JUDGMENT : A.K. Rath, J. This appeal is by the legal heirs of the defendants against a reversing judgment. 2. Plaintiffs-respondents instituted the suit for declaration of right, title, interest over the suit house, recovery of possession, special damages of Rs.1250/- for occupation of the suit house and Rs.857/- for taking away the properties from the defendants. Plaintiff no.1 is the Secretary of Balliguda Pastorate Union and plaintiff no.2 is the Presbyter in-charge of Balliguda Pastorate Union. The case of the plaintiffs was that Balliguda Pastorate Union (in short, “the Union”) was in continuous peaceful possession of the suit house for more than 40 years. Different pastors were staying in the house. The house was under the control of Rev. Suman Patranayak, area Superintendent of the Union. After his transfer, plaintiff no.2 remained in-charge of the Union. He was residing in the suit house from 1974. The defendants, who have no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit house, put a lock in the house on 11.11.1976 in the absence of plaintiff no.2 and prevented his entry. The matter was reported to the Police. No action was taken. The defendants occupied the suit house forcibly. It was further pleaded that while Rev. Suman Patranayak was the area Superintendent, the Tahasildar, Balliguda initiated encroachment case against him in the year 1968. The same is subjudice. In the settlement, the house had been recorded in the name of the plaintiffs. With this factual scenario, they instituted the suit seeking the relief’s mentioned supra. 3. The defendants filed written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. According to the defendants, the defendant no.1 had purchased the suit house in the year 1930. He is the owner in possession of the suit house. The house was let out to one Devanath Nayak in the year 1974-75. His nephew, plaintiff no.2, was residing in the house. Plaintiff no.2 did not pay rent to the defendants. He was evicted from the said house. Plaintiffs have no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit house. 4. On the interse pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck seven issues. Parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their cases. Learned trial court decreed the suit in part holding inter alia that the plaintiffs have no right, title and interest over the suit house. The house belonged to defendant no.1. 4. On the interse pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck seven issues. Parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their cases. Learned trial court decreed the suit in part holding inter alia that the plaintiffs have no right, title and interest over the suit house. The house belonged to defendant no.1. Though the plaintiffs are not entitled for recovery of possession of the suit house on the basis of the title, yet plaintiff no.2 is entitled to get Rs.857/-towards the value of his articles, which had been taken away by the defendants forcibly. Plaintiffs are not entitled to special damages. Felt aggrieved, the plaintiffs filed T.A. No.19 of 1987 before the learned District Judge, Phulbani. Learned appellate court held that the Christian Missionary occupied the suit house forcibly for more than 12 years by the time the plaintiffs were dispossessed from the suit house. Long possession of a person over the property will confer title. Defendants claimed title by means of an unregistered sale deed, Ext.A said to have been executed by one Boitalu Mallik. The boundary of the suit land and the sale deed does not tally. Reliance placed on Ext.A is misplaced. The draft record of right has been published in the name of the plaintiffs. The certified copy of the order dated 11.12.1980 passed by the Tahasildar, Balliguda in encroachment case indicates that the land over which the disputed house stands, belonged to the Government. Plaintiffs are in possession of the suit house since long time beyond the statutory period and perfected title. Held so, it allowed the appeal. It is apt to mention here that during pendency of the suit, the defendant no.1 died. The legal heirs have been substituted. During pendency of the second appeal, the appellant no.2-defendant no.2 died, whereafter his legal heirs have been substituted. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law enumerated in paragraphs A, B, G, H and I of the memo of appeal. The same are : “A. For that the plaintiff no.1 is a Union of Pastors which is purported to be represented by Dhania Mallik and others who are willing to be impleaded as plaintiff. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law enumerated in paragraphs A, B, G, H and I of the memo of appeal. The same are : “A. For that the plaintiff no.1 is a Union of Pastors which is purported to be represented by Dhania Mallik and others who are willing to be impleaded as plaintiff. When no evidence either documentary and oral was adduced to prove the identity of the Union as a person or otherwise, and/or existence of the said Union whether the suit is maintainable without the leave of the court under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. B. For that when the plaintiff no.2 as well as his witnesses have not been able to prove beyond doubt that such a Union was and is in existence, can the court grant any relief to the said plaintiff no.1 which is an unincorporated and unregistered Union and whether the plaintiff Union could possess as claimed in the absence of any pleadings and/or evidence as to who possessed the house and at what point of time. G. For that the lower appellate court illegally held that the entry in the record of rights is admissible in evidence under Sec.35 of the Evidence Act. The R.O.R. shows a Church standing on the said land whereas the admitted case of the plaintiff is that the said house was never used as Church or the place of worship. Whether on the face of such evidence of the plaintiff can a record of right create a title in favour of the plaintiff Union which is an unregistered and unincorporated Union inasmuch as the validity and/or its existence having not been proved. H. For that even if an encroachment proceeding was started against the member Paster (Suman Patra) in the year 1968. Whether the Paster was possessing this house for and on behalf of the Union and whether the said proceeding could be deemed to be in possession for and on behalf of the Union continuously and uninterruptedly establishing the plaintiff’s hostile animus. I. For that it is the case of the defendants as well as the P.Ws. that the plaintiff no.2 was in permissive possession as a tenant, whether the court is justified in holding that the defendants have perfected their title by way of adverse possession.” 6. Heard Mr. I. For that it is the case of the defendants as well as the P.Ws. that the plaintiff no.2 was in permissive possession as a tenant, whether the court is justified in holding that the defendants have perfected their title by way of adverse possession.” 6. Heard Mr. Sailesh Chandra Samantaray, learned counsel for the appellants. None appeared for the respondents. 7. Mr. Samantaray, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the draft R.O.R. or notice in encroachment case cannot confer title on plaintiffs. The defendants have proved the sale deed of the year 1930. The same is admissible in evidence. The witnesses examined by the defendants stated that the defendants are in possession. The defendants have title over the suit land. He further contended that permissive possession cannot become adverse, unless animus possidendi is pleaded and proved. The plaintiffs have not expressed hostile animus against the true owner. Plaintiffs have failed to prove the identity of Union as to whether the same is a juristic person. None from the locality of the Christian community came forward to support the case of the plaintiffs. The Union is neither incorporated nor registered. 8. In the celebrated judgment, the Privy Council in the Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan, AIR 1934 Privy Council 23 held that the classical requirement of adverse possession is that the possession should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. Their Lordships quoted with approval the decision in the case of Radhamoni Devi v. The Collector of Khulna and others, Indian Appeals 1900 Vol. XXVII at page 140 that “the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in extent to shew that it is possession adverse to the competitor”. 9. In Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Govt. of India and others, (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the apex Court held : "In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Nonuse of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. Nonuse of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario", that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” (emphasis laid) 10. Reverting to the facts of the case and keeping in view the decisions cited supra, this Court finds that there is no pleading with regard to adverse possession. The date of entry into the suit land has not been mentioned in the plaint. Mere possession of the suit land for long time is not suffice to hold that the defendant has perfected title by way of adverse possession, unless the classical requirements of adverse possession nec vi, nec clam, nec precario are pleaded and proved. Learned appellate court fell into patent error of law in holding that the plaintiffs have perfected title by way of adverse possession. Learned appellate court on a scrutiny of the documents came to hold that suit property belongs to the Government. Thus reliance placed on Ext.A is totally misplaced. The sale deed said to have been executed by one Boitalu Mallik. Learned appellate court on a scrutiny of the documents came to hold that suit property belongs to the Government. Thus reliance placed on Ext.A is totally misplaced. The sale deed said to have been executed by one Boitalu Mallik. There is no evidence on record that the vendor has title over the property. Thus the defendants have no title over the suit property. The offshoot of the above discussion is that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants have title over the suit property. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 11. Resultantly, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.