JUDGMENT : 1. These two appeals under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘CPC’ for short) are by the 1st plaintiff in O.S.No.3056/2016 on the file of the XXXV Addl. City Civil Judge, Bengaluru. The 2nd plaintiff is Karnataka Chemists and Druggist Association (referred to as “Association” hereafter). The plaintiff instituted a suit seeking a declaration that he is the President of the plaintiff No.2 Association and for a consequential decree of perpetual injunction to restrain defendants from claiming to be officer bearers of the Association and obstructing him from functioning as the President of the Managing Committee of the said Association. 2. The first plaintiff has pleaded that in a meeting held on 25.6.2015 he was elected as the President of the Association. On 1.1.2016, a general body meeting of the Association was held at Madikeri and in that meeting one of the items of the agenda was about the amendments to be brought to the byelaws of the Association. It was unanimously accepted. Since there was no approved byelaws, the general body of the Association treated all the office bearers as adhoc till the proposed amendments were submitted and registered. In order to implement the resolutions passed at the general body, the plaintiff No.1 wrote a letter on 26.03.2016 to the second defendant who was the General Secretary of the Association to convene a meeting on 5.4.2016. But till 4.4.2016 he did not take any action and thereafter he issued a meeting notice on 5.4.2016 fixing the meeting date as 10.4.2016. The first plaintiff went to attend the meeting and saw somebody else having chaired the meeting. He tried to explain the gathering about the position of the byelaws and need to amend it. But the defendants and others hackled him with unwanted and unrelated topics. They threatened him saying that they would bring people from all over the state and picket his residence and office. Therefore plaintiff No.1 left the meeting hall. It is further stated that defendant No.1 enemically disposed of towards plaintiff No.1 circulated whatsapp messages painting him in bad shape. In the said messages he has also mentioned that first defendant was care taker President of the Association. The defendants conspired to collect the keys of the office premises of the Association unauthorisedly. The plaintiff No.1 stated that he did not resign from the post of President. In the said messages he has also mentioned that first defendant was care taker President of the Association. The defendants conspired to collect the keys of the office premises of the Association unauthorisedly. The plaintiff No.1 stated that he did not resign from the post of President. Second defendant issued a letter on 12.4.2016 on a fabricated letterhead stating that plaintiff No.1 stepped down from the post of President and walked out of the meeting hall and that he was no more a President right from 2.2.2016. Since the defendants made a consulted attempted to unseat him from the post of President, he filed the suit for above reliefs. Along with the plaint he also filed two applications, I.A.No.1 and 2 under Order 39 Rues 1 and 2 CPC. In I.A.No.1 he sought an order of temporary injunction restraining the first defendant from functioning as the President of Association and in I.A.No.2 he sought an order of temporary injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing him from functioning as the President of the Association. 3. The first defendant filed statement of objection to these two applications contending that the first plaintiff suppressed the material facts and attempted to mislead the court for obtaining an order of temporary injunction. He stated that the first plaintiff has no legal right to institute the suit. According to the first defendant, the Association was registered in the year 1944 under Societies Registration Act. The byelaws were also registered. Subsequently byelaws were amended and registered with the District Registrar on 16.09.1964. In the election held on 19.05.2013, 31 members were elected to the managing committee for the period 2013-14 to 2016-17. One K.E.Prakash was elected as the President and one Mr. A.K. Jeevan, i.e., the 2nd defendant was elected as the Secretary. But K.E. Prakash resigned from the President post even before completion of his tenure. The 1st appellant forcefully assumed charge as the care taker or adhoc President and started falsifying the records before the Deputy Registrar. On 10.4.2016 at the Managing Committee meeting the first plaintiff resigned from the post of care taker President of the Association. On that day the first defendant was lawfully appointed as the President. It is contended that the first plaintiff has no legal right to file the suit because at no point of time he was the member of the Managing Committee. On that day the first defendant was lawfully appointed as the President. It is contended that the first plaintiff has no legal right to file the suit because at no point of time he was the member of the Managing Committee. Even if it is assumed that he had a legal right to act as the President of the Association, his tenure ended in the year 2015 itself. Fresh elections were held thereafter and the first defendant was democratically and legally elected as the President. In these set of circumstances, the 1st plaintiff has no right to sue. The managing committee has the prerogative to replace the President at any time as per the bye laws. The first plaintiff has not made out prima facie case. Balance of convenience also does not lie in his favour. He suffers no loss or injury if injunction is not granted. 4. The trial court by its common order dated 08.12.2017 dismissed both the applications and hence these two appeals by the first plaintiff. 5. The trial court’s findings are that the first plaintiff was not elected as President rather his was selection. Despite the fact that the first plaintiff’s name appears in the letterheads of the Association, it is not indicative of the fact that the first plaintiff is the President. Even in the meeting notice issued by the second defendant in the letterhead of the Association, the name of the first plaintiff is mentioned as President, but one document produced by the plaintiff shows that on 19.4.2016, the first defendant Raghunath Reddy became caretaker President. It is stated that the first plaintiff walked out of the meeting held on 10.4.2016 by resigning from the post of President. The first plaintiff also made a complaint to the police that he was intimidated by the other members of the Association. But, according to the byelaws, the President has to be elected. The documents produced by the defendant shows that he was elected by the Managing Committee held on 19.5.2013. Since there is difference between selection and election, on the day when the suit was filed, the first plaintiff was not legally elected President. Therefore, the trial court held the plaintiff No.1 was not entitled to interim relief of temporary injunction. 6. Assailing these findings, the learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs has argued that the trial court failed to appreciate the actual issue before it. Therefore, the trial court held the plaintiff No.1 was not entitled to interim relief of temporary injunction. 6. Assailing these findings, the learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs has argued that the trial court failed to appreciate the actual issue before it. The actual question was whether the first plaintiff had resigned from the post of President of the Association. In fact, the defendants’ claim that the first plaintiff tendered resignation and this stand taken by them shows that the first plaintiff was in fact was appointed as the President of the Association. The defendants produced a recording of the meeting held on 10.4.2016. It appears the learned trial judge did not view this recording to ascertain whether the first plaintiff tendered resignation or not. This video does not show the resignation. 6.1. It is his further argument that the trial judge appears to have failed to comprehend the facts of the case. At a meeting of the managing committee of the association held on 25.6.2015, the first plaintiff was coopted as the member of the Managing Committee and thereafter he was unanimously declared as President. The byelaws provide for cooption of a member to the Managing Committee. The meeting on 25.6.2015 was attended by the defendants also. The first plaintiff’s cooption and his subsequent election to the post of President was not opposed by them. These being the actual state of affairs, the trial court should not have given a finding that the first plaintiff was selected as the President. 6.2. His further argument is that the trial court has misinterpreted the word ‘resignation’ in the context of the facts of the case. There is no document to show that the first plaintiff tendered his resignation. If the first plaintiff’s election was opposed to byelaws, he could have been removed by holding a meeting. This was not at all resorted to in the meeting held on 10.4.2016. In fact, removal of the first plaintiff was not included in the agenda of the meeting. In the general body meeting it was unanimously decided to bring the amendments to the byelaws adopted in the year 1944. That byelaw had become inoperable due to death of most of the members who were parties to adopting the byelaw. As on 10.4.2016 no byelaw was in force. For this reason if really the first plaintiff had resigned, it did not assume any importance. That byelaw had become inoperable due to death of most of the members who were parties to adopting the byelaw. As on 10.4.2016 no byelaw was in force. For this reason if really the first plaintiff had resigned, it did not assume any importance. Without looking into these fundamental issues, the trial court wrongly held that the first plaintiff was not the President. Its finding that there is no prima facie case is also wrong. Further finding on balance of convenience and irreparable injury is not sustainable. Therefore, he argued that there is a need to interfere with the impugned orders and thereby the temporary injunction sought for by the first plaintiff has to be granted. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents/defendants argued that the first plaintiff has no right to maintain the suit as he has no connection with the relief sought. He has espoused his personal cause, i.e., to continue as President of the Association. He cannot claim to be President of the Association as he is not a member of Managing Committee. The byelaws do not provide for a member like the first plaintiff to become the President of the Association. The term of the managing committee was from 2013 to 2016. When the fresh elections were held, he did not participate in the election, rather the defendants were elected as office bearers. Since the first plaintiff was not at all entitled to hold the post of President, whether he resigned from the post of President or not is not relevant issue. His appointment as President was in violation of the byelaws. Even if it can be presumed that he was appointed, the subsequent event shows that he resigned from the post of President. Majority of the members of the Association have issued letters and sworn to affidavits stating that the first plaintiff resigned from the President’s post. Compact disc recording of the meeting held on 10.4.2016 at Hubli shows that the first plaintiff admitted that he was only an ad hoc President and he walked away from the meeting saying that he had resigned. On the day when the suit was filed the first plaintiff was not the President at all and in fact he was never considered as President. He appointed himself as the President of the Association. On the day when the suit was filed the first plaintiff was not the President at all and in fact he was never considered as President. He appointed himself as the President of the Association. The trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff No.1 has not made out prima facie case. There is no pleading with regard to balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Even if these two aspects are examined, the balance of convenience lies in dismissing the application because in the absence of President, the Vice President can act in his stead. All functions of the Association are carried out by the Secretary. The term of the Association management ended in the year 2016. Appellant was not one of the 31 managing committee members. Now that other office bearers have been elected democratically, they cannot be unseated by issuing an injunction. He relies upon two judgments of the Supreme Court, namely SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS VS B.D.KAUSHIK [ (2011) 13 SCC 774 ] and ISHWAR NAGAR COOPERATIVE HOUSING BUILDING SOCIETY VS PARAMANAND SHARMA [ (2010) 14 SCC 230 ]. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant replied that any finding the court gives on existence of byelaws of the Association affects the other pending suits. 9. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel. From the first plaintiff’s side it is argued that the amendments proposed to the byelaws were not given into effect and his argument was virtually that there exists no byelaw for the present and the same is controverted by the learned counsel for the defendants. It is also emphasized by the counsel for the defendants by referring to judgment of the Supreme Court in Ishwar Nagar Housing Building Society (supra) that the first plaintiff is bound by the byelaws. The argument is that the first plaintiff is not entitled to claim the post of President because he was not one among 31 members of the managing committee elected by the ordinary or like members of the Association. If this point is to be considered, necessarily byelaws have to be referred to and interpreted. Since it was submitted by the first plaintiff’s counsel that finding on byelaw affects the other pending suits, I have not discussed this point. Even otherwise, this appeal can be decided by considering other documents. 10. If this point is to be considered, necessarily byelaws have to be referred to and interpreted. Since it was submitted by the first plaintiff’s counsel that finding on byelaw affects the other pending suits, I have not discussed this point. Even otherwise, this appeal can be decided by considering other documents. 10. It has to be stated that the finding of the learned trial judge that the first plaintiff was selected as the President and not elected to that post, cannot be sustained. The first plaintiff has produced a document, i.e., minutes of the 11th Managing Committee Meeting held on 25.6.2015 at Hotel Bell, Bengaluru. This document shows that the President of the Association, namely K.E.Prakash submitted his resignation to the post of Managing Committee and President of the Association. This was unanimously accepted. Likewise, M.P.Medappa resigned from Managing Committee and requested to coopt Sri V.Hari Krishnanan, i.e., the first plaintiff. The house unanimously coopted one Sri B.Lokesh and V. Harikrishnan for vacant Managing Committee positions. Later, Devidas Prabhu, the President incharge proposed Sri V.Harikrishnan for the post of President and the entire House seconded this proposal, therefore V.Harikrishnan was declared President unanimously. The defendants virtually dispute the election of the first plaintiff in the meeting held on 25.6.2015, but they cannot dispute election of the first plaintiff to the post of President that day. The plaintiff has produced other documents such as notice issued to the members of the Association on 1.12.2015 in connection with 58th annual general body meeting held on 1.1.2016, a letter dated 26.3.2016 written by the first plaintiff to the Honorary General Secretary of the Association, a letter dated 4.4.2016 written by A.K.Jeevan, Honorary Secretary to the President of the Association and another letter dated 5.4.2016 meeting notice signed by the General Secretary of the Association. All these notices and letters are in the letterheads of the Association. In these letterheads, the President’s name is shown as V.Harikrishnan. Likewise, Devidas P Prabhu and B Lokesh are shown as Vice Presidents and A.K.Jeevan is shown as Honorary General Secretary. When these meeting notices and other communications on the letterheads are not disputed by the defendants, it is possible to draw an inference that the first plaintiff was elected as President in the 11th Managing Committee held on 25.6.2015 at Hotel Bell, Bengaluru. When these meeting notices and other communications on the letterheads are not disputed by the defendants, it is possible to draw an inference that the first plaintiff was elected as President in the 11th Managing Committee held on 25.6.2015 at Hotel Bell, Bengaluru. Therefore, the contention of the defendants that the election of the first plaintiff as President as opposed to byelaw cannot be accepted. Necessarily inference to be drawn is that first plaintiff was elected as President of the Association. 11. The actual controversy is with regard to election of the first defendant as the President on 10.4.2016. The first plaintiff has stated in the plaint that he attended this meeting. He claims that he did not resign from the post of President and that the defendant No.2 issued a letter dated 12.4.2016 on a fabricated letterhead stating that the first plaintiff stepped down as President and walked out of the meeting hall stating that he was no more a President from 2.2.2016 itself. This is actually at dispute. 12. Now, if the minutes of the meeting held on 10.4.2016 are perused, it becomes evident that all the members of the Association sought resignation of the first plaintiff and at that time, the first plaintiff said that he was no more a President from 2.2.2016 and that the committee was free to take any decision. It is recorded that the first plaintiff left the hall stating that he would transfer the office officially after some days. Later on, the members of the Association requested for completing the other formalities and in this process the name of the first defendant was proposed for the post of President, and likewise the names of B.K.Prasanna Kumar and Omkar Murthy were proposed for Vice President and Treasurer respectively. These proposals were seconded by other members and thereafter these proposals were accepted unanimously. Since the learned counsel for the plaintiff and the defendants requested me to cross verify the proceedings of the meeting by playing the compact disc recording of the proceedings, I had to listen to the audio graph. It was possible for me to hear very clearly one person saying that he was no more the President from 2.2.2016 onwards and that the members could take any decision. There was great demand for resignation of the first plaintiff from the post of President. It was possible for me to hear very clearly one person saying that he was no more the President from 2.2.2016 onwards and that the members could take any decision. There was great demand for resignation of the first plaintiff from the post of President. Virtually all the members showed no confidence in the first plaintiff and expressed their displeasure in the way he was managing the Association being the President. Therefore, this recording on the compact disc corroborates the defendants contention. Though the first plaintiff might not have tendered resignation in writing, it was his voluntary act to say that he was no more a President and it is for this reason that the Managing Committee had to elect other office bearers. This was a decision taken unanimously by the members of the Association. On the day when the suit was filed, the plaintiff was not the President of the Association and he cannot claim injunction against the defendants who are democratically elected. In this context I find it apt to refer to judgment of the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Bar Association (supra) : “43. It hardly needs to be emphasized that in any Body governed by democratic principles, no member has a right to claim an injunction so as to stall the formation of the Governing Body of the Association. No such right exists in election matters since exercise of a right conferred by a rule is always subject to the qualifications prescribed and limitations imposed thereunder. The contention of the respondents that the amendment to Rule whereunder the right to be eligible to contest for any post for the Association or the eligibility to cast the vote at the election, takes away the right completely, is misconceived since by the amendment the right is not taken away but is preserved subject to certain restrictions on its exercise and this could always be done.” Therefore, I come to the conclusion that though the learned trial judge has dismissed the application for temporary injunction giving some other reason, the final conclusion of the learned trial judge cannot be interfered with. These appeals deserve dismissal. Therefore, appeals are dismissed. There is no order as to costs.