled to consider the nature of the claim and the defence put forward. 49. In reply to the submissions made by the respondents the Ld. advocate of the petitioner relies on the case of Karam Kapahi (supra) and submitted that the respondents were going on making inconsistent pleas with the mala-fide intention of not repaying the money paid on account of loan. The Ld. advocate harps on the point that the defendants have admitted in clear terms that the money was paid and accepted. He further submits that since the money had changed hands and there is no denial to that effect, accordingly, this Court is liable to pass judgment upon admission irrespective of the nature of transaction and/or the reason for payment of money. 50. Upon hearing the rival contentions and upon perusal of the documents on record my views are as follows. 51. The issue of dismissal of the suit on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the registered office of both the parties are located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. All the communications made by and between the parties and the memorandum of understanding as well as the deeds of mortgage were either executed or registered in the office of the Additional Registrar of Assurance-I, Kolkata and as such a part of the cause of action certainly arose within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. 52. The plaintiff/petitioner on 11th September, 2017 issued a letter of demand to the defendants demanding Rs. 2 crore together with interest due on the mortgage. No step was taken by him to enforce and realise the amount out of the sale proceeds of the mortgaged property. 53. The respondents do not admit that the money was paid on account of any loan but claims that the same was advance part payment made for purchasing the property. Whether the money was paid on account of loan or as part advance payment for purchase of the property in question is to be decided at the time of trial of the suit. The plea of sham transaction is also to be decided upon trial. 54. Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that Rs. Whether the money was paid on account of loan or as part advance payment for purchase of the property in question is to be decided at the time of trial of the suit. The plea of sham transaction is also to be decided upon trial. 54. Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that Rs. 2 crore was paid by the plaintiff/petitioner to the defendants and that no significant work whatsoever was done by the defendants for development of the mortgaged property in terms of the said agreement between the parties. Accordingly, the amount paid by the plaintiff/petitioner is required to be secured and protected. 55. The balance sheet of the defendant no. 1 ending on 31st March, 2013 reflects that company received loan and advance of a sum of Rs. 1.25 crore and Rs. 75 lakh. Although the name of the creditor was not disclosed in the said balance sheet it is not difficult to link this amount with the amount received by the defendant from the plaintiff. However, in view of the ratio of the cases discussed above the said entry cannot be teemed as a judgment on admission. To qualify the admission, a statement has to be clear, unequivocal and unconditional. 56. The petitioner has failed to make out a prima-facie case for passing a judgment on admission without trial as there has not been any admission on the part of the respondents. Moreover passing judgment on admission will deny the valuable right of the respondents to contest the claim and permanently deny the remedy of the respondent by way of an appeal on merits. The petitioner has further failed to make out a case that the respondents are attempting to remove or dispose of their assets with the intention of defeating the decree that may be passed in favour of the petitioner. 57. Although the Hon’ble First Court refused grant judgment upon admission or an order of attachment before judgment, on appeal from His Lordship’s judgment and order the appellate Court at the stage of admission of the appeal granted an interim order restraining the defendants from alienating their Nibra property in Howrah. The trial of the suit has commenced. There is no change in the facts. Therefore, at this stage I do not wish to interfere with the discretion used by the Hon’ble Appeal Court applying the ratio laid down in the case of Mohd. The trial of the suit has commenced. There is no change in the facts. Therefore, at this stage I do not wish to interfere with the discretion used by the Hon’ble Appeal Court applying the ratio laid down in the case of Mohd. Mehtab Khan vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan (Supra). 58. I have gone through the draft judgment proposed to be delivered by my brother I.P. Mukerji, J. I am in agreement with the conclusions reached by His Lordship. The ordering part of this judgment will be according to the judgment and order.