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2018 DIGILAW 457 (GUJ)

JAYESH KANTILAL MEHTA v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2018-02-08

J.B.PARDIWALA

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. By this application, the applicant - original accused has prayed for the following reliefs : "(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant this application; (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to delete the condition no.8 of the order dated 20.5.2017 passed by the Ld. Sessions Judge, Mehsana in Criminal Misc. Application No.567 of 2017, in the interest of justice; (C) Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the condition no.8 of the order dated 20.5.2017 passed by the Ld. Sessions Judge, Mehsana in Criminal Misc. Application No.567 of 2017, pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, in the interest of justice; (D) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant such other and further relief(s), as are deemed fit, in the interest of justice;" 2. The applicant-accused came to be arrested in connection with the First Information Report being CR-I No.57 of 2017 registered at the Lagnaj Police Station, District Mehsana, for the offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 63, 65, 68A of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Sections 101, 102, 103, 104 and 105 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. 3. The applicant was ordered to be released on regular bail vide order dated 20th May 2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana, in the Criminal Misc. Application No.567 of 2017. The Court below thought fit to impose certain conditions while releasing the applicant on bail. One of those conditions reads as under : "(8) Applicant/accused shall not used any similar Registered Trade Mark used by GMBELL Healthcare (India) Private Ltd. till the final order of the present criminal case." 4. The applicant being dissatisfied, or rather, aggrieved by imposition of the condition referred to above, is here with this application with a prayer to delete the condition. 5. Mr.Thacker, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, submitted that the Court below could not have imposed such a condition as the same would amount to grant of injunction which only a civil court has the jurisdiction. The learned counsel would submit that the condition in question could be termed as onerous and unreasonable and beyond the parameters prescribed under Sections 437(3) and 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. The learned counsel would submit that the condition in question could be termed as onerous and unreasonable and beyond the parameters prescribed under Sections 437(3) and 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the following decisions of the Supreme Court : (1) Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013)15 SCC 570 ; (2) Dinbandhu v. State of Bihar and another, (2011)13 SCC 618; (3) Munish Bhasin and others v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi and another), (2009)4 SCC 45 . 7. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prays that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and the condition no.8 imposed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mehsana, referred to above be deleted. 8. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr.Falgun Brahmbhatt, the learned counsel appearing for the original first informant as well as by the learned APP appearing for the State of Gujarat. 9. The learned counsel submitted that the condition imposed could be termed as reasonable. The condition cannot be said to be onerous or unreasonable and the same effectuates the object of imposing conditions, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. Mr.Brahmbhatt, the learned counsel invited the attention of this Court to an order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) dated 28th October 2010 below Exh.5 in the Regular Civil Suit No.29 of 2008 filed by the original first informant for injunction, damages and accounts of profit under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957. 11. It was further pointed out that the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge restraining the applicant herein from using and committing the act of 'passing off' the plaintiff's trade mark came to be affirmed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 30th November 2013 passed in the Appeal from Order No.348 of 2010. He further pointed out that the matter was carried upto the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court affirmed both the orders referred to above. 12. He further pointed out that the matter was carried upto the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court affirmed both the orders referred to above. 12. According to Mr.Brahmbhatt as well as the learned APP, when the civil court has granted injunction in favour of the original first informant and has restrained the applicant herein from using the plaintiff's trade mark, then in such circumstances, the criminal court, while releasing the applicant on bail, was well justified in imposing the condition that the applicant shall not use any similar registered trade mark till the final disposal of the criminal case. 13. In such circumstances referred to above, it is prayed that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the court below was justified in imposing the condition in question. Sub-section (3) of Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows : "When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI. Chapter XVI or chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or abetment of or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any offence, is released on bail under subsection (1), the Court may impose any conditions which the Court considers necessary - (a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this chapter. (b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or (C) otherwise in the interest of justice." 15. Under Section 439(1)(a) even the High Court or the Court of Session can impose conditions only for the purposes mentioned in Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. While granting anticipatory bail under section 438(1), the High Court or Court of Session may impose any reasonable conditions including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 438. 16. Under Section 439(1)(a) even the High Court or the Court of Session can impose conditions only for the purposes mentioned in Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. While granting anticipatory bail under section 438(1), the High Court or Court of Session may impose any reasonable conditions including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 438. 16. The conditions mentioned under that sub-section are : (i) that the accused person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required; (ii) that the accused person shall not directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; (iii) that the accused person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court; (iv) such other conditions as may be imposed under subsection (3) of Section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. 17. On reading of sub-section (3) of Section 437, sub-section (1) of Section 439 and sub-section (2) of Section 438, it is clear that the Court can impose any conditions which are considered necessary for the purposes mentioned in the three clauses of sub-section (3) of Section 437, while granting bail to an accused person. Even the conditions mentioned in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section 2 of Section 438 in regard to anticipatory bail can be imposed, while granting bail under Section 437(1) or 439(1). The discretion vested in the Court in imposing conditions particularly in the light of Clause (c) of Section 437(3) is of a wide amplitude to take in its sweep the facts and circumstances of any case in which the Court grants bail. However wide and unfettered the discretion may be, it is the discretion, which is to be exercised by a Court. It is well settled that the discretion of a Court of justice means sound discretion guided by law and governed by rule and not by humour, whim or caprice. The judicial discretion should not be arbitrary or vague or fanciful. However wide and unfettered the discretion may be, it is the discretion, which is to be exercised by a Court. It is well settled that the discretion of a Court of justice means sound discretion guided by law and governed by rule and not by humour, whim or caprice. The judicial discretion should not be arbitrary or vague or fanciful. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab, (At p.1137 of 1998 Cri LJ) that "every kind of judicial discretion, whatever may be the nature of the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised, as to be used with due care and caution. In fact, an awareness of the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised and of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its use, is the hall-mark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion." 18. The condition that a Court can impose would only be for the purposes of ensuring proper and fair investigation which cannot be impeded or hampered by the fact of the accused being at large. Conditions can be imposed for securing the attendance of the accused as and when required either by the Investigating Officer or by the Court. Conditions can be imposed for securing the right of the Investigating Agency to proceed with the investigation fairly and properly. Conditions can also be imposed to secure a fair trial by the witnesses, who may be examined during the trial, being free and un-interfered with by the accused. Any condition, which has no reference to the fairness or propriety of the investigation or trial cannot be countenanced as permissible under the law. In imposing conditions, while granting bail to an accused person, the Court must be extremely chary and see that they maintain a balance between the personal liberty of the accused and the investigational rights of the police. The conditions should not be such as might enable an unfair advantage to the accused or to the Investigating Agency. An essential requirement in the imposition of any condition is that it should result in minimum interference with the personal liberty of the accused and the rights of the police to investigate into the case. Let me now look into the three judgments of the Supreme Court on the subject. 19. An essential requirement in the imposition of any condition is that it should result in minimum interference with the personal liberty of the accused and the rights of the police to investigate into the case. Let me now look into the three judgments of the Supreme Court on the subject. 19. In Sumit Mehta (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question, whether the condition of depositing an amount of Rs.1 crore in a fixed deposit for anticipatory bail was sustainable in law and whether such a condition was outside the purview of Section 438 of the Code. The observations of the Supreme Court are extracted hereunder : "7. In order to answer the above question, it is useful to refer Section 438 of the Code which reads as under: "438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest:- (1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely:- (i) the nature and gravity of the accusation; (ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence; (iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and (iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail: 20. Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this sub-section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application. (1A) Where the Court grants an interim order under sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the Court. (1B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary in the interest of justice. (2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may thinks fit, including- (i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required; (ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court; (iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. (3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub-section (1)." 21. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that a person should not be harassed or humiliated in order to satisfy the grudge or personal vendetta of the complainant. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that a person should not be harassed or humiliated in order to satisfy the grudge or personal vendetta of the complainant. The grant of bail under Section 438(1) of the Code is dependent on the merits and circumstances of a case. 8. A Bench of five-Judges of this Court in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1632 ), while dealing mainly with the question of considerations that can validly weigh with the courts while granting bail under Section 438, examined various facets of the issue and held as under: "26. We find a great deal of substance in Mr. Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the Court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on, compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after the decision in Maneka Gandhi [1978] 2 SCR 621: ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) that in order to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Section 438, in the form in which it; is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in it which are not be found therein." 22. The aforesaid decision gives an abundant clarity as to the intention and the scope of Section 438 of the Code. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in it which are not be found therein." 22. The aforesaid decision gives an abundant clarity as to the intention and the scope of Section 438 of the Code. Certainly, the power conferred must be exercised very sparingly and judiciously. However, this Court has always frowned on onerous condition being imposed as a condition precedent for granting anticipatory bail. 9. In Amarjit Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi (2009) 13 SCC 769 , this Court ruled as under: "7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the imposition of condition to deposit the sum of Rs. 15 lacks in the form of FDR in the Trial Court is an unreasonable condition and, therefore, we set aside the said condition as a condition precedent for granting anticipatory bail to the accused/appellant." 10. In Sheikh Ayub v. State of M.P. (2004) 13 SCC 457 , it was held that a direction to pay a portion of the amount misappropriated by the accused to the complainant as a condition for bail is unwarranted. Similar view was adopted by this Court in I. Glaskasden Grace and Ors. v. Inspector of Police and Anr. (2009) 12 SCC 769 : ( AIR 2009 SC 1629 ), Ramathal and Ors. v. Inspector of Police and Anr. (2009) 12 SCC 721 : (2009 AIR SCW 2218) and Sandeep Jain v. National Capital Territory of Delhi Rep. by Secretary, Home Deptt. (2000) 2 SCC 66 : ( AIR 2000 SC 714 ). 11. While exercising power under Section 438 of the Code, the Court is duty bound to strike a balance between the individual's right to personal freedom and the right of investigation of the police. For the same, while granting relief under Section 438(1), appropriate conditions can be imposed under Section 438(2) so as to ensure an uninterrupted investigation. The object of putting such conditions should be to avoid the possibility of the person hampering the investigation. Thus, any condition, which has no reference to the fairness or propriety of the investigation or trial, cannot be countenanced as permissible under the law. So, the discretion of the Court while imposing conditions must be exercised with utmost restraint. 12. The object of putting such conditions should be to avoid the possibility of the person hampering the investigation. Thus, any condition, which has no reference to the fairness or propriety of the investigation or trial, cannot be countenanced as permissible under the law. So, the discretion of the Court while imposing conditions must be exercised with utmost restraint. 12. The law presumes an accused to be innocent till his guilt is proved. As a presumably innocent person, he is entitled to all the fundamental rights including the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 13. We also clarify that while granting anticipatory bail, the Courts are expected to consider and keep in mind the nature and gravity of accusation, antecedents of the applicant, namely, about his previous involvement in such offence and the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice. It is also the duty of the Court to ascertain whether accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating him by having him so arrested. It is needless to mention that the Courts are duty bound to impose appropriate conditions as provided under subsection (2) of Section 438 of the Code. 14. Thus, in the case on hand, fixed deposit of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- for a period of six months in the name of the complainant and to keep the FDR with the investigating officer as a condition precedent for grant of anticipatory bail is evidently onerous and unreasonable. It must be remembered that the Court has not even come to the conclusion whether the allegations made are true or not which can only be ascertained after completion of trial. Certainly, in no words are we suggesting that the power to impose a condition of this nature is totally excluded, even in cases of cheating, electricity pilferage, white-collar crimes or chit fund scams etc. 15. The words "any condition" used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a Court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance and effective in the pragmatic sense and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such extreme condition to be imposed." 23. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance and effective in the pragmatic sense and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such extreme condition to be imposed." 23. In Dinbandhu (supra), the appellant was granted anticipatory bail by the High Court subject to a condition. The order stipulated that in a partition suit that was pending between the parties, neither the accused nor the informant would use a certain document (a family arrangement-cum-partition deed) as evidence. The Supreme Court, while holding that such a condition could not have been imposed by the High Court, observed as under : "We are clearly of the view that the condition attached by the High Court to the anticipatory bail granted to the appellant is quite bad and illegal and cannot be sustained. It is basic and elementary that the final judge of the genuineness, correctness and validity of a document used as evidence in a suit is the civil court. Hence, it is fort the court dealing with the partition suit between the parties to examine and test the genuineness of the 'shartnama' produced by the appellant in support of his case. If the civil court found it to be actually fraudulent or subjected to interpolation or forgery, it would be open to it to institute proper proceedings against the appellant in terms of Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The genuineness and validity of the document can hardly be tested in the complaint case and certainly not at the stage of grant of bail to the accused. Clearly thus, it was not open to the High Court to impose the condition that in the civil suit the parties would not rely upon the document and the condition put by the High Court amounts to prejudging the issue." 24. In Munish Bhasin (supra), the appellant assailed the condition imposed by the High Court requiring him to pay a sum of Rs.12,500=00 as maintenance to his wife and child while granting anticipatory bail to him and his parents with reference to a complaint filed by his wife for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court, while holding that such a condition could not have been imposed, observed as under : "8. From the perusal of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 438, it is evident that when the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under subsection (1) to release an accused alleged to have committed non-bailable offence, the Court may include such conditions in such direction in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including "(i) a condition that a person shall make himself available for interrogation by police officer as and when required, (ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer, (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court and (iv) such other conditions as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section." 9. Sub-section (3) of Section 437, inter alia, provides that when a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under subsection (1), the Court shall impose the following conditions - "(a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, (b) that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected, and (c) that such person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence" the Court may also impose, in the interests of justice, such other conditions as it considers necessary. 10. 10. It is well settled that while exercising discretion to release an accused under Section 438 of the Code neither the High Court nor the Session Court would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no manner of doubt that the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case can impose necessary, just and efficacious conditions while enlarging an accused on bail under Section 438 of the Code. However, the accused cannot be subjected to any irrelevant condition at all. 11. The conditions which can be imposed by the Court while granting anticipatory bail are enumerated in subsection (2) of Section 438 and sub-section (3) of Section 437 of the Code. Normally, conditions can be imposed (i) to secure the presence of the accused before the investigating officer or before the Court, (ii) to prevent him from fleeing the course of justice, (iii) to prevent him from tampering with the evidence or to prevent him from inducing or intimidating the witnesses so as to dissuade them from disclosing the facts before the police or Court or (iv) restricting the movements of the accused in a particular area or locality or to maintain law and order etc. To subject an accused to any other condition would be beyond jurisdiction of the power conferred on Court under section 438 of the Code. 12. While imposing conditions on an accused who approaches the Court under section 438 of the Code, the Court should be extremely chary in imposing conditions and should not transgress its jurisdiction or power by imposing the conditions which are not called for at all. There is no manner of doubt that the conditions to be imposed under section 438 of the Code cannot be harsh, onerous or excessive so as to frustrate the very object of grant of anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. 13. In the instant case, the question before the Court was whether having regard to the averments made by Ms.Renuka in her complaint, the appellant and his parents were entitled to bail under section 438 of the Code. When the High Court had found that a case for grant of bail under section 438 was made out, it was not open to the Court to direct the appellant to pay Rs. When the High Court had found that a case for grant of bail under section 438 was made out, it was not open to the Court to direct the appellant to pay Rs. 3,00,000/- for past maintenance and a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month as future maintenance to his wife and child. In a proceeding under section 438 of the Code, the Court would not be justified in awarding maintenance to the wife and child. 14. The case of the appellant is that his wife Renuka is employed and receiving a handsome salary and therefore is not entitled to maintenance. Normally, the question of grant of maintenance should be left to be decided by the competent Court in an appropriate proceedings where the parties can adduce evidence in support of their respective case, after which liability of husband to pay maintenance could be determined and appropriate order would be passed directing the husband to pay amount of maintenance to his wife. The record of the instant case indicates that the wife of the appellant has already approached appropriate Court for grant of maintenance and therefore the High Court should have refrained from granting maintenance to the wife and child of the appellant while exercising powers under section 438 of the Code. The condition imposed by the High court directing the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month as maintenance to his wife and child is onerous, unwarranted and is liable to be set aside." 25. Thus, in all the three cases before the Supreme Court, the facts were altogether different, and having regard to the same, the Supreme Court, in all the three cases, took the view that the conditions therein could not have been imposed. 26. Let me now look into the order of injunction passed by the civil court. The first order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), dated 28th October 2010 reads as under : "ORDER The Interim Injunction Application Exh.5 is hereby granted subject to the decision given by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Civil Suit No.1342/07. 26. Let me now look into the order of injunction passed by the civil court. The first order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), dated 28th October 2010 reads as under : "ORDER The Interim Injunction Application Exh.5 is hereby granted subject to the decision given by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Civil Suit No.1342/07. The defendant, their agents, servants, dealers, distributors are hereby restrained from using and committing the act of 'Passing Off' the plaintiff's Trade mark named 'Clobet-GM, Fungdid-B and ENAC-GEL' including other assigned products and also restrained them from using, acquiring, providing and/or offering business to others, advertising, Marketing and/or exposing the business by using the Identical and/or deceptively similar name as of the mark 'Clobet-GM, Fungdid-B and ENAC-GEL' including other assigned products of the plaintiff till the disposal of the suit. The defendant, their agents, servants, dealers, distributors are also restrained from using the similar artistic work, colour combination, phonetical writ-upon the box and Artistic Labels of the Products 'Clobet-GM, Fungdid-B, ENAC-GEL' and by that way committing the Act of 'Infringement of Copy Right' of the plaintiff till the disposal of the suit. No order as to costs. Pronounced in the open court on this 28th day of October, 2010 Sd/- (R.N.Malik) Additional District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural)." The aforesaid order was challenged before this Court by filing the Appeal from Order No.348 of 2010. This Court, while dismissing the Appeal from Order, observed as under : "13. I have gone through the record and proceeding and averments of both the sides, which makes it clear that defendant has misled the trial Court and trial Court has grossly erred in appreciating the evidence at such stage where mainly prima facie evidence is to be looked into i.e. Court is not deciding the suit finally, but deciding the rights of the parties based upon the prima facie evidence where interim injunction is sought for. 14. In background of above facts and circumstances, when main suit is yet to be decided on its own merits wherein all the parties would have sufficient and ample opportunity to adduce final evidence to prove their case, scrutinizing and thereby discussion and determination on any evidence on record in any manner would ultimately prejudice the trial. 14. In background of above facts and circumstances, when main suit is yet to be decided on its own merits wherein all the parties would have sufficient and ample opportunity to adduce final evidence to prove their case, scrutinizing and thereby discussion and determination on any evidence on record in any manner would ultimately prejudice the trial. Therefore, it is not advisable to scrutinize, discuss and thereafter determining the outcome of other documentary evidence and submissions of both the sides so as to arrive at any specific conclusion either regarding dispute or issue between the parties or regarding the effect of such evidence at such interim stage. 15. At present, it is sufficient, at the cost of repetition to recollect that the original user of trademarks under reference was one M/s.Universal Impex. One of the partners of such Universal Impex against whom there is an allegation that he has unilaterally executed an assignment deed, his partner of present defendant Universal Pharma i.e. Jayesh Kantilal Mehta and, therefore, he is very much aware about the fact that original ownership of trademark by Universal Impex was assigned against consideration in favour of present plaintiff and, therefore, he has no reason whatsoever to use same trade name and trademark for same product in any manner whatsoever. Therefore, the trial Court was right in allowing the interim application by the plaintiff restraining the defendant from continuing infringement and passing off so far as other issues are concerned, the trial Court has rightly granted the injunction with an observation that it is subject to a decision by the High Court of Bombay in Civil Suit No.1342 of 2007. Therefore, after decision in such suit, either party is entitled to apply for modification of such impugned order. However, at present, I do not see any illegality or irregularity to interfere in the impugned order. I have perused the record, pleading and impugned order also. The trial Court has taken care in detail of all relevant aspect, argument and submission of both the sides and referred relevant decisions cited by both the sides and passed a reasoned order. 16. In view of such facts and circumstances, I do not see any substance in the present appeal from order and hence same deserves to be dismissed. The present Appeal from Order is therefore dismissed. 16. In view of such facts and circumstances, I do not see any substance in the present appeal from order and hence same deserves to be dismissed. The present Appeal from Order is therefore dismissed. The interim order dated 26.11.2010, which is continued till date is hereby vacated." The matter was carried to the Supreme Court. By order dated 11th April 2014, the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP. 27. I am of the view that I should not delete the condition imposed by the criminal court which has been impugned in this application. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the same is not tenable in law or is unreasonable or onerous. If the entire prosecution is one relating to an offence under the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act, and the civil court has also restrained the applicant from using the trade mark of the first informant, then while releasing the accused on bail the court could be well justified in directing the accused that he should not repeat or indulge in the very same offence. The condition to be imposed must have reference either to the requirement of an uninterrupted investigation or trial of the offences alleged or be intended to prevent a recurrence of the incident, said to be the subject-matter of investigation. Moreover, the condition imposed by the court below had relation to a situation that was then prevalent. The condition in question did not render the order of bail nugatory nor it could be said to have been imposed in derogation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to an accused person under the Constitution. In my view, no interference is warranted. This application, therefore, fails and is hereby rejected.