JUDGMENT : 1. There is a sole plaintiff and there are two defendants in the instant suit. 2. This suit was listed before this Commercial Division under the caption 'To Determine Jurisdiction'. 3. Mr. R. Parthasarathy, learned counsel on record for sole plaintiff and Mr. T. Mohan, learned counsel representing the counsel on record for Defendant No.1 as well as Defendant No.2 are before this Commercial Division. 4. Both the aforesaid learned counsel took different positions with regard to jurisdiction of this Commercial Division qua this suit. 5. Learned counsel for plaintiff submitted that this Commercial Division does have jurisdiction to entertain this suit under Section 7 of 'The Commercial Courts Act, 2015' ('said Act' for brevity), as the suit relates to a 'Commercial Dispute' of 'Specified Value'. To be noted, 'Commercial Dispute' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) and Specified Value within the meaning of Section 2(1)(i) read with Section 12 of said Act, is learned counsel's say. 6. Opposing the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for defendants, while agreeing that there is no dispute regarding 'Specified Value' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(i) read with Section 12 of said Act, submitted that this suit will not qualify as a 'Commercial Dispute' under sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of said Act. Even with regard to the question as to whether this suit will qualify under sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c), there was further narrowing down of the issue about which there shall be elaboration infra. 7. Before I delve into that, it may be necessary to give the factual matrix of the case in a nutshell for appreciating these proceedings. To be noted, only a thumbnail sketch of facts sans unnecessary details are given or in other words, the facts that are imperative and absolutely essential for appreciating this order/proceedings alone are set out infra. 8. There is no dispute between the two learned counsel before this Commercial Division that nucleus of this lis/suit is constituted by four agreements. These four agreements have been filed as Plaint Document Nos.6, 15, 21 and 23. Plaint Document No.6 is a Deed of Assignment dated 15.12.2006. Plaint Document No.15 is an addendum to said Deed of Assignment and it is dated 04.07.2007. These four agreements have been filed as Plaint Document Nos.6, 15, 21 and 23. Plaint Document No.6 is a Deed of Assignment dated 15.12.2006. Plaint Document No.15 is an addendum to said Deed of Assignment and it is dated 04.07.2007. Plaint Document No.21 is a Tripartite Agreement between the first plaintiff and another entity, which goes by the name Bhavya Conbuild Pvt. Ltd., Plaint Document No.23 is a Supplementary Agreement dated 25.02.2014. 9. Sum and substance of these four agreements is that the first defendant agreed to find a large tract of land for the plaintiff for the purpose of development of business/Commercial Centre in Chennai, a specific piece of land (along with some pre-existing buildings/superstructure thereon) ad-measuring 8.24 acres or thereabouts at No.120, Alandur Village, Tambaram Taluk, Kancheepuram District, Tamil Nadu (hereinafter 'suit property' for brevity ) was identified, thereafter both the defendants stated in unison that they assure and undertake to clear certain encumbrances in suit property including eviction of encroachers and get the suit property conveyed in favour of plaintiff, certain sums of money were paid by plaintiff to Defendants towards this, but defendants could not get the suit property conveyed in favour of plaintiff (free of encumbrances) resulting in the instant suit by the plaintiff for recovery of monies paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. 10. Having set out the factual matrix in nutshell, I now revert to determination of jurisdiction exercise, which is the subject matter of this order/proceedings. As already alluded to supra, there is no dispute or disagreement between the parties that this suit certainly qualifies qua 'specified value' under Section 2(1)(i) of said Act, plaintiff counsel pitches himself only under sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of said Act to say that this lis is a 'Commercial Dispute' and in other words plaintiff does not pitch himself on any of the other 21 sub-clauses of Section 2(1)(c) of said Act. 11. I had already referred to further narrowing down of the dispute or disagreement between the parties and I shall elaborate on the same now. A perusal of sub-clause (vii) would reveal that the aforesaid four agreements, which constitute the nucleus of this suit, are certainly agreements relating to immovable property. There is no dispute or disagreement between the parties on this also. 12. A perusal of sub-clause (vii) would reveal that the aforesaid four agreements, which constitute the nucleus of this suit, are certainly agreements relating to immovable property. There is no dispute or disagreement between the parties on this also. 12. There is also no dispute or disagreement between the parties that the four agreements constitute the nucleus of this suit relate to suit property and is to be used exclusively in trade or commerce i.e., for development of business / commercial centre in Chennai. 13. In other words, sub-clause (vii) can be broken into three parts. (a) 'agreements relating to immovable property', (b) 'used' and (c) 'exclusively in trade and commerce'. To be precise, with regard to (a) and (c), there is no dispute or disagreement between the parties. The dispute is only with regard (b) i.e., the term 'used' occurring in sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c). Therefore, the issue is thoroughly narrowed down and the entire discussion in the instant proceedings devolves on the meaning, dynamics and dimensions of the term 'used' occurring in sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of said Act. 14. Learned counsel for plaintiff submits that the term 'used' occurring in sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of said Act definitely includes suit property, as it is to be used exclusively for trade or commerce according to the four nucleus documents and plaint pleadings. In contradistinction, learned counsel for defendants submits that the term 'used' is necessarily to be construed as used in praesenti and not in futuro. 15. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for plaintiff pressed into service two unreported and one reported orders/judgments of Delhi High Court, i.e., Jagmohan Belal Vs. State Bank of Indore (Decided on 22.09.2017), Monika Arora case Vs. Neeraj Kohli in CM(M) 850/2016 (Decided on 01.09.2016) and AIR 2016 Del 186 (Soni Dave Vs. Trans Asian Industries Expositions Pvt. Ltd.). 16. Jagmohan Belal is a Division Bench order of the Delhi High Court and this is a case where the dispute relates to an action-at-law for recovery of immovable property. In this case, on facts, immovable property was intended to be used exclusively for trade and commerce. With regard Monica Arora case, on facts, it is a specific performance suit and the subject matter of the suit was a property which was purchased for the purpose of being used as an office. In this case, on facts, immovable property was intended to be used exclusively for trade and commerce. With regard Monica Arora case, on facts, it is a specific performance suit and the subject matter of the suit was a property which was purchased for the purpose of being used as an office. Soni Dave case on facts, is an ejectment suit, but the property was used exclusively for trade and commerce and the Commercial Division entertained the suit. 17. Learned counsel, referring to these three judgments of the Delhi High Court (one by a Division Bench and other two by learned Single Judges) submitted that the Commercial Division of the Delhi Court has entertained suits in cases where the property, which forms part of the subject matter of the suit is intended to be used in trade and commerce in future. Learned counsel also submitted that Delhi High Court judgments not being judgments of a coordinate Bench or a Division Bench of this Court, have only persuasive value, but learned counsel submitted that it has greater persuasive value as Delhi High Court had defined 'Commercial suits' even before the advent of said Act. According to learned counsel, Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967 had a dedicated Chapter captioned 'Commercial Suits'. Though it was not specifically pointed out, it surfaces from this Court's research that reference is apparently to Chapter XVI of Delhi High Court Original Side Rules captioned 'Commercial Suits' wherein 'Commercial Cases' had been defined. Learned counsel went as far as saying that such a provision in the Delhi High Court Original Side Rules was the inspiration for said Act and therefore, Delhi High Court judgments are of greater persuasive value. 18. At the moment, in my judicial wisdom, I deem it appropriate to leave this aspect open and not express any opinion on the aforesaid submission as that will draw/deflect this entire discussion into another arena, namely law of precedents, which may become tangential given the narrow compass on which these proceedings turn. Considering the narrow scope of these proceedings and the further narrowed down issue, I deem it appropriate to leave this submission open to be examined in another matter, if such an argument is propounded. Suffice to say that three judgments of the Delhi High Court are of persuasive value. 19. Considering the narrow scope of these proceedings and the further narrowed down issue, I deem it appropriate to leave this submission open to be examined in another matter, if such an argument is propounded. Suffice to say that three judgments of the Delhi High Court are of persuasive value. 19. Thereafter, learned counsel for plaintiff referred to two unreported orders of Commercial Division of the Madras High Court. One is Kalyan Jewellers case (Kalyan Jewellers India Ltd. V. Jaswanth Chand Bhandari, Decided on 06.09.2018) and the other is Shanaz Leathers Case (Shanaz Leathers V. Standard Chartered Bank, Decided on 12.12.2017). Kalyan Jewellers case is one where the property which is subject matter of suit was purchased by the plaintiff for the purpose of residence of it's Staff. Plaintiff contended that though they had put the property to residential use, it is part of their commercial activity as it has been taken on lease for the purpose of accommodating it's staff close to its showroom and under fiscal laws also, they are claiming the same as business expenditure. In this context, it was held that the actual use of the property is put to, is of importance. With regard to Shanaz Leathers, it is one where the term 'arising out of' occurring in clause (c) of Section 2(1) of said Act was explained by me. Drawing inspiration from the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in 2006 (9) SCC 591 , it was held that the expression 'arising out of' should be given an elaborate meaning and connotation. 20. Per contra, learned counsel for defendants pressed into service, a judgment of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Vasu Healthcare Private Limited Vs. Gujarat Akruti TCG Biotch Limited reported in (2017) AIR (Gujarat) 153. 21. To be noted, Vasu Healthcare Private Limited is an order in an appeal arising out of an order made by a Commercial Court returning the plaint to the original plaintiff. Referring to paragraph 7.3 and 7.4 of the said judgment, learned counsel submitted that literal and strict interpretation has been applied for deciding about the term 'used' occurring in sub-clause (vii). 'Used' means actual use or being used. Though obvious, it is made clear that Gujarat High Court judgment is also of persuasive value. Referring to paragraph 7.3 and 7.4 of the said judgment, learned counsel submitted that literal and strict interpretation has been applied for deciding about the term 'used' occurring in sub-clause (vii). 'Used' means actual use or being used. Though obvious, it is made clear that Gujarat High Court judgment is also of persuasive value. Also to be noted, Gujarat High Court Division Bench had referred to an income tax case decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reported in (2004) 267 ITR 768 [Dineshkumar Gulabchand Agrawal V. Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. reported in (2004) 267 ITR 768 (Bom)]. 22. From a careful analysis of the case laws pressed into service by both sides what emerges is that in the three Delhi High Court judgments, issue as to whether term 'used' should be construed as in praesenti or in futuro was not projected. Those are cases in which, Commercial Division of the Delhi High Court has exercised jurisdiction, though the property which is subject matter of the respective suits were to be used in trade and commerce in future. 23. As mentioned supra, Kalyan Jewellers case is one where it was held that the use of the suit property is of relevance and not the attendant fiscal law aspect of the same. As mentioned supra, Shanaz Leather case is one where the expression 'arising out of' has been explained. Therefore, it can be safely inferred that the Delhi High Court judgments/orders are for the principle that a Commercial Division does exercise jurisdiction over suits where the subject matter of the suit being immovable property, is to be used exclusively in trade or commerce in future also. 24. Kalyan Jewellers case is not of much help to the plaintiff in the instant case as that operates in a different realm. Shanaz Leather case is of some relevance as Sub-clause (vii) has to necessarily be read in the context of the expression 'arising out of' in clause (c). 25. This leaves us with the Gujarat High Court judgment. A perusal of the relevant paragraph of Gujarat High Court Judgment i.e., Paragraphs 7.3 and 7.4 reveal that the Division Bench has proceeded on the principle that literal and strict interpretation has to be applied. On this basis, the term 'used' occurring in sub-clause (vii) has been interpreted by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court. 26. A perusal of the relevant paragraph of Gujarat High Court Judgment i.e., Paragraphs 7.3 and 7.4 reveal that the Division Bench has proceeded on the principle that literal and strict interpretation has to be applied. On this basis, the term 'used' occurring in sub-clause (vii) has been interpreted by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court. 26. Be that as it may, to my mind, a literal and strict interpretation of 'used' as occurring in sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of said Act necessarily refers to past, present and future. If the intention of the Parliament was to restrict it to any one of the three, the term used would have been suitably prefixed. If it was intended to be past, the term 'was' would / could have been used employed to prefix 'used'. If it is intended to be present only, the term 'used' could /would have been prefixed with 'is being'. Likewise, if it was intended to be restricted to future, an expression 'to be' would/could have been employed to prefix 'used'. The fact that the Parliament in its wisdom has chosen not to prefix the term 'used' occurring in sub-clause (vii) with any one of the these three or any equivalent expression/s shows that the intention of Parliament is to leave it open to be made applicable to all three situations, namely past, present and future depending on the factual matrix of each case. I am taking such a view with regard to interpretation of the term 'used' occurring in Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of said Act. 27. In the considered opinion of this Commercial Division, whenever a Statute intends to refer to some aspects of a provision of law in terms of past, present and / or future, it has been explicit. One provision that immediately comes to the mind of this Commercial Division in this regard is Section 9 of 'The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996' ('A and C Act' for brevity). With regard to interim measures qua arbitral proceedings, the Statute in Section 9 of A and C Act had specifically used the expression '.... before or during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of an arbitral award .....'. It is common knowledge that this came up for consideration in the oft quoted judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. before or during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of an arbitral award .....'. It is common knowledge that this came up for consideration in the oft quoted judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. NEPC India Limited, reported in AIR 1999 SC 565 , which is one of the earliest judgments after 1996 A & C Act came into force replacing the 1940 Act. 28. I now proceed to fall back on the three Delhi High Court judgments and Shanaz Leathers Case, authored by me. As mentioned supra, in all the three Delhi High Court judgments, the Commercial Division of the Delhi High Court has exercised jurisdiction in suits where the subject matter of the suit was intended to be used in trade or commerce in future. Therefore, by necessary inference, it follows that the Commercial Division of Delhi High Court has understood the term 'used' occurring in Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of said Act as being applicable to cases where the subject matter of the suit being immovable property, is to be used in trade or commerce in future also. Though this is implied, it is a clear and inevitable inference. To this extent, I prefer to go with the view taken by the Commercial Division of Delhi High Court. 29. I have already held that Kalyan Jewellers case does not help the plaintiff. With regard to Shanaz Leathers, as mentioned supra, the expression 'arising out of' occurring in clause (c) of Section 2(1) of said Act has been held to be an expression which is to be given wide and broad connotation. If this is read in juxtaposition, sub-clause (vii) should also receive a wide and broad connotation without restricting it to immovable properties (subject matter of suits) which are used in praesenti alone as that will make it too narrow a lane qua the said Act for various kinds of commercial disputes that are likely to emerge in future. It is better to keep this avenue broad and wide enough to accommodate suits wherein the suit property is likely to be used exclusively in trade and commerce in future also, as it is virtually impossible to visualize and make an enumeration of all and every possible scenario. 30. As a last observation, it may be also necessary to have a quick look at the objects of the said Act. 30. As a last observation, it may be also necessary to have a quick look at the objects of the said Act. Broadly the objects are, improving the international image of Indian justice delivery system in India, inspiring confidence in the legal culture of India qua the investor world, fast tracking resolution of commercial disputes of specified value and ultimately accelerating economic growth. With this avowed objects and policies being in focus qua the said Act, one has to visualize a situation where there may be investments made for developmental activity qua immovable property for the purpose of being used exclusively in trade and commerce. Unfortunately, if such a venture runs into rough weather and litigation eliminating the scope of fast tracking the same in the Commercial Division will tantamount to running contrary to avowed objects of said Act. 31. This Commercial Division is reminded of what Lord Justice Laws in his lecture delivered in the University of Law in London had to say. After describing Professor Noam Chomsky as a pioneer of linguistics, what Professor Noam Chomsky said in 'Language and Mind' (Cambridge University Press, 2006) was quoted. Before parting with this case, this Commercial Division deems it appropriate to reproduce the quote which reads as follows : 'Language is a process of free creation; its laws and principles are fixed, but the manner in which the principles of generation are used is free and infinitely varied. Even the interpretation and use of words involves a process of free creation'. 32. Referring to the above quote, Lord Justice Laws said 'Interpretation is supposedly the servant of the Parliament's will. But it is an autonomous creative process'. 33. Owing to all that have been set out supra, it is held that this Commercial Division will have jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit. 34. Jurisdiction thus determined. 35. Having determined jurisdiction, there will be separate proceedings when the suit is next listed with regard to further proceedings in the suit depending on the stage of the suit. 36. Registry to remove the caption 'To Determine Jurisdiction' in the next listing.