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2018 DIGILAW 446 (KAR)

Special Land Acquisition Officer Hidkal Dam Project, Hidkal Hukkeri Taluk v. Venkatesh Annaji Kulkarni

2018-03-26

KRISHNA S.DIXIT

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 18th March 2003 passed in LAC No.26 of 2000 by the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Hukkeri, whereby the reference petition filed by the land-losers for enhancement of compensation for the acquisition of lands measuring 2 Acres 14 Guntas in Sy.No.60 and 3 Acres 07 Guntas in Sy.No.78 for the purpose of Hidkal Dam Project, was allowed and the compensation was enhanced to Rs.13,825/- per Acre. 2. The brief facts stated are: The respondent was the owner of lands admeasuring 02 Acres 14 Guntas in Sy.No.60 and 03 Acres 07 Guntas in Sy.No.78 of Biranaholi village. These lands were the subject matter of acquisition pursuant to the preliminary notification dated 24.06.1965 followed by final notification dated 21.02.1967 which in turn was followed by an award dated 23.08.1971. The possession of the lands was taken over on 30.11.1971. 3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.500/- per Acre for the land in Sy.No.78 and Rs.1,200/-per Acre for the land in Sy.No.60. 4. The Reference Court in landlosers’ LAC No.26/2000 enhanced the compensation from Rs.1,200/- per acre to Rs.13,825/- per Acre in respect of both the lands. This award is challenged by appellant No.1 which is the acquiring body and appellant No.2 which is the beneficiary of the acquisition i.e., Karnataka Niravari Nigama Limited (‘KNNL’ for short). 5. The learned counsel for the respondent landlosers at the outset raised a preliminary objection as to the locus standi of appellant No.2/KNNL to challenge the impugned judgment and order of the Court below on the ground that as on the date the acquisition proceedings were accomplished by passing the award in the year 1971, the said appellant was not born at all. He submits that appellant No.2 is only a Government Company as defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 incorporated by the Government of Karnataka vide Notification dated 30.05.1999 i.e., 28 years after the award was passed. 6. He submits that appellant No.2 is only a Government Company as defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 incorporated by the Government of Karnataka vide Notification dated 30.05.1999 i.e., 28 years after the award was passed. 6. In reply, the learned Standing Counsel for appellant No.2/KNNL submits that the said Government Company is the successor-in-interest of the Department of Irrigation of the Government of Karnataka by virtue of Notifications dated 26.11.1998 and 30.05.1999 and that the enhanced compensation has to be paid by this appellant who is the beneficiary of the acquisition and therefore, it is entitled to maintain an appeal inasmuch as it is aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order. However, no legal evidence is produced by the said appellant in support of its contentions. The Xerox copies of the Government of Karnataka orders dated 26.11.1998 and the Government of Karnataka Notification dated 30.05.1999 read out by the appellant’s counsel do not support his contentions. Therefore, I hold that appellant No.2 does not have any locus standi to challenge the impugned judgment and award of the Court below. 7. The learned Government Pleader Smt.Amaravati appearing for the appellant No.1 submits that the Court below has enhanced the compensation by looking to the provisions of 1984 amendment made to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and that the Apex Court has held this amendment to be prospective in operation and consequently, the benefit of the said amendment does not avail to preamendment acquisition. 8. The learned counsel in support of her submission banks upon paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Apex court in the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Kanhaiya Lal and Others, (2000) 7 SCC 756 , which reads as under : “7. Section 25 before its substitution by Act 68 of 1984, mandated the Court not to award compensation exceeding the amount so claimed by the land owners and not to be less than the amount awarded by the Collector. This very clearly limits awarding of compensation within the amount claimed. On the facts of the present case it is not in dispute the award itself was given on 27.12.1977 and even proceeding pursuant to referring order, was concluded on 28.2.1981, i.e., much prior to the aforesaid Amending Act. Thus, on the facts of this case it is unamended Section 25 to be applicable and not the amended section. On the facts of the present case it is not in dispute the award itself was given on 27.12.1977 and even proceeding pursuant to referring order, was concluded on 28.2.1981, i.e., much prior to the aforesaid Amending Act. Thus, on the facts of this case it is unamended Section 25 to be applicable and not the amended section. In view of this the peripheral limitation on the Court awarding the compensation, would equally apply to the High Court exercising its power as the first appellate Court. The case of Gobardhan Mahto V/s. State of Bihar (1979) 4 SCC 330 was also a case in which unamended Section 25 was applicable. The Court held : (SCC p.331, para 8) "The short answer to this contention is to be found in the provisions of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act. By sub-sec. (1) of that section, when an applicant makes a claim to compensation pursuant to a notice given to him under Section 9 the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed. By subsection (2) of Section 25 when the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector." 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the land-losers contends that, under the scheme of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it is for the court to determine the market value since the compensation depends upon the market value established by the evidence and does not depend upon what the land owner says is the value of his land irrespective of what is the amount stated by him in the claim petition to be the market value. In support of his submissions, he relied upon paragraph 16 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of AMBYA KALYA MHATRE Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, (2011) 9 SCC 325 . The said paragraph reads as under: “16. A land owner, particularly a rural agriculturist, when he loses the land may not know the exact value of his land as on the date of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. When he seeks reference he may be dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation but may not really know the actual market value. A land owner, particularly a rural agriculturist, when he loses the land may not know the exact value of his land as on the date of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. When he seeks reference he may be dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation but may not really know the actual market value. Many a time there may not be comparable sales, and even the courts face difficulty in assessing the compensation. There is no reason why a land owner who has lost his land, should not get the real market value of the land and should be restricted by technicalities to some provisional amount he had indicated while seeking the reference. As noticed above, the Act does not require him to specify the quantum and all that he is required to say is that he is not satisfied with the compensation awarded and specify generally the grounds of objection to the award. Under the scheme of the Act, it is for the court to determine the market value. The compensation depends upon the market value established by evidence and does not depend upon what the land owner thinks is the value of his land. If he has an exaggerated notion of the value of the land, he is not going to get such amount, but is going to get the actual market value. Similarly if the land owner is under an erroneous low opinion about the market value of his land and out of ignorance claims lesser amount, that can not be held against him to award an amount which is lesser than the market value. When the Act does not require the land owner to specify the amount of compensation, but he voluntarily mentions some amounts, and subsequently, if the market value is found to be more than what was claimed, the land owner should get the actual market value. We fail to see why the land owner should get an amount less than the market value, as compensation.” 10. We fail to see why the land owner should get an amount less than the market value, as compensation.” 10. Learned counsel for the respondent land-losers also submits that he is a poor land-loser, but lost his land for an irrigation project of the Government of Karnataka; this land was the only source of livelihood; though the acquisition began by the preliminary notification of June 1965, the award was passed only in the year 1971; the delay in accomplishing the acquisition also affected the standard of life of the land-loser; the enhanced amount of compensation is also at the rate of Rs.13,825/-per Acre which is too small a figure to be mentioned. He also submits that in the matter of compulsory acquisition of land, the land owners who are villagers are not willing parties. They are compelled to give the land to the State for public purpose. In such cases, the defects in the pleadings or the lower figures of market value wrongly stated in the pleadings should not come in the way of judicial determination of just and proper compensation under the scheme of the Act. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent-land-losers banks upon the latest decision of the Apex Court dated 11.09.2017 in Civil Appeal Nos.10429–10430 of 2017 between Narendra and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment read as under: “(10) Prof. (Dr.) N.R. Madhava Menon explains the meaning and contour of social justice adjudication as the application of equality jurisprudence evolved by the Parliament and the Supreme Court in myriad situations presented before courts where unequal parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and where courts are called upon to dispense equal justice. Apart from the socioeconomic inequalities accentuating the disabilities of the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial process itself operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a situation, the Court has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities of parties involved but also positively inclined to the weaker party if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of justice. The Courts, in such situations, generally invoke the principle of fairness and equality which are essential for dispensing justice. Purposive interpretation is given to subserve the ends of justice particularly when the cases of vulnerable groups are decided. The Courts, in such situations, generally invoke the principle of fairness and equality which are essential for dispensing justice. Purposive interpretation is given to subserve the ends of justice particularly when the cases of vulnerable groups are decided. The Court has to keep in mind the ‘problem solving approach’ by adopting therapeutic approaches to the maximum extent the law permits rather than ‘just deciding’ cases, thereby bridging the gap between law and life, between law and justice. The notion of access to justice is to be taken in a broader sense. The objective is to render justice to the needy and that means fair solutions to the conflict thereby providing real access to ‘justice’. (11) Justice is a core value of any judicial system. It is the ultimate aim in the decision making process. In post-traditional liberal democratic theories of justice, the background assumption is that all humans have equal value and should, therefore, be treated as equal, as well as by equal laws. This can be described as ‘Reflective Equilibrium’. The method of Reflective Equilibrium was first introduced by Nelson Goodman in ‘Fact, Fiction and Forecast’ (1955). However, it is John Rawls who elaborated this method of Reflective Equilibrium by introducing the concept of ‘Justice as Fairness’. While on the one hand, we have the doctrine of ‘justice as fairness’, as propounded by John Rawls and elaborated by various jurists thereafter in the field of law and political philosophy, we also have the notion of ‘Distributive Justice’ propounded by Hume which aims at achieving a society producing maximum happiness or net satisfaction. When we combine Rawls’s notion of ‘Justice as Fairness’ with the notions of ‘Distributive Justice’, to which Noble Laureate Prof. Amartya Sen has also subscribed, we get jurisprudential basis for achieving just results for doing justice to the weaker section of the society.” 12. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties. I have also perused the impugned judgment and order of the Court below as also the lower court records. 13. PW1 Manohar V.Kulkarni, who is none other than the son of the land loser has deposed that the total amount of compensation awarded is Rs.4,723.91 paise for the entire land when the income from agriculture per Acre was Rs.14,000/to Rs.15,000/. He has stated that during the acquisition period, the land losers were growing sugarcane in these lands which were of very high yield. He has stated that during the acquisition period, the land losers were growing sugarcane in these lands which were of very high yield. In the crossexamination of this witness, nothing worth while is elicited to disbelieve his version as to location of the land, crop pattern and the crop yield. Marginal discounting of his version too is not helpful to the Appellant-beneficiary of the land acquisition. 14. Similarly, Sri.M.S.Patil, who was examined as PW2 has deposed that the lands are situated near the bank of Ghataprabha river which is the source of irrigation facility for all the 12 months of a year. These lands were red fertile lands with the alluvial mud left by the river. He has also elaborately stated about the crop pattern and crop yield. In his crossexamination, nothing worth mentioning is elicited to discredit his version. 15. The land-losers have also produced enough other material which has a bearing on the assessment of market value of their land during the period of acquisition. After looking to the evidentiary material supporting the claim of the land-losers for enhancement, the Court below has enhanced the compensation. There is no reason to interfere in the finding of the Court below as to the just and proper compensation inasmuch as all material relevant to assessing the market value of the land in question have been duly considered by the Reference Court. 16. The contention of the appellants that the land losers are not entitled to take the benefit of 1984 amendment as held by the Apex Court does not require consideration inasmuch as the reference court has not invoked amendment provisions at all in enhancing the compensation. The impugned judgment and order of the reference court are founded on the evidentiary material loaded to the record of the Court by the land losers, as rightly contended by their counsel Sri.R.H.Angadi. Even otherwise also, the enhanced rate of compensation is just Rs.13,825/-per Acre, which in my opinion is also just and proper compensation. For all the reasons stated above, I dismiss the appeal. 17. The amount in deposit before this Court be forthwith released to the respondents land owners after ascertaining their credentials.