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2018 DIGILAW 458 (GUJ)

Narsinhbhai Khodabhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat

2018-02-08

J.B.PARDIWALA

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant – original first informant has prayed for the following reliefs: “15(A) To allow this Revision Application. (B) To quash and set aside the order passed below application at Exh 62 dated 22.01.2018 in Sessions Case No.106/2016 by the Hon'ble 9th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, Ahmedabad and be pleased to allow the application at Exhibit 62 filed by the petitioner. (C) Pending admission, final hearing and disposal of this application to stay the further proceedings of Sessions Case No.106/2016 pending before the Hon'ble 9th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, Ahmedabad. (D) To pass any other and further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper.” 2. The case of the applicant, as pleaded in his application, is as under: “2. The petitioner submits that the brother of the petitioner namely Maganbhai @ Mafabhai Khodabhai Makwana (deceased for short) had committed suicide on 01.05.2014 for hanging in the house and because of the abetment of suicide committed by the accused, the petitioner has lodged an FIR with Changodar Police Station, Ahmedabad being IC. R. No.43/2014 on 02.05.2014 against the present respondents accused. The said offence was registered for the alleged offence under Sections 306, 323 and 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. 3. The petitioner submits that it is the prosecution case that the daughter of the accused no.1 Hirabhai Ramabhai Makwana namely Kalpana was in love with son of the deceased Magan @ Mafabhai Khodabhai Makwana namely Jagat and therefore they both i.e. Kalpana and Jagat run away and thereafter they have been located and again they have ran away and therefore the accused no.1 and other accused have forced the deceased to find out the daughter of the accused no.1 and therefore the threats were given and deceased was assaulted and amount was demanded and therefore the deceased committed suicide by hanging in his house therefore in the aforesaid facts and circumstance an FIR was lodged. 4. 4. The petitioner submits that thereafter the police investigated the matter and after completion of the investigation has filed the chargesheet against the accused before the learned J.M.F.C., Sanand which has been registered as Criminal Case No.1901/2014 and since the offence were tribal by the Hon'ble Sessions Court therefore the learned Magistrate by order dated 13.02.2015 under Section 209 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has committed the said case before the Hon'ble Sessions Court against the present respondents accused and the same has been duly registered as Sessions Case No.106/2016. 5. The petitioner submits that thereafter the Hon'ble Sessions Court was pleased to frame the charge against all the accused for the offence under Sections 306, 323, 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 at Exhibit 10 on 19.01.2017 to which the accused denied the charge. 6. The petitioner submit that thereafter the prosecution has submitted following list of documents as under copy of FIR at Exhibit 22, copy of Janvajob at Exhibit 25, copy of Suchi patra Exhibit 45, copy of FSL report Exhibit 46, copy of Ravangi Nodh Exhibit 47 and copy of PM note Exhibit 52. 7. The petitioner submits that the prosecution has examined following witnesses to prove its case: 1. PW 1 Exh. 19 – Narshibhai Khodabhai 2. PW 2 Exh. 23 Geetaben Maganbhai Makwana wife of deceased 3. PW 3 Exh. 24 Narendra Maganbhai Parmar Banevi, Brother in law of deceased. 4. PW Exh. 31 Samuben Khodabhai Makwana Mother of deceased 5. PW 5 Exh 32 Savitaben Mafabhai @ Maganbhai Makwana Daughter of deceased 6. PW 6 Exh. 33 Maheshbhai Babbabhai Makwana Neighbour of deceased 7. PW 7 Exh 34 Chamanbhai Parmabhai Makwana – Hostile witness 8. PW 8 Exh. 36 Mahendrabhai Mohanbhai Makwana – Security Guard – Hostile witness 9. PW 9 Exh. 37 Dineshbhai Ajibhai Makwana – Panch witness, Panchnama Exhibit 38 (inquest) Hostile. 10. PW 10 Exh. 38 Sankarbhai Ramjibhai Makwana Panch witness, Panchnama Exhibit 38 (Inquest) Hostile. 11. PW 11 Exh. 40 Savjibhai Malabhai Makwana – Hostile Panch witness – Scene of offence panchnama Exhibit 41. 12. PW 12 Exh. 42 Munnabhai Karsanbhai Makwana – Hostile panch witness – scene of offence Panchnama Exhibit 41. 13. PW 13 Exh. 43 Jayandriben Mansukhbhai Patel – Women Police Head Constable – who has lodged the FIR 14. PW 14 Exh. PW 11 Exh. 40 Savjibhai Malabhai Makwana – Hostile Panch witness – Scene of offence panchnama Exhibit 41. 12. PW 12 Exh. 42 Munnabhai Karsanbhai Makwana – Hostile panch witness – scene of offence Panchnama Exhibit 41. 13. PW 13 Exh. 43 Jayandriben Mansukhbhai Patel – Women Police Head Constable – who has lodged the FIR 14. PW 14 Exh. 44 Takhuji Badarji Rathod Police Sub Inspector Investigating Officer – Changodar Police Station. 15. PW 15 Exh. 51 Dr. Kinnar Rameshbhai Patel – who has done past mortem of deceased – PM Note Exhibit 52. 16. PW 16 Exh. 53 Baldevbhai Sanabhai Jadhav, Dy. SP, Investigating Officer, Police Inspector, Changodar Police Station. 8. The petitioner submits that thereafter the matter was kept for arguments for the parties on 22.01.2018 the petitioner submits that therefore on 22.01.2018, the petitioner has submitted written arguments at Exhibit 61 before the learned Trial Court, the same was duly accepted by the learned Trial Court. 9. The petitioner submits that therefore the petitioner has requested the learned Trial Court that the advocate of the petitioner be permitted for oral hearing as the first informant is the victim and looking to the facts of the case and the issue of law involved but the learned Trial Court did not permitted the advocate of the petitioner for oral hearing and stated that if any instruction is to be given then the same may be given to the Public Prosecutor and that the Public Prosecutor will argue the matter and hence the advocate of the petitioner was not permitted for oral arguments. 10. The petitioner submits that therefore the petitioner has submitted an written application at Exhibit 62 that oral hearing be given to the petitioner for a short time on 22.01.2018. The said application was argued and advocate of the petitioner has argued that the written argument stated in Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also include the oral argument and the Hon'ble Court has got ample jurisdiction to permit the advocate of the applicant for oral arguments in the interest of justice and looking to the facts of the case and that the petitioner is a victim. The advocate of the accused has opposed the application and stated that the advocate of the first informant/victim has no right for oral hearing. The advocate of the accused has opposed the application and stated that the advocate of the first informant/victim has no right for oral hearing. Thereafter the learned Trial Court was pleased to dismiss the said application by passing order below Exhibit 62 on 22.01.2018. Thereby denied the oral hearing to the petitioner who is the first informant/victim has no right for oral hearing. Thereafter the learned Trial Court was pleased to dismiss the said application by passing order below Exhibit 62 on 22.01.2018. Thereby denied the oral hearing to the petitioner who is the first informant/victim.” 3. The grounds urged in the petition are as under: “A. The petitioner submits that the petitioner is the victim as defined in Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and in view of the amendment Act 5 of 2009 which came in effect from 31.12.2009, certain rights have been given to the victim, now even the victim is also permitted to file appeal against the acquittal. Earlier there was no provision for complainant/first informant to prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal but now in view of the aforesaid amendment under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the victim has right to prefer an appeal. Therefore looking to the amendment to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the ld. Trial Court ought to have permitted the advocate of the complainant – petitioner to assist the Hon'ble Court and for oral hearing. Hence also the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. B. The petitioner submits that in view of the provisions contained in Section 24(8) proviso of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also, by the aforesaid amendment Act even the victim can engage the advocate of his choice to assist the prosecution when a special prosecutor is appointed therefore looking to the scheme of the amendment Act the victim has a right of audience, if the Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper and therefore the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. C. The petitioner submits that in view of the provision contain in Section 301 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also the private person can instructs the public prosecutor, hence also the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. C. The petitioner submits that in view of the provision contain in Section 301 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also the private person can instructs the public prosecutor, hence also the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. D. The petitioner submits that in view of the fact that the petitioner can submit the written argument therefore impliedly the oral argument can also be made by the petitioner and the same was also argued by the advocate of the petitioner and therefore also the provisions of Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is required to be interpreted accordingly for the benefit of victim. But the learned Trial Court did not consider the aforesaid arguments and rejected the application. E. The petitioner submits that there is no prohibition in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which prohibits that the audience cannot be given to the victim and therefore also looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the ld. Trial Court ought to have given audience hence also the impugned order is required to be quashed and aside. F. The petitioner submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in the case of Sudam Charan Dash Versus State of Orissa reported in 2014(2) SCC 141 , which were bail proceedings and in that matter also the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed that complainant be heard when the bail application is decided. But no law is decided regarding giving of hearing but the facts remains that the audience was given to the complainant even at the stage of bail proceedings therefore this shows that the victim, who is ultimately sufferer should be given audience in criminal justice system looking to the facts and circumstances. G. The petitioner submits that no prejudice would be caused to the accused if the audience is given to the victim-complainant to arrive at the just decision of the case hence, the ld. Trial Court should have given the audience to the victim. H. The petitioner submits that the Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to grant audience to the victim, it is discretion of the Hon'ble Court but since the order is challenged therefore the private accused are also joined as party respondents, though they are not required to be heard since it is the discretion of the Court whether to grant audience to the victim or not. I. The petitioner submits that as far as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 consent there is an amendment made in the Act that is Amendment Act, 1/2016 whereby Section 15(A) is introduced namely Rights of victim and weaknesses and therefore also looking to the agony faced by the victim, the rights should be given to the victim for oral hearing.” 4. The impugned order passed by the Court below reads as under: “ORDER I have read the present application and heard the ld. Adv. for the accused as well as the app. I have perused the Sec. 225 and Sec. 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Sec. 225 provides that every trial before a Court of Sessions, the Prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor and Section 301 of the CrPC provides the right to submit only written arguments only under the direction of the Public Prosecutor and with the permission of the Court. The Written Arguments submitted by the with Prosecution Adv. is already taken on record vide Ex. 61. The present application has strongly objected on behalf of the accused. They have submitted that with prosecution Adv. has no right for vocal submission and as his written argument is already taken on record. This application required to be rejected. As, discussed above and specially looking to the provisions contained in Sec. 225 and Sec. 301 I do not find any merits in the application, the same is rejected, however with no order as to costs.” Dt: 22.01.2018 9th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) Mirzapur, Ahmedabad.” 5. Thus, the point for my consideration is whether the private lawyer of the applicant, being the original first informant and the victim, should be permitted to address the Trial Court simultaneously with the Public Prosecutor. To put it in other words, whether the private lawyer of the first informant should be permitted to make his oral final arguments before the Trial Court simultaneously with the Public Prosecutor incharge of the trial. 6. Before adverting to the submissions canvassed on behalf of the applicant, it is necessary to look into the provisions of Sections 301 and 302 of the Cr.P.C. Section 301 of the Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder: “301. 6. Before adverting to the submissions canvassed on behalf of the applicant, it is necessary to look into the provisions of Sections 301 and 302 of the Cr.P.C. Section 301 of the Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder: “301. Appearance by Public Prosecutors (1) The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may appear and plead without any written authority before any Court in which that case is under inquiry, trial or appeal. (2) If in any such case any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any Court, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and may, with the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case.” 7. Section 302 of the Cr.P.C. is extracted hereunder: “302. Permission to conduct prosecution (1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector; but no person, other than the Advocate General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such permission :Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted. (2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader.” 8. It deserves to be noted that the provision of Section 302 of the Cr.P.C. is intended only for the Magistrate Court. It enables the Magistrate to permit any person to conduct the prosecution. The only rider is that the Magistrate cannot give such permission to a police officer below the rank of Inspector. Such person need not necessarily be a Public Prosecutor. 9. In the Magistrate's Court anybody (except a police officer below the rank of Inspector) can conduct prosecution, if the Magistrate permits him to do so. Once the permission is granted, the person concerned can appoint any counsel to conduct the prosecution on his behalf in the Magistrate's Court. 10. But, the above laxity is not extended to other Courts. 9. In the Magistrate's Court anybody (except a police officer below the rank of Inspector) can conduct prosecution, if the Magistrate permits him to do so. Once the permission is granted, the person concerned can appoint any counsel to conduct the prosecution on his behalf in the Magistrate's Court. 10. But, the above laxity is not extended to other Courts. A reference to Section 225 of the Code is necessary in this context. It reads thus: “225. Trial to be conducted by Public Prosecutor.- In every trial before a Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor.” 11. The old Criminal Procedure Code (1898) contained an identical provision in Section 270 thereof. A Public Prosecutor means “any person appointed under Section 24 and includes any person acting under the directions of the Public Prosecutor”, (vide Section 2(u) of the Code). 12. There are two parts of subsection (1) of Section 301. The first subsection gives absolute power to the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case to appear and plead without any written authority before any Court in any inquiry, trial or appeal. Subsection (2) provides that if in such case, means in a case which is under inquiry, trial or appeal in any Court, any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person, the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor. Pausing for a while here, the above provisions clearly do not indicate that any permission as such is required from the Court for any private person to instruct a pleader to prosecute any person in any Court along with the Public Prosecutor. It clearly shows that the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor is in charge of the case and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor. The words "under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor" are significant. It clearly shows that the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor is in charge of the case and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor. The words "under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor" are significant. They expressly indicate that the private pleader so instructed to act in a case pending before any Court is permitted to act "under the directions of the Public Prosecutor" i.e. to say if the Public Prosecutor is otherwise willing to accept such instructions from private pleader, he can authorise such pleader to act in the case. The question of granting permission by the Court does not arise at all, in view of the clear provisions of the section. However, the learned counsel for the applicant contended that this section authorises the Court to give permission to the private lawyer of the first informant to make oral arguments. I am afraid, that this contention is without any substance. In my opinion, the words used in this section "under the directions of the Public Prosecutor" will have to be construed in the ordinary meaning i.e. to say "under the guidance and control of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor as the case may be." 13. Having provided that the pleader so instructed shall, act "under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor", Section 301(2) further provides that with permission of the Court, such pleader may submit written arguments after evidence is closed in the case. The word “permission” used in section is restricted only to grant permission in regard to written arguments. This stage is also provided after the evidence is closed in the case. 14. The word “act” is dependent on the words "under directions of the Public Prosecutor." If the word "act" used in Section 301(2) shall include oral arguments or examination or cross-examination of the witnesses, the words “Under the directions of the Public prosecutor” used in this section will be meaningless. Such wider interpretation of the word “act” is not warranted by the provisions of this section. Such wider interpretation of the word “act” is not warranted by the provisions of this section. The word “act” has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashwini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabindo Bose, reported in 1953 SCR 1 , wherein the Supreme Court has said that the word “act” strictly speaking means taking of substantial steps in the course of proceeding in the Court, while pleading means oral submissions. I think, though written submission of the argument is provided in this section, with permission of the Court, the legislature has intended to restrict the pleading to the extent of submitting written arguments after a certain stage, by using the word “act” restricted to intend only to show that something is to be done by a person in the course of the trial. The words “under directions of the Public Prosecutor” must be construed in their ordinary meaning i.e. to say that the Public Prosecutor will guide and control the conduct of the prosecution before the Court. The word “act” must be given a limited meaning i.e. to take some steps only under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor alone is the sole officer to decide the general policy of the trial. In view of this interpretation of the words used in Section 301(2), I think there is no right to ask for permission whatsoever to make oral arguments. 15. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar vs. Hukam Chand [ (1999) 7 SCC 467 ], wherein the Supreme Court explained the position of law in details. The relevant observations are extracted hereunder: “13. In the backdrop of the above provisions we have to understand the purport of Section 301 of the Code. Unlike its succeeding provision in the Code, the application of which is confined to magistrate courts, this particular section is applicable to all the courts of criminal jurisdiction. This distinction can be discerned from employment of the words any court in Section 301. In view of the provision made in the succeeding section as for magistrate courts the insistence contained in Section 301(2) must be understood as applicable to all other courts without any exception. This distinction can be discerned from employment of the words any court in Section 301. In view of the provision made in the succeeding section as for magistrate courts the insistence contained in Section 301(2) must be understood as applicable to all other courts without any exception. The first subsection empowers the Public Prosecutor to plead in the court without any written authority, provided he is in charge of the case. The second subsection, which is sought to be invoked by the appellant, imposes the curb on a counsel engaged by any private party. It limits his role to act in the court during such prosecution under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. The only other liberty which he can possibly exercise is to submit written arguments after the closure of evidence in the trial, but that too can be done only if the court permits him to do so. 14. From the scheme of the Code the legislative intention is manifestly clear that prosecution in a sessions court cannot be conducted by any one other than the Public Prosecutor. The legislature reminds the State that the policy must strictly conform to fairness in the trial of an accused in a sessions court. A Public Prosecutor is not expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts involved in the case. The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor while conducting prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the court and to the investigating agencies but to the accused as well. If an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit during trial the Public Prosecutor should not scuttle/conceal it. On the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore and make it available to the accused. Even if the defence counsel overlooked it, Public Prosecutor has the added responsibility to bring it to the notice of the court if it comes to his knowledge. A private counsel, if allowed free hand to conduct prosecution would focus on bringing the case to conviction even if it is not a fit case to be so convicted. That is the reason why Parliament applied a bridle on him and subjected his role strictly to the instructions given by the Public Prosecutor. 15. A private counsel, if allowed free hand to conduct prosecution would focus on bringing the case to conviction even if it is not a fit case to be so convicted. That is the reason why Parliament applied a bridle on him and subjected his role strictly to the instructions given by the Public Prosecutor. 15. It is not merely an overall supervision which the Public Prosecutor is expected to perform in such cases when a privately engaged counsel is permitted to act on his behalf. The role which a private counsel in such a situation can play is, perhaps, comparable with that of a junior advocate conducting the case of his senior in a court. The private counsel is to act on behalf of the Public Prosecutor albeit the fact he is engaged in the case by a private party. If the role of the Public Prosecutor is allowed to shrink to a mere supervisory role the trial would become a combat between the private party and the accused which would render the legislative mandate in Section 225 of the Code a dead letter. 16. An early decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Queen Empress v. Durga (ILR 1894 Allahabad 84) has pinpointed the role of a Public Prosecutor as follows: “It is the duty of a Public Prosecutor to conduct the case for the Crown fairly. His object should be, not to obtain an unrighteous conviction, but, as representing the Crown, to see that justice is vindicated: and, in exercising his discretion as to the witnesses whom he should or should not call, he should bear that in mind. In our opinion, a Public Prosecutor should not refuse to call or put into the witness-box for cross-examination a truthful witness returned in the calendar as a witness for the Crown, merely because the evidence of such witness might in some respects be favorable to the defence. If a Public Prosecutor is of opinion that a witness is a false witness or is likely to give false testimony if put into the witness-box, he is not bound, in our opinion, to call that witness or to tender him for cross-examination.” 17. As we are in complete agreement with the observation of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Medichetty Ramakistiah & Ors. As we are in complete agreement with the observation of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Medichetty Ramakistiah & Ors. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1959 AP 659 ) we deem it fit to extract the said observation: “A prosecution, to use a familiar phrase, ought not to be a persecution. The principle that the Public Prosecutor should be scrupulously fair to the accused and present his case with detachment and without evincing any anxiety to secure a conviction, is based upon high policy and as such courts should be astute to suffer no inroad upon its integrity. Otherwise there will be no guarantee that the trial will be as fair to the accused as a criminal trial ought to be. The State and the Public Prosecutor acting for it are only supposed to be putting all the facts of the case before the Court to obtain its decision thereon and not to obtain a conviction by any means fair or foul. Therefore, it is right and proper that courts should be zealous to see that the prosecution of an offender is not handed over completely to a professional gentleman instructed by a private party.” 18. Another Division Bench of the same High Court in re Bhupalli Malliah & ors. (AIR 1959 A.P. 477) had in fact deprecated the practice of Public Prosecutors sitting back and permitting private counsel to conduct prosecution, in the following terms: We would like to make it very clear that it is extremely undesirable and quite improper that a Public Prosecutor should be allowed to sit back, handing over the conduct of the case to a counsel, however eminent he may be, briefed by the complainant in the case. 19. Equally forceful is the observation of Bhimasankaram, J. for the Division Bench in Medichetty Ramakistiah (cited supra) which is worthy of quotation here: “Unless, therefore, the control of the Public Prosecutor is there, the prosecution by a pleader for a private party may degenerate into a legalized means for wreaking private vengeance. The prosecution instead of being a fair and dispassionate presentation of the facts of the case for the determination of the Court, would be transformed into a battle between two parties in which one was trying to get better of the other, by whatever means available. The prosecution instead of being a fair and dispassionate presentation of the facts of the case for the determination of the Court, would be transformed into a battle between two parties in which one was trying to get better of the other, by whatever means available. It is true that in every case there is the overall control of the court in regard to the conduct of the case by either party. But it cannot extend to the point of ensuring that in all matters one party is fair to the other.” 16. Thus, it is for the protection of the accused persons in Sessions trials (in India) that the provisions of Section 301 of the Cr.P.C. is made to have the case against him prosecuted only by a Public Prosecutor and not by a counsel engaged by the aggrieved private party. 17. The scheme envisaged in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no doubt, indicates that a person, who is aggrieved by the offence committed, is not altogether wiped out from the scenario of the trial merely because the investigation was taken over by the police and the chargesheet was laid by them. Even the fact that the Court had taken cognizance of the offence is not sufficient to debar him from reaching the Court for ventilating his grievance. Even in the Sessions Court, the Public Prosecutor is the only authority empowered to conduct the prosecution as per Section 225 of the Cr.P.C. I do not say for a moment that the original first informant or the victim, who is aggrieved by the offence involved in the case, is altogether debarred from participating in the trial. He can participate in the trial to the extent as provided under Section 301(2) of the Cr.P.C. It is always open for the applicant being the first informant and the victim to submit written arguments, and if such written arguments are tendered, the Court has a duty to consider such arguments before taking a decision. However, the first informant or the victim cannot, as a matter of right, assert that his counsel should also be permitted to make oral arguments over and above the arguments that may be canvassed by the Public Prosecutor. Even if the permission is granted, the role of the said counsel allowed to assist the Assistant Public Prosecutor is very much limited. Even if the permission is granted, the role of the said counsel allowed to assist the Assistant Public Prosecutor is very much limited. The rein is still held by the Public Prosecutor. If the Court so permits, the assisting counsel can submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case. That is all. The section does not envisage any other authority or independent power for the counsel who is engaged to assist the Assistant Public Prosecutor. In other words, even after permission is granted for rendering assistance under Section 301(2) of the Cr. P.C. the responsibility for conduct of the prosecution continues to be with the Assistant Public Prosecutor. It naturally follows that he is the person who is to decide how the prosecution should proceed. 18. Mr. Goswamy, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that, in the case on hand, the lawyer appearing in the Trial Court on behalf of the applicant has already filed his written arguments and the same have been ordered to be taken on record. If that be so, the Trial Court shall look into the same in accordance with law along with the arguments that may be canvassed by the Public Prosecutor. Let me clarify that if the Trial Court wants to seek any clarification on any particular issue of the matter, then it would be within the discretion of the Court to put certain questions to the lawyer appearing for the original first informant. However, it is an absolute discretion of the Trial Court. 19. I do not find any infirmity as such in the impugned order, warranting interference in exercise of my supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. With the above, this application is disposed of.