JUDGMENT : S. Sunil Dutt Yadav, J. 1. The appellant herein, who was petitioner before the learned Single Judge, had sought for the following relief in W.P. No. 23063/2017 :- "(i) A writ of mandamus or any other like writ thereby direct the respondent No.1 to demolish the unauthorized construction put up on 13 guntas of 'B' kharab land in Sy. No.2 of Kaikondrahalli Village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk. INTERIM PRAYER (ii) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass interim order directing the respondents 2 to 4 not to put up any further construction in 13 guntas of 'B' kharab land in Sy.No.2 of Kaikondrahalli Village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk, pending disposal of the above writ petition. ......" The learned Single Judge, however, declined to grant any relief and dismissed the writ petition by the order dated 25.10.2017, observing that the remedy was to be availed by way of a civil suit and not by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge, the present appeal has been filed. The relevant facts being that the appellant (petitioner in the writ petition) and respondents No.2 to 4 were co-owners of certain survey numbers situated at Kaikondrahalli Village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk. Dispute amongst themselves resolved itself in a compromise whereby properties were amicably shared. Sy.No.3/4 situated in the above-mentioned Village fell to the share of the appellant. It was contended that access to the appellant was only through the extent of 13 guntas of 'B' Kharab (unarable land reserved for public use) land in Sy.No.2 of the above-mentioned Village, which was a part of Sy.No.2 that had fallen to the share of respondent Nos.2 to 4. It was alleged that respondent Nos.2 to 4 had started construction in the area of 13 guntas of 'B' Kharab land which was in violation of the stipulation in the order of conversion according to which, 'B' Kharab land was to be kept vacant. It was also alleged that despite the respondent No.1-Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (hereinafter referred to as 'BBMP') having admitted that the construction of respondents No.2 to 4 was without sanction, no further action was forthcoming to demolish the illegal construction. However, the petition came to be dismissed relegating the petitioner to the Civil Court. It was also alleged that despite the respondent No.1-Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (hereinafter referred to as 'BBMP') having admitted that the construction of respondents No.2 to 4 was without sanction, no further action was forthcoming to demolish the illegal construction. However, the petition came to be dismissed relegating the petitioner to the Civil Court. The said order is now challenged contending primarily, that where a remedy exists under the provisions of Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 ('KMC Act' for short), remedy should be worked out under the said special Statute and there would be an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court. It is clear that the appellant's grievance is that his right of access is illegally obstructed by the respondents No.2 to 4 by encroaching upon an extent of 13 guntas of 'B' Kharab land and by carrying construction thereon, which in essence, is a violation of a private civil right of the appellant. The contention that the KMC Act is a self-contained Code and hence, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred is sought to be canvassed by relying on the following judgments; (i) Srikant Kashinath Jituri and others Vs. Corporation of the City of Belgaum, [ (1994) 6 SCC 572 ]; (ii) M/s.Vora Automotives Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Gopalrao Namdeorao Pohre and others, AIR 1993 Bombay 151; and (iii) Mathew Phillips Vs. P.O. Kosh, AIR1966 Mysore 74. It needs to be observed that there is a clear distinction between enforcement of a statutory right and assertion of infringement of a private civil right. While the former is a matter that can be canvassed before a writ Court, as regards the latter category of infringement, ordinarily, the remedy by way of a civil suit can be availed of. It is to be noted that under Section 321 of the KMC Act, the Municipal Authority is conferred with the power of "demolition or alteration of buildings or well-work unlawfully commenced, carried on or completed". Power is also conferred to take action by passing appropriate direction, which would include removal of such construction, which is unlawfully executed or to carry out such alterations in order to bring the work in conformity with the Act and other Rules governing such construction. Power is also conferred to take action by passing appropriate direction, which would include removal of such construction, which is unlawfully executed or to carry out such alterations in order to bring the work in conformity with the Act and other Rules governing such construction. However, the exercise of statutory power is vested solely with the Municipal Authority and it is settled law that mere violation of Building Bye-laws would not necessarily confer a right on the neighbouring property owner to seek for its enforcement. Hence, reliance on the judgment in the case of Mathew Phillips (supra), which merely reiterates the above-mentioned principle does not in any way further the case of the appellant. The following excerpt clarifies the position:- "4.......... Sri Jayaram, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has not shown any provision of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, or any other law, which creates a right in a neighbouring owner to bring a suit for injunction of the nature in the instant case. The argument of Sri Jayaram was that the provision in the bye-law that a clear space of 4 feet should be left is for the benefit of the adjacent owner. He has not been able to show any provision of the Act or bye-law or any other law that such a provision is for the benefit of the neighbouring owner. The City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, is a self-contained Code, which provides a remedy for any contravention of its provisions or the bye-laws made thereunder. It is for the appropriate authority constituted under the Act to determine, whether or not a licensee of a building has contravened the terms and conditions of his licence. Prima facie, I am not satisfied that any legal right of the plaintiff has been infringed or that he has any locus standi to maintain the suit. I do not wish to prejudice the final result of his suit by expressing any final opinion in the matter. The existence of a doubt as to the right of the plaintiff is sufficient to refuse the application for a temporary injunction." The grievance with respect to right of access is in the nature of assertion of a private civil right and the scheme of Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act does not provide for a mechanism for redressal of such a right. Section 9 of CPC reads as follows:- "9. Section 9 of CPC reads as follows:- "9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred. The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." In the light of the above, the present grievance, which is an assertion of violation of a private civil right, can be validly addressed by invoking the remedy available before the Civil Court. The question of bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court has been dealt with in the case of Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another : AIR 1969 SC 78 wherein, exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been considered as follows; "... (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not." It is clear that if the above test enunciated by the Apex Court is applied, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not excluded as the right of access to the appellant infringed by respondents Nos.2 to 4, is a matter not provided for under the scheme of Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, and hence, remedy before the Civil Court is not barred. In the case of Srikant Kashinath Jituri (supra), the Hon'ble Court considered the question as to whether the assessment made under the KMC Act could be challenged by way of a civil suit and the Court held that the question of property tax assessment can be challenged by way of taxation appeals, there was further a second appeal to the District Court and relevant provision under the Act provides that such an order shall be final. As there was an express bar under the applicable law and no case was made out as to non-compliance with any of the provisions of the Statute, the Supreme Court recorded a clear finding that there was no case made out for entertaining a civil suit relying upon the judgment in Dhulabhai's case (supra). The case on hand is entirely different, as the KMC Act does not provide for a remedy for redressal of grievance of the private civil rights of the appellant as complained herein. The reliance on the judgment in the case of M/s.Vora Automotives Pvt. Ltd., (supra) is also ill-founded, as the law laid down therein is merely to the effect that enforcement of statutory right without asserting violation of any private civil right is not permissible, which principle is not in dispute. The said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In view of the above, the present appeal is dismissed as bereft of merits, however, while noting that the learned Single Judge has rightly relegated the parties to the Civil Court. There is no need to consider the pending interlocutory application, as the same has become redundant. No costs.