ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. These writ petitions have been preferred by the petitioners for change of cut-off date which is prescribed in the public advertisement for the post of District Judges from the Bar. Advertisement No.1 of 2017 was issued on 13.10.2017 in the public Newspaper and the cut-off date for the age of the candidates is 31.01.2016 as per Rule 9 of the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules, 2001'). The minimum age was 35 years and the maximum age limit was 45 years for the general category candidates as on 31.01.2016. These petitioners are claiming change of cut-off date instead of 31.01.2016, it should be 31.01.2011 (as prayed in W.P.(S) No.6204 of 2017 as well as in W.P.(S) No.6699 of 2017), whereas in another writ petition, there is prayer that cut-off date should be instead of 31.01.2016, it should have been 31.01.2013 (as prayed in W.P.(S) No.6302 of 2017). Thus, for change of cut-off date and for accepting “accommodative approach”, these writ petitions have been preferred. 2. Factual Matrix Public advertisement No.1 of 2017 has been given in the Newspaper inviting applications for the post of District Judges from the Bar. The total vacancy advertised is 17. Rule 9 of the Rules, 2001 reads as under :- “9. Thus, for change of cut-off date and for accepting “accommodative approach”, these writ petitions have been preferred. 2. Factual Matrix Public advertisement No.1 of 2017 has been given in the Newspaper inviting applications for the post of District Judges from the Bar. The total vacancy advertised is 17. Rule 9 of the Rules, 2001 reads as under :- “9. Eligibility : A candidate shall be eligible to be appointed as an Additional District Judge under these Rules, if : (a) he is above the age of 35 years and below the age of 45 years as on the last day of January preceding the year in which the examination is held; provided that in the case of candidate belonging to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, there may be a relaxation of upper age limit by three years; (b) is a graduate in law from a University recognized for the purpose of enrollment as an Advocate under the Advocates' Act, 1961; (c) has an experience of more than seven years at the Bar as a practicing Advocate after having been duly enrolled as such under the Advocates, Act, 1961; (d) Possesses good health, is of sound moral character and is not involved in, or related any criminal case of any type involving moral turpitude.” (Emphasis supplied) The petitioners in all the aforesaid writ petitions are general category candidates, and hence, as on cutoff date, i.e., 31.01.2016 the minimum age should be 35 years and maximum should be 45 years only. Thus, general category candidates can apply for the post in question. Preliminary examination for the aforesaid post is going to be conducted after 4 days, i.e., on 25.02.2018. As the advertisement was given in the year 2017, the cut-off date of all the candidates is 31.01.2016 which is eventually applicable to all the general category candidates and other candidates for calculation of their age limit. The last date for preferring the application was 15.11.2017, whereas writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6699 of 2017 has been filed on 17.11.2017 with a prayer of change of cut-off date so as to accommodate the petitioners. In W.P.(S) No.6302 of 2017, the date of birth of the petitioner – Krishna Kumar Mishra, is 01.12.1970, and hence, his age as on cut-off date 31.01.2016, is 45 years and 02 months. Thus, this petitioner is seeking cut-off date to be shifted for two months which can be 30.11.2015. In W.P.(S) No.6302 of 2017, the date of birth of the petitioner – Krishna Kumar Mishra, is 01.12.1970, and hence, his age as on cut-off date 31.01.2016, is 45 years and 02 months. Thus, this petitioner is seeking cut-off date to be shifted for two months which can be 30.11.2015. Nonetheless, in this writ petition prayer for change of cut-off date is demanded by this petitioner is 31.01.2013. We do not see any reason of such prayer which includes two more years, though not required for this petitioner. There are four petitioners in W.P.(S) No.6204 of 2017 and the date of birth of the petitioners are as follows :- Petitioner Numbers Date of Birth Age as on 31.01.2016 Petitioner No.1 11/02/69 46 years & 11 months Petitioner No.2 27/05/70 45 years & 08 months Petitioner No.3 06/01/71 45 years & 25 days Petitioner No.4 01/01/69 47 years. In writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6699 of 2017, the date of birth of the petitioners are as under :- Petitioner Numbers Date of Birth Age as on 31.01.2016 Petitioner No.1 15/01/68 48 years & 16 days Petitioner No.2 28/12/66 49 years, 1 month & 3 days Petitioner No.3 01/01/67 49 years 1 month Petitioner No.4 15/08/69 46 years & 04 months Thus, these petitioners are seeking separate cut-off date instead of 31.01.2016 so that they can also be accommodated and so that they can be more eligible than what is prescribed under Rule 9 of the Rules, 2001. Thus, all these petitions have prayed for change of cut-off date from 31.01.2016 to 31.01.2011 (as prayed in W.P.(S) No.6204 of 2017 as well as in W.P.(S) No.6699 of 2017) and 31.01.2013 (as prayed in W.P.(S) No.6302 of 2017). 3. The arguments canvassed by the counsels for the petitioners : I. Senior counsel, Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, has submitted that the date of preliminary examination is 25.02.2018, i.e., after 04 days, and hence, let these petitioners be allowed to appear in the ensuing examination or the matter may be finally heard by this Court. II. It is further submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that change of cut-off date is necessary because earlier the examination for the post of District Judges was conducted in the year 2011 and this examination is conducted after 07 years. In fact cut-off date should have been 31.01.2011. III. II. It is further submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that change of cut-off date is necessary because earlier the examination for the post of District Judges was conducted in the year 2011 and this examination is conducted after 07 years. In fact cut-off date should have been 31.01.2011. III. It is further submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that in the several decisions given by this Court, the cut-off date has been altered and reliance has placed upon the decisions reported in 2008 (2) JLJR 543 ; 2005 (3) JCR 505 ; (2006) 9 SCC 507 ; 2014 (1) JLJR 217 (for the interim relief) and the judgment and order dated 16.01.2014 in W.P.(S) No.7526 of 2013. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel that cut-off date can always be altered by this Court. In a decision given in W.P.(S) No.7526 of 2013, cut-off date was shifted from 31.01.2013 to 31.01.2009. Every year examination is not being conducted though it is required as per the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2006) 9 SCC 507 , and hence, let the cutoff date be shifted from 31.01.2016 to 31.01.2011 so that all these petitioners may be accommodated. IV. It is also submitted by the counsels for the petitioners that vacancies are of the year 2011, and hence, the cut-off date should be prescribed as on 31.01.2011. 4. Arguments canvassed by the counsels for the respondents : I. Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that advertisement No.1 of 2017, which has been given on 13.10.2017 for the post of District Judges from the Bar, is in consonance with the Rule 9 of the Rules, 2001. II. The validity of this Rule, 2001 is not under challenge at all looking to the prayers in the aforesaid writ petitions. III. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that as the advertisement was published on 31.10.2017, the cut-off date prescribed is 31.01.2016 and these petitioners are over age as on 31.01.2016, some by few days, some by few months, some by few years and some of the petitioners are over age by limited years. If any accommodative approach is propounded by this Court then other candidates may also apply to this Court and again the cut-off date will have to be changed. IV. If any accommodative approach is propounded by this Court then other candidates may also apply to this Court and again the cut-off date will have to be changed. IV. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that prescribing a cut-off date is the prerogative powers of the rule making authority and unless such cut-off date is capricious, whimsical or unless it is very wide off mark as to make it wholly unreasonable, such cut-off date may not be altered by this Court. V. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that whenever a cut-off date is prescribed it will be bound for few candidates, who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. Whenever any cut-off date is prescribed, it will be bound for few candidates who will be over age. All cannot be accommodated. VI. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that there cannot be any cut-off date which never makes the candidates over age. If this type of petitions are allowed, then it will be injustice to those candidates who have not applied for the post in question thinking that they are over age as on 31.01.2016. In fact prescription of the cut-off date is the prerogative power of the rule making authority, and hence, there is no corresponding right vested in any of the citizens. That there is right vested in all the citizens to have a particular type of cut-off date there is no corresponding duty vested in the rule making authority, much less there is public duty vested in the respondents, and hence, no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the respondents to change the cut-off date. Thus, once there is power vested in the respondents to prescribe a cut-off date, it cannot be equated with public duty of the respondents, and hence, no writ of mandamus can be issued for the so called breach of the public duty. VII. Thus, once there is power vested in the respondents to prescribe a cut-off date, it cannot be equated with public duty of the respondents, and hence, no writ of mandamus can be issued for the so called breach of the public duty. VII. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be exercised for alteration of the cut-off date otherwise, every now and then, such type of dates re-fixed by the order of the Court will also be required to be altered, because even after alteration of the cut-off date still there will be few candidates who will be again over age, and if such type of accommodative approach is propounded by this Court, perhaps a candidate having the age of 59 years and 6 months can also apply for the post in question, the age of superannuation is 60 years. VIII. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that even to accommodate these petitioners in only these three writ petitions, also no lumpsum or general concession can be given by altering the cut-off date. Such type of lumpsum, general or wholesale concession cannot be given by this Court in view of the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which are as under :- (a) (1975) 1 SCC 305 ; (b) AIR 1985 SC 1367 ; (c) (1990) 2 SCC 669 ; (d) (1990) 3 SCC 368 ; (e) (1994) 4 SCC 212 ; (f) (1996) 10 SCC 536 ; (g) (1997) 6 SCC 614 (h) (2003) 9 SCC 519 ; (i) (2004) 2 SCC 76 ; (j) (2006) 8 SCC 671 (k) (2008) 14 SCC 702 ; and (l) (2009) 9 SCC 135 . IX. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that judgment delivered by this Court, as relied upon by the counsels for the petitioners are per incuriam judgment and they are indirectly over-ruled. X. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court which is based on the concession given by the Advocate General, is of no help to the petitioners and said judgment is reported in 2008 (2) JLJR 543 = 2008 (3) JCR 267 . XI. X. It is further submitted by the counsels for the respondents that the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court which is based on the concession given by the Advocate General, is of no help to the petitioners and said judgment is reported in 2008 (2) JLJR 543 = 2008 (3) JCR 267 . XI. Counsels appearing for the respondents submitted that if the judgment delivered by this Court is per incuriam, i.e., out of ignorance or by ignoring several decisions delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, are of no help to these petitioners, and these writ petitions may not be allowed on the basis of the per incuriam decision or which are indirectly over-ruled decision. To fortify this contention, counsel for the respondents have relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which are as under:- (a) (1989) 1 SCC 101 ; (b) (1991) 4 SCC 139 ; (c) (2004) 13 SCC 217 ; (d) (2014) 7 SCC 663 ; (e) (2014) 12 SCC 696 ; (f) (2015) 4 SCC 1 ; (g) (2015) 10 SCC 333 ; and (h) (2017) 4 SCC 760 . XII. Counsels appearing for the respondents submitted that prescription of the cut-off date is a policy decision of the respondents. Prescription of the cut-off date is a complex phenomena and depends upon the several factors, such as, which age group candidates should be selected with a maximum limit of the age, is the prerogative power of the respondents. XIII. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is jointly submitted by the counsels for the respondents that cutoff date prescribed under Rule 9 of the Rules, 2001, which is 31.01.2016, may not be altered just to accommodate these petitioners, otherwise there will be no end of re-fixation of the cut-off date, hence, these writ petitions may not be entertained by this Court. Reasons : 5. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we see no reason to entertain these writ petitions mainly for the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements :- I. Advertisement No.1 of 2017 was given in the widely circulated local Newspaper and thereafter on the website also inviting applications for the post of District Judges from the Bar. II. II. These appointments are being governed by the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001. Advertisement No.1 of 2017 was given as per Rule 9 of the Rules, 2001, and as per the Rule, general category candidates should have an age as on 31.01.2016 more than 35 years and less than 45 years. III. These writ petitioners in above three writ petitions, as stated here-in-above, are of different age group as on 31.01.2016 varying from 50 years to 45 years and 25 days. Now, these candidates are in search of change of cut-off date so that all can prefer applications for the post of District Judges, which is not permissible in the eye of law. IV. To prescribe a cut-off date is a policy decision of the respondents and just to accommodate the petitioners, the cut-off date cannot be altered by this Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. V. Even if, the cut-off date is altered by this Court, there will be still few candidates, who will fall on wrong side of cut-off date. There cannot be any cut-off date whereby nobody feel aggrieved. There are bound to be few persons who will be over age, even if cut-off date is altered by this Court, and hence no such “accommodative approach” can be adopted by this Court while exercising power of judicial review. VI. No right is vested in these petitioners to have a particular type of cut-off date, so that they can apply for the post in question. Similarly, there is no duty vested in the respondents, to fix a particular type of cut-off date so that there may not be any aggrieved party. On the contrary, prescription of a cut-off date is a prerogative power of the respondents-authority and hence there is no corresponding right vested in the petitioners. Once there is no public duty vested in the respondents to prescribe a particular cut-off date, no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the respondents. Neither any law nor any cut-off date nor any judgment can accommodate all. VII. Once there is no public duty vested in the respondents to prescribe a particular cut-off date, no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the respondents. Neither any law nor any cut-off date nor any judgment can accommodate all. VII. If these type of petitions are allowed just to accommodate these petitioners, then every now and then similar type of matters will come to the Court, and if we allow a candidate aged about 49 years to prefer an application, then why not to a candidate aged about 50 years. If we allow a candidate aged about 50 years, then why not all the candidates aged about 55 years and so forth, and slowly this cut-off date will allow a candidate to prefer an application for the post in question just before couple of days of the age of his superannuation. This is not permissible in the eye of law. Unless the cutoff date is whimsical, capricious, arbitrary or wide off the mark, as to make it wholly unreasonable, it cannot be altered by the Court. In this eventualities only, the cut-off date can be further scrutinized by this Court. Looking to the facts of the present case, the prescription of the cut-off date, i.e., 31.01.2016 is in consonance with the Rule 9 of the Rules, 2001. Rule 9 has already been quoted under the heading 'Factual Matrix'. As advertisement was given in the year 2017, cut-off date has been prescribed as 31.01.2016 which is equally applicable to all the candidates, reserved and unreserved category of candidates. VIII. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another Vs. M/s Parameswaran Match Works & Others, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 305 , in paragraph no.10, which reads as under : “10. The concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the notification. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Dr Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. per Justice Holmes.” (Emphasis Supplied) VIX. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. (Mrs.) Sushma Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in A.I.R, 1985 SC 1367, in paragraph no.29, which read as under : “29. The object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing. So therefore experience and continuous employment were necessary ingredients. The Hindi version of the Ordinance used the expression “ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein” is capable of meaning “and are continuing” to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. So therefore experience and continuous employment were necessary ingredients. The Hindi version of the Ordinance used the expression “ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein” is capable of meaning “and are continuing” to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. Keeping the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper construction which is in consonance with the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object of the Act then in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should be construed to mean that only those would be eligible for screening who were appointed prior to 25-6-1975 and were continuing at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12-6-1978 i.e. approximately about three years. If that is the correct reading, then we are unable to accept the criticism that those who were for a short period appointed prior to 25-6- 1975 then again with interruption were working only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12-6- 1978 would also be eligible. In other words people with very short experience would be eligible for absorption. That cannot be the purpose of the Act. It cannot be so read reasonably. Therefore on a proper construction it means that all temporary lecturers who were appointed as such on or before 25-6-1975 and were continuing as such at the commencement of the Ordinance shall be considered by the University for screening for absorption. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. If a Legislature considers a particular period of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such a decision is not subject to judicial review. Keeping the aforesaid reasonable meaning of clause (3) of the Ordinance and section 3 of the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed for screening for absorption was not irrational criterion or a criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Keeping the aforesaid reasonable meaning of clause (3) of the Ordinance and section 3 of the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed for screening for absorption was not irrational criterion or a criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the criticism that a teacher who was working even for two or three months only before 25-6-1975 and then with long interruptions was in employment of the University at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance would be eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from 26-6-1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e. 25th June, 1975 for three years would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against long experience, cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language used in the provisions concerned. It is well-settled that if a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or for absorption, it is within the wisdom of the Legislature, and what period should be sufficient for a particular job or a particular employment is not subject to judicial review. We need not refer to a large number of decisions on this point.” (Emphasis Supplied) X. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Public Service Commission Vs. B. Sarat Chandra, reported in (1990) 2 SCC 669 , in paragraph nos.6, 7 & 8, which read as under : “6. There is no dispute that the eligibility of a candidate as to age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police should be determined according to Rule 5 of the A.P. Police Services Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to look first at that Rule. Rule 5 so far as is relevant provides: “5. Qualifications.— (A) No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Category 2 by direct recruitment unless he — (i) has completed the age of 21 years and had not completed the age of 26 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. * * *” 7. The rule prescribes the minimum as well as the maximum age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Minimum age is 21 years. * * *” 7. The rule prescribes the minimum as well as the maximum age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Minimum age is 21 years. The candidate must have completed 21 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. He should not have also completed 26 years as on that day. The Tribunal while construing this rule has observed: “According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in forwarding the list to the appointing authority. The essence of the process lies in the preparation of the list. A selection can be said to have been done only when the list is prepared. In this view the eligibility of the candidates as to age has to be determined at this stage.” If the word ‘selection’ is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment, then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps. When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to construe the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the rule making authority. 8. The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal. (emphasis supplied) XI. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Ramjee Prasad, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 368 , in paragraph no.8, which reads as under : “8. In the present case as pointed out earlier the past practice was to fix the last date for receipt of applications a month or one and a half months after the date of actual publication of the advertisement. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. The respondents and some of the intervenors who were not completing the required experience by that date, therefore, challenged the fixation of the last date as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is obvious that in fixing the last date as January 31, 1988 the State Government had only followed the past practice and if the High Court's attention had been invited to this fact it would perhaps have refused to interfere since its interference is based on the erroneous belief that the past practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year as the last date for receipt of applications. Except for leaning on a past practice the High Court has not assigned any reasons for its choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is not the case of anyone that experienced candidates were not available in sufficient numbers on the cut-off date. Merely because the respondents and some others would qualify for appointment if the last date for receipt of applications is shifted from January 31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is no reason for dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or irrational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in striking down the government's action of fixing the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988 as arbitrary.” (Emphasis Supplied) XII. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another Vs. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 212 , in paragraph nos.7, 8 & 11, which read as under : “7. In this context, it would also be useful to state that when a court is called upon to decide such a matter, mere errors are not subject to correction in exercise of power of judicial review; it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared to be void, as stated in Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago in which Justice McKenna observed as follows: “It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void ....” The aforesaid was noted by this Court in Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan in which case also reasonability of fixation of a date for a particular purpose had come up for examination. 8. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void ....” The aforesaid was noted by this Court in Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan in which case also reasonability of fixation of a date for a particular purpose had come up for examination. 8. Having known the legal parameters within which we have to function, let it be seen whether fixation of 1st August as cut-off date for determining the eligibility of applicants qua their age can be held to be arbitrary despite preliminary examination being conducted before that date. As to why the cut-off date has not been changed despite the decision to hold preliminary examination, has been explained in paragraph 3 of the special leave petition. The sum and substance of the explanation is that preliminary examination is only a screening test and marks obtained in this examination do not count for determining the order of merit, for which purpose the marks obtained in the main examination, which is still being held after 1st August, alone are material. In view of this, it cannot be held that continuation of treating 1st August as the cut-off date, despite the Union Public Service Commission having introduced the method of preliminary examination which is held before 1st August, can be said to be “very wide off any reasonable mark” or so capricious or whimsical as to permit judicial interference. xx xx xx 11. For the aforesaid reasons, equity does not demand any favour to be shown to the respondent. The result is that appeal is allowed with costs by setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal. Cost assessed as Rs 10,000. The respondent would not be treated or deemed to have passed the examination in question and whatever benefit of the same was given to him pursuant to Tribunal's directions shall stand cancelled.” (Emphasis Supplied) XIII. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of University Grants Commission Vs. Sadhana Chaudhary & Ors., reported in (1996) 10 SCC 536 , in paragraph no.21, which reads as under : “21. We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of University Grants Commission Vs. Sadhana Chaudhary & Ors., reported in (1996) 10 SCC 536 , in paragraph no.21, which reads as under : “21. We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan at p. 269.) In the present case, the date, 31-12- 1993, as fixed by notification dated 21-6-1995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of lecturer has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken in submitting the Ph.D. thesis or obtaining M. Phil. degree by candidates who had undertaken the study for Ph.D. or M. Phil. degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31-12- 1993, cannot be held to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cut-off date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. The High Court was in error in taking this view. ...... (emphasis supplied) XIV. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , in paragraph nos.5, 7, 11 and 17, which read as under : “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , in paragraph nos.5, 7, 11 and 17, which read as under : “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. SaratChandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, “when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age. 7. In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut-off date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. 17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cut-off date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cut-off date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs.” (emphasis supplied) XV. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shankar K. Mandal & Others Vs. State of Bihar & Others., reported in (2003) 9 SCC 519 , in paragraph no.5, which reads as under : “5. Pursuant to the directions contained in the earlier judgment of the High Court as affirmed by this Court, a fresh exercise was undertaken. Since the present appellants were not selected, writ petitions were filed before the High Court. State of Bihar & Others., reported in (2003) 9 SCC 519 , in paragraph no.5, which reads as under : “5. Pursuant to the directions contained in the earlier judgment of the High Court as affirmed by this Court, a fresh exercise was undertaken. Since the present appellants were not selected, writ petitions were filed before the High Court. In the writ petition which was filed by fifty-five persons and disposed of by the Division Bench the conclusions were essentially as follows: (1) Some of the writ petitioners (Writ Petitioners 5, 18, 23, 28, 41 and 53) were overage at the time of their initial appointment and their cases were, therefore, wholly covered by the directions given by the High Court, and they were not entitled to relaxation of age; (2) So far as Writ Petitioners 6, 26, 30 and 55 are concerned, the stand was that they had not crossed the age-limit at the time of making the applications for appointment and, therefore, were within the age-limit at the time of initial appointment and were, therefore, entitled to relaxation of age in terms of the judgment passed by the High Court earlier and affirmed by this Court. This plea was turned down on the ground that what was relevant for consideration related to the age at the time of initial appointment and not making of the application; (3) As regards Writ Petitioner 24, he was underage at the time of appointment. He was permitted to file a representation before the Director of Primary Education and the High Court ordered that his case would be considered afresh; (4) In respect of Writ Petitioners 9 and 17, it was noted that they were refused absorption on the ground that they had not made any application in response to advertisement issued pursuant to the order passed by this Court. Since no material was placed to substantiate this stand and no reasons had been communicated for non-absorption, direction was given to consider representations if made by them within one month from the date of judgment. The said judgment is under challenge in CA No. 916 of 1999. The appellants have taken the stand that in terms of this Court's judgment, a person who was not overage on the date of initial appointment was to be considered. The said judgment is under challenge in CA No. 916 of 1999. The appellants have taken the stand that in terms of this Court's judgment, a person who was not overage on the date of initial appointment was to be considered. Though it was conceded before the High Court that they were overage at the time of initial appointment, much would turn as to what is the date of initial appointment. The High Court had not considered as to what was the applicable rule so far as the eligibility regarding age is concerned. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent State however submitted that having made a concession before the High Court that they were overage on the date of appointment, it is not open to the appellants to take a different stand. The crucial question is whether appellants were overage on the date of their initial appointment. It is true that there was concession before the High Court that they were overage on the date of initial appointment. But there was no concession that they were overage at the time of making the application. There was no definite material before the High Court as to what was the eligibility criteria so far as age is concerned. No definite material was placed before the High Court and also before this Court to give a definite finding on that aspect. What happens when a cut-off date is fixed for fulfilling the prescribed qualification relating to age by a candidate for appointment and the effect of any non-prescription has been considered by this Court in several cases. The principles culled out from the decisions of this Court (see Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar, Bhupinderpal Singh v. State of Punjab and Jasbir Rani v. State of Punjab) are as follows: (1) The cut-off date by reference to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules. (2) If there is no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date shall be as appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications. (3) If there is no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications were to be received by the competent authority.” (Emphasis Supplied) XVI. (3) If there is no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications were to be received by the competent authority.” (Emphasis Supplied) XVI. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramrao Vs. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn., reported in (2004) 2 SCC 76 , in paragraph nos.29 to 36, which read as under : “29. It is now well settled that for the purpose of effecting promotion, the employer is required to fix a date for the purpose of effecting promotion and, thus, unless a cut-off date so fixed is held to be arbitrary or unreasonable, the same cannot be set aside as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the cut-off date so fixed having regard to the directions contained by the National Industrial Tribunal which had been given a retrospective effect cannot be said to be arbitrary, irrational, whimsical or capricious. 30. The learned counsel could not point out as to how the said date can be said to be arbitrary and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary1 it has been observed: (SCC p. 546, para 21) “21. ... It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, SCC at 310 : SCR at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, SCC at 66 : SCR at p. 269.)” 32. If a cut-off date can be fixed, indisputably those who fall within the purview thereof would form a separate class. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, SCC at 310 : SCR at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, SCC at 66 : SCR at p. 269.)” 32. If a cut-off date can be fixed, indisputably those who fall within the purview thereof would form a separate class. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object which the decision of the Bank to promote its employees seeks to achieve. Such classifications would neither fall within the category of creating a class within a class or an artificial classification so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 33. Whenever such a cut-off date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cut-off date, but, the fact that some persons or a section of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 34. In State of W.B. v. Monotosh Roy it was held: (SCC pp. 76-77, paras 13-15) “13. In All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Assn. v. Union of India a Bench of this Court distinguished the judgment in Nakara and pointed out that it is for the Government to fix a cut-off date in the case of introducing a new pension scheme. The Court negatived the claim of the persons who had retired prior to the cut-off date and had collected their retiral benefits from the employer. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. P.N. Menon. In State of Rajasthan v. Amrit Lal Gandhi the ruling in P.N. Menon case was followed and it was reiterated that in matters of revising the pensionary benefits and even in respect of revision of scales of pay, a cut-off date on some rational or reasonable basis has to be fixed for extending the benefits. 14. In State of U.P. v. Jogendra Singh a Division Bench of this Court held that liberalized provisions introduced after an employee's retirement with regard to retiral benefits cannot be availed of by such an employee. In that case the employee retired voluntarily on 12-4-1976. Later on, the statutory rules were amended by notification dated 18-11-1976 granting benefit of additional qualifying service in case of voluntary retirement. In that case the employee retired voluntarily on 12-4-1976. Later on, the statutory rules were amended by notification dated 18-11-1976 granting benefit of additional qualifying service in case of voluntary retirement. The Court held that the employee was not entitled to get the benefit of the liberalized provision which came into existence after his retirement. A similar ruling was rendered in V. Kasturi v. Managing Director, State Bank of India. 15. The present case will be governed squarely by the last two rulings referred to above. We have no doubt whatever that the first respondent is not entitled to the relief prayed for by him in the writ petition.” 35. In Vice-Chairman & Managing Director, A.P. SIDC Ltd. v. R.Varaprasad in relation to “cut-off” date fixed for the purpose of implementation of Voluntary Retirement Scheme, it was said: (SCC p. 580, para 11) “The employee may continue in service in the interregnum by virtue of clause (i) but that cannot alter the date on which the benefits that were due to an employee under VRS were to be calculated. Clause (c) itself indicates that any increase in salary after the cut-off point/date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of payments to which an employee is entitled under VRS.” 36. The High Court in its impugned judgment has arrived at a finding of fact that the Association had failed to prove any malice on the part of the authorities of the Bank in fixing the cut-off date. A plea of malice as is well known must be specifically pleaded and proved. Even such a requirement has not been complied with by the writ petitioners.” ” (Emphasis Supplied) XVII. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Others Vs. Sajal Kumar Roy & Ors., reported in (2006) 8 SCC 671 , in paragraph nos.10 & 11, which read as under : “10. It is not in dispute that the appellants have framed rules for recruitment known as the Education Code for Kendriya Vidyalayas. Article 45 of the said Code provides for age-limit in the following terms: “45. Sajal Kumar Roy & Ors., reported in (2006) 8 SCC 671 , in paragraph nos.10 & 11, which read as under : “10. It is not in dispute that the appellants have framed rules for recruitment known as the Education Code for Kendriya Vidyalayas. Article 45 of the said Code provides for age-limit in the following terms: “45. Age-limits The following upper age-limits have been prescribed for recruitment to the posts: Assistant Commissioner 30-40 years Principal 35-50 years PGT 40 years TGT 35 years Primary teacher 30 years Music teacher 30 years Other teachers including librarian 35 years LDC and UDC 25 years Group D Lab Attendants 18-25 years The upper age-limits are relaxable in the case of special categories as follows: (i) Scheduled Caste/Tribe - 5 years (ii) Retrenched Central Government - Period of their service in employees including defence civil/military departments personnel increased by 3 years The appointing authority can, in his discretion, relax these age-limits in deserving cases on the recommendation of the Appointing Committee/Selection Committee.” 11. The respondents are not members of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Age-limit is prescribed for appointment to the general category of employees. The upper age-limit for appointment to the post of LDC is 25 years. The advertisement also says so. The Rules, as noticed hereinbefore, are in two parts. The first part talks about the age-limit. The second part provides for relaxation. Such relaxation can be granted for the purpose specified i.e. in favour of those who answered the descriptions stated therein. Relaxation of age-limit even in relation to the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribe candidates or the retrenched Central Government employees, including the defence personnel is, however, not automatic. The appointing authorities are required to apply their mind while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the age-limits. Discretion of the authorities is required to be exercised only for deserving candidates and upon recommendations of the Appointing Committee/Selection Committee. The requirements to comply with the rules, it is trite, were required to be complied with fairly and reasonably. They were bound by the rules. The discretionary jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation of age provided for in the rules and within the four corners thereof. The requirements to comply with the rules, it is trite, were required to be complied with fairly and reasonably. They were bound by the rules. The discretionary jurisdiction could be exercised for relaxation of age provided for in the rules and within the four corners thereof. As the respondents do not come within the purview of the exception contained in Article 45 of the Education Code, in our opinion, the Tribunal and consequently, the High Court committed a manifest error in issuing the aforementioned directions.” (Emphasis Supplied) XVIII. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Subbarayudu., reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702 , in paragraph nos.5 to 9, which read as under : “5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. 6. No doubt in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India this Court had struck down the cut-off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara case as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal. 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. SadhanaChaudhary, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. (emphasis supplied) XIX. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Public Service Commission & Ors. Vs. Arvind Singh Chauhan & Ors., reported in (2009) 9 SCC 135 , in paragraph nos.19, 20, 23 and 24, which read as under : “19. As far as the finding of the High Court is concerned, had the intention of the Commission been to consider 31- 3-2003 as a cut-off date for eligibility, it would have been explicitly specified. The Division Bench has referred to the Circular dated 22-3-2002 issued by the Department of General Administration of the State Government. The relevant portion of the Circular reads: “Keeping in view the increasing problem of unemployed youths in the State and keeping the interest of the unemployed youths in mind, the Government has again considered and has taken a decision that a further relaxation of two years more needs to be given. The relevant portion of the Circular reads: “Keeping in view the increasing problem of unemployed youths in the State and keeping the interest of the unemployed youths in mind, the Government has again considered and has taken a decision that a further relaxation of two years more needs to be given. Meanwhile, thereby now from March 2000 to March 2003, the maximum age-limit for appointment in government services will be thirty-five years.” 20. Rule 5(C) of the State Services Examination Rules on which reliance was placed by the appellant states: “5. (C)(a) A candidate must have attained the age of 21 years and must not have attained the age of 30 years on 1st January next following the date of commencement of the competitive examination.” xx xx xx 23. On account of no record of any concession made on the part of the appellants and considering all the circumstances of the case, it is clear that the respondents were over aged on the specified cut-off dates which makes their application liable for cancellation. 24. In view of the above discussion, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.” (Emphasis Supplied) XX. In view of the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we see no reason to change the cut-off date from 31.01.2016 to 31.01.2011 (as prayed in W.P.(S) No.6204 of 2017 as well as in W.P.(S) No.6699 of 2017), neither there is any reason to alter the same and to re-fix it as 31.01.2013 (as prayed in W.P.(S) No.6302 of 2017). XXI. In the above writ petitions, two types of prayers are made for two cut-off dates. Thus, if these petitions are allowed there shall be “fluctuating cut-off date” which is also not permissible. “Fluctuating cut-off date” is nothing but “an accommodative approach”, which is not permissible. XXII. Whenever any cut-off date is prescribed, the candidates will be divided in two types of classes, one class will be of the candidates who are of the age of maximum 45 years as a general category candidate as on 31.01.2016, whereas another class will be more than 45 years of age, as general category candidate as on 31.01.2016. XXII. Whenever any cut-off date is prescribed, the candidates will be divided in two types of classes, one class will be of the candidates who are of the age of maximum 45 years as a general category candidate as on 31.01.2016, whereas another class will be more than 45 years of age, as general category candidate as on 31.01.2016. This classification is always valid even though no specific reasons have been assigned for grant of cut-off date as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India & Another Vs. M/s Parameswaran Match Works & Others, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 305 , and in the case of University Grants Commission Vs. Sadhana Chaudhary & Ors., reported in (1996) 10 SCC 536 . Cut-off date is prescribed by the respondents keeping in mind the several facts and circumstances. XXIII. Fixing cut-off date is a complex phenomenon and it is a policy decision of the respondents. Several factors are involved in fixing the cut-off date like it is a free volition of the respondent – Government to allow a particular age group candidates, looking to the need of the State Government. Sometimes from the very beginning if the elderly persons are recruited they will be slow in adopting new techniques, like using information technology. Per incuriam judgments:- XXIV. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the petitioners about the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court, reported in 2005 (3) JCR 505 and 2008 (2) JLJR 543 as well as the judgment delivered in W.P.(S) No.7524 of 2013 dated 16.01.2014, for change of cut-off date. None of the aforesaid judgments are helpful to the petitioners mainly for the following reasons :- (a) If any judgment is delivered out of ignorance, such type of judgment is known as per incuriam judgment; (b) If the earlier catena of decisions, rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, have never been cited before the earlier Division Bench nor the same have been discussed by the earlier Division Bench, and out of this type of ignorance, if any judgment is delivered then such type of judgments are per incuriam and impliedly overruled and the ratio propounded by such type of judgments are not binding. (c) 'Incuria' literally means carelessness. In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignorantium. (c) 'Incuria' literally means carelessness. In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignorantium. 'Per Incuriam' are those decisions given in ignorance in forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned. (d) Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. (e) The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a Court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same Court or the superior Court rendered on the same issue deciding that issue. (f) Therefore, when a Court delivers a judgment in obvious inadvertence or oversight of a plain statutory authority running counter to the reason and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedent. This is more so the case than such omission is obtrusive and glaring. (g) A decision or judgment can also be held to be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of co-equal or larger Bench. (h) A judgment in which there is no consideration of the principle of law and thus, the said order without there being contest on the principle of law cannot be treated as a precedent for deciding the legal issue at hand. (i) Any decision of the High Court which has taken a view contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court would stand overruled as a consequence of the same. (j) In a matter wherein the decision of the Supreme Court holds binding authority, and same has been erroneously ignored, then any subsequent decision must implicitly follow the decision of the Supreme Court holding such ignorant judgment as impliedly overruled. (k) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Antulay Vs. R. S. Nayak, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602 , in paragraph no.42, which reads as under :- “42. (k) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Antulay Vs. R. S. Nayak, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602 , in paragraph no.42, which reads as under :- “42. It appears that when this Court gave the aforesaid directions on 16-2-1984, for the disposal of the case against the appellant by the High Court, the directions were given oblivious of the relevant provisions or law and the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar case. See Hulsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 26, page 297, para 578 and page 300, the relevant notes 8, 11 and 15; Dias on Jurisprudence, 5th Edn., pages 128 and 130; Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. Also see the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore v. Hewitt and Penny v. Nicholas. “Per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. See Morelle v. Wakeling. Also see State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. We are of the opinion that in view of the clear provisions of Section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, these directions were legally wrong.” (Emphasis supplied) (d) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 682 , in paragraph no.40, which reads as under :- “40. We now deal with the question of per incuriam by reason of allegedly not following the Constitution Bench decisions. The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. A decision can be said generally to be given per incuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when a High Court has acted in ignorance of a decision of this Court. It cannot be doubted that Article 141 embodies, as a rule of law, the doctrine of precedents on which our judicial system is based. It cannot be doubted that Article 141 embodies, as a rule of law, the doctrine of precedents on which our judicial system is based. In Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar, it was held that the words of Article 141, “binding on all courts within the territory of India”, though wide enough to include the Supreme Court, do not include the Supreme Court itself, and it is not bound by its own judgments but is free to reconsider them in appropriate cases. This is necessary for proper development of law and justice. May be for the same reasons before judgments were given in the House of Lords and Re Dawson’s Settlement Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Dawson, on July 26, 1966 Lord Gardiner, L.C. made the following statement on behalf of himself and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary: “Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law.” (Emphasis supplied) (e) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., reported in (1991) 4 SCC 139 , in paragraph no.41, which reads as under :- “41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law? Here again the English courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law? Here again the English courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. “A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind.” (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn., p. 153). In Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered ‘without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority’. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur. The bench held that, ‘precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment’. The courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry it was observed, ‘it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein’. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law.” (Emphasis supplied) (f) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Vs. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 458 , in paragraph no.98, which reads as under :- “98. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 458 , in paragraph no.98, which reads as under :- “98. It is also well known that a decision rendered in ignorance of a binding precedent and/or in ignorance of a constitutional provision, would be held to have been rendered per incuriam.” (Emphasis supplied) (g) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Mhaharashtra, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 694 , in paragraph nos.128 to 136, which read as under :- “128. Now we deem it imperative to examine the issue of per incuriam raised by the learned counsel for the parties. In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. the House of Lords observed that “Incuria” literally means “carelessness”. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The “quotable in law” is avoided and ignored if it is rendered in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority. The same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law**. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders: Judicial Decisions as Authorities (pp. 297-98, Para 578) per incuriam has been elucidated as under: A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., KB at p. 729 : All ER at p. 300). In Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson, or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force. 129. Lord Goddard, C.J. in Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson observed that where a case or statute had not been brought to the court’s attention and the court gave the decision in ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of the case or statute, it would be a decision rendered per incuriam. 130. This Court in Govt. 129. Lord Goddard, C.J. in Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson observed that where a case or statute had not been brought to the court’s attention and the court gave the decision in ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of the case or statute, it would be a decision rendered per incuriam. 130. This Court in Govt. of A.P. v. B. Satyanarayana Rao observed as under: (SCC p. 264, para 8) “8. … The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same court or the superior court rendered on the same issue or where a court omits to consider any statute while deciding that issue.” 131. In a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, Pathak, C.J. observed as under: (SCC p. 766, para 9) “9. The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transactions forming part of his daily affairs. And, there fore, the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court.” 132. In Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikyamma a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the three-Judge Bench decision in Karmi v. Amru was per incuriam and observed as under: (Thota case, SCC p. 320, para 10) “10. … It is a short judgment without adverting to any provisions of Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither makes any mention of any argument raised in this regard nor is there any mention of the earlier decision in Badri Prasad v. Kanso Devi. The decision in Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit and scope of Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Act.” 133. In R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the question is whether it was bound to accept the decision rendered in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Mazdoor Sabha which was not in conformity with the decision of a Constitution Bench in P.H. Kalyani v. Air France. J.S. Verma, J. speaking for the Court observed as under: (R. Thiruvirkolam case, SCC p. 14, para 11) “11. J.S. Verma, J. speaking for the Court observed as under: (R. Thiruvirkolam case, SCC p. 14, para 11) “11. With great respect, we must say that the above quoted observations in Gujarat Steel at p. 215 are not in line with the decision in Kalyani which was binding or with D.C. Roy to which the learned Judge, Krishna Iyer, J. was a party. It also does not match with the underlying juristic principle discussed in Wade. For these reasons, we are bound to follow the Constitution Bench decision in Kalyani which is the binding authority on the point.” 134. In Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Mumbai Shramik Sangha a Constitution Bench of this Court ruled that a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court binds a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court and that judicial discipline obliges them to follow it, regardless of their doubts about its correctness. 135. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra has observed that: (SCC p. 682, para 12) “(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength.” 136. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Official Liquidator v. Dayanand again reiterated the clear position of law that by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution, the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi is binding on all courts including this Court till the same is overruled by a larger Bench. The ratio of the Constitution Bench has to be followed by Benches of lesser strength. In SCC para 90, the Court observed as under: (Official Liquidator case, SCC p. 57) “90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed.” (Emphasis supplied) (h) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 , in paragraph nos.64 & 65, which read as under :- “64. “Incuria” literally means “carelessness”. In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. The courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. Thus the “quotable in law”, is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority. 65. In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal this Court held: (SCC p. 235, para 7) “7. … where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission.” (Emphasis supplied) (i) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. P. Rural Road Development Authority VS. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers & Contractors, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 4958, in paragraph nos.28 to 31, which read as under :- “28. The principle of per incuriam has been very succinctly formulated by the Court of Appeal in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. Lord Greene, Master of Rolls formulated the principles on the basis of which a decision can be said to have been rendered “per incuriam”. The principle of per incuriam has been very succinctly formulated by the Court of Appeal in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. Lord Greene, Master of Rolls formulated the principles on the basis of which a decision can be said to have been rendered “per incuriam”. The principles are: (KB p. 729) “… Where the court has construed a statute or a rule having the force of a statute its decision stands on the same footing as any other decision on a question of law, but where the court is satisfied that an earlier decision was given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or a rule having the force of a statute the position is very different. It cannot, in our opinion, be right to say that in such a case the court is entitled to disregard the statutory provision and is bound to follow a decision of its own given when that provision was not present to its mind. Cases of this description are examples of decisions given per incuriam.” 29. The decision in Young was subsequently approved by the House of Lords in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., AC at p. 169 of the Report. Lord Viscount Simon in the House of Lords expressed His Lordship’s agreement with the views expressed by Lord Greene, the Master of Rolls in the Court of Appeal on the principle of per incuriam (see the speech of Lord Viscount Simon in Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. case, AC at p. 169 of the Report). 30. Those principles have been followed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (see the discussion in SCR at pp. 622 and 623 of the Report). 31. The same principle has been reiterated by Lord Evershed, Master of Rolls, in Morelle Ld. v. Wakeling, QB at p. 406. 30. Those principles have been followed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (see the discussion in SCR at pp. 622 and 623 of the Report). 31. The same principle has been reiterated by Lord Evershed, Master of Rolls, in Morelle Ld. v. Wakeling, QB at p. 406. The principle has been stated as follows: “… As a general rule the only cases in which decisions should be held to have been given per incuriam are those of decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned; so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found, on that account, to be demonstrably wrong.” (Emphasis supplied) (j) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandeep Kumar Bafna Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2014) 16 SCC 623 , in paragraph no.19, which reads as under :- “19. It cannot be over emphasised that the discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of a decision on the application of the per incuriam rule is of great importance, since without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of this Court. It must immediately be clarified that the per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly applicable to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta. It is often encountered in High Courts that two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of the Supreme Court are cited at the Bar. We think that the inviolable recourse is to apply the earliest view as the succeeding ones would fall in the category of per incuriam. (Emphasis supplied) (k) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Kumar Gupta Vs. We think that the inviolable recourse is to apply the earliest view as the succeeding ones would fall in the category of per incuriam. (Emphasis supplied) (k) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 760 , in paragraph no.17, which reads as under :- “17. We may now refer to an order of this Court dated 15-7-2004 which has been relied upon in the impugned judgment in para 31. There is no consideration of the principle of law and thus, the said order without there being contest on the principle of law could not be treated as a precedent for deciding the legal issue at hand. (Emphasis supplied) (l) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C. N. Rudramurthy Vs. K. Barkathulla Khan, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 275 , in paragraph no.6, which reads as under :- “6. In D.C. Bhatia case this Court was concerned with a provision under the Delhi Rent Control Act and Section 3(c) made it clear that the Act was not applicable to any premises whether residential or non-residential whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand rupees which is akin to the provision under Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. In Shobha Surendar case the High Court had proceeded to rely upon Padmanabha Rao case; when the matter was brought to this Court though no specific reference was made to Padmanabha Rao case this Court stated that the law laid down in D.C. Bhatia case would be applicable, it was not open to the High Court to state that it would prefer to follow the decision in Rattan Arya case. Indeed it is a matter of judicial discipline that requires that when this Court states as to what the law on the matter is, the same shall be binding on all the courts within the territory of India. This mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution is not based on any doctrine of precedents, but is an imprimatur to all courts that the law declared by this Court is binding on them. This mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution is not based on any doctrine of precedents, but is an imprimatur to all courts that the law declared by this Court is binding on them. If that is so, it was not open to the High Court to consider the effect of the decisions in Rattan Arya case, its scope, what was decided therein and whether there could be any distinction between that decision and the decision rendered in D.C. Bhatia case. The clear pronouncement made by this Court in Shobha Surendar case was that D.C. Bhatia case was applicable with reference to Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and, therefore, in view of that decision, the High Court’s decision was upset in another matter where the High Court had followed the Padmanabha Rao case. In effect, Padmanabha Rao case stood impliedly overruled. Thus, it was not at all open to the High Court to have tried to explain the decision of this Court and ought to have implicitly followed the decision of this Court. The law declared by this Court is clear that D.C. Bhatia case was applicable to the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. So it was not open to the learned Judge to take any other view in the matter. Thus we are of the view that the direction issued by the High Court to the parties to work out their remedies under the Rent Control Act is not at all correct.” (Emphasis supplied) (m) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. N. Agarwal Vs. R. C. Bansal, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 48 , in paragraph nos.28 & 29, which read as under :- “28. The Special Judge considering all those materials brought on record during investigation and relying upon the decisions of this Court in SWIL Ltd. v. State of Delhi, Nisar v. State of U.P., Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar and Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar, came to the conclusion that the respondents are involved in the commission of offence and consequently summons were issued against them. 29. While passing the impugned order the High Court instead of relying on the decisions of this Court reversed the order passed by the Special Judge by following the decision of the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Anirudh Sen case. 29. While passing the impugned order the High Court instead of relying on the decisions of this Court reversed the order passed by the Special Judge by following the decision of the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Anirudh Sen case. Prima facie, therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court quashing issuance of summons by the Special Judge against the respondents is erroneous in law and cannot be sustained. However, at this stage it was not necessary for the Special Judge to issue directions to CBI to get a case registered against the guilty officers who have investigated the case.” (Emphasis supplied) (n) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Himangni Enterprises Vs. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia, reported in (2017) 10 SCC 706, in paragraph no.25, which reads as under :- “25. We have gone through the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of her contention. Having gone through the same, we are of the considered opinion that firstly, some decisions are rendered by the High Court; secondly, remaining decisions are distinguishable on facts; and lastly, in the light of two authoritative decisions of this Court, which are directly on the point and continue to hold the field, no reliance can be placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on any decision of the High Court. Indeed, any such decision of the High Court, which has taken view contrary to the view of this Court, the same stands overruled. Such is the case here.” (Emphasis supplied) XXV. It further appears from the decisions upon which reliance is placed by the counsel for the petitioners especially the one which is reported in 2008 (2) JLJR 543 , a concession was given by the Advocate General, and hence, the cut-off date was altered, as stated in paragraph no.21 of the aforesaid decision. Such type of precedence cannot be a binding precedent. XXVI. In view of the aforesaid decisions, if the decision is given without there being any discussion of the earlier binding judgments then the judgment is known as per incuriam judgment. Judgment depends upon the arguments. Sometimes, there is a good assistance by the advocates and sometimes it is otherwise. Judges are not supposed to know, what is the fact and what is the law. Judges have to choose best matching of the two. Judgment depends upon the arguments. Sometimes, there is a good assistance by the advocates and sometimes it is otherwise. Judges are not supposed to know, what is the fact and what is the law. Judges have to choose best matching of the two. It is the duty of the counsel, who argue, to point out the correct facts and laws. If the earlier binding precedents have not been pointed out before the Division Bench and out of ignorance, a judgment has been delivered which runs counter to, the binding precedents as per Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Such judgments are known as per incuriam and ratio propounded by such type of precedents judgments are not binding. In fact per incuriam judgments are indirectly over ruled judgments. XXVII. As stated here-in-above, consistent views of the Hon'ble Supreme Court right from 1975 onwards that unless cut-off date is arbitrary, whimsical, capricious and so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable, the cut-off date cannot be altered by the Courts while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or while exercising powers under judicial review. The Courts cannot be more charitable than law. Charity beyond law is a cruelty to others. “Accommodative approach” cannot be adopted by this Court, when law is explicitly clear. Summary of principles :- XXVIII. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the law can be summarized as under :- (i) The choice of date as a basis for classification fixed by the legislature or its delegate cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary, even if, no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless, it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances, (ii) The cut-off date, to attain the minimum or maximum age, must be specific and determinate on a particular date and it cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date, because it may lead to consequences, anomalies and uncertainties. (iii) Mere errors of government in fixing of cutoff date, which may be unjust and oppressive are not subject to judicial review, it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared void. (iii) Mere errors of government in fixing of cutoff date, which may be unjust and oppressive are not subject to judicial review, it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared void. (iv) It is the discretion of the rule-making authority or employer, to fix a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post and it cannot be, per se arbitrary, unless the cut-off date, is as wide off the mark, as to make it wholly unreasonable. (v) A cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date and the persons falling on the wrong side cannot challenge the same, unless, it is as capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. (vi) There cannot be any “wholesale relaxation” on the ground that the advertisement is delayed unless, there is an allegation of any mala fides in connection with delay in issuing an advertisement. This wholesale relaxation would make total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate and it might be unfair for large number of similarly situated candidates who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. (vii) A cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of statute or executive order and if any hardship is caused to some persons or a section of society that may by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires to Article 14 of the constitution. (viii) The fixing of cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date is fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. Therefore the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. XXIX. The aforesaid view has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.429 of 2014 with L.P.A. No.3 of 2015 with L.P.A. No.4 of 2015 with L.P.A. No.9 of 2015. XXIX. The aforesaid view has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.429 of 2014 with L.P.A. No.3 of 2015 with L.P.A. No.4 of 2015 with L.P.A. No.9 of 2015. Judgment has been delivered by this very Division Bench vide judgment and order dated 03.07.2017, Special Leave Petition against which, has been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 25.01.2018 in Special Leave Petition Diary No.38114 of 2017. 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we are not inclined to change the cut-off date from 31.01.2016 to any other date and much less to 31.01.2011 or 31.01.2013, as prayed in these writ petitions. 7. Hence, there is no substance in these writ petitions and the same are, hereby, dismissed.