JUDGMENT : C.V. BHADANG, J. 1. All these appeals arise out of judgment and order dated 24.09.2015, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Panaji in Sessions Case No. 27/2011. As such, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. The appellants (original accused nos. 1, 2 and 4) along with Anandi Gawas (accused no. 3) were put on trial before the learned Sessions Judge for the offences punishable under Section 302, 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC for short). The learned Sessions Judge, by the impugned judgment has convicted the appellants and Anandi Gawas for the offences as charged. For the offence under Section 498A of IPC, they have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each. For the offence under Section 304B of IPC, they have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and lastly for the offence under Section 302 of IPC, they have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each. 2. The prosecution case, shorn of minor details may be stated thus:- The Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1) was married to now deceased Pramila alias Sunita Gawas, somewhere in July 2006. After her marriage, she started residing with her husband and the co-accused, who are her in-laws, at her matrimonial house at Van Maulinguem, Bicholim. Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1), the complainant, is the brother of Pramila, who resides at Kudchirem, Bicholim. The marriage of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) was settled with a girl from Van Maulinguem and the engagement ceremony was fixed on 22.06.2011 at Van Maulinguem, followed by marriage ceremony on 26.06.2011. It is the material prosecution case that none of the accused attended the engagement ceremony on 22.06.2011 nor Pramila was allowed to attend the same. On the following day i.e. 23.06.2011, Pramila met with an unnatural death by burning, in which she received 95% burn injuries. Initially, a case of unnatural death was registered in the matter, being UD No. 41/2011. 3. Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) lodged a complaint (Exhibit-20) with P.S. Bicholim on the same day, alleging that Pramila was ill treated and harassed by her husband and her inlaws, on account of the fact that she was not begetting a child and also on account of non satisfaction of a demand for dowry. 3. Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) lodged a complaint (Exhibit-20) with P.S. Bicholim on the same day, alleging that Pramila was ill treated and harassed by her husband and her inlaws, on account of the fact that she was not begetting a child and also on account of non satisfaction of a demand for dowry. On the basis of the complaint, an offence at Crime No. 119/2011 was registered against the appellants and Anandi Gawas. During the course of the investigation, a supplementary statement of the complainant came to be recorded on 27.06.2011. The Investigating Officer drew spot panchanama of the scene of occurrence and an inquest of the dead body of Pramila. The dead body was sent for the postmortem examination. Statements of witnesses came to be recorded, including the neighbours from Van Maulinguem and Kudchirem. The seized articles were sent for the report of the chemical analyser. On completion of the investigation, a charge sheet came to filed, which was committed to the Court of Sessions. 4. The learned Sessions Judge initially framed a charge against the appellants and Anandi Gawas, on 05.12.2011 for the offence punishable under Section 304B and Section 302 of IPC. Subsequently, on 28.08.2015, a charge for the offence under Section 498A of IPC was added. The appellants/accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. The defence of the appellants/accused is one of total denial and false implication. 5. At the trial, the prosecution examined in all 24 witnesses and produced the record of investigation. The appellants neither entered into the witness box nor examined any defence witnesses. The learned Sessions Judge framed the following two points:- 1. Whether prosecution succeeded in proving that deceased Pramila was subjected to cruelty by ill treating her physically and mentally with a view to fulfill demand for dowry by all the accused persons? 2. Whether prosecution succeeded in proving that all accused persons in furtherance of common intention and in view to fulfill demand for dowry caused death of Pramila by putting her on fire on 23.06.2011 in their matrimonial house? 6. The learned Sessions Judge answered both the points in the affirmative and proceeded to convict and sentence the appellants and the co-accused Anandi Gawas as aforesaid. 7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants and the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. 6. The learned Sessions Judge answered both the points in the affirmative and proceeded to convict and sentence the appellants and the co-accused Anandi Gawas as aforesaid. 7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants and the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for parties, we have gone through the evidence and the impugned judgment. 8. It is submitted by Shri Saudagar, the learned Counsel for the appellant/ accused no. 1 that there is no finding in the postmortem report about the death of Pramila being a case of homicidal death. It is submitted that this rules out commission of an offence under Section 302 of IPC, particularly, against accused no. 1, when the evidence shows that he was not present in the house, when Pramila received the burn injuries. It is submitted that the finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge about Pramila having met with a homicidal death is incorrect and not borne out of the record. It is submitted that the onus to explain the manner in which Pramila sustained the burn injuries, could not have been shifted on the accused. It is submitted that the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, cannot apply to an offence under Section 302 of IPC. It is next submitted that the charge under Section 498A of IPC was framed and explained to the appellants after the prosecution closed its evidence, which has caused serious prejudice to the appellants, in as much as, the cross examination of the witnesses, on the charge under section 304B of IPC, would differ from the one where the charge is also under Section 498A of IPC. The learned Counsel has referred to the objection (Exhibit D-170), raised on behalf of the appellants. It is submitted that even otherwise, there is no evidence of any ill treatment meted out to Pramila on account of a demand for dowry. It is submitted that in the absence of the same, the charge under Section 304B of IPC and for the matter of that, the one under Section 498A of IPC, cannot be held to be proved. It is submitted that admittedly, the accused no. 1 was not present in the house, when Pramila received the burn injuries. It is submitted that in the absence of the same, the charge under Section 304B of IPC and for the matter of that, the one under Section 498A of IPC, cannot be held to be proved. It is submitted that admittedly, the accused no. 1 was not present in the house, when Pramila received the burn injuries. It is submitted that there is no evidence forth coming from the Primary Health Centre, Bicholim (PHC), where Pramila was initially taken before being shifted to GMC. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Paparambaka Rosamma & Others Vs. State of A.P., (1999) 7 SCC 695 , Jasvinder Saini & Others Vs. State, (2013) 7 SCC 256 , and R. Rachaiah Vs. Home Secretary, (2016) 12 SCC 172 . 9. Shri Naik, the learned Counsel for the appellants/ accused nos. 2 and 4 has advanced arguments more or less on similar lines. Shri Naik, the learned Counsel for the appellants/ accused nos. 2 and 4 has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Virendra Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 407 , in order to submit that there is no evidence to gather common intention, which can be attributed to accused nos. 2 and 4 to ill treat Pramila or to cause her death. 10. Shri Rivankar, the learned Public Prosecutor on the contrary has supported the impugned judgment. It is submitted that the appellants were aware of the nature of the charges against them and have cross examined the prosecution witnesses extensively. It is submitted that thus, no prejudice can be said to be caused to the appellants on account of the fact that the charge under Section 498A of IPC was explained after the closure of the prosecution evidence. It is submitted that Pramila met with an unnatural death, within seven years of her marriage and the evidence shows that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty in connection with non satisfaction of demand for dowry. The learned Public Prosecutor has referred to the evidence of Laximi Gaonkar (PW-3), Satyavati Gaonkar (PW-4), Sumita Gaonkar (PW-10) and Jayanti Gaonkar (PW-15) in this regard in order to submit that there is enough evidence to show that Pramila was subjected to cruelty, soon before her death. The learned Public Prosecutor has referred to the evidence of Laximi Gaonkar (PW-3), Satyavati Gaonkar (PW-4), Sumita Gaonkar (PW-10) and Jayanti Gaonkar (PW-15) in this regard in order to submit that there is enough evidence to show that Pramila was subjected to cruelty, soon before her death. It is submitted that Pramila had lodged a complaint against the appellants and the accused Anandi Gawas on 30.06.2008, which supports the case of the prosecution. It is submitted that the death of Pramila having occurred under unnatural circumstances, at the house of the appellants, particularly when the accused nos. 2, 3 and 4 were present in the house, it was for the appellants/accused to explain the circumstances leading to the death of Pramila, as it is a fact, which can be said to be within the special knowledge of the accused. It is thus submitted that the learned Sessions Judge was right in holding that Pramila died a homicidal death, after excluding the possibility of her death being either suicidal or accidental in nature. He therefore submits that the appeals be dismissed. 11. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival circumstances and the submissions made. 12. We would first propose to deal with the submissions based on the fact that the charge under Section 498A of IPC was framed and explained to the accused after the closure of the prosecution evidence. The effect of the same has to be examined with reference to any possible prejudice to the accused. Now before doing that, it is necessary to note that even assuming that the appellants demonstrate prejudice on account of the fact that the charge under Section 498A of IPC was framed and explained after the closure of the prosecution evidence, it may at the highest affect the conviction only under Section 498A of IPC. In other words this has no bearing and cannot affect the conviction under Section 302 and Section 304A of IPC, if found to be otherwise sustainable. Be that as it may, it is a matter of record that the charge as initially framed was only under Sections 302 and 304B of IPC. This was in pursuance of an order dated 21.11.2011, which shows that the learned Sessions Judge had observed that there was prima facie material to show demand of dowry and ill treatment in relation to the same. This was in pursuance of an order dated 21.11.2011, which shows that the learned Sessions Judge had observed that there was prima facie material to show demand of dowry and ill treatment in relation to the same. However, the operative part of the order did not mention Section 498A of IPC. 13. On behalf of the prosecution, an application (Exhibit- D/169) came to be filed before the learned Sessions Judge to frame and explain a charge under Section 498A of IPC. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing the parties passed a speaking order on 28.08.2015 and found that the error needs to be rectified. The learned Sessions Judge while coming to the said conclusion has inter alia noted the provisions of Section 215 and Section 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code for short). Under Section 216 of the Code, the Court has wide powers to add or to alter the charge any time before the judgment is pronounced. The question is essentially of any possible prejudice to the accused, in as much as, the accused cannot be taken by surprise by such addition or alteration of the charge. 14. In the present case the charge sheet was filed inter alia alleging commission of the offence under Section 498A of IPC. The initial order dated 21.11.2011 also shows that the Court had found material to support allegations of ill treatment on account of a demand for dowry. That apart, we also find that the allegations and requirement under Section 304A of IPC, about there being ill treatment on account of non satisfaction of a demand for dowry, is also the requirement under Section 498A of IPC. In that limited sense, the two offences can be said to be of the same genre. We have also gone through the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses on behalf of the appellants/accused and we find that the accused were aware about the nature of the offences for which they were being tried. The reliance placed on the various decisions of the Supreme Court in our opinion is misplaced. 15. In the case of Jasvinder Saini (supra), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier decision in the case of Rajbir Vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 15 SCC 116 . The reliance placed on the various decisions of the Supreme Court in our opinion is misplaced. 15. In the case of Jasvinder Saini (supra), the Supreme Court clarified its earlier decision in the case of Rajbir Vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 15 SCC 116 . It has been inter alia held that mechanical addition of a charge under Section 302 of IPC, in every case involving offence under Section 304B is not contemplated. In the case of R. Rachaiah (supra), the prosecution had led entire evidence in a trial under Section 306 of IPC, after which an alternate charge under Section 302 of IPC was framed. The learned Sessions Judge without recalling any of the prosecution witnesses, convicted the accused under Section 302 of IPC, which was found to be not permissible. The cases clearly turned on their own facts. We are thus unable to persuade ourselves to hold that there is any prejudice caused to the appellants on account of the fact that the charge under Section 498A of IPC was framed and explained to the appellants, after the closure of the prosecution evidence. The contention in this regard, thus, cannot be accepted. 16. We now propose to deal with the merits of the substantive challenge. The points which fall for our determination are as under:- 1. Whether the prosecution proves that Pramila died a homicidal death by burning on 23.6.2011 at her matrimonial house at Van Mauliguem? 2. If yes, whether the prosecution proves that the appellants alongwith the co-accused Anandi Gawas, in furtherance of their common intention, caused the death of Pramila by setting her on fire? 3. Whether the prosecution proves that Pramila died an unnatural death, within seven years of her marriage and soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty by the appellants for or in connection with any demand for dowry? 4. Whether the prosecution proves that the appellants in furtherance of their common intention subjected Pramila to cruelty within the meaning of the explanation to Section 498A of IPC? 5. What Order? 17. Points Nos. 1 and 2:- These points are connected and will have to be taken up together. This is because in a charge under Section 302 of IPC, the prosecution is obliged to prove that the victim met with a homicidal death. 5. What Order? 17. Points Nos. 1 and 2:- These points are connected and will have to be taken up together. This is because in a charge under Section 302 of IPC, the prosecution is obliged to prove that the victim met with a homicidal death. Any other nature of unnatural death i.e. suicidal or accidental death, rules out an offence under Section 302 of IPC. It is not in dispute that Pramila suffered burn injuries at her matrimonial house on 23.06.2011 at about 8.30 a.m. It is also not in dispute and it has clearly come on record that at the time when Pramila sustained burn injuries, the Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1) and Jayanti Gawas (accused no. 4) were not at home. Indisputably, Pramila was first taken to PHC, Bicholim and thereafter, shifted to GMC Bambolim. Dr. Vimal Krishna Rajput (PW-22) examined her at 12 noon and found 95% burn injuries on her person. She died shortly thereafter at about 1:30 p.m. Dr. Madhu Ghodkirekar (PW-9), who conducted postmortem examination on the dead body gave the cause of death as shock, as a result of extensive body surface area flame burn injuries, which were “necessarily fatal”. Although, prosecution examined two doctors, namely, Dr. Sarang Kanekar (PW-21) and Dr. Vimal Krishna Rajput (PW- 22), who claimed that Pramila was conscious and in a condition to speak, there is no dying declaration of deceased Pramila on record. As noticed earlier and as rightly found by the learned Sessions Judge, the appellants have not disputed and even otherwise, it is established on record that Pramila died due to burn injuries to the extent of 95%. The question however is whether, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that she suffered death, which can be said to be homicidal in nature. 18. The learned Sessions Judge in coming to the conclusion that it is a homicidal death has observed thus in para 32 of the judgment:- “32. It is no-where the case of the accused persons that Pramila sustained burn injuries accidentally or it is the case of committing suicide by said Pramila. Once both the above possibilities are ruled out, the only conclusion is to be drawn is that death of Pramila is homicidal. It is no-where the case of the accused persons that Pramila sustained burn injuries accidentally or it is the case of committing suicide by said Pramila. Once both the above possibilities are ruled out, the only conclusion is to be drawn is that death of Pramila is homicidal. Therefore same is covered under Section 299 of IPC under the caption of culpable homicide wherein it is mentioned “whoever causes death by doing the act with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death commits the offence of culpable homicide.” The material brought on record by the prosecution through evidence of various witnesses clearly show the burn injuries caused to Pramila are not due to accidental event. Similarly there is nothing on record to suggest that Pramila might have committed suicide by pouring kerosene on her body and by putting fire to herself. There is absolutely no material brought on record by the accused persons to even faintly suggest the eventuality of committing suicide by Pramila. The scene of offence panchanama shows that the incident took place inside the house wherein Pramila was residing alongwith all the accused persons and that too during morning hours and near the fire place (chulla). Similarly the empty kerosene lamp and one can were found during the scene of offence panchanama which were attached as well as used matchsticks. In normal circumstances while cooking on a chulla with the help of firewood, use of kerosene and matchstick is a common ingredient however when the aspect of accidental catching fire or an attempt to suicide are ruled out, the only aspect remains is that someone did such act by putting the victim on fire. Thus the aspect of culpable homicide under Section 299 of IPC stands established.” 19. We are unable to agree with the reasoning as articulated. The learned Sessions Judge has basically proceeded on the assumption that the manner in which Pramila sustained burn injuries, would be within the special knowledge of the accused and the accused having failed to explain the same or having claimed that the death was either accidental or suicidal in nature, the only conclusion is that the death was homicidal in nature. In the first place the Doctor has nowhere ruled out the possibility of the death being suicidal in nature. Merely because the accused have not taken any stand of the death being either suicidal or accidental in nature, would not be sufficient to hold that the death was homicidal in nature. It is trite that the burden to establish that the death was homicidal lay on the prosecution, which must stand or fall on its own feet. The accused are entitled to maintain silence. In the absence of any presumption in the nature of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, which is not applicable to the offence under Section 302 of IPC, it is not possible to draw an inference as has been drawn by the learned Sessions Judge. We therefore hold that the prosecution has failed to establish that Pramila met with a homicidal death. As a necessary consequence, the appellants and the co-accused cannot be held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The points are accordingly answered in the negative. 20. Point Nos. 3 and 4:- This takes us to the offences under Section 304B of IPC and Section 498A of IPC, which can be considered together. Section 304B of IPC, which defines the offence of “dowry death”, reads as under:- “304B. Dowry death.— (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” It can thus be seen that for bringing home an offence under Section 304B of IPC, the prosecution has to establish the following ingredients:- i. That the death of the woman is caused by any burns or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage. ii. ii. It is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or the relatives of her husband and iii. Such harassment should be, “for or in connection with any demand for dowry”. 21. “Dowry” for the purposes of this Section has the same meaning as assigned to it in the Dowry Prohibition Act. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 defines dowry as under:- “2. Definition of “dowry” — In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly— (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person. “at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.” 22. The Supreme Court in the case of Satvir Singh & Others Vs. State of Punjab & Another, AIR 2001 SC 2828 has held that “dowry” has necessarily to be a demand in connection with the marriage and not otherwise. In other words any demand or gift which is customary in nature, given at the time of any festival, would not come within the meaning of dowry. Before adverting to the evidence insofar as the charge of dowry death is concerned, it would be necessary to note the presumption available under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. Section 113B of the Evidence Act reads as under:- “113B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.” 23. The Supreme Court in the case of Sher Singh @ Partapa Vs. The Supreme Court in the case of Sher Singh @ Partapa Vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 3 SCC 724 , has inter alia held that in order to raise the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, which is statutory in nature, the prosecution has to establish that the woman was subjected to cruelty, “for or in connection with demand for dowry”, on preponderance of probability. The Supreme Court while holding so, has noticed the phraseology used in the section when it says “it is shown” as distinguished from “it is proved”. We are conscious of the fact that this is so, only for the limited purpose of raising the presumption and not otherwise. Once the conditions requisite for raising the presumption are established, the Court is bound to raise the presumption and then, it is for the accused to rebut the same beyond reasonable doubt (see para 19 of the judgment). 24. It would now be necessary to look into the evidence of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1), Laximi Gaonkar (PW-3), Satyavati Gaonkar (PW-4), Sumita Gaonkar (PW-10) and Jayanti Gaonkar (PW-15) in order to find out whether the evidence is sufficient to raise the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act and consequently, to establish the offence under Section 304B of IPC. Although, cruelty is a common ingredient and requirement of offences under Section 304B and Section 498A of IPC, they are essentially distinct offences. For instance, for establishing the offence under Section 498A of IPC, it would not be necessary that the cruelty meted out is “for or in connection with demand for dowry”, as required under Section 304B of IPC. Thus, the evidence of the aforesaid witness has also to be looked into, in order to see whether, the offence under Section 498A of IPC is brought home and if yes, against which of the accused. 25. Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) who is the brother of Pramila states that Pramila started making grievance of "small issues" in the matrimonial house, after about three to four months of her marriage with the accused no. 1. He states that after about a year or so, Pramila informed that accused no. 1-Prakash Gawas was harassing her, as she was not begetting a child and would also assault her. He states that Pramila used to inform about the harassment meted out to her for not bearing a child, to her neighbour Vinanti. 1. He states that after about a year or so, Pramila informed that accused no. 1-Prakash Gawas was harassing her, as she was not begetting a child and would also assault her. He states that Pramila used to inform about the harassment meted out to her for not bearing a child, to her neighbour Vinanti. Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) went to the matrimonial house of Pramila with one Ramesh, however, before that, Pramila came to her maternal place as the accused no. 1 had assaulted her. It appears that Pramila had lodged a complaint on 30.06.2008 with Bicholim Police Station as the accused no. 1-Prakash Gawas had thrown the cupboard with the contents thereof like utensils, articles etc. of Pramila out of the house. The Bicholim Police acting on the complaint dated 30.06.2008, brought the accused no. 1 to the police station where Pramila was present. It is stated that accused no. 1- Prakash Gawas gave assurance that he will not harass Pramila and on that basis, the police dropped Pramila to her matrimonial house. After this incident, there was no instance of harassment for two years and in the meantime, Pramila also delivered a male child. 26. It has come on record that the marriage of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) was settled with one girl, Sarita, who was from Van Maulinguem i.e. the matrimonial place of Pramila. It has also come on record that engagement ceremony of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) was fixed at Van Maulinguem on 22.06.2011 followed by marriage ceremony on 26.06.2011. The house of Sarita was close to the matrimonial house of Pramila. It is further the evidence of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) that when he had gone to invite Pramila for the wedding, she told him that accused no. 1 alongwith the family members have again started harassing her. He states that Pramila wanted money from him for purchasing gold ornaments, since ornaments earlier made for her at the time of marriage were “not available to her”. Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) assured her that he would give her money after his marriage. It has come in the evidence that Shevanti, sister-in-law of brother of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) had gone to the house of Pramila on 22.06.2011, for inviting her to the engagement ceremony. Pramila was lying on the bed dressed for the occasion, however, she did not respond. It is the evidence that the accused no. It has come in the evidence that Shevanti, sister-in-law of brother of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) had gone to the house of Pramila on 22.06.2011, for inviting her to the engagement ceremony. Pramila was lying on the bed dressed for the occasion, however, she did not respond. It is the evidence that the accused no. 1 refused to send Pramila for the engagement ceremony. Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) states that he had earlier given a fan and also a mixer to Pramila, as she was not in a position to grind on a stone. This is all that has come in the evidence of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1). 27. The weight of the evidence would indicate that initially, the ill treatment meted out to Pramila was on account of the fact that she was unable to beget a child. As noticed earlier, subsequently, Pramila gave birth to a male child and thus, the cause evidently did not survive. What is significant from the evidence of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) is that, it was Pramila, who was demanding money from Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) as she wanted to make gold ornaments. The evidence of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) on the point of ill treatment is also predominantly against the accused no. 1 with a stray statement that accused nos. 2, 3 and 4 were also harassing her. It would be significant to note that there is nothing in the evidence of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) that there was any demand for dowry either by accused no. 1 or by the other accused. The complaint lodged by Pramila on 30.06.2008 also does not indicate that there was any demand of dowry or any other valuables by the accused no. 1 or the accused nos. 2, 3 and 4. The complaint dated 30.06.2008 indicates that Pramila had complained about the accused no. 1 beating her and causing her bodily injuries and of insulting and humiliating her for not having a child. Pramila had stated in the complaint dated 30.06.2008 that her husband and her in-laws are not allowing her to stay in the matrimonial house and that accused no. 1-Prakash Gawas had taken her two gold bangles, one necklace, four earrings and Rs.2,000/-, which were kept by her in the cupboard, which articles were given in her marriage by her parents. She then complained about the accused no. 1 having thrown the cupboard and the bed outside. 1-Prakash Gawas had taken her two gold bangles, one necklace, four earrings and Rs.2,000/-, which were kept by her in the cupboard, which articles were given in her marriage by her parents. She then complained about the accused no. 1 having thrown the cupboard and the bed outside. Incidentally, she had also complained that the accused no. 1 was not keeping sexual relations with her and when she insisted for the same, the accused no. 1 used to beat her. Thus, from the complaint of Pramila also, it cannot be gathered that there was any ill treatment meted out to Pramila “for or in connection with a demand for dowry”. On the contrary, the evidence would show that there were certain issues between Pramila and the accused no. 1 and for the matter of that accused nos. 2, 3 and 4, in which, according to Pramila, the accused were not allowing her to stay in the matrimonial house. The complaint (Exhibit-20) lodged by Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) also indicates that according to him, the accused no. 1 used to harass Pramila for “simple things”. Although, the complaint mentions about the demand by accused no. 1 to bring cash from her parents, that is not found in the substantive evidence of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1). 28. Laximi Gaonkar (PW-3) is the neighbour of the accused. She stated that the accused used to quarrel with Pramila and used to tell her that they do not want her in the house as she was unable to beget a child. The evidence of Laximi Gaonkar (PW-3) only discloses that on the date of the incident, she went to the matrimonial house of Pramila and saw that Pramila was lying in the bagel/padvi on the floor. This witness put a gunny bag on Pramila, as the fire was still burning at the waist. PW-3 called accused no. 3 (i.e. the mother-in-law, who has not chosen to challenge the conviction) who stated that “let Sunita die”. She further states that accused no. 2 was in the verandah brushing his teeth. This witness also does not state anything about the ill treatment meted out to Pramila, “for or in connection with the demand for dowry”. She has gone to the extent of saying that her statement was not recorded by the police. 29. Satyavati Gaonkar (PW-4) is the sister-in-law of Pramila. 2 was in the verandah brushing his teeth. This witness also does not state anything about the ill treatment meted out to Pramila, “for or in connection with the demand for dowry”. She has gone to the extent of saying that her statement was not recorded by the police. 29. Satyavati Gaonkar (PW-4) is the sister-in-law of Pramila. It is this witness who had gone to the house of Pramila on the date of the engagement of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1), where this witness had seen Pramila lying on the bed having dressed for the occasion. Satyavati Gaonkar (PW-4) states that Pramila had worn a new saree to attend the ceremony and when she went to call her, Pramila did not reply. The accused no. 1 told this witness that he would not send Pramila for the ceremony. The only thing that has come in the evidence of this witness is that the accused no. 1 had demanded a fan and a mixer. However, as noticed earlier, the evidence of Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1) would indicate that the fan and the mixer was given to Pramila and he also states that the mixer was given to Pramila as she was unable to grind on a stone. In the cross examination Satyavati Gaonkar (PW-4), in categorical terms, admitted that at the time of the marriage of Pramila, none of the accused had demanded gold ornaments or any other items such as bed and cupboard and these articles were given voluntarily. Satyavati Gaonkar (PW-4) also stated that she does not personally know whether after the marriage, the accused no. 1 had demanded anything from them. 30. Sumita Gaonkar (PW-10) is a resident of Kudchirem, Paltadwada and the maternal place of Pramila is about 10 minutes walking distance from the house of Sumita Gaonkar (PW-10). The evidence of Sumita Gaonkar (PW-10) indicates that Pramila used to make calls from the coin box phone installed by this witness and she had noticed that Pramila used to cry on the phone. All that this witness has stated is that Pramila told her that the accused no. 1 used to shout at her and abuse her. 31. Lastly, Jayanti Gaonkar (PW-11) is a resident of Van Maulinguem. All that this witness has stated is that Pramila told her that the accused no. 1 used to shout at her and abuse her. 31. Lastly, Jayanti Gaonkar (PW-11) is a resident of Van Maulinguem. All that this witness has stated is that the relations of the accused and Pramila were not cordial and the accused used to fight with her and had even thrown her belongings out and that accused no. 1 used to assault Pramila. Except this, nothing has come in the evidence of this witness. 32. On a careful consideration of the evidence, we do not find that there is any evidence, which has come on record to show that the ill treatment meted out to Pramila was, “for or in connection with a demand for dowry” and much less whether, such cruelty was meted out to Pramila soon before her death. The evidence predominantly shows that it was accused no. 1, who was assaulting Pramila and initially, the treatment was on account of the fact that Pramila was unable to beget a child. The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act can be raised only when the necessary ingredient, on the basis of which, such presumption arises are properly established. Although, it has come on record that Pramila died otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, the necessary ingredient of she being subject to cruelty “for or in connection with demand for dowry”, cannot be said to be established on record. For this reason, we are unable to uphold the conviction under Section 304B of IPC. Point No. 3 is answered in the negative. 33. This takes us to the conviction under Section 498A of IPC. Section 498A of IPC also speaks of cruelty to which a married women is subjected to by her husband or the relations of her husband. For this reason, we are unable to uphold the conviction under Section 304B of IPC. Point No. 3 is answered in the negative. 33. This takes us to the conviction under Section 498A of IPC. Section 498A of IPC also speaks of cruelty to which a married women is subjected to by her husband or the relations of her husband. The explanation annexed to Section 498A would show that, for the purpose of this section, cruelty means (a) any wilful conduct, which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 34. On the basis of the prosecution evidence as led, we are unable to find that there was any demand for any property or valuable security as is envisaged under explanation (b) to Section 498A of IPC. However, we find that there is sufficient evidence only against accused no. 1 that Pramila was subjected to cruelty as is likely to drive the woman to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical). The evidence indicates that the accused no. 1 used to assault Pramila and during the initial years of her marriage, this was on account of the fact that Pramila was not begetting a child. The ill treatment continued even after Pramila had a child. There is evidence that accused no. 1 had thrown the belongings of Pramila out of the house. There is also evidence that he refused to send Pramila even on the occasion of the engagement ceremony of her brother Atmaram Gaonkar (PW-1). Thus, in our opinion there is sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of accused no. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC. 35. We are conscious of the fact that a young lady having a minor child has met with a tragic death, by burning within seven years of her marriage. Thus, in our opinion there is sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of accused no. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC. 35. We are conscious of the fact that a young lady having a minor child has met with a tragic death, by burning within seven years of her marriage. However, given the evidence on record, we are unable to sustain the conviction, except that of the accused no. 1 and that too, for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC. The point no. 4 is answered partly in the affirmative, as against accused no. 1. 36. Although, the accused no. 3 has chosen not to challenge the conviction, the same also will have to be set aside in the facts and circumstances of the case. 37. In the result, the following order is passed: (i) Criminal Appeal Nos. 58/2015 and 64/2015, are hereby allowed. (ii) The conviction and the consequent sentence awarded to the Appellant-Anand Gawas (accused no. 2) and the Appellant-Jayanti Gawas (accused no. 4), is hereby set aside. (iii) The conviction and sentence awarded to the original accused no. 3 (Anandi Gawas), is also set aside. (iv) The Appellant-Anand Gawas (accused no. 2), the original accused no. 3 (Anandi Gawas) and the Appellant-Jayanti Gawas (accused no. 4), are acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 302, 304B and 498A of IPC. (v) Bail Bonds of the Appellant-Anand Gawas stand cancelled. Fine if paid, be refunded. (vi) Original accused no. 3 (Anandi Gawas) and the Appellant- Jayanti Gawas (accused no. 4) be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in connection with any other offence. (vii) Criminal Appeal No. 38/2016 is partly allowed. (viii) The conviction of the Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1) for the offences punishable under Section 302 and 304B of IPC, is hereby set aside. (ix) The Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1), is hereby acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 302 and 304B of IPC. (x) The conviction and sentence awarded to the Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1) for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC, is hereby confirmed. (xi) The Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1) is in custody from 24.06.2011. (ix) The Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1), is hereby acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 302 and 304B of IPC. (x) The conviction and sentence awarded to the Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1) for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC, is hereby confirmed. (xi) The Appellant-Prakash Gawas (accused no. 1) is in custody from 24.06.2011. In view of the fact that he has been sentenced to imprisonment for two years, he shall be set at liberty forthwith, subject to payment of fine, if not already paid and if not required in connection with any other offence. (xii) The order as regards disposal of the property is hereby maintained.