JUDGMENT : Hon’ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.—Heard Sri Saurabh Srivastava, learned counsel for the defendant-tenant/petitioners. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed praying for the following relief: “Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, setting aside/quashing the impugned dated 1.2.2018 passed by prescribed authority/Judge Small Causes Court, Kanpur Nagar in Rent Case No. 5 of 2011 (Swami Dayal Kaityar v. Mahesh Kumar and another)” 2. By the impugned order dated 1.2.2018 the application for cross-examination of the deponent of the affidavit (paper No. 36 Ga), i.e., Sri S. S. Kushwaha, Engineer and Architect, has been rejected on two findings, firstly, that Rule 22 does not provide for cross-examination and there is no provision under the Act for cross-examination from witness and secondly, the application for cross-examination has been moved with intent to delay with the disposal of the case. Aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 1.2.2018 the defendant-tenant/petitioners have filed the present writ petition. Submissions 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Section 34(1)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 confers power upon the prescribed authority and certain other authorities under the Act to summon and enforce the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. Therefore, the observation of the prescribed authority in the impugned order that there is no such provision, is wholly incorrect. In support of his submission he relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Ist Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1983 (1) ARC 752 (para 11 to 16), Mahesh Chand v. Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Bulandshahar/Prescribed Authority, 2005 (1) ARC 558 and Mohd. Rauf v. Prescribed Authority (Civil Judge, Senior Division), Unnao and others, 1997 (2) ARC 589. Discussions and findings 4. From the record of this writ petition it appears that an application under Section 21(1)(b) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 was filed by the plaintiff-respondent on 30.5.2011 for release of the tenanted accommodation being part of house No. 51/7P (new No. 51/43) Mohalla Ramganj, Kanpur Nagar. On the ground that the said house is more than 100 years old and it is in a dilapidated condition and the plaintiff requires it for demolition and new construction. Written statement was filed by the defendant-tenant/petitioners in December, 2012. On the ground that the said house is more than 100 years old and it is in a dilapidated condition and the plaintiff requires it for demolition and new construction. Written statement was filed by the defendant-tenant/petitioners in December, 2012. In evidence inspection report dated 10.2.2011 of Shyam Associates (Engineers and Architects), Kanpur was filed by the plaintiff-respondent in which detail facts with regard to the condition of the house in question including its walls, roof, slab, floor and joinery etc. have been mentioned and an opinion has been expressed that the construction of the house is very old say about 100 years and the condition is poor. Estimated cost of demolition and disposal of Malwa, cost of new construction have also been given in the said report alongwith a map. An affidavit of Er. S. S. Kushwah of M/s Shyam Associates dated 19.11.2012 was also filed giving detail of the condition of construction of the disputed house. According to the defendant-tenant/petitioner he has also filed a report of Er. Mahesh Chand, approved Valuer and Engineer dated 19.9.2013. 5. An affidavit of the aforesaid Er. Mahesh Chand was also filed an evidence by the defendant-tenant/petitioners dated __January, 2014 in which the deponent of the affidavit has given details about himself in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 and thereafter in paragraph 4 he stated that he has personally inspected the disputed property and has given his inspection report which has been sent by him and the contends of the report forms part of his affidavit and the said report is correct. 6. 6. After about 7 years of institution of the rent case and after about 6 years of submission of the engineer’s report and his affidavit filed in evidence by the plaintiff-landlord/respondent, the defendant-tenant/petitioners filed an application being paper No. 72 dated 1.2.2018 which is produced below: ^^Jheku~ th] izkFkhZ@izfroknh fuosnu gS fd%& 1- ;g fd mijksDr okn Hkou Lokeh ds /kkjk 21¼1½ ¼ch½ ;wŒihŒ ,DV 13 o"kZ 1972 ds vUrZxr nkf[ky fd;k x;k gS ftlus dh Hkou Lokeh }kjk fu;e 17 dk vuqikyu vko';d gSA 2- ;g fd Hkou }kjk Jh ,lŒ,lŒ dq'kokgk bUthfu;j ds }kjk cuk;h x;h fjiksVZ ,oa 'kiFki= dkxt la[;k&36x nkf[ky fd;k x;k gS mlds foijhr foi{kh }kjk Jh egs'k pUnz bUthfu;j ds }kjk fjiksVZ ,oa 'kiFki= nkf[ky fd;k x;k gSA 3- ;g fd nksuks bUthfu;jks ds }kjk fjiksVZ esa cgqr gh fojks/kkHkkl gSA 4- ;g fd i=koyh ij lR; fLFkfr yk;s tkus gsrq ;g vko';d gS fd Jh ,lŒ,lŒ dq'kokgk bUthfu;j ds 'kiFki= dkxt la[;k&36x ij ftjg dh tk;s rkfd lgh oLrqfLFkfr ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds le{k vk ldsA 5- ;g fd bathfu;j Jh ,lŒ,lŒ dq'kokgk ds }kjk izLrqr 'kiFki= dkxt la[;k&36x ij ftjg gsrq rycdj ftjg djus dh vuqefr iznku fd;k tkuk U;k;fgr esa vfr vko';d gSA izkFkZuk vr% Jheku~ th ls fouez fuosnu gS fd bathfu;j Jh ,lŒ,lŒ dq'kokgk ds }kjk izLrqr 'kiFki= dkxt la[;k&36x ij ftjg gsrq rycdj ftjg djus dh vuqefr iznku djus dh d`ik djsaA Jheku th dh egku x;k gksxhA fnukad & 01-02-2018 izkFkhZ@izfroknh egs'k dqekj }kjk vf/koDrkA** 7. His application being paper No. 72 dated 1.2.2018 for cross-examination of the Er. S. S. Kushwah, was rejected by the impugned order dated 1.2.2018. 8. Perusal of the aforequoted application (paper No. 72) dated 1.2.2018 shows that it is a vague application, not a word has been stated in the said application that which content of the affidavit of the aforesaid Er. S. S. Kushwah filed long back in the year 2012, is incorrect. Relevant Provisions 9. The provisions relevant for the basis of controversy raised in the present writ petition, are Section 34(1) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 and Rule 15 and 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 which are re-produced below: “Section 34. Relevant Provisions 9. The provisions relevant for the basis of controversy raised in the present writ petition, are Section 34(1) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 and Rule 15 and 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 which are re-produced below: “Section 34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them.—(1) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any appellate authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely,- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath ; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits ; (c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation ; (d) requiring the discovery and production of documents ; (e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any party or requiring security for costs from any party ; (f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith ; (g) any other matter which may be prescribed. Rule 15. Application for release of buildings under occupation of tenant [Section 21(1)] (1) Every application for release under Section 21(1) shall specify the ground or grounds on which the tenant is sought to be evicted. (2) The application or its reply shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed under Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. If there are more than one landlords, the application shall be signed by all the co-landlords. (3) Every application referred to in sub-rule (1) shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. Rule 22. If there are more than one landlords, the application shall be signed by all the co-landlords. (3) Every application referred to in sub-rule (1) shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. Rule 22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Section 34 (1) (g)]—[The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate or revising authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under the Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely - (a) the power to dismiss an application, appeal or revision for default and to restore it for sufficient cause; (b) the power to proceed ex parte and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex parte; (c) the power to award costs and special costs to any successful party against an unsuccessful party; (d) the power to allow amendment of an application, memorandum of appeal or revision; (e) the power to consolidate two or more cases of eviction by the same landlord against different tenants; (f) the power referred to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned.]” Expeditious disposal of Rent Cases - Statutory Mandate 10. Rule 15(3) of the Rules is a clear statutory mandate for deciding every application under Section 21(1) of the Act, as far as possible, within two months from the date of its presentation. Thus, expeditious disposal of a release application under Section 21(1) of the Act is one of the objects of the Act. Similar view has also been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Khushi Ram Dedwal v. Additional Judge, Small Causes Court/Prescribed Authority, Meerut and others, 1997 (2) ARC 674 (para 13). 11. The rent case in question was filed by the plaintiff-respondent in May, 2011. Written statement was filed by the defendant-tenant in December, 2012. The report of the engineer dated 10.2.2011 and his affidavit were filed in the year 2012. 11. The rent case in question was filed by the plaintiff-respondent in May, 2011. Written statement was filed by the defendant-tenant in December, 2012. The report of the engineer dated 10.2.2011 and his affidavit were filed in the year 2012. The defendant-tenant/petitioners on 01st February, 2018 filed the application for cross-examination (paper No. 72) dated 1.2.2018 which has been rejected by the impugned order dated 1.2.2018 with the observation that the application has been moved in this old case with intent to post pone the argument and to delay the disposal of the case. 12. On the facts and legal provisions as aforenoted, I do not find any infirmity in the aforesaid finding recorded by the Court below. Right of cross-examination of witness under U.P. Act XIII of 1972 13. So far as, the question of right of cross-examination in rent cases under the Act is concerned, there cannot be any quarrel that a right of cross-examination has been conferred under Section 34(1)(a) of the Act, but this right is limited. To allow cross-examination is the discretionary power of the Court which may be exercised sparingly, only in appropriate cases and for sufficient reasons. 14. In the case of M/s. Associated Cement Companies Limited v. Prescribed Authority and another, 1984 (10) ALR 173, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that dispute under the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 has to be decided primarily on affidavits. It does not mean that the Court or Authority cannot, in a proper case, direct for cross-examination, but that discretionary power has to be exercised sparingly. 15. In the case of Radha Kishan v. IVth Additional District Judge, Jalaun at Orai and others, 1985 (1) ARC 427 (para 3) this Court held as under: “It was also urged that as Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code applied the authorities could not have decided the claim of parties on affidavits only. According to him the parties should have been examined on oath and an opportunity should have been afforded for cross-examining them. This argument has been advanced on number of occasions before different Benches of this Court but has been replied. Moreover the objection does not appear to have been taken before any of the authorities. According to him the parties should have been examined on oath and an opportunity should have been afforded for cross-examining them. This argument has been advanced on number of occasions before different Benches of this Court but has been replied. Moreover the objection does not appear to have been taken before any of the authorities. Evidence of affidavits is permissible by section itself and is necessary as well as the primary objective of Act XIII of 1972 is expeditious disposal of the cases. It may be hindered if parties are permitted to lead oral evidence.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 16. In the case of Khushi Ram Dedwal (supra) a Division Bench of this Court considered the question of affording opportunity of cross-examination in proceedings under U.P. Act 13 of 1972 and held that the authority can permit the cross-examination of a deponent of an affidavit only when it is necessary in the case. The Division Bench discussed the matter in detail and observed as under: “5. The Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the suits. In a suit, a party has to adduce oral evidence and the evidence on affidavit is not permissible except under the circumstances provided under Order XIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A party has to lead oral evidence as provided under Order XVIII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XIX. Rule 1 is an exception to the said Rule. A party can file an affidavit under Rule 1 only when the Court for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved on affidavits. Either the party may agree that the case may be decided on affidavits or for any other sufficient reason the Court passes an order to take evidence on affidavits. Under Rule 2 the Court does not decide the suit but decide only applications which are filed in the suit. Distinction between Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order XIX was considered by Hon’ble P.N. Bhagwati. J., (as he then was) in Bai Zabu Khima v. Amardas Balakdas, A!R 1967 Gujrat 214, wherein it was held that Rule 1 applies to all the proceedings including the suits but Rule 2 applies only to applications and not to suits. Under Rule 1, reasons for taking evidence on affidavits have to be set out in the order but not under Rule 2. Under Rule 1, reasons for taking evidence on affidavits have to be set out in the order but not under Rule 2. 6. Section 34 (1) (b) of the Act permits the authorities under the Act to receive evidence on affidavits and clause (a) confers power on the authorities for summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. The cross-examination of a deponent of an affidavit is thus not excluded. The authorities have power to permit any party to cross-examine the deponent of the affidavit. The exercise of power to permit cross-examination should be on the principle as laid down under Order XIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 which came into force on 1.1.1977. The proviso to Rule 1 of Order XIX was substituted by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976. Substituted proviso reads as follows : “Provided that if it appears to the Court, whether at the instance of either party or otherwise and whether before or after the filing of such affidavit, that the production of such witness for cross -examination is necessary and his attendance can be procured, the Court shall order the attendance of such witness, whereupon the witness may be examined, cross-examined and re-examined.” 7. The Court has been given power under the said proviso for production of the deponent for cross-examination, if it is necessary. The provision itself is clear that the Court has discretion to permit for cross-examination and such discretion should be exercised only when cross-examination is necessary. The necessity for cross-examination will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If an application is filed by a party for cross-examination of a deponent by an affidavit, he must give reasons why cross-examination is necessary. It Is not in every case that once an application is filed for cross-examination it has to be permitted as a general rule. It is true that the veracity of averments made in affidavits can be tested by cross-examination but unless it is established that the veracity of facts stated in the affidavit is necessary to be tested by cross-examination, the party must give reasons as to which particular fact and under what circumstances and for what reasons such cross-examination is necessary in the context and facts and circumstances of the case. U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 applies for determining certain rights of the landlord, tenant and such other persons who claim the benefit under the provisions of the said Act. This Act itself provides the manner in which the evidence is to be taken by the parties concerned. The purpose of the enactment of any of the provisions has to be taken into account while permitting a party to cross-examine the deponent of an affidavit. 10. The various Benches of this Court considered the rights of a party to cross-examine the deponent of an affidavit, in the proceedings under the Act. There is no divergent view that a deponent of an affidavit cannot be cross-examined or there is no power with the authorities to permit cross-examination of a deponent. The only question remains as to what are the circumstances under which the cross-examination can be permitted. 11. In M/s. Associated Cement Companies Limited, Kanpur v. Prescribed Authority/IXth Additional Munsif, Kanpur and another, 1984 (1) ARC 137. Hon’ble R. M. Sahal, J. (as he then was) held that the discretionary power has to be exercised sparingly by the prescribed authority while deciding the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 12. The same view was followed in Smt. Gulaicha Devl v. Prescribed Authority (Munsif), Basti and another, 1989 (1) ARC 407; Satish Kumar Sharma v. Prescribed Authority (A.C.J.M.). Dehradun and another, 1991 (1) ARC 438 and Subhosh Chandra Sachdeva v. District Judge, Etah and others, 1992 (2) ARC 253. In these cases, the decision in Rang Lal v. Prescribed Authority and another, 1982 (1) ARC 449, was considered and it was held that the prescribed authority had earlier allowed the application for cross-examination but later on without any justification refused permission to his cross-examine the deponent of the affidavits and in that context an observation was made that in a case where an affidavit is filed the veracity or credibility of witness cannot be decided unless the deponent of the affidavit is subjected to cross-examination. The decision in Ashraf Ahmad v. Prescribed Authority (Civil Judge), Rampur and another, 1987 (1) ARC 356, wherein on facts it was found that the dispute was relating to the oral gift on which the landlord was claiming the right In the property, the prescribed authority in those circumstances should have permitted the cross-examination. These two cases were distinguished on facts. 13. These two cases were distinguished on facts. 13. The proviso to Order XIX, Rule 1 has used the words “cross-examination is necessary”. The effect of this proviso was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Assam Dass v. Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow and another, 1996 (2) ARC 92, and it was held that if the prescribed authority is satisfied that the cross-examination is necessary, it can allow a party to cross-examine the deponent of an affidavit. The Court observed. “In our view a conjoint reading of Rule 1 of Order XIX, Code of Civil Procedure and Section 34 of the Act makes it quite manifest that if the prescribed authority is satisfied that it is necessary for the ends of justice and to elicit truth that the deponent of the affidavit should be called upon to appear before it for the purpose of cross-examination, the prescribed authority has jurisdiction and power to ask such person to appear before it for that purpose.” When cross-examination is necessary, it has to be decided in the context of factual backdrop of the case and in the context of nature of the proceedings under Act. The application under Section 21(1) of the Act is to be decided expeditiously. Rule 15 (3) of the Rules framed under the Act lays down that every application under Section 21(1) of the Act shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. The Legislature did not provide that oral evidence to be adduced in support of the case as contemplated under Order XVIII. Rule 4, C.P.C. but the facts are to be proved on affidavits. If unnecessary cross-examination is permitted, that will only hamper the expeditious disposal of the cases. The Hon. Supreme Court emphasised this aspect in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir (supra). Considering this provision Hon’ble R.M. Sanai J. as he then was, in the case of Radha Krishan v. Vth Additional District Judge, Jalaun at Oral and others, 1985 (1) ARC 427, observed that the primary objective of Act No. 13 of 1972 is expeditious disposal of the cases. It may be hindered if the parties are permitted to lead oral evidence. It may be hindered if the parties are permitted to lead oral evidence. In the case of Smt. Gutaicha Devi (supra) the following observation was made : “If oral evidence was contemplated to be filed and if the deponent of every affidavit was permitted to be cross-examined then it would not be possible to decide the release application under Section 21(1) of the Act within a period of two months.” It may be that when the case is being decided, a party files an application for cross-examination only to delay the proceedings. The Court has to examine in each case as to whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, cross-examination is necessary and the application filed for cross-examination is bona fide. If the matter relates as to the extent of the accommodation or the matter which could be verified on inspection, the cross-examination will be hardly relevant. If the question arises regarding title of the property which can be decided on the basis of the documentary evidence, the cross-examination will not be relevant as the fact can be proved by documentary evidence which can be annexed with the affidavit. 14. The principle that a party is to be permitted to cross-examine on the principle of natural justice cannot be accepted in every case. Oral examination in all cases is not contemplated. Even in disciplinary inquiries in exceptional cases oral evidence may not be insisted upon as held in Hira Nath Mishra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, AIR 1973 SC 1260 and State of Haryana v. Rattar Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1512 . If a party wants to cross-examine, he has to give the necessary facts in the application as to why the cross-examination is necessary. The prescribed authority will give the reasons either for allowing or refusing the cross-examination. The reasons disclosed in the order of the prescribed authority will show whether he acted fairly or not. Considering every aspect of the matter, the authority under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 can permit the cross-examination of a deponent of an affidavit only when it is necessary in the case.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 17. In the case of Sanjay Kumar Katyal v. Smt. Kamlesh Gupta and another, 2007 (67) ALR 250 (para 10, 11 and 12) this Court observed as under: “10. In the case of Sanjay Kumar Katyal v. Smt. Kamlesh Gupta and another, 2007 (67) ALR 250 (para 10, 11 and 12) this Court observed as under: “10. As regards Application No. 27-C, filed on behalf of the petitioner, inter alia, praying for permission to cross-examine the respondent No. 1, it is submitted by Shri A.B. Saran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that cross-examination of the respondent No. 1 was necessary in view of the averments made by her in the affidavits filed by her in the said P.A. Case No. 41 of 2006. 11. In reply, Smt. Rama Goel, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act are normally decided on the basis of the affidavits filed by the parties in support of their respective cases, and cross-examination of any party should not be permitted as a matter of course. 12. Having considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the submission made by Smt. Rama Goel, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, are correct. The Prescribed Authority has given valid and cogent reasons for rejecting the said Application NO. 27-C, filed on behalf of the petitioner, and I do not find any good ground for interfering with the conclusions of the Prescribed Authority in this regard.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 18. In the case of Mahesh Chand v. Additional Civil Judge (S.D.), Bulandshahar/Prescribed Authority, (2005)/ ARC 558, this Court considered the provisions of Section 21and 34 of the Act and held that the Authority under the Act has power to summon the deponent for cross-examination, if it is necessary. The power is discretionary and should be exercised only when cross-examination is found necessary. 19. In the case of Satnam Singh v. Rakesh Kumar, 2011 (89) ALR 560, this Court consider the question of right of cross-examination under Order XIX Rule 2 C.P.C. and after noticing the facts of that case, held as under : “3. The power is discretionary and should be exercised only when cross-examination is found necessary. 19. In the case of Satnam Singh v. Rakesh Kumar, 2011 (89) ALR 560, this Court consider the question of right of cross-examination under Order XIX Rule 2 C.P.C. and after noticing the facts of that case, held as under : “3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Ashfaq Ahmad v. Prescribed Authority (Civil Judge), Rampur, 1987 All LJ 1452 and submits that the provisions of order XIX Rule 2 C.P.C. are very clear inasmuch as upon a release application evidence may be given by affidavit and the Court may at the instance of either party order the attendance for cross-examination of the deponent. There is no dispute regarding the power of the Court to order a deponent to present himself for cross-examination however in the case of Ashfaq Ahmad the Court clearly found that the party had questioned the claim made by the opposite party regarding share in other two buildings named in the objection on the basis of oral gift when to meet the claim of the party the opposite party had taken a stand that the aforesaid house were orally given to someone else and opposite party No. 2 had no interest in those two houses. It was this denial made in the pleadings on affidavit which was considered by the Court in Ashfaq Ahmad’s case wherein it was held that the application for cross-examination of the deponent was wrongly rejected. 5. The law laid down by the Supreme Court is quite clear from a reading of the aforesaid paragraph. The Court found that there was failure to explain by cogent evidence regarding possession of the original LOA. The Supreme Court held that this was an irrelevant issue although reliance was placed on the affidavit which stated that the suit bonds were borrowed from SCB but would have no meaning as the deponent refused to submit himself to cross-examination. The substance of the decision is that when cross-examination of the deponent is required and he refused to submit himself to be cross-examined the substance and the affidavit would not give any advantage to such a deponent. The facts of the present case are totally different. Here the application 26-A made by the revisionist has been filed as annexure to the affidavit. The facts of the present case are totally different. Here the application 26-A made by the revisionist has been filed as annexure to the affidavit. The application itself is quoted here under— ^^U;k;ky; fu;r vf/kdkjh] vuwi'kgjA jsaV dUVªksy okn la[;k 1 lu~ 2009 jkds’k cuke lruke Jhekuth] fuosnu gS fd okn mijksDr esa izkFkhZ@oknh }kjk viuh lk{; esa Lo;a viuk] vius iq= iz'kkUr ,oa vU; lkf{k;ksa ds 'kiFk&i= nkf[ky fd;s gS] ftuesa vfHkdfFkr rF;ksa dh lR;rk tkuus ds fy, mDr lHkh lkf{k;ksa ls ftjg dh tkuh vko';d gSA vU;Fkk Hkh mDr 'kiFk&i= esa of.kZr rF;ksa esa dkQh fojks/kkHkkl gSA izkFkhZ us vius 'kiFk&i= esa dqN rF;ksa dks rksM+&ejksM+dj ,oa okLrfodrk fNikdj nkf[ky fd;k gS] ftlls okLrfodrk dh tkudkjh ugha gks ikrh gSA vr% izkFkZuk gS fd izkFkhZ jkts'k dqekj ,oa vU; lkf{k;ksa ds foi{kh mRrjnkrk dks ftjg djus dk volj iznku djus dh d`ik djsaA fnukad & 14-12-2010 izkFkhZ }kjk & vf/koDrk ¼fi;w"k feJk½ ,MoksdsVA** 6. A reading of this application indicates that there is no averment of denial whatsoever or as to what is the contradiction in the affidavit in evidence filed by the plaintiff respondent. It is a general allegation claiming cross-examination. The provision of Order XIX Rule 2 C.P.C. cannot be interpreted to mean that even when there is no averment in denial or regarding an alleged contradiction in an affidavit in evidence the party would still have right to summon a deponent for he application for cross-examination of the deponent. There is no merit in this Civil Revision nor there is any illegality or material irregularity committed by the Court below. cross-examination. Such interpretation of the provision would not be corrected. There has to be a denial of the affidavit in evidence before the deponent can be summoned for cross-examination of the averments made in an affidavit filed as evidence. 8. Under such circumstances in the absence of any denial or alleged contradiction in the affidavit filed in evidence by the plaintiff respondent the Court has correctly refused to allow the application for cross-examination of the deponent. There is no merit in this Civil Revision nor there is any illegality or material irregularity committed by the Court below.” (Emphasis supplied by me) Conclusion 20. The legal principle for allowing the cross-examination in proceedings under Section 21(1) of the Act are absolutely clear. There is no merit in this Civil Revision nor there is any illegality or material irregularity committed by the Court below.” (Emphasis supplied by me) Conclusion 20. The legal principle for allowing the cross-examination in proceedings under Section 21(1) of the Act are absolutely clear. The power under Section 34(1) of the Act is discretionary which should be exercised sparingly by the Prescribed Authority only when he finds that cross-examination is necessary for deciding the release application. The application for cross-examination has to be decided in the context of factual back drop of the case and in the context of nature of the proceedings under the Act. The legislature has not provided for oral evidence to be adduced in support of the case as contemplated under Order XVIII Rule 4 C.P.C. but the facts are to be proved on affidavit. If unnecessary cross-examination is permitted, that will only hamper the expeditious disposal of the cases and shall defeat the primary object of the Act, i.e., the expeditious disposal of the cases. When an application for cross-examination is filed, the Court has to examine, in each case, as to whether on the facts and circumstance of the case, cross-examination is necessary and the application filed for cross-examination is bona fide. Cross-examination will not be relevant as to the fact which can be proved by documentary evidence and which can be annexed with the affidavit. Under the scheme of the Act, oral examination may be allowed only as an exception. If a party wants to cross-examine, he has to disclose the necessary facts in his application as to why the cross-examination is necessary. Unless it is established that the veracity of facts as stated in the affidavit is necessary to be tested by cross-examination, the cross-examination cannot be allowed in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. The party moving the application must give reasons as to which particular part of the affidavit is incorrect and under what circumstances and for what reasons such cross-examination is necessary in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case. 21. The party moving the application must give reasons as to which particular part of the affidavit is incorrect and under what circumstances and for what reasons such cross-examination is necessary in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case. 21. On the aforesaid legal position, although the observation made by the Court below in the impugned order that there is no provision under U.P. Act 13 of 1972 for cross-examination of witness, is incorrect, yet I do not find any good reason to interfere with the impugned order and to allow the defendant-tenant/petitioner to cross-examine the deponent of the affidavit 36 Ga for two reasons, firstly, that the application (paper No. 72) does not disclose that which part of the affidavit is incorrect and secondly, the application is vague and it has been moved merely to delay the argument and disposal of such an old case. 22. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is dismissed.