Revathi Mohan v. State of Kerala, Represented by the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Department of Health & Family Welfare, Secretariat
2018-01-12
DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. The petitioners pray that directions be issued to the competent Authority to extend the cutoff date, fixed by the University for admission to the B. Pharm course in the 4th respondent college, so as to enable them to secure admission. 2. The petitioners have made aforementioned prayer on a peculiar matrix of facts. According to them, they had secured admission for the B. Pharm course in the 4th respondent college last year, i.e. academic year 2016-17, under the management quota. However, the Admission Supervisory Committee found their admissions to be irregular, since it was made in violation of the rigour that 50% of the vacancies be filled up from the list provided by the LBS Centre for Science and Technology, which was the competent authority to allot the candidates for such seats. 3. This order of the Admission Supervisory Committee was challenged before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 3269 of 2017, which culminated in Ext. P1 judgment. This Court, found the order of Committee to be in order and affirmed that the admissions of the petitioners were contrary to the mandate of law. The petitioners, as we see it from the pleadings, took up the matter before the Honourable Supreme Court of India by filing SLP No. 14039 of 2017 and the Honourable Court, by order dated 09.05.2017, permitted them to appear in the annual examination with the specific disclaimer that it will be subject to the result of the Special Leave Petition. 4. While matters stood so, it appears that the 4th respondent College obtained orders for continuing provisional affiliation from the 3rd respondent University, through Ext. P4 order, dated 12.10.2017. We are told at the Bar by the learned counsel appearing for the University that the Pharmacy Council of India, additional 6th respondent in this Writ Petition, had initially fixed the cutoff date for admissions in the various Colleges as 15.08.2017. At that time, obviously, the 4th respondent College had not obtained orders for continuing provisional affiliation. We are told that the College had, therefore, approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 23585 of 2017 and obtained certain orders permitting them to admit students, awaiting orders of provisional affiliation, till 16.08.2017 - because 15.08.2017 [which was fixed by the Pharmacy Council] was a public holiday.
We are told that the College had, therefore, approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 23585 of 2017 and obtained certain orders permitting them to admit students, awaiting orders of provisional affiliation, till 16.08.2017 - because 15.08.2017 [which was fixed by the Pharmacy Council] was a public holiday. We are also told that another Writ Petition, namely, W.P.(C) No. 27106 of 2017 had been filed by certain other colleges before this Court and that an interim order was passed therein, whereby directions were given to the University to extend the cutoff date till 30.09.2017. The various counsel appearing in this case concede that there was no extension of cutoff date after 30.09.2017. 5. In the above factual perspective, the petitioners before us now face a very consternating problem. This is because, as on 30.09.2017, which was the extended cutoff date as prescribed by the University for securing admissions, they were undergoing studies in the 4th respondent college on the strength of Ext. P2 interim order of the Honourable Supreme Court of India, and they did not make any application for admission to the College, presumably because they were hoping that the SLP pending before the Honourable Supreme Court would end in their favour. However, the SLP mentioned above was dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court by order, dated 12.12.2017, without making any provision or reservation to the petitioners to continue in the college. The petitioners say that this now compels them to apply for admission afresh, because the effect of Ext. P3 order of the Honourable Supreme Court is that their admissions stand cancelled and they cease to be students of the 4th respondent college 6. It is in these factual circumstances, that the petitioners have approached this Court seeking that the cutoff date of 30.09.2017, fixed by the 3rd respondent University, be directed to be extended so as to enable them to secure admissions afresh in the 4th respondent college 7. We have heard Sri. Gopalakrishna Kurup, assisted by Sri. K. Suresh - the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners; Smt. Mary Benjamin - the learned standing counsel appearing for the second respondent Admission Supervisory Committee; the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State; Sri. P. Sreekumar - the learned standing counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent University; Sri. Shaji Thomas - the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 4 and 5; and Sri.
P. Sreekumar - the learned standing counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent University; Sri. Shaji Thomas - the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 4 and 5; and Sri. T.V. Vinu - the learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the Additional 6th respondent Pharmacy Council of India. 8. We have given an intent thought to the request made by the petitioners in the backdrop of the submissions made by the Sri. Gopalakrishna Kurup – the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. The learned senior counsel submits, rather strongly, that the plight of the petitioners who did not apply for admission to the College within the cutoff date, because they were governed and protected by Ext. P2 order of the Honourable Supreme Court, cannot be lost right of. He says that it was only when the Honourable Supreme Court, through Ext. P3 order, dismissed the Special Leave Petition that the petitioners became required to obtain fresh admission for the B.Pharm course. According to him, since the petitioners are not at fault in not applying for fresh admission within the cutoff date, it is only equitable and justified that they be given an opportunity to apply for and obtain admission in the 4th respondent college afresh for the academic year 2017-18. Sri. Kurup, the learned senior counsel, also has a definite case that nine vacancies are available in the college because, within the cutoff date, only 41 students have been admitted against 50 seats that were available for admission in the college. 9. Sri. P. Sreekumar, the learned standing counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent University submits that the cutoff date for admission was initially prescribed by the 6th respondent Pharmacy Council of India. He adds that the University generally cannot go beyond the command and prescriptions of the 6th respondent in such matters. However, he says, that the university had extended the cutoff date, till 30.09.2017, only on account of certain directions contained in the judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) No 27106 of 2017. In fact, he candidly admits that he is not sure if the Pharmacy Council would concede even to this extension, strictly going by the terms of the applicable Rules and Regulations.
In fact, he candidly admits that he is not sure if the Pharmacy Council would concede even to this extension, strictly going by the terms of the applicable Rules and Regulations. His submission, therefore, is that notwithstanding the plight of the petitioners, as has been shown by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, it would not be justified or within the authority of this Court to extend the cutoff date for admission, which has been specifically prescribed by the Pharmacy Council of India. 10. Sri. Vinu T.V. - the learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the additional 6th respondent Pharmacy Council of India says that they had fixed the cutoff date as 15.08.2017, taking into account the various imperative parameters that are required to be followed for the purpose ensuring excellence in the B.Pharm course. According to him, the Pharmacy Council is not willing to extend the time any further and he says, in answer to the pointed question made by the Bench, that the Pharmacy Council of India is not in favour of any further extension at all. 11. We have considered the submissions of the various learned counsel as above. It becomes ineluctable, from a survey of the provisions governing the field, that there is no power even to the University to extend the cutoff date, which was fixed by the 6th respondent Pharmacy Council. We cannot find any specific method or avenue available to the University to do so and at best they can consider extension of the cutoff date only if the Pharmacy Council permits. However, in this case, it is leculent that the Pharmacy Council is not in favour of any such extension. Therefore, it is obvious that the hands of the university are tied. 12. The corollary question, therefore, would be whether it be justified for this Court to pass any orders directing the University to extend the cutoff date, even though legally they are not permitted to do so. The answer to this question, in our mind, without any effort, is to the negative. This Court is not vested with the jurisdiction to tamper with the process of admission, which are vested in the command and control of the various statutory and expert bodies, in terms of law.
The answer to this question, in our mind, without any effort, is to the negative. This Court is not vested with the jurisdiction to tamper with the process of admission, which are vested in the command and control of the various statutory and expert bodies, in terms of law. This Court does not have the expertise or the competence to make alternate suggestions or directions or to substitute our wisdom for the wisdom of experts even if we are to think that an alternate view is possible, especially, because such powers are exercised by the concerned authorities under the realm of policy decision making. It is not the province of this Court, especially when we act under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to do so, since these are best left to the wisdom of the experts, as has been cautioned by the Honourable Supreme Court in several cases. [See for support, Balco Employees Union Vs. Union of India, (2002)2 SCC 333 , Federation of Pharmacy Officers Association Vs. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 289 and Satyanarayan and another Vs. S. Purushottam and Ors., (2008) 5 SCC 416 ]. 13. As regards the submissions of Sri. Gopalakrishna Kurup that the petitioners cannot be blamed for not making the application within the cutoff date is concerned, we are of the view that this would be no avail. They were perhaps justified in thinking that since their Special Leave Petitions are pending before the Honourable Supreme Court and since they were being protected by Ext. P2 order, that it would not be necessary for them to make an application especially because, as Mr. Kurup contends, had they done so, they feared that their Special Leave petition itself would be jeopardised. 14. That being said, the question that we have to ask ourselves is whether the plight of the individual students would be a sufficient cause for this Court to interfere with the time schedule fixed by the Pharmacy Council justifying orders to extend the cutoff date for admission, especially when the competent Authorities are not willing to do so. Unfortunately for the petitioners, we are certain that we do not have the power or jurisdiction to do so.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, we are certain that we do not have the power or jurisdiction to do so. In fact, we are of the view that when the SLP was being considered by the Honourable Supreme Court, the petitioners should have been advised to make this request before their Lordships of the Honourable Court because the petitioners were aware of the consequences of the dismissal of SLP, especially because Ext. P2 order had been issued showing clearly that the said order was being issued subject to the result of the SLP. The fact that the Honorouble Supreme Court did not grant any such liberty to the petitioners should caution us from making any such orders, which might be seen to be an overreach to the directions given by the Honourable Supreme Court. 15. In such circumstances, we are certain that we do not have the jurisdiction to grant the reliefs sought for by the petitioners. We are, therefore, forced, without any other option being available before us, to dismiss this writ petition, which we do. 16. In the rather peculiar circumstances that are presented before us, we do not deem it necessary to make any order as to the costs and leave the parties to suffer their respective costs.