JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. Since the common questions of law and facts are involved in these petitions, the same have been taken up together and are decided by this common judgment. 2. In these matters, the Corporation has proceeded against the petitioners, who are the sureties, u/s 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act’). 3. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners have relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon. Apex Court in the matter of ‘Karnataka State Financial Corporation vs. N. Narasimahaiah and others’ reported in (2008) 5 SCC 176 . Their Lordships have held as under: - “20. Section 29 of the Act nowhere states that the corporation can proceed against the surety even if some properties are mortgaged or hypothecated by it. The right of the financial corporation in terms of Section 29 of the Act must be exercised only on a defaulting party. There cannot be any default as is envisaged in Section 29 by a surety or a guarantor. The liabilities of a surety or the guarantor to repay the loan of the principal debtor arises only when a default is made by the latter. 21. The words "as well as" in our opinion play a significant role. It confers two different rights but such rights are to be enforced against the same person, viz., the industrial concern. Submission of the learned senior counsel that the second part of Section 29 having not referred to 'industrial concern', any property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the financial corporation can be sold, in our opinion cannot be accepted. It is true that Subsection (1) of Section 29 speaks of guarantee. But such a guarantee is meant to be furnished by the Corporation in favour of a third party for the benefit of the industrial concern. It does not speak about a surety or guarantee given in favour of the corporation for the benefit of the industrial concern. 22. The legislative object and intent becomes furthermore clear as in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the Act only when a property is sold, the manner in which the sale proceeds is to be appropriated has categorically been provided therein. 22. The legislative object and intent becomes furthermore clear as in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the Act only when a property is sold, the manner in which the sale proceeds is to be appropriated has categorically been provided therein. It is significant to notice that Sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the Act which lays down appropriation of the sale proceeds only refers to 'industrial concern' and not a 'surety' or 'guarantor'. 29. It is a trite law that the entire statute must be first read as a whole then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. 32. Section 31 of the Act provides for the relief’s which may be sought for by the Corporation strictly in terms thereof. Clause (aa) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act provides for a final relief. It does not speak of any interlocutory order. Clause (aa), as noticed hereinbefore, has been inserted by Act No. 43 of 1985. Thus, prior thereto even Section 31 could not have been taken recourse to against a surety. Such a relief, if prayed for, would also lead to grant of a final relief and not an interlocutory one. 33. Similarly, Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act also provides for a final relief. Only Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act empowers the District Judge in the event any application is filed by the Corporation to pass an ad interim injunction. The very fact that Section 31 uses the terminology "without prejudice" to the provisions of Section 29 of the Act and/or Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, it clearly postulates an additional relief. What can be done by invoking Section 29 of the Act can inter alia be done by invoking Section 31 thereof also but therefore a different procedure has to be adopted. Section 31 also provides for a relief against a surety and not confined to the industrial concern alone. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 also refers to industrial concern and not the surety. The legislative intent, therefore, to our mind, is clear and unambiguous. 34. Sub-section (1A) of Section 32 of the Act lays down a procedure when Clause (aa) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 thereof is invoked. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 also refers to industrial concern and not the surety. The legislative intent, therefore, to our mind, is clear and unambiguous. 34. Sub-section (1A) of Section 32 of the Act lays down a procedure when Clause (aa) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 thereof is invoked. Sub-section (4A) of Section 31 also empowers the court to forthwith order the enforcement of the liability of the surety if no cause is shown on or before the date notified by the parties. However, in the event, a cause is shown upon making an investigation as provided for under Subsection (6) of Section 32, a final order can be passed in terms of Sub-section (7) thereof. 37. The legislative intent, in our opinion, is manifest. The intention of the Parliament in enacting Sections 29 and 31 of the Act was not similar. Whereas Section 29 of the Act consists of the property of the industrial concern, Section 31 takes within its sweep both the property of the industrial concern and as that of the surety. None of the provisions control each other. The Parliament intended to provide an additional remedy for recovery of the amount in favour of the Corporation by proceeding against a surety only in terms of Section 31 of the Act and not under Section 29 thereof.” 4. In view of the definite law laid down by their Lordships in the aforesaid judgment, the right under Section 29 of the Act of 1961 has to be exercised only against the defaulting industrial concerns and not against a surety or guarantor. Their Lordships have further held that the surety can be proceeded against only in terms of Section 31 and not u/s 29 of the Act of 1951. Sections 29 and 31 are distinct and none of these provisions contradict with each other. 5. Accordingly both the writ petitions are allowed. Impugned annexures are quashed and set aside. The respondent-Corporation is, accordingly, restrained from taking over the possession of the petitioners’ properties. 6. However, it shall be open to the respondents to proceed against the petitioners in accordance with law.