JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. The question, proffered for our deliberation in this appeal, wears a rather simple look : Can the period of service of a teacher served in an aided or Government school prior to his/her resignation from that school to join another aided/ Government school be also taken into account while computing his/her total service and its attendant benefits? 2. Though the point looks simple, its evaluation becomes slightly knotty on account of the fact that certain specific provisions of the Kerala Education Act and Rules seem to answer it to the negative, while the various orders issued by the Government from time to time under the sanction of the afore Act and Rules appear to stipulate to the contrary, subject to certain defined criterion. 3. The brief facts of this case are set out under: In this appeal, the State of Kerala and its functionaries of the Education Department challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.25120/2012, wherein this Court allowed the writ petition filed by the first respondent herein impugning the order issued against her to recover certain sums on the allegation that her ten year higher grade fixation had been incorrectly done and that she is not entitled to the difference in pay and allowances drawn by her on account of such irregular fixation for the relevant period. 4. The facts in this case are not greatly disputed. The parties are ad idem that before the first respondent joined service as a High School Assistant (Malayalam) in the services of St.Joseph's High School, Mathilakam, she had broken spells of service in three different schools. The writ petitioner has given the details of her service in the first paragraph of the writ petition itself, which we extract for convenience of reference as under : The service details of the petitioner are given below: HSA (Malayalam) 18.04.1984 to 17.09.1984 GHS, Pazhayannur 01.07.1985 to 02.06.1986 Arogiamatha HS; Kottathara, Palakkad District. 02.06.1986 to 25.09.1986 Mount Carmel HS, Mananna, Tellippara. 05.01.1987 to 23.03.1987 St.Joseph's High School, Mathilakam 13.07.1987 to 02.09.1987 '' 18.09.1987 to 04.12.1987 '' 01.06.1988 onwards '' As is clear from the afore details provided by the petitioner, the petitioner's service prior to joining of St.Joseph's High School, Mathilakam was broken and not continuous since she had been obviously accommodated in the respective school in leave vacancies. 05.01.1987 to 23.03.1987 St.Joseph's High School, Mathilakam 13.07.1987 to 02.09.1987 '' 18.09.1987 to 04.12.1987 '' 01.06.1988 onwards '' As is clear from the afore details provided by the petitioner, the petitioner's service prior to joining of St.Joseph's High School, Mathilakam was broken and not continuous since she had been obviously accommodated in the respective school in leave vacancies. The sole question is whether these broken spells of non-continuous service can also be reckoned for the purpose of granting benefit of ten year higher grade to the writ petitioner/first respondent. 5. It is asserted by the first respondent that she was given the benefit of the ten year higher grade on 01.11.1996, taking into account the aforementioned three spells of broken service also. The controversy herein is not if this was proper or otherwise but whether this period could have been taken into account because there was a delay of more than 100 days in her joining the St.Joseph's High School, Mathilakam on 05.01.1987, after she resigned from the services of Mount Carmel High School at Tellippara. While the Government asserts that a break of more than one month would lead to forfeiture of all past service prior to the resignation, the first respondent asserts that this is not so on account of the provisions of the applicable Government Orders, to which she refers to in extenso. 6. The learned Single Judge, after a close examination of the materials on record and the submissions made by the learned counsel, concluded that the first respondent's challenge against the impugned order was tenable and on such basis allowed the writ petition, thus compelling the appellants herein to file this appeal. 7. We have heard Sri. E.S. Ashraf, learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellants and Sri. V. Rajasekharan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. 8. As we have already indicated above, the point in controversy in this case is solely whether the admitted delay of nearly 100 days occasioned in the petitioner joining St.Joseph's High School, Mathilakam after resigning from the earlier school, would lead to forfeiture of all her services in the earlier schools. 9. 8. As we have already indicated above, the point in controversy in this case is solely whether the admitted delay of nearly 100 days occasioned in the petitioner joining St.Joseph's High School, Mathilakam after resigning from the earlier school, would lead to forfeiture of all her services in the earlier schools. 9. The learned Government Pleader initially commenced his submissions by asserting that as per Rules 53 and 54 of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules ('the KER' for brevity) read with Rule 62 of Chapter XIV-C thereof, the entire period of service, prior to resignation of a teacher, would be statutorily extinguished and forfeited. For the purpose of easy reference, we extract these provisions below : “53. A teacher shall not himself terminate his service before the expiry of the term of his appointment without the permission of the Educational Officer. 54. (1) If any teacher resigns his appointment in any aided school, he shall not on re-appointment, be eligible to count his service prior to his resignation for purposes of increment or seniority on re-appointment; but he shall only be deemed to commence service afresh. 62. Consequences of resignation -The premature resignation from the school entails forfeiture of past service and of any retiring allowance to which the teacher who prematurely resigns would otherwise have been eligible.” 10. However, we are aware that even when the Statute provides so, the Government had issued various orders from the year 1968, wherein these conditions were either relaxed or re-fixed in terms of the requirements and exigencies from time. We will, therefore, have to gauge this submission of the learned Government Pleader from the touchstone of the Government Orders, which are also relied on by the petitioner/first respondent. 11. The first of the Government Orders in this regard is G.O.(Ms)No.74/68/E.dn. dated 24.02.1968, wherein it was stipulated that past service in aided schools will be counted for the purpose of sanctioning of higher scale of pay to Government School teachers on condition that the service should be approved and continuous and that there should not have been a break of more than one month between leaving the service of the aided school and joining the Government school. 12. Subsequently the Government issued G.O.(Ms)No. 67/69/Edn. 12. Subsequently the Government issued G.O.(Ms)No. 67/69/Edn. dated 05.02.1969, wherein the prescriptions appear to have been further relaxed to provide that those teachers who had more than six or more years of service prior to resignation would be entitled to have the break of up to one year condoned; that teachers having more than five years of service prior to resignation would be entitled to ten months of break to be condoned; that teachers with more than four years of pre-resignation service would be entitled to eight months break being condoned; that teachers with three years of such service would be entitled to six months of break; that teachers with three and above one year of service would be entitled to two months of break and finally that the teachers with below one year service would not be entitled to any such condonation. 13. After stipulating such various periods, being entitled to the teachers for having their break between the resignation and joining of the new school condoned, the Government thereafter issued G.O.(Ms)No.47/71/S.Edn. dated 21.04.1971, which made these benefits applicable to the teachers who resigned from one aided school to join another aided school. 14. This was followed by another Order, G.O.(Ms)No. 62/73/S.Edn. dated 02.05.1973, wherein it was provided that while reckoning the service for grant of higher grade, in lieu of continuous teaching service insisted for such purpose, total teaching service will be counted and that such concession shall take effect from 01.01.1973. It was also provided that in the said Government Order that the arrears will be given with effect from 01.01.1973. 15. This order was succeeded by another order, namely, G.O.(Ms)No.190/74/G.Edn. dated 30.09.1974, wherein the it was ordered that when a break is less than five years, the Controlling Officers can ignore it and take the aggregate for sanctioning the higher grade after referring to the Government Order dated 02.05.1973. 16. This position continued for about twelve years. 17. Thereafter the Government issued an order, bearing No.G.O.(Ms) No.122/86/G.Edn. dated 17.07.1986, wherein, after referring to all the aforementioned orders, it luculently consolidated the position as under : “It has been brought to the notice of the Committee for clearance of Audit Objections that higher grade sanctioned to both Government school and aided school teachers counting their service prior to resignation in aided School or Govt. school for joining service as the case may be as per G.O.(Ms) No.463/68/Edn. school for joining service as the case may be as per G.O.(Ms) No.463/68/Edn. dated 26.10.1968 and the higher grade sanctioned to teacher who resigned from one aided school to join service in another aided school counting their pre-resignation service are held under objection in aided schools in certain districts on the ground that orders of Govt. in individual case have not been obtained as contemplated in Govt. letter No.34912/J3/76/G.Edn. dated 13.09.1976. The committee for clearance of audit objections has its 4th report made the following recommendation in order to clear the above audit objections. “Government may clarity that the orders issued in the Government letter No. 34912/J3/76/G.Edn. dated 13.9.1976 and letter No. 77712/J1/77/G.Edn./79 dated 18.1.1979 are not binding on the teachers in Government schools as well as in aided school who have been sanctioned higher grade counting their pre-resignation service for taking up appointment in a Government School a aided school as the case may be subject to the condition that there should not be break for more than a month between leaving the service of aided School and joining service in Government School or leaving the service of Government School/Local Body School and joining service in aided school in terms of G.O.(Ms) No. 463/63/Edn. dated 26.10.1968 or between leaving the service from aided school and joining service from aided school in terms of G.O.Ms.No.47/71 S.Edn. dated 21.4.1971 overlooking their resignation for this purpose.” The Government have considered the recommendation made by the committee in this regard. They accept the recommendation of the committee for clearance of audit objections and order accordingly. However the Director of Public Instruction will report to Government individual cases of sanction of hither grade and matters relating thereto based on the above clarification, for appropriate orders.” 18. Referring to the afore Government Orders, the learned Government Pleader submits that the directions contained in the impugned judgment cannot hold water because concededly the first respondent had less than three years service but over one year service prior to her resignation, thus entitling her, under the provisions of 1969 Government Order, only to the benefit of condonation of break for a period of two months. The learned Government Pleader says that in this case since the break in service is admitted to be over 100 days, going by the tenor of the various Government Orders aforementioned, the grant of higher grade to the first respondent with effect from 01.11.1996, which was done taking into account the broken service spells served by her in the schools prior to the resignation was incorrect and improper. He points out that the Audit Department has, therefore, raised Exhibit P1 objection that the higher grade sanctioned to the first respondent, reckoning her service up to 25.09.1986, is illegal and irregular. He thus supports Exhibit P9 order issued by the Government, wherein the audit objection has been upheld and consequential directions have been issued to recover the excess payment made to the first respondent on account of such allegedly irregular fixation. 19. The learned counsel for the first respondent au contraire submits that no error was committed by the authorities in fixing the date of entitlment of the first respondent to higher grade as 01.11.1996 because, according to him, as per Exhibit P9 Order, which is the Government Order dated 05.02.1969, it provides that break in service up to five years be ignored in certain cases, including resignation. He further submits that, as is clear from the aforementioned various Government Orders, except the one of the year 1986, break in service even on account of resignation to join another school will stand condoned and in particular, he refers to the aforementioned Government Order dated 02.05.1973 to assert that in lieu of continuous teaching service for the purpose of higher grade, total teaching service, which includes pre-resignation service also, ought to be counted and reckoned. 20. We have considered the submissions of the learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the first respondent with great amount of care. 21. On a scrutiny of the afore-extracted legal statutory provisions and the afore-narrated Government Orders, a legitimate suspicion may arise as to how the Government had issued such orders, condoning the break in service of teachers after resignation, when the statutory provisions appear to be speaking otherwise. 21. On a scrutiny of the afore-extracted legal statutory provisions and the afore-narrated Government Orders, a legitimate suspicion may arise as to how the Government had issued such orders, condoning the break in service of teachers after resignation, when the statutory provisions appear to be speaking otherwise. However, it is limpid from the various Government Orders examined above that it has been attempting to give certain benefits to the teachers, notwithstanding the apparent proscription contained in the statutory provisions, taking into account various representations and requests made by the teachers from time to time. Since none of the above Government Orders have ever been subjected to challenge at any point of time by any of the parties and since these orders have been issued by the Government themselves, we are of the view that it will not be necessary for us to consider the legality and validity of the orders from the stand point of the provisions in the KER in an appeal impelled by the Government. Since the benefits under the Government Orders have been offered all these years to several hundreds of teachers, in the absence of any specific challenge to them, we are persuaded to take a view that it will not be necessary for this Court to consider these issues herein. 22. Thus, as matters now stand, the field is governed by the various Government Orders aforementioned and we are, therefore, of the view that it will be necessary for us only to assess the facts of this case against the afore orders without answering the question as to whether these orders are in conflict with the provisions of the KER. This is more so because this appeal has been filed by the Government and they themselves admit that these Government Orders continue to hold the field. 23. In this case, the fact remains that the first respondent was granted her ten year higher grade on 01.11.1996. This was objected to by the Audit Department only through Exhibit P1, which was issued more than three years thereafter, on 04.02.2000. The first respondent had obtained all the benefits of the ten year higher grade fixation by then and she still continues to enjoy those benefits based on such fixation. This was objected to by the Audit Department only through Exhibit P1, which was issued more than three years thereafter, on 04.02.2000. The first respondent had obtained all the benefits of the ten year higher grade fixation by then and she still continues to enjoy those benefits based on such fixation. It is on such basis that the audit Department has recommended that recovery be effected against her to obtain back the amounts that she has enjoyed on account of the alleged irregular fixation. The question, therefore, that raises for our consideration is whether the date on which the first respondent was granted the ten year higher grade, namely 01.11.1996, was validly reckoned and fixed by the concerned authorities when such sanction was given in the first instance. 24. A proper evaluation of this issue is certainly underpinned on the afore referred Government Orders and it becomes inescapable that since the benefit given to the first respondent was much after the Government Order of the year 1986 had come into effect, the rigor of that order ought to have been taken into account while doing so. As per the provisions of the Government Order dated 17.07.1986, a break in service for more than one month could not have been normally condoned. This means that where a teacher had pre-resignation service but did not join the second school within a period of one month after resigning from the former school, his/her entire period of service prior to that would stand forfeited. Since the 1986 Government Order was issued referring to the Orders dated 24.02.1968, 05.02.1969, 02.05.1973 and 30.09.1974, to which we have already adverted to above, it can only inferentially lead to the position that the terms of this Government Order were intended and designed to override the provisions contained in the earlier orders. 25. Of course, we are cognizant that the learned counsel for the first respondent has a specific assertion that the Government Order dated 02.05.1969 has not been referred in this order and therefore, that the provisions of that Government Order should also inure to the benefit of the first respondent. When we hear this submissions we are compelled to consider the contents of the 1968 Government Order also to see whether the first respondent would get an overriding benefit under the terms of that order. 26. When we hear this submissions we are compelled to consider the contents of the 1968 Government Order also to see whether the first respondent would get an overriding benefit under the terms of that order. 26. We are afraid that even it we accede to the contention of the learned counsel, it would be of no consequence in the particular facts involved herein, because when one examines the manner of that order, it will become evident that, since the first respondent has pre-resignation service of less than three years but more than one year, only a break of two months would have been entitled to her for being condoned, to reckon the benefits based on such service. In the case at hand, the break is concededly over two months, more than 100 days. In such view of the matter, we are not sure how the submission of the learned counsel for the first respondent that the 1969 Government Order would inure to the benefit of the first respondent, to have the break of 100 days condoned, can stand scrutiny of law. In any event of the matter, we are of the view that since the relevant Government Order now occupying the field is the one dated 17.07.1986, any benefit could have been granted to the first respondent thereafter only within the confines of the terms of that order and no other. 27. Viewed from the above perspective, it is ineluctable that the grant of ten year higher grade to the first respondent with effect from 01.11.1996 becomes untenable. 28. Once we so hold, then the question is whether the appellants should be entitled to cause recovery of the amount allegedly accepted by her on account of this wrong fixation. From the facts we have seen in this case, it is certain that the first respondent had availed of the benefits of the higher grade fixation on the basis of valid orders issued by the competent authorities and there is no allegation or even any whisper that she had been in any manner at fault in receiving such benefits. Further, the first respondent has been in continuous service from 01.06.1988 and therefore, obviously, she would be entitled to a ten year higher grade on a date slightly later than 01.11.1996, even if her pre-resignation service is completely forfeited. Further, the first respondent has been in continuous service from 01.06.1988 and therefore, obviously, she would be entitled to a ten year higher grade on a date slightly later than 01.11.1996, even if her pre-resignation service is completely forfeited. From this stand point, even though, in terms of strict law, it may lead to the consequence of recovery being thrust on the first respondent, the ratio of the judgment in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) ( (2015) 4 SCC 334 ) of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would come to her aid. In the said judgment, their Lordships has declared the law emphatically that once a person has retired from service, no steps for recovery can be initiated or pursued especially if the benefits that are sought to be recovered had been afforded to the person not on account of any fault that can be attributed to him/her. In the case at hand, there is no allegation even from the side of the appellants that benefits were given to the first respondent on account of any act from her side, but it it is virtually conceded that the fixation of the dated 01.11.1996 was made by the authorities under a wrong impression and that it was also granted under valid orders. Thus, irrefragably, the order to recover the excess amounts from the first respondent may not now obtain the favour of law. 29. However, this does not mean that other consequential action, including to re-fix her pay and allowances in future could not have been taken by the authorities. However, since the first respondent has retired from service, the best that the authorities can now do is to refix the pension based on the correct date on which her ten year higher grade could have been validly eligible to her. We are told at this time by the learned counsel that, on account of Exhibit P1 objections, no benefit consequent to the fixation of salary has been paid to the first respondent thereafter. If that be so, it is obvious that she will not be entitled to any further benefit on the strength of the higher grade fixation on 01.11.1996 and that such benefits will flow to her only with effect from a subsequent date, which has to be fixed by the authorities taking into account the fact that her pre-resignation service would now stand forfeited. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The appellants are directed to re-fix the date for grant of ten year higher grade to the first respondent in terms of law and adverting to our observations afore, but injuncting them from initiating or pursuing any action for recovery of the arrears alleged to have been drawn by the first respondent on account of the wrong fixation.