ORDER : Do the restrictions imposed on the Court under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in granting bail to a person accused of an offence which is specified therein apply while considering an application for pre-arrest bail filed by such person under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973? (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). This question arises for consideration in this application for anticipatory bail. 2. The petitioner is the second accused in the case registered as Crime No. 943/2018 of the Perumbavoor police station under Section 21(c) of the Act. The prosecution case can be briefly stated as follows: On 12.03.2018, at about 08.22 hours, the Sub Inspector of Perumbavoor police station received reliable information that a person was transporting hashish by travelling on the motor cycle bearing registration No. KL-06/H-743 and that he was proceeding from Kothamangalam to Perumbavoor. By 09.00 hours, the Sub Inspector reached the road near Asramam School at Perumbavoor and started checking of vehicles. When he saw the aforesaid motor cycle coming from east to west, he intercepted it. The first accused was the person who was riding the motor cycle. After complying with the necessary legal formalities, the Sub Inspector searched the contents of the bag found in the possession of the first accused. The bag contained 1994 grams of hashish oil in a packet. The Sub Inspector seized it and arrested the first accused. On interrogation of the first accused, it was revealed that the hashish oil was entrusted with him by the petitioner for selling it. On the basis of such information, the petitioner is implicated as the second accused in the case. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Public Prosecutor and perused the case diary. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is absolutely no material to connect the petitioner with the hashish oil allegedly seized from the possession of the first accused. Learned counsel would also point out that the petitioner is implicated in the case solely on the basis of the confession statement given to the police by the first accused which is inadmissible in evidence. Learned counsel would also point out that the petitioner is implicated in the case solely on the basis of the confession statement given to the police by the first accused which is inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there are materials collected by the investigating officer confirming the complicity of the petitioner in the crime and pre-arrest bail cannot be granted to the petitioner in view of the provisions contained in Section 37 of the Act. 5. The quantity of hashish oil allegedly seized from the possession of the first accused is 1994 grams. There is no dispute with regard to the fact it constitutes commercial quantity. Section 21 of the Act provides that whoever, in contravention of any provision of the Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses any manufactured drug or any preparation containing any manufactured drug shall be punishable in the manner provided in clauses (a) to (c) therein. 6. Section 37 of the Act reads as follows: “37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) - (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall he cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless - (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 7. Section 37 of the Act contains special provisions with regard to grant of bail in respect of the offences enumerated under the said Section which includes an offence involving commercial quantity. Section 37 of the Act contains special provisions with regard to grant of bail in respect of the offences enumerated under the said Section which includes an offence involving commercial quantity. As per Section 37(1)(b) of the Act, it is mandatory that the Public Prosecutor shall be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail filed by a person accused of such offence. As per Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, in case, where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, two conditions have to be satisfied for enlarging the accused on bail. The first one is that the Court shall be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged against him. The second ground is that the Court shall be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Only on satisfaction of these twin conditions, the Court has the power to enlarge the accused on bail. 8. In Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari : (2007) 7 SCC 798 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: “As the provision itself provides no person shall be granted bail unless the two conditions are satisfied. They are; the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Both the conditions have to be satisfied. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the bar operates and the accused cannot be released on bail.” 9. Again in Union of India v. Rattan Mallik @ Habul : (2009) 2 SCC 624 , the Apex Court has held as follows: “It is plain from a bare reading of the non obstante clause in the Section and sub-s. (2) thereof that the power to grant bail to a person accused of having committed offence under the NDPS Act is not only subject to the limitations imposed under S.439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it is also subject to the restrictions placed by sub cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S.37 of the NDPS Act. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S.37 of the NDPS Act. Apart from giving an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the application for such release, the other twin conditions viz; (i) the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, have to be satisfied. It is manifest that the conditions are cumulative and not alternative.” 10. Recently, in Union of India v. Niyazuddin: AIR 2017 SC 3932 , the Apex Court has held as follows: “The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under S.37 of the NDPS Act, in case, the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment. (1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such offence; (2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 11. Section 37 of the Act mentions the restrictions on the Court in granting bail to a person accused of the offences under the Act which are specified therein. Do these restrictions under the Act regarding granting bail to such a person apply to granting him the benefit of pre-arrest bail? 12. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the Act does not contain any provision to the effect that the provisions in Section 438 of the Code would not apply to a person accused of an offence under the Act. Had it been the intention of the legislature to deny the benefit of pre-arrest bail to a person who is accused of an offence under the Act, such provision would have been made in the Act. It is also to be noted that the provisions contained in Section 37 of the Act regarding granting of bail do not create an absolute bar in that regard but only create some rigid restrictions. 13. Section 37 of the Act does not differentiate between regular bail and anticipatory bail. It is also to be noted that the provisions contained in Section 37 of the Act regarding granting of bail do not create an absolute bar in that regard but only create some rigid restrictions. 13. Section 37 of the Act does not differentiate between regular bail and anticipatory bail. The provision only uses the expression 'bail'. Bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly, release from the custody of the police. The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial (See Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab: AIR 1980 SC 1632 ). The expression 'bail' only means security taken from an accused for release from custody or for protection from custody. The power under Section 438 of the Code is being exercised by the Court to give a direction that the applicant shall be released on bail in the event of his arrest. Since the provisions contained in Section 37 of the Act do not differentiate between regular bail and anticipatory bail, it has to be found that the restrictions provided therein apply to granting regular as well as anticipatory bail. 14. In Balchand Jain v. State of M.P : AIR 1977 SC 366 , the Apex Court was seized with the question as to whether an order granting anticipatory bail can be passed by a Court of Session or the High Court under Section 438 of the Code in case of an offence under Section 184 of the Defence of Internal Security of India Rules, 1971 made under the Defence of Internal Security of India Act, 1971. The aforesaid Rule contained provision imposing restriction in granting bail to a person accused or convicted of a contravention of the Rules or orders made thereunder. It provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code no such person shall be released on bail unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such contravention. The Apex Court held that the Rule cannot be construed as displacing altogether the provisions of the Code in regard to bail. It provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code no such person shall be released on bail unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such contravention. The Apex Court held that the Rule cannot be construed as displacing altogether the provisions of the Code in regard to bail. After examining the historical background of Section 438 of the Code, the Apex Court also held that the aforesaid Rule does not stand in the way of a Court of Session or a High Court granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code to a person apprehending arrest on an accusation of having committed contravention of any rule or order made under that Rules. However, the Apex Court proceeded further to state as follows: “If these are the conditions provided by the rule making authority for releasing on bail a person arrested on an accusation of having committed contravention of any Rule or order made under the Rules, it must follow a fortiori that the same conditions must provide the guidelines while exercising the power to grant 'anticipatory bail' to a person apprehending arrest on such accusation, though they would not be strictly applicable. When a person apprehending arrest on an accusation of having committed contravention of any Rule or Order made under the Rules applies to the Court for a direction under S.438, the Court should not ordinarily grant him 'anticipatory bail' under that section unless a notice has been issued to the prosecution giving it an opportunity to oppose the application and in case the contravention is of a Rule or order specially notified in this behalf, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such contravention.” 15. In Muraleedharan v. State of Kerala: (2001) 4 SCC 638 , the Supreme Court took note of the fact that Section 41A of the Abkari Act (Kerala) is in pari materia with Section 37 of the NDPS Act and observed as follows: “The above provision is in pari materia with Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. In Muraleedharan v. State of Kerala: (2001) 4 SCC 638 , the Supreme Court took note of the fact that Section 41A of the Abkari Act (Kerala) is in pari materia with Section 37 of the NDPS Act and observed as follows: “The above provision is in pari materia with Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. This Court has held, time and again, that no person who is involved in an offence under that Act shall be released on bail in contravention of the conditions laid down in the said Section (Vide Union of India v. Ram Samujh, 1999 (9) SCC 429 ). If the position is thus in regard to an accused even after arrest, it is incomprehensible how the position would be less when he approaches the court for pre-arrest bail knowing that he would also be implicated as an accused.” 16. Very recently, in Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab : AIR 2018 SC 2011 , the Apex Court has held as follows: “Be that as it may, the order dated 21.09.2017 passed by the High Court does not show that there is any reference to Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The quantity is reportedly commercial. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court could not have and should not have passed the order under Sections 438 or 439 Cr.P.C without reference to Section 37 of the NDPS Act and without entering a finding on the required level of satisfaction in case the Court was otherwise inclined to grant the bail. Such a satisfaction having not being entered, the order dated 21.09.2017 is only to be set aside and we do so.”(emphasis supplied). 17. The upshot of the discussion above is that the restrictions provided in Section 37 of the Act in granting bail to a person accused of the offences specified therein would also apply in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code to such a person. 18. In the instant case, it is to be examined whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence alleged against him and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 18. In the instant case, it is to be examined whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence alleged against him and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there is absolutely no material to show that the petitioner has got any connection whatsoever with the hashish oil seized from the possession of the first accused and that the petitioner is implicated in the case solely on the basis of the confession statement given to the police by the first accused which is inadmissible in evidence. 19. The case diary reveals that the first accused has given information to the investigating officer that it was the petitioner who entrusted with him the hashish oil for sale. It is true that in view of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 confession statement given to a police officer by an accused is not admissible in evidence and it cannot be proved as against a person accused of an offence. True, statement of a co-accused to a police officer may not be taken as legally admissible evidence against the other accused during the trial, but for the purpose of investigation, it can certainly be considered as providing a lead in the investigation. Confession statement of an accused may give valuable information to the investigating officer regarding the complicity of other persons involved in the commission of the crime. The investigating officer is entitled to proceed with the investigation on the basis of such information. 20. In Muraleedharan's case (supra), the Supreme Court had occasion to observe as follows: “According to the Sessions Judge “no material could be collected by the investigating agency to connect the petitioner with the crime except the confessional statement of the co-accused. ........ It is disquieting that a Sessions Judge has chosen to adopt such inane reasoning for granting anticipatory bail in cases involving offences for which the legislature has imposed stringent restrictions even in regard to the grant of regular bail.” The Supreme Court has proceeded further and observed as follows: “We express our reprobation at the supercilious manner in which the Sessions Judge decided to think that “no material could be collected by the investigating agency to connect the petitioner with the crime except the confessional statement of the co-accused”. Such a wayward thinking emanating from a Sessions Judge deserves judicial condemnation. No Court can afford to presume that the investigating agency would fail to trace out more materials to prove the accusation against an accused. We are at a loss to understand what would have prompted the Sessions Judge to conclude, at this early stage, that the investigating agency would not be able to collect any material to connect the appellant with the crime”. 21. In the light of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that confession statement given to a police officer by an accused cannot be used by the investigating officer to find out the complicity of other persons in the crime, does not merit acceptance. It is true that the investigating officer is expected to find out the veracity of the statement given to him by the accused as regards the complicity of other persons in the crime. In the instant case, the investigating officer has collected materials to prove the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. As per the statement given by the first accused to the investigating officer, it was at about 02.30 hours on 10.03.2018 that hashish oil was entrusted with him by the petitioner. While arresting the first accused, the detecting officer had seized the mobile phone found in his possession. The call data records relating to the mobile phones of the first accused as well as the petitioner show that on 10.03.2018 they had contacted with each other over mobile phone at 0.55.57, 1.38.32, 1.52.07 and 2.06.46 hours, during night. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has got acquaintance with the first accused for a long time and it was not unusual for such persons to contact each other over mobile phone. True, it is not unusual for friends and relatives to contact with each other over mobile phone. However, in the instant case, the contacts between the petitioner and the first accused on mobile phone were at odd hours, immediately after midnight on 10.03.2018 and the contacts so made between them indicate that the information given by the first accused to the investigating officer is true and correct. However, in the instant case, the contacts between the petitioner and the first accused on mobile phone were at odd hours, immediately after midnight on 10.03.2018 and the contacts so made between them indicate that the information given by the first accused to the investigating officer is true and correct. Further, the investigating officer has also collected details regarding the tower location of the mobile phones of the petitioner and the first accused on that night. 22. Call data records constitute an important and effective tool and evidence which facilitate and assist the investigating officer and they help the court to ascertain the veracity of the prosecution case. Such scientific evidence cannot be ignored or overlooked. An active mobile phone has two components, that is, the mobile instrument and the SIM card. Every mobile instrument has a unique identification number, namely, International Mobile Equipment Identity number, for short, IMEI number. Such SIM card could be provided by the service providers either with cash card or post paid card to the subscriber and once this SIM card is activated the number is generated which is commonly known as mobile number. The mobile service is operated through a main server computer called mobile switching centre which handles and records each and every movement of an active mobile phone like day and time of the call, duration of the call, calling and the called number, location of the subscriber during active call and the unique IMEI number of the instrument used by the subscriber during an active call. This mobile switching centre manages all this through various sub-systems or sub-stations and finally with the help of telephone towers. These towers are actually Base Trans-receiver Stations also known as BTS. Such BTS covers a set of cells each of them identified by a unique cell ID. A mobile continuously selects a cell and exchanges data and signalling traffic with the corresponding BTC. Therefore, through a cell ID the location of the active mobile instrument can be approximated (Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq Vs State of NCT of Delhi: (2011) 13 SCC 621 ). Every time a mobile handset is used for making a call, besides recording the number of the caller as well as the person called, the IMEI numbers of the handsets used are also recorded by the service provider. Arif @ Ashfaq Vs State of NCT of Delhi: (2011) 13 SCC 621 ). Every time a mobile handset is used for making a call, besides recording the number of the caller as well as the person called, the IMEI numbers of the handsets used are also recorded by the service provider. Call data records, being evidence of a conclusive nature, cannot be overlooked and even a serious discrepancy in oral evidence has to yield to such scientific evidence (See Gajraj v. State (NCT) of Delhi: (2011) 10 SCC 675 ). 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that no narcotic drug or psychotropic substance has been seized from the possession of the petitioner. In order to attract Section 21(c) of the Act, it is not always necessary that the contraband article was in the possession of the accused. As noticed earlier, Section 21 of the Act provides that whoever, in contravention of any provision of the Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses any manufactured drug or any preparation containing any manufactured drug shall be punishable in the manner provided in clauses (a) to (c) therein. To attract Section 21 of the Act, it is not always necessary that a person should be found to be in possession of the drug. If any one of the ingredients mentioned in Section 21 of the Act is satisfied, the offence would be complete. It is to be noted that possession implies exclusiveness which relates to 'dominion' over the contraband article. In the present case, the allegation is that the petitioner was the person who entrusted the hashish oil with the first accused. The entrustment was for the purpose of sale. Prima facie, it would indicate that the hashish oil was in the possession of the petitioner and that he sold it to the first accused. Moreover, Section 21(c) of the Act would be attracted when manufactured drug of commercial quantity is used by a person. As per Section 2 (xxviiia) of the Act, use in relation to narcotic drugs means any kind of use except personal consumption. 24. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Act is 'reasonable grounds'. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. As per Section 2 (xxviiia) of the Act, use in relation to narcotic drugs means any kind of use except personal consumption. 24. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Act is 'reasonable grounds'. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. The Court while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the Court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. The Court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty. It is neither necessary nor desirable to weigh the evidence meticulously to arrive at a positive finding as to whether or not the accused has committed the offence alleged against him. Further, the satisfaction of the Court as regards his likelihood of not committing an offence while on bail must be construed to mean an offence under the Act and not any offence whatsoever be it a minor or major offence (See Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari: (2007) 7 SCC 798 , Union of India v. Rattan Mallik @ Habul : (2009) 2 SCC 624 and Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 5 SCC 294 ). 25. In the instant case, there are sufficient materials to indicate the complicity of the petitioner in the crime. There is no reasonable ground for believing that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him. Therefore, the bar under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Act is attracted and pre-arrest bail cannot be granted to him. 26. Moreover, custodial interrogation of the petitioner is absolutely necessary to have an effective investigation in the case. There is no reasonable ground for believing that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him. Therefore, the bar under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Act is attracted and pre-arrest bail cannot be granted to him. 26. Moreover, custodial interrogation of the petitioner is absolutely necessary to have an effective investigation in the case. If custodial interrogation of the petitioner is denied to the investigating agency, it would leave many loose ends and gaps in the investigation. Custodial interrogation of the petitioner would help the investigating agency to elicit further information and vital clues as to his role in the drug trafficking. In State v. Anil Sharma : AIR 1997 SC 3806 , the Supreme Court has stated as follows: “Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation orientated than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this effective interrogation of suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful information’s and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases”. 27. The persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. Reason may be large stake and illegal profit involved (See Union of India v. Ram Samujh: (1999) 9 SCC 429 ). Trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances lead to drug addiction among the public, particularly the adolescents and students, and it has a deadly impact on the society as a whole. Reason may be large stake and illegal profit involved (See Union of India v. Ram Samujh: (1999) 9 SCC 429 ). Trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances lead to drug addiction among the public, particularly the adolescents and students, and it has a deadly impact on the society as a whole. This is also a factor to be kept in mind by the Court while considering an application for pre-arrest bail made by a person accused of an offence under the Act. 28. The discussion above leads to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to get the protection of pre-arrest bail. The petition is liable to be dismissed. 29. In the result, the petition is dismissed. It is made clear that the observations in this order regarding the merits of the prosecution case have been made only for the purpose of deciding the application for bail and that they shall have no bearing on the trial of the case.