JUDGMENT : Paily and Annam had four children - three sons Kora, Kuruvila and Varghese, (herein after referred to as “sons”), and one daughter Rachel (herein after referred to as “daughter”). Paily and Annam executed a joint Will on 26.11.1997. Annam died on 29.12.2003 and Paily on 06.12.2011. The sons and the wives of two of the sons namely, Jolly wife of Kuruvila and Sali wife of Varghese, are legatees under the Will. They filed LAOP 279/16 before the District Court seeking Letters of Administration in respect of the Will. Rachel-the daughter is the respondent in the LAOP. The daughters of Rachel, three in number namely Ann, Mareena and Elizabeth (herein after referred to as “grand daughters”), filed applications as I.A. Nos. 3132/16, 6621/16 and 6745/16 seeking to get themselves impleaded in the LAOP. The applications were originally dismissed by the learned District Judge. Thereafter, on review applications filed by them, they were impleaded in the proceedings. Challenging the said order, the petitioners in the LAOP are before this Court. 2. Heard Senior Counsel Sri. N. Sukumaran on behalf of the petitioners and Sri. M.M. Mathew, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 3. To come on record in a Letters of Administration proceeding, what is relevant is, whether the person who seeks to come on record has a “caveatable interest” in terms of Sections 283 (1)(c) and 284(1) of the Indian Succession Act, or not. Sections 283 (1)(c) and 284(1) of the Indian Succession Act reads thus: “283. Powers of District Judge.—(1) In all cases the District judge or District Delegate may, if he thinks proper,— (a) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (b) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (c) issue citations calling upon all persons claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate or letters of administration.” “284. Caveats against grant of probate or administration.— (1) Caveats against the grant of probate or administration may be lodged with a District Judge or a District Delegate.” The term “caveatable interest” is not defined under the Act. However, what is a “caveatable interest”, has been the subject of deliberation in a series of decisions. There has been slightly different notes. Caveats against grant of probate or administration.— (1) Caveats against the grant of probate or administration may be lodged with a District Judge or a District Delegate.” The term “caveatable interest” is not defined under the Act. However, what is a “caveatable interest”, has been the subject of deliberation in a series of decisions. There has been slightly different notes. In Jagit Singh v. Pamela Manmohan Singh [ (2010) 5 SCC 157 ] the Apex Court has referred the matter for consideration by a Larger Bench in view of the incongruity between Krishna Kumar Birla v. Rajendra Singh Lodha and Others [ (2008) 4 SCC 300 ] which accepted a strict construction and G. Gopal v. C. Baskar [ (2008) 10 SCC 489 ] which held that a person having even a slight interest is entitled to file a caveat. However, for the present, it would suffice to notice that the person must have some manner of interest or right over the property in respect of which the LAOP is filed. If an order is passed granting Letters of Administration, his interests or rights must be affected. If a person is entitled to succeed to the estate of the testator, it could be said that he has a caveatable interest. If the grant of probate would defeat a line of succession, then the person entitled to succeed would have a caveatable interest. The descriptions are not exhaustive. 4. Do the grand daughters who seek to come on record have a caveatable interest? As per Ext.B1 Sale Deed, the properties described in schedules 'D' and 'E' to LAOP were purchased jointly in the names of the father, mother and all the four children, along with the wife of the eldest son Kora. The property belonged in equal rights to all the seven co-owners. A building was constructed in the property. It was leased out to strangers. On the first and second floors of the building, a partnership firm conducted business as tenant. At some point of time, two of the grand daughters (daughters of Rachel) were admitted to the partnership. It appears that there has been a subsequent re-constitution of the firm whereunder one of the grand daughters retired from the firm and the other grand daughter became a partner. The firm continued the business as a tenant of the premises. At some point of time, two of the grand daughters (daughters of Rachel) were admitted to the partnership. It appears that there has been a subsequent re-constitution of the firm whereunder one of the grand daughters retired from the firm and the other grand daughter became a partner. The firm continued the business as a tenant of the premises. As per Ext.A1 Partnership Deed dated 01.04.1996, the firm was re-constituted whereunder all the seven co-owners of the property became partners. The building in which the business was being conducted was brought in as a partnership asset. Under Ext.A1, the grand daughters retired from the firm. Subsequently, Annam died. Thereafter, Ext.A2 Partnership Deed was executed between the remaining partners. Exts.A1 and A2 Partnership Deeds are denied by the daughter and grand daughters (Rachel and her daughters). 5. The grand daughters seek to get themselves impleaded in the LAOP on the claim that the property in question having been brought in as a partnership asset and they being partners of the firm have interest over the property and the consequent proceedings in the LAOP. Here, a few facts are relevant- (1) The property was brought in as a partnership asset under Ext.A1 Partnership Deed; (2) Prior to Ext.A1 Partnership Deed, the firm was conducting business in the property as a tenant; (3) The grand daughters were partners of the firm prior to Ext.A1; (4) The grand daughters retired from the firm under Ext.A1; and (5) The genuineness of Ext.A1 is disputed by the grand daughters. If the contention of the grand daughters regarding the genuineness of Ext.A1 is accepted, then they continue as partners of the firm. But then, the property in question does not become a partnership asset since the same was brought in as a partnership asset only under Ext.A1. The property was in the possession of the firm as a tenant. Therefore, they cannot claim any manner of interest over the asset. A mere tenant or the partner of a tenant firm cannot claim a right to get impleaded in a Letters of Administration proceeding in respect of the Will of the owner-landlord of the property. The property was in the possession of the firm as a tenant. Therefore, they cannot claim any manner of interest over the asset. A mere tenant or the partner of a tenant firm cannot claim a right to get impleaded in a Letters of Administration proceeding in respect of the Will of the owner-landlord of the property. In (2008) 4 SCC 300 (supra), the Apex Court accepting the statement of law laid down by the High Court of Rajasthan in Jagdish Chander v. State, 1988 RLR 678 observed, “A tenant occupying the premises belonging to a testator was held not to have any caveatable interest in the property of the testator”. On the other hand, if Ext.A1 Partnership Deed is accepted, the grand daughters cease to be partners and therefore, the claim regarding interest over the asset in the capacity as partners cannot be sustained. Therefore, viewed either way, the grand daughters do not have any manner of interest. They are not entitled to get impleaded in the LAOP. 6. The court below has mainly given two reasons for allowing the impleading application. Firstly, that the grand daughters who seek to get themselves impleaded have similar status as that of the daughters-in-law of Paily and Annam. Secondly, the property has already been transferred to the partnership firm as per Exts.A1 and A2 Partnership Deeds. As noticed supra, the daughters-in-law are legatees under the Will while the grand daughters are not. The observation of the court below that they are having similar status as that of the grand daughters, is not correct. Coming to the finding regarding transfer of assets to the firm, the grand daughters project a case that the property was already transferred to the partnership and hence the testators did not have right over the property. The court below has observed that the argument of the grand daughters is based on Section 152 of the Succession Act which deals with “Ademption of legacies”. Therefore, essentially the title of the testator to the subject of bequest at the time of his death, is under challenge. Such a person cannot be said to have a caveatable interest. A person who denies the title of the testator cannot be said to have a caveatable interest. Therefore, essentially the title of the testator to the subject of bequest at the time of his death, is under challenge. Such a person cannot be said to have a caveatable interest. A person who denies the title of the testator cannot be said to have a caveatable interest. In 2008 (4) SCC 300 (supra), the Apex Court observed thus, “In fact the appellants have disentitled themselves from lodging a caveat as they are questioning the title of the testatrix as also her right to execute a will.....”. (Also Ittyanath Madathil Madhavi v. Sree Rama Varma ( AIR 1969 Ker. 256 and In re N. Narasimhan and another AIR 1975 Mad. 330 ). In a proceeding for grant of probate, the question of title does not arise for determination. All that is adjudicated is regarding the genuineness of the Will. Here it would be relevant to refer to the observations by the Apex Court in Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi (AIR 54 SC 280) :- “The Court of Probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last Will and testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good or bad is not within the purview of the Probate Court”. The interest claimed as caveatable interest must not be one in derogation of the title of the testator. On this ground also they are not entitled to come on record. 7. Therefore, viewed in any manner, the grand daughters who seek to get themselves impleaded do not have a caveatable interest and are not entitled to come on record. In the result, the original petition is allowed. The order dated 10.11.17 in I.A. Nos.166/17, 168/17 and 170/17 in LAOP No.279/16 of the VIth Additional District and Sessions Judge is set aside. The impleading applications will stand dismissed.