JUDGMENT : The civil miscellaneous second appeal is directed against the Judgment and Decree, dated 21.08.2000, passed in C.M.A.No.36 of 1998, on the file of the Principal District Court, Thanjavur, confirming the fair and decretal orders, dated 21.10.1998, passed in I.A.No.326 of 1994 in O.S.No.96 of 1993, on the file of the Subordinate Court, Thanjavur. 2. The appellants preferred the application, under Order XXXVIII Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to raise the attachment effected in respect of the petition schedule property in I.A.No.247 of 1993 in O.S.No.96 of 1993 and discharge the petition schedule property, on the footing that the petition schedule property was purchased by their paternal grandfather Kuppusami Pillai, by way of a registered sale deed dated 04.02.1923 and after his demise, his sons, namely, Janakiraman/second respondent herein and his brother Sundaramurthy had effected a partition on 22.08.1991, whereby, the petition schedule property had been allotted to the share of Janakiraman/second respondent herein, who is none other than the father of the appellants and accordingly, it is stated that the petition schedule property is the ancestral property of the appellants and further, it is also the case of the appellants that the second respondent had transferred his undivided 1/3rd share in the petition schedule property in their favour by way of a relinquishment deed, dated 01.02.1993 and further stated that in the partition deed, dated 22.08.1991, the suit for partition laid by the second respondent's brother had also been referred to. As the second respondent is a spendthrift and the appellants had spent a lot of amounts towards him and accordingly, on that basis, he had relinquished his undivided share in the petition schedule property in favour of the appellants and the abovesaid relinquishment deed had been registered on 21.05.1993 and the assessment for the petition schedule property had also been duly transferred in the name of the appellants and accordingly, it is only the appellants, who have title, possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property as the absolute owners thereof and on the other hand, the first respondent had obtained the attachment of the petition schedule property in I.A.No.247 of 1993, on the footing that the petition schedule property belongs to the second respondent, however, the second respondent has no subsisting right, title or interest in the petition schedule property on the date of attachment and accordingly, seeking to raise the order of attachment, according to the appellants, they had been necessitated to file the abovesaid application. 3. 3. The first respondent had resisted the abovesaid application preferred by the appellants contending that the application preferred by the appellants is not maintainable either in law or on facts and according to the first respondent, the so-called deed of relinquishment projected by the appellants had been carried out, only after the filing of the suit and the same is a sham and nominal document and by way of which, no interest has been transferred or relinquished and the same had been created only for the purpose of defeating or delaying the realization of the claim of the first respondent and furthermore, the relinquishment had been effected only after the institution of the suit and based on the old stamp papers, the abovesaid document had been ante-dated and fabricated and accordingly, the document had come to be registered belatedly and the document had come to be executed only after knowing the institution of the suit and attachment effected, in respect of the petition schedule property by way of collusion amongst the appellants and the second respondent and the allegation that the second respondent Janakiraman is a spendthrift and that the appellants had spent a lot of amounts on him are all false and that the petition schedule property belongs to only the second respondent absolutely and it is only the second respondent, who is in possession and enjoyment of the same, therefore, the case of the appellants that the petition schedule property is their ancestral property is false, it is the self-acquired property of the second respondent and therefore, the application preferred by the appellants to raise the attachment is devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. 4. In support of the appellants' case, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.P1 to P15 were marked and on the side of the respondents, no oral and documentary evidence has been adduced. 5. Based on the materials placed on record, both oral and documentary, the Courts below were pleased to raise the attachment in respect of the petition schedule property only as regards the 2/15th undivided share of the appellants and dismissed the claim of the appellants in other respects. Aggrieved over the same, the present civil miscellaneous second appeal has been preferred. 6. Aggrieved over the same, the present civil miscellaneous second appeal has been preferred. 6. At the time of admission of the civil miscellaneous second appeal, the following substantial question of law was formulated for consideration: “Whether the finding of the Courts below that the attachment is invalid only in respect of the appellants' 2/15th share is sustainable on law and on facts? 7. The appellants are the sons of the second respondent Janakiraman. It is seen that the first respondent had laid the suit in O.S.No.96 of 1993 against the second respondent and also obtained an order of attachment in respect of the petition schedule property and seeking to raise the attachment effected in respect of the petition schedule property, the appellants had come forward with the application in I.A.No.326 of 1994 and with reference to the same, the appellants would putforth the case that the petition schedule property is their ancestral property, the same having been purchased by their paternal grandfather Kuppusami Pillai, by way of a registered sale deed, dated 04.02.1923 and in the partition effected between their father Janakiraman and their paternal uncle Sundaramurthy on 22.08.1991, the petition schedule property had been allotted to the share of the appellants' father Janakiraman and furthermore, according to the appellants, the allotment of the petition schedule property in favour of the said Janakiraman had been upheld in O.S.No.14 of 1984, on the file of the Subordinate Court, Tanjore and accordingly, putforth that their father Janakiraman had relinquished his 1/3rd undivided share in the petition schedule property in their favour by way of a relinquishment deed, on 01.02.1993 and thus, it is contended by the appellants that the petition schedule property belongs to them absolutely and therefore, the first respondent is not entitled to attach the petition schedule property on the footing that the same belongs to the second respondent absolutely and hence, it is contended that the attachment effected in respect of the petition schedule property is liable to be raised. 8. 8. The first respondent had putforth its case that only with a view to raise the attachment, the relinquishment deed, dated 01.02.1993, had been created by the appellants and their father Janakiraman in collusion and the stamp papers for the same had been purchased in Trichy and furthermore, the abovesaid relinquishment document had been very much belatedly registered and no plausible explanation has been offered by the appellants for the same and according to the first respondent, the relinquishment deed had been ante-dated to suit the case of the appellants with a view to raise the attachment effected in respect of the petition schedule property by the first respondent and it is contended by the first respondent that the petition schedule property belongs to the second respondent absolutely and therefore, the appellants are not entitled to raise the attachment as prayed for. 9. Based on the materials placed on record, it is seen that the petition schedule property had been acquired by the appellants' paternal grandfather Kuppusami Pillai, by way of a sale deed, dated 04.02.1923 and the said document has been marked as Ex.P1. Furthermore, as could be seen from the copy of the compromise decree passed in O.S.No.14 of 1984, dated 02.03.1987, it could be gathered that the paternal uncle of the appellants, namely, T.K. Murugesan had laid the suit against the appellants' father T.K. Janakiraman, their paternal uncle T.K. Sundaramurthy and others, seeking partition in respect of the petition schedule property and thereby, sought for 1/5th share in the same. On the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties, it is seen that the appellants' father T.K. Janakiraman and their paternal uncle T.K. Sundaramurthy had been directed to pay certain amounts in favour of the plaintiff and the other parties and a further direction has been given to pay certain amounts to the third defendant therein by the plaintiff and the other defendants in the suit and accordingly, it is seen that the said amounts having been paid accordingly, the appellants putforth the case that the petition schedule property had been obtained wholly by the appellants' father Janakiraman and their paternal uncle Sundaramurthy. It is also stated by the appellants that in the partition effected amongst Janakiraman and Sundaramurthy, dated 22.08.1991, the petition schedule property had been allotted to Janakiraman wholly. It is also stated by the appellants that in the partition effected amongst Janakiraman and Sundaramurthy, dated 22.08.1991, the petition schedule property had been allotted to Janakiraman wholly. The abovesaid facts could be gathered from the compromise decree passed in O.S.No.14 of 1984, marked as Ex.P5 and the partition deed, dated 19.08.1991, marked as Ex.P2. 10. As rightly determined by the Trial Court, it is seen that the appellants' father Janakiraman has been held to be entitled to obtain 1/5th share in the petition schedule property in O.S.No.14 of 1984. Accordingly, based on the compromise, it is also found that he and Sundaramurthy on paying certain amounts to the other parties in the abovesaid suit, they are held to be equally entitled to acquire the entire petition schedule property and thus, it is found that on the appellants' father and paternal uncle Sundaramurthy having paid the amounts, it is seen that thereby, the said Sundaramurthy and the appellants' father had obtained the right and interest in respect of the entire petition schedule property, therefore, as rightly found by the Trial Court, the appellants' father had right only in respect of the 1/5th share in the petition schedule property ancestrally and by way of paying certain amounts to the plaintiff and the other defendants in O.S.No.14 of 1984, it is found that the appellants' father and paternal uncle Sundaramurthy had come to acquire the petition schedule property wholly. Therefore, strictly it is seen found that the petition schedule property cannot be deemed to be acquired by the appellants' father Janakiraman and paternal uncle Sundaramurthy ancestrally from their father and on the other hand, they could be held to have acquired the shares of the other legal heirs of Kuppusami Pillai by paying the amounts to them as determined by the Court in O.S.No.14 of 1984. In such view of the matter, as rightly determined by the Trial Court, at the most, the appellants' father could only be held to have acquired 1/5th share in the petition schedule property ancestrally and the remaining 4/5th share is found to have been acquired by him and his brother Sundaramurthy separately by paying the amounts as directed by the Court and consequently, in the partition effected amongst the appellants' father and Sundaramurthy, the petition schedule property had come to be allotted to the appellants' father, in such view of the matter, the Trial Court is correct in determining that the appellants' father is found to have derived 1/5th share ancestrally in the petition schedule property and had acquired the remaining 4/5th share separately. As regards the claim of the appellants that it is they, who had paid the sums to the plaintiff and the other defendants, as determined in O.S.No.14 of 1984, there is no acceptable proof projected for the same by the appellants and therefore, the same had been rightly rejected by the Courts below. 11. Accordingly, it is noted that the appellants, at the most, would be entitled to claim 1/3rd share each in the 1/5th share of their father in the petition schedule property and on that basis, it is found that the Trial Court had raised the attachment as regards the 2/15th share of the appellants in the petition schedule property and dismissed their application in other aspects. 12. Mainly, it is noted that the appellants claim right over the petition schedule property based on the relinquishment deed, dated 01.02.1993. Now, according to the appellants, their father is a spendthrift and accordingly, they had spent a lot of amounts on him and based on the abovesaid consideration, it is their case that their father had relinquished his 1/3rd undivided share in the petition schedule property in their favour and thus, the petition schedule property wholly belonged to them. However, as above noted, the appellants' father is entitled to only 1/5th share in the petition schedule property ancestrally. As regards the case of the appellants that their father is a spendthrift and that they had spent a lot of amounts on him, with reference to the same, there is no reliable and acceptable material forthcoming. Even the first appellant, who had been examined as P.W.1, would depose that his father would not spend unnecessarily. As regards the case of the appellants that their father is a spendthrift and that they had spent a lot of amounts on him, with reference to the same, there is no reliable and acceptable material forthcoming. Even the first appellant, who had been examined as P.W.1, would depose that his father would not spend unnecessarily. When such being the evidence tendered by P.W.1, the case of the appellants that their father is a spendthrift, as such, cannot be countenanced. 13. As regards the relinquishment deed, dated 01.02.1993, marked as Ex.P3, it is found that the stamp papers for the same had been purchased in Tiruchirappalli and with reference to the same, there is no proper explanation forthcoming on the part of the appellants. However, during the reexamination, P.W.1 would putforth the case that inasmuch as the stamp papers were not available in Tanjore at the relevant point of time, the same had been purchased in Tiruchirappalli. However, with reference to the abovesaid explanation, when there is no proof or evidence adduced to hold that at the relevant point of time, inasmuch as stamp papers were not available in Tanjore, they had been necessitated to purchase the stamp papers in Tiruchirappalli, the abovesaid explanation offered by the first appellant, as such, cannot be countenanced readily. That apart, it is seen that the abovesaid relinquishment deed had been registered only on 21.05.1993. Furthermore, there is no proper explanation on the part of the appellants as to why the abovesaid document had been belatedly registered and with reference to the same, nothing has been offered in the application. Even P.W.1 has not offered any explanation as regards the same. However, the witness of the relinquishment deed examined as P.W.2 would state that as the husband of the appellants' sister had picked up quarrel, the delay had occurred in the registration of the relinquishment deed and according to P.W.2, the abovesaid cause, as regards the delay, had come to his knowledge only through P.W.1. Therefore, it is seen that the explanation for the delay offered by P.W.2 is only a hearsay evidence and thus, it cannot be relied upon. P.W.1 had not deposed anything as regards the delay in the registration of the relinquishment deed. However, it is seen that the relinquishment deed had been registered within the time allowed by the law. Therefore, it is seen that the explanation for the delay offered by P.W.2 is only a hearsay evidence and thus, it cannot be relied upon. P.W.1 had not deposed anything as regards the delay in the registration of the relinquishment deed. However, it is seen that the relinquishment deed had been registered within the time allowed by the law. However, when the case of the first respondent that the relinquishment deed had been pre-dated, but executed or created only during the month of May, 1993 with a view to raise the attachment effected in respect of the petition schedule property and accordingly, the document had come to be registered only in the month of May, 1993, in such view of the matter, at the foremost, the appellants should establish that the relinquishment deed had been really executed by the second respondent in their favour on 01.02.1993 as putforth by them. In this connection, the only independent witness examined on behalf of the appellants is the attestor of the abovesaid document examined as P.W.2. When from the evidence of P.W. 2, it is seen that he is a close associate of the first appellant and acquainted with him for more than 15 years and when he is unable to depose as to the description of the other attestor and according to him, the relinquishment deed had been typed and thereafter his signature had been obtained in the document, in such view of the matter, it is seen that his evidence cannot be safely relied upon for upholding the case of the appellants that the relinquishment deed had been executed on 01.02.1993 as putforth by them. If really the relinquishment deed had been executed in the month of February, 1993, there is no need for belatedly registering the said document during the month of May, 1993. If really the relinquishment deed had been executed in the month of February, 1993, there is no need for belatedly registering the said document during the month of May, 1993. In such view of the matter, as rightly determined by the Courts below, after coming to know about the attachment effected in respect of the petition schedule property by the first respondent, with a view to raise the same one way or the other, it is found that the appellants and their father, namely, the second respondent herein had in collusion created the relinquishment deed in the month of May, 1993 after the attachment antedating the same as having executed the same on 01.02.1993 and accordingly, it is evident they had been necessitated to register the document only during the month of May, 1993. Therefore, from the facts projected in the matter as could be gathered from the materials placed on record, when it is found that the relinquishment deed could not have been executed on 01.02.1993, the Courts below had rightly refused to place reliance upon Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter, referred to as “the Act”) for the proposition that the document once registered takes effect from the date of its execution. The abovesaid effect of registration as outlined under Section 47 of the Act, could be raised provided the appellants establish that the relinquishment deed had been really executed on 01.02.1993. The abovesaid effect of registration as outlined under Section 47 of the Act, could be raised provided the appellants establish that the relinquishment deed had been really executed on 01.02.1993. However, when the appellants have failed to establish that the relinquishment deed had been executed on 01.02.1993 and when it is seen that all along the appellants as well as their father had been residing under the same roof and when there is no material placed on record to show that the appellants' father is a spendthrift and that the appellants had spent a lot of amounts on him and furthermore, when the appellants' father is not shown to be acting adversely against the interest of the appellants at any point of time and when the address of the appellants and their father given in the application being one and the same, as rightly determined by the Courts below, the appellants and their father are found to be residing under the same roof and in such view of the matter, when the reasons for relinquishing the share of the appellants' father in favour of the appellants is also not buttressed by placing acceptable and reliable evidence and on the other hand, when from the materials placed on record, it is noted that the relinquishment deed had come to be projected only with the sole aim of raising the attachment effected in respect of the petition schedule property, accordingly, it is seen that the appellants are unable to establish the factum of the execution of the relinquishment deed on 01.02.1993 as putforth by them. The assessment of the petition schedule property in favour of the appellants and consequently, the house tax receipts projected by the appellants in the matter are all found to be emanating only based upon Ex.P3 relinquishment deed as admitted by P.W.1 and in such view of the matter, by way of the abovesaid documents, they being only the revenue documents, the claim of ownership of the petition schedule property by the appellants wholly cannot be accepted and determined. 14. 14. As rightly determined by the First Appellate Court, the Trial Court may not also be correct in raising the attachment as regards the 2/15th share of the appellants in the petition schedule property, when it is noted that the appellants' father and the appellants had been living together and the appellants had not established that their father is a spendthrift and indulging in illegal activities and accordingly, also failed to establish that the amount payable by their father to the first respondent is tainted with immorality and illegality and in such view of the matter, the determination of the First Appellate Court that the Trial Court had erred in raising the attachment in respect of the 2/15th share of the appellants in the petition schedule property cannot be easily discarded. However, as rightly determined by the First Appellate Court, inasmuch as the first respondent has not challenged the raising of the attachment of 2/15th share of the appellants in respect of the petition schedule property by way of filing a regular appeal or cross objection as per law, as determined by the First Appellate Court, the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court have to necessarily be confirmed. 15. In the light of the above discussions, as determined by the Trial Court, the decision of the Apex Court in Hamda Ammal vs. Avadiappapathar, reported in 1990 4 JT 391 , would not be applicable to the case at hand as the appellants had failed to establish that the relinquishment deed had indeed been executed on 01.02.1993, in such view of the matter, the appellants cannot be allowed to invoke Section 47 of the Act in their favour. 16. For the reasons aforestated, the substantial question of law formulated in this civil miscellaneous second appeal is accordingly answered against the appellants. 17. Resultantly, the civil miscellaneous second appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.