JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran J., If one were to measure this writ petition solely by its forensic merits and factual facets, we are certain that it would not justify its longevity in this Court from the year 2008. 2. At the heart of controversy in this case is the action taken by the Revenue authorities of the Government of Kerala under the provisions of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957 [hereinafter referred to as KLC Act for short], to resume an extent of 115.8900 hectares of land in Ernad-Manjeri, which is claimed to be in the possession of the first petitioner herein. 3. The first petitioner claims that it is a public limited company, registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and asserts to be in possession of the afore extent of land under valid title. The second petitioner is stated to be one of its share holders. 4. However, the claim of the first petitioner over the property in question has been refuted by the competent Authorities under the KLC Act, leading to Exts. P22, P27 and P32 orders, issued by the concerned Tahsildar, Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) and the Government respectively. The petitioners impugn these orders in this writ petition on various grounds, but primarily predicating that they are entitled to hold possession over the property and to resist action under the KLC Act because the first petitioner-Company is a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 [hereinafter referred to as KLR Act]. 5. We have heard Sri. Joseph Kodianthara, learned Senior counsel assisted by Sri. Isaac Thomas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners; Sri. M. Ramesh Chander, learned Senior counsel who is assisting this Court as Amicus Curiae; Sri. M.P. Sreekrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the 10th respondent-Zamorin Raja of Calicut; Sri. R. Lakshmi Narayanan, the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent-Malabar Devaswom Board; Sri. S. Ramesh, the learned counsel for the 9th respondent and Sri. Mohammed Ansar K.J., the learned Special Government Pleader for Revenue. 6. Before we venture into an assessment of the factual contentions raised by the petitioners, it will be apposite and necessary to briefly state the essential facts involved. 7. S. Ramesh, the learned counsel for the 9th respondent and Sri. Mohammed Ansar K.J., the learned Special Government Pleader for Revenue. 6. Before we venture into an assessment of the factual contentions raised by the petitioners, it will be apposite and necessary to briefly state the essential facts involved. 7. The first petitioner claims possession over the property in question under two lease deeds, both executed by the Zamorin Raja of Kozhikode in his capacity as the Managing Trustee of Sree Panthalloor Bhagavathi Devaswom, copies of which have been placed on record as Exts.P1 and P2. These Lease Deeds are conceded to be in favour of a person by name Sri. K.M. Cheriyan and the said individual was granted lease of the properties for a 60 year period. It is admitted that the said lease deeds were registered as Documents No. 1189 of 1943 and 1190 of 1943 on 04.09.1943 and that it was to expire, as per its terms, on 04.09.2003. 8. Even when Exts.P1 and P2 lease deeds were in force, Sri. K.M. Cheriyan transferred the entire extent of land covered by it to an entity by name Panthalloor Plantations in the year 1956. In the same year, the afore Panthalloor Plantations transferred 200 acres, out of the 400 acres covered by Exts.P1 and P2, in favour of a company by name Devon Tea & Produce Co. Ltd and the balance 200 acres to the first petitioner herein. Subsequently, in the year 1969, as we see from the records available, the aforementioned Devon Tea & Produce Company Ltd transferred 200 acres available with them to the first petitioner herein as per a Sale Deed dated 10.03.1969. It is thus that the first petitioner claims to be in possession of the property involved herein on the strength of the aforesaid transactions. 9. As we have already indicated above, the period of lease granted under Exts.P1 and P2 Lease Deeds expired on 04.09.2003 and it appears that action was initiated by the Panthalloor Bhagavathi Devaswom to resume the land and that an Original petition was filed before this Court, numbered as O.P. No. 11369 of 2003, at the instance of the “Kshetra Samrakshana Samithy” (The Association of devotees formed to protect the temple), seeking directions from this Court to the competent officials to resume the land from the first petitioner. 10. 10. Almost simultaneous to the filing of this writ petition, the first petitioner herein filed W.P.(C) No. 32655 of 2003, wherein they prayed that the respondents therein, who are the Authorities under the State, be directed not to evict them using force and that they be allowed to be in possession of the property, without threat from the official respondents. 11. We notice that these two petitions were disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court through Ext.P12 judgment, dated 05.02.2004. As is clear from Ext. P12 judgment, this Court disposed of the writ petitions recording that the temple and the Kshetra Samithi will recover the properties from the petitioners herein only through a process known to law and concluding therefore, that the apprehension voiced by the first petitioner herein was unfounded. In effect, all the parties involved in those cases were left to their remedies, as were available to them, to be invoked suitably, as they were to be advised. 12. It transpires that pursuant to the directions of this Court in Ext.P12, the Panthalloor Bhagavathi Devaswom [hereinafter referred to as the Devaswom for convenience] represented by the Zamorin Raja of Kozhikkode, filed O.S. No. 66 of 2004 alleging that the lease granted in favour of Sri. K. M. Cheriyan, covered by Exts. P1 and P2 deeds, had expired on 04.09.2003 and that the petitioners herein and their predecessors-in-interest, who they alleged were companies incorporated by the children and close relatives of the original lessee, are in illegal possession of the property in question. The plaint in the said suit has been placed on record as Ext. P13 and we see that the first petitioner herein had filed a detailed written statement in the said suit, which has been appended to this writ petition as Ext. P14. 13. We are told by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that when the afore noticed suit was so pending, the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951 [hereinafter referred to as HR&CE Act] was amended, introducing Section 94A w.e.f. 31.01.2008. The effect of this amendment was that the lands belonging to the Devaswom Boards and other religious institutions would be deemed to be the property of the Government for the purpose of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957 and that all the provisions of the said Act would apply to such lands. 14. The effect of this amendment was that the lands belonging to the Devaswom Boards and other religious institutions would be deemed to be the property of the Government for the purpose of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957 and that all the provisions of the said Act would apply to such lands. 14. When this amendment was brought in, it appears that the Devaswom decided to withdraw the suit, so as to enable the Government to invoke the provisions of the newly introduced Section, namely 94A of the H.R. & C.E. Act and consequently to initiate and pursue action under the KLC Act. 15. While matters stood so, it is seen that in the year 2007, an attempt had been made by the Government, through the Tahasildar, Ernad -Manjeri, to pursue action under the KLC Act and that Ext. P15 notice was issued to the first petitioner herein. The petitioner Company replied to this notice through Ext. P16 objection, wherein their specific contention was that the property belongs to them exclusively under Exts. P1 and P2 lease deeds as also under Exts. P3 and P4, which they claim are the letters of ratification issued by the Zamorin Raja of Kozhikkode accepting the sale of the properties by their predecessors-in-interest to them, in the years 1956 and 1969, as we have been afore noticed [As we will seen in detail later, the Zamorin Raja of Kozhikkode has a definite contention that Exts. P3 and P4 letters are forged and fabricated]. 16. According to the petitioners, no action was further taken by the Government subsequent to Ext. P15 notice and they say that the process was thus allowed to die in its natural death. 17. That being as above, the cause now shown by the petitioners in this writ petition has its genesis in a subsequent action taken by the competent Authority under the KLC Act, which was initiated through Ext. P18 notice, issued under Section 12 of the said Act. Through this notice, the first petitioner was notified that since they are occupying property which belongs to the Devaswom, the Government is authorised to initiate action under Section 94A of the HR & CE Act, and that they are, therefore, required to vacate from the premises forthwith. The petitioners say that they had preferred detailed objections to this notice, a copy of which has been produced as Ext. The petitioners say that they had preferred detailed objections to this notice, a copy of which has been produced as Ext. P21, but that Ext. P22 order was issued by the 7th respondent -Additional Tahasildar, confuting all these objections and thus sanctioning further action under the provisions of the KLC Act. 18. The petitioners assert that they, therefore, had no other option but to impugn this order before this Court by filing this writ petition and that, as permitted by this Court in subsequent interim orders, they had filed a statutory appeal against it before the 12th respondent [Revenue Divisional Officer], culminating in Ext. P27 order rejecting it, thus further constraining them to file statutory revision, again, as allowed by this Court, before the Government of Kerala, which also has been found against them through Ext. P32 order. The petitioners thus challenge Ext. P18 notice, Exts. P27 and P32 orders as being illegal and unlawful. 19. Sri. Joseph Kodianthara, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners commenced his submissions by asserting that the orders impugned in this writ petition have been issued by the Authorities concerned transgressing their limits of jurisdiction because they have proceeded to adjudicate and evaluate the first petitioner's title over the property which, according to him, they are not entitled to do under the provisions of the KLC Act. As per the learned senior counsel, the narration of facts ut supra would show that his client is in legitimate and legal possession of the property under Exts. P1 and P2 lease deeds and Exts. P3 and Ext.P4 ratification letters of the Zamorin Raja of Kozhikkode and axiomatically that they should be construed to be cultivating tenants in possession of the property, being entitled to the benefits of fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the KLR Act. 20. The submissions of the learned senior counsel in its crux, therefore, is that his client is entitled to fixity of tenure over the property, on account of the fact that they are cultivating tenants, being in its possession even before the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and therefore, that Exts. P27 and P32 orders, which have negatived their claim of title over this property, are irregular and improper. P27 and P32 orders, which have negatived their claim of title over this property, are irregular and improper. He relies on the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and that of this Court to say that when an Authority acts under the provisions of KLC Act they have no right or jurisdiction to enter into the questions relating to title. He cites the judgment of the Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and another [ (1982) 2 SCC 134 ] in support of his contention that when there are disputes of title with respect to a property, summary procedure for eviction of land by the Government would not legally permissible. The learned senior counsel calls our attention to the portions of paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment, which we extract below for easy reference : “8. It seems to us clear from these provisions that the summary remedy for eviction which is provided for by Section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is "the property of Government" .......................................................... …............................ If there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that, the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided by Section 6 for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. …........................................................... 9. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by S. 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of "a very recent origin", cannot be stretched too far. That was also the view taken by the learned single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Mehrunnissa Begum v. State of A. P., (1970) Andh LT 88 which was affirmed by a Division Bench (1971) 1 Andh LT 292: (AIR 1971 Andh Pra 382). It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide.” 21. Relying on the afore declaration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Sri. Joseph Kodianthara, the learned senior counsel avouches that the facts involved in the present case stands pari materia to the facts noticed by the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforementioned case and contends, therefore, that the impugned order and action of the Authority under the KLC Act has to fail, since it has chosen to continue with the process of eviction even though the petitioners have raised a dispute regarding the title of the Devaswom over the property. 22. The learned senior counsel further adds that another Division Bench of this Court has in Harrisons Malayalam Limited and another Vs. State of Kerala and others [ 2018 (2) KLT 369 ] followed Thummala Krishna Rao (supra) and calls our attention in particular to paragraph 134 of the judgment, which reads as under : “134. We do not think, any of the decisions cited by the State apply to the proceedings under the KLC Act. On the contrary the decisions cited by the petitioners; Thummala Krishna Rao, Padmavathi Devi & Sankara Narayanan squarely apply .....................................................................................We have identified the scheme of KLC Act as one confined to a summary eviction and in that context we need not refer to Banerjee Memorial Club- 2016 (1) KLT 241 and Shahul Hassan Musaliyar- 2015(4) KHC 615 , wherein the lands belonged to the Government, but the allegation of unauthorised occupation was repelled by the land holders on grounds of valid permission for possession. Here, the petitioners have a more valid ground of title which cannot be trivialised and falls within the scope and ambit of a very bonafide dispute. The SO, authorised under the KLC Act and acting under the powers conferred under the statute, to summarily evict unauthorised occupants from Government and puramboke lands cannot adjudicate on the title and then carry out eviction. The SO, authorised under the KLC Act and acting under the powers conferred under the statute, to summarily evict unauthorised occupants from Government and puramboke lands cannot adjudicate on the title and then carry out eviction. The State is not exercising sovereign functions and is in an adversorial capacity in so far as the lands belonging to third parties are concerned. We again notice Section 20, which reserves the right of an occupier to establish title and so challenge a proceeding under the KLC Act, before a Civil Court. The reservation so made divests, the authority under the KLC Act, of the power to adjudicate on title.....................................” He thus reiterates his contention that the Authorities exercising powers under the KLC Act are completely divested, on account of Section 20 thereof, in adjudicating title related claims. 23. When we hear the learned senior counsel as above, we are certainly enjoined to scrutinise the facts noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thummala Krishna Rao (supra) and assess it against that which are presented in the case before us. The judgment of the Supreme Court shows that the property therein was covered by a process of acquisition, which did not culminate in the possession of it being taken from the owners. Even though the possession of the acquired property had not been taken from the owners and even though the suit filed by the Osmania University, for whose benefit the acquisition was done, had been dismissed on the ground of limitation, action was taken by the Government under a summary procedure akin to the KLC Act for eviction, which was viewed pejoratively by the Honourable Supreme Court holding that since there existed a genuine dispute between the Government and the owners of the land, the Government cannot resort to a unilateral summary procedure for eviction of the owners. 24. As has also been rightly said by Sri. Joseph Kodianthara, the view has certainly been followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Harrisons Malayalam Limited (supra). This is because, as is limped from the afore extracted paragraph of the judgment, the Bench found that the petitioner there had a “valid ground of title which cannot be trivialised and falls within the scope and ambit of a very bonafide dispute.” 25. This is because, as is limped from the afore extracted paragraph of the judgment, the Bench found that the petitioner there had a “valid ground of title which cannot be trivialised and falls within the scope and ambit of a very bonafide dispute.” 25. We are afraid, that by no stretch of imagination can the facts involved in the afore cited cases be even said to be analogous or similar to the facts involved herein, because, in the case at hand, all that the petitioners contend is that they are in possession of the property on the strength of Exts. P1 and P2 lease deeds, which are concededly not in their name, but in the name of Sri. K. M. Cheiryan, as also Exts.P3 and P4 letters said to have been issued by the Zamorin Raja, which again is severely disputed, as we will see presently, but they have been unable to produce any document or evidence in substantiation of this claim that they have obtained the character and locus of cultivating tenants, being entitled to the protection under the KLR Act. 26. The sole document that the petitioners show in support of their claim is Ext. P5 order, issued by the Taluk Land Board, Perinthalmanna, relating to the property in question, wherein it has been found exempted from the provisions of the KLR Act. However, what is pertinent, even on an ex facie examination of Ext. P5, is that the declarant in that proceedings is a certain Sri. P. K. Cheriyan and that the declaration relates to his family. Even though Sri. P. K. Cheriyan has been shown therein to be superintendent of the first petitioner company, it is clear from its tenor that the Land Board, Perinthalmanna was acting on a declaration made by him personally and in his family's name. 27. Sri. Joseph Kodianthara, the learned senior counsel in answer to this, submits that what is recorded in Ext. P5 is a mistake committed by the Land Board because, according to him, going by the tax receipts produced on record as Exts. P5(a) to P5(d), it is clear that the basic tax with respect to the property has been paid not by Sri. P. K. Cheriyan in his individual capacity but by the first petitioner, being in possession of the said property. P5(a) to P5(d), it is clear that the basic tax with respect to the property has been paid not by Sri. P. K. Cheriyan in his individual capacity but by the first petitioner, being in possession of the said property. Even if this submission of the learned senior counsel is accepted, the fact remains that in Exts. P5(a) to (d) tax receipts, the first petitioner has not been shown to be the owner but it shows its name solely as the person/entity who has remitted the amount of tax. In any event, it is now settled law that mere payment of land tax cannot and does not make the remitter the owner of the property, since even a person other than owner can so remit the land tax. To add to this, as is clear from Ext. P5 order, the Taluk Land Board has recorded that a declaration has been filed by Sri. P. K. Cheriyan in his individual capacity, under Section 85(2) of the KLR Act, which culminated in the proceedings before it. Therefore, as long as the said document, which has been produced by the petitioners themselves, speaks that Sri. P. K. Cheriyan is the declarant before the Land Board, it would not be justified for this Court to act on surmises and conjectures and conclude that it should be deemed that the afore mentioned Sri. P. K Cheriyan had made the declaration under the KLR Act for and on behalf of the first petitioner company. 28. That apart, we notice that the specific claim of the petitioners is hinged solely on Exts. P1, P2 lease deeds in favour Sri. K. M. Cheriyan and on Exts. P3 and P4 letters of the Zamorin Raja, which as we have already said earlier is contended by the Zamorin Raja to be forged. However, nowhere do they say in their pleadings or in their submissions before us that the petitioners have even attempted, under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, to claim right over the property as a cultivating tenant. This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest. This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest. Of course, the period of limitation shown therein can be extended by the Government for sufficient reasons. The imperative mandate of this Section is inescapable and we, therefore, deem it necessary to extract it as under to facilitate a complete reading of it : “72B(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under sub-section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.” 29. From the factual factors in this case, it is rather obvious that even though the petitioners claim possession and ownership over the property on the strength of Exts. P1 to P4, asserting that they are cultivating tenants, they have conspicuously chosen never to make an application before Land Tribunal for assignment of the right, title or interest over the property in their favour until now. Therefore, all that the petitioners have done is to merely make a claim, solely based on the documents aforementioned and Ext. P5, to assert that they are cultivating tenants with respect to the property in question, however, consciously choosing not to make any application under the afore extracted Section 72B (3) to establish such claim, even when they are statutorily obligated to do so. 30. We notice from the proceedings herein that when action was initiated under the KLC Act, the petitioners objected to it alleging that they are cultivating tenants, entitled to fixity of tenure. The submissions of the learned senior counsel Sri. 30. We notice from the proceedings herein that when action was initiated under the KLC Act, the petitioners objected to it alleging that they are cultivating tenants, entitled to fixity of tenure. The submissions of the learned senior counsel Sri. Joseph Kodianthara is that once such a claim is made by the occupant in possession of the property, then it becomes obligatory on the part of the Authorities to cease all action under the KLC Act and to first establish such claim to be untenable by invoking the jurisdiction of a competent Land Tribunal and only thereafter proceed further. In other words, the submission of Sri. Kodianthara is that if a claim for fixity of tenure is raised by a person in possession of a property, then the Authorities are disabled from continuing further under the KLC Act. He, in fortification of this contention, relies on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Lissy Vs. Kuttan [ 1976 KLT 571 (FB)] to impress upon us that this judgment clearly postulates that where a person claims to be a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the KLR Act, then even the Civil Courts are prohibited from considering such issues and that the Court can only thereupon refer it to the Land Tribunal, under Section 125(3) of the KLR Act. His singular contention, based on the ratio of this judgment, is that when a person in possession of property, raises a claim for fixity of tenure, it would axiomatically entail the end of jurisdiction of the Authorities acting under the KLC Act. 31. We are afraid that we cannot subscribe to above submission of Sri. Kodianthara for various reasons, primarily among them being that the judgment in Lissy Vs. Kuttan [supra] has been over ruled by a Larger Bench of this Court in Kesava Bhat Vs. Subraya Bhat [ 1979 KLT 766 ]. The specific conclusions, holdings and declaration of the Larger Bench is available in paragraphs 6, 7 and 11 which are as under: “6. ....................................................... We are unable to accept the reasoning of the Full Bench. The rule of presumption following title, as is well known, is applicable only in certain limited classes of cases, and under limited conditions and circumstances. That rule has no relevance in deciding whether a question of tenancy "arises" in a plain and simple suit for injunction. ....................................................... We are unable to accept the reasoning of the Full Bench. The rule of presumption following title, as is well known, is applicable only in certain limited classes of cases, and under limited conditions and circumstances. That rule has no relevance in deciding whether a question of tenancy "arises" in a plain and simple suit for injunction. Nor are we impressed with the reasoning that a finding on tenancy would be relevant and useful in evaluating evidence as to possession. We are unable to see how this would be so. We therefore overrule the decision of the Full Bench in Lissy v. Kuttan (1976 KLT. 571) on this point, and hold that the decisions in Alavi v. Mohammedkutty Haji (1973 KLT. 937) and Narayana Menon v. Kallandi (1973 KLT. 983) were rightly decided. We endorse the judgment of Mr. Justice krishnamoorthy Iyer in C. R. P. No. 298 of 1973 which "was also overruled in Lissy v. Kuttan (1976 KLT. 571). 7. As, however, the reference to the Full Bench of five judges was occasioned to consider the other questions strongly debated before us, which frequently arise for determination, and which have to be settled for providing guidance to the lower courts, we shall deal with these questions. These are: when can it be said that a question regarding the rights of a tenant "arises" within the meaning of S. 125 (3) ? If a question thus "arises", and is not referred to the Land Tribunal but is dealt with and disposed of by the civil court, is the resultant decree one without jurisdiction? 11. Counsel for the appellant contended, on the strength of the decisions in Noor Mohammad Khan v. Fakirappa (AIR. 1978 SC. 1217) and bhimjai v. Dundappa (AIR. 1966 SC. 166) that the question of tenancy arises as soon as the plea was raised by the defendant that he was a tenant, and therefore the matter had to be referred to the Land Tribunal. We do not think this extreme position taken up by counsel for the appellant will be justified. A statement in such wide and comprehensive terms is to be found in the Full bench decision in Lissy v. Kutian ( 1976 KLT 571 ). We do not think this extreme position taken up by counsel for the appellant will be justified. A statement in such wide and comprehensive terms is to be found in the Full bench decision in Lissy v. Kutian ( 1976 KLT 571 ). The Full Bench observed: "the only matter to be considered in the court is whether any question regarding the rights of a tenant or a kudikidappukaran including the question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran arises in a suit or proceeding. This, the court will have to examine and for this purpose what will have to be examined are the pleadings, and we consider, nothing else. Whether the plea is frivolous or sustainable or prima facie true or not are all foreign to the scope of the enquiry before court. We are in complete agreement with the decision in Sankaran v. Raiammal (1974 KLT. 486) where all the decisions on the subject on an analogous provision of previous enactment's have been reviewed. The view has been taken in the decision that s. 125 (3) has barred any consideration by the court of the question even for the purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case has been established." (p. 575) We consider that the principle has been very widely and broadly stated in the above passage. We cannot accept the statement of the law as correct. Unless the question actually "arises" for consideration, there is no obligation under S. 125 (3) to make a reference to the Land Tribunal. The mere incorporation of an unnecessary or irrelevant plea of tenancy into the written statement which has no relation whatever to the material averments and the reliefs sought in plaint, cannot attract the bar of S. 125 (1), or the provisions of S. 125 (3 ). It follows that the statement of the principle in Sankaran v. Rajammal (1974 KLT. 488) which was approved by the Full Bench in Lissy v. Kutian (1976 KLT. 571) mustalsobe overruled. That decision stated that S. 125 (3) bars any consideration by the court of the question even for the purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case has been established. We consider this an overstatement of the principle. It is only if the question arises for consideration that the obligation to refer under S. 125 (3) also arises. That decision stated that S. 125 (3) bars any consideration by the court of the question even for the purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case has been established. We consider this an overstatement of the principle. It is only if the question arises for consideration that the obligation to refer under S. 125 (3) also arises. We do not think it can be the intention of the Legislature to make the reference to the Land Tribunal dependent upon a plea in the written statement which has got no relation to the claim made in the plaint, and which would not, having regard to the frame of the plaint, or to other legal obstacles in raising the defence, call for any adjudication at all.” 32. The reliance of the learned senior counsel on the judgment of the Full Bench in Lissy Vs. Kuttan (supra), therefore, becomes untenable and in any event of the matter, it is difficult for us to even accede to the proposition that it is merely enough for a person to make a claim that he is a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, to efface the jurisdiction vested with the Authorities under the KLC Act. We are certain, and we are guided in our view by the judgment of the Larger Bench that such a claim, if made by a person, will have to be bonafide, supported by cogent, reliable and substantiable evidence and that a mere claim, for the sake of making a defence, would not in any manner eliminate the jurisdiction of the Authority under the KLC Act. In fact, the afore-extracted view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thummala Krishna Rao (supra) and that of this Court in Harrisons Malayalam Limited (supra) would cement this position because it is now ineluctably declared that it is only when a “bonafide” dispute is raised with respect to the rights and title over the property involved, will the Government be restrained from invoking summary action for eviction. The emphasis on the words “bonafide dispute” is unmistakable and in the absence of some evidence, material, document or order to show such dispute to be bonafide, the Government and its competent functionaries cannot be interdicted from pursuing eviction proceedings under the applicable law. 33. The emphasis on the words “bonafide dispute” is unmistakable and in the absence of some evidence, material, document or order to show such dispute to be bonafide, the Government and its competent functionaries cannot be interdicted from pursuing eviction proceedings under the applicable law. 33. We must at this juncture also have a glance at Section 20 of the KLC Act which stipulates as under : “20. Saving of suits by persons aggrieved by proceedings under this Act :-No suit against the Government shall be entertained in any Civil Court in respect of any order passed under this Act except upon the ground that the land in respect of such order has been passed is not a land which is the property of Government whether a poramboke or not: Provided that Civil Courts shall not take cognizance of any such suit unless it shall be instituted within one year from the date on which the cause of action arose.” 34. As has been recorded in Harrisons Malayalam Limited (supra) this section “reserves the right of an occupier to establish title and so challenge a proceeding under the KLC Act, before a Civil Court”. Since the judgment has been cited by the petitioners themselves in support of their contention, and since no one before us opposes these specific findings, we deem it apposite to accept as it is without venturing to assess it, and therefore, it is inexplicable that, even though they are thus conceding to this remedy, the petitioners have chosen to file this Writ Petition and to assert title by invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are afraid that since there are severe disputation of facts between the parties herein, it is not justified in us to delve into there or to state affirmatively on them, one way or the other, being guided by the now well established constraints in jurisdiction of Courts exercising writ jurisdiction, in dealing with issues solely in the realm of facts, that too which are severely disputed. 35. We must also notice now that the learned Special Government Pleader has also opposed each of the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners recorded above, vehemently supporting the impugned orders, asserting that they have been issued in valid exercise of jurisdiction by the competent Authorities. 35. We must also notice now that the learned Special Government Pleader has also opposed each of the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners recorded above, vehemently supporting the impugned orders, asserting that they have been issued in valid exercise of jurisdiction by the competent Authorities. According to him, Section 94A of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 makes it incumbent upon the Government to act when a property belonging to the Devaswom or a religious institution has been trespassed into by persons claiming possession. He vehemently submits that when such action is taken by the Government and by its functionaries, acting under the statutory requirements of the KLC Act, the persons claiming possession can resist such action only if they are able to establish, at least prima facie, that they have a legal right to continue in such possession of the property. The singular submission of the learned Special Government Pleader is that it is not enough that the occupier merely raises a claim of right or title over the property but that they will have to substantiate it by cogent and reliable materials. 36. When we hear the learned Special Government Pleader as afore, it becomes apparent that the stand of the official respondents is that unless the petitioners are able to show at least a semblance of right to be in possession of the property, the statutory Authorities under the KLC Act cannot be interdicted from proceeding further with the proceedings under the said Act. 37. The learned Special Government Pleader further adds in support of the impugned orders that what the Authorities have done in this case is not to adjudicate title of the petitioners over the property in question but that they have issued the said orders since the petitioners are unable, even prima facie, to establish any such right or interest over the property, except by making a bald claim that they have a legal right to continue so and to resist action under the KLC Act. The definite case of the learned Special Government Pleader is that merely because an occupier claims title, albeit without any shred of evidence, document or material in strength of the same, the authorities under the KLC Act are not bound to take cognizance of the same or to adjudicate on such right or title and to cease proceedings merely because such a claim has been made. He says that this will amount to abdication of statutory functions, which is not legally or statutorily permissible. 38. Sri. Ramesh Chander, a learned senior counsel of this Court who was gracious to assist us as an amicus curiae, expatiates the specific forensic issues in this case by telling us that the obligation of a person, who claims to be a cultivating tenant, to apply under the provisions of KLR Act, is manifest from Section 72B (3) of the KLR Act. According to him, if a person stakes claim as a cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of a property, it is statutorily enjoined on him to make an application for such purpose before the Land Tribunal within the period of time prescribed under the said section. The learned Amicus Curiae continued to tell us that since the petitioners have chosen not to do so, it would only lead to a situation where his claim, of being a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure, remains nothing more than a claim, which has not been adjudicated and concluded upon by any competent authority. He says, therefore, that the question before this Court is whether it will be sufficient for a person to merely make a claim, without initiating necessary statutory action to establish it, as is enjoined upon him under the provisions of KLR Act, in order to resist action under the KLC Act initiated by the Authority under the provisions of the applicable law. He submits that in his considered opinion, the answer to this question is to the negative and that unless and until a person is able to establish his title over the property as a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, by making an application under Section 72B (3) of the KLR Act, it would not concede to him the liberty to claim ownership, merely because he now makes such a claim. 39. 39. As regards the earlier suit filed by the Devaswom, which was subsequently withdrawn by them, the learned amicus curiae further says that if any concessions or admissions have been made by the Devaswom in Ext. P13 suit, with respect to the right, title or ownership of the petitioner company over the property, when it certainly would be open to the petitioner to use that to resist action under the KLC Act. However, he says that on a reading of the plaint in question, namely Ext. P13, there are no such admissions or concessions given by the Devaswom Board and that they have underpinned their reliefs in the said suit on the allegation that the original lease was in favour of Sri. K. M. Cheriyan, thus making the subsequent transfers, in favour of the first petitioner, illegal and unlawful. According to him, it is, therefore, certain that no admissions or concessions are available to the petitioners at the hands of the Devaswom Board and consequently that they will have to establish their right independently under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. 40. Sri. M. P. Sreekrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the 10th respondent Zamorin Raja of Kozhikkode, invites our attention to Ext. P32 order of the Government and says that when his client was heard by the Government, while the revision filed by the first petitioner, against the order impugned in the Writ Petition, was being considered, he had stated unequivocally that Exts. P3 and P4 documents are forged and fabricated. According to Sri. Sreekrishnan, the benefits under Exts. P1 and P2 would inure only to late Sri. K. M. Cheiryan and not to other persons or entities claiming under documents executed by him, since all such transfers are, in the eye of the provisions of the KLR Act, illegal and non-est. P3 and P4 documents are forged and fabricated. According to Sri. Sreekrishnan, the benefits under Exts. P1 and P2 would inure only to late Sri. K. M. Cheiryan and not to other persons or entities claiming under documents executed by him, since all such transfers are, in the eye of the provisions of the KLR Act, illegal and non-est. He contends further that the transfer of the 200 acres of land to the first petitioner company in the year 1969 can only be construed as being void and null, since that transfer was made much after the KLR Act was brought into effect on 01.04.1964 and he refers to Sections 83 and 84 of the KLR Act in support of this contention, which indubitably provides that with effect from the date notified by the Government, no person will be entitled to hold or own or possess, under a mortgage, lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area and further that all voluntary transfers effected after the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the gazette, otherwise than by partition or in favour of a tenant of the holding before the 27th July, 1960 or by a family or any member thereof or by an adult unmarried person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area or otherwise than by way of gift in favour of his son or daughter or the son or daughter of his pre-deceased son or daughter by any person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area shall be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of this Act and shall be invalid. 41. The learned Amicus Curae Sri. Ramesh Chander, in fact, affirms this submission of Sri. Sreekrishnan by adding that under the provisions of Section 74 of the KLR Act, all future tenancies after the commencement of the KLR Act are treated as being invalid. 42. 41. The learned Amicus Curae Sri. Ramesh Chander, in fact, affirms this submission of Sri. Sreekrishnan by adding that under the provisions of Section 74 of the KLR Act, all future tenancies after the commencement of the KLR Act are treated as being invalid. 42. Even though specific submissions with respect to the validity of the lease or the validity of the transfers in favour of the petitioners has been impelled before us, we are of the view that it would not be necessary for us to make an affirmative or conclusive adjudication on the same, since it is not within the competence of this Court, while we act under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to deal with or consider them, going by the well recognized constraints of jurisdiction while dealing with disputations of facts. We say this because, in the pleadings available in the writ petition, though the petitioners say that Exts. P3 and P4 letters, ratifying sale in their favour had been issued by Zamorin Raja of the Kozhikkode, the specific stand of the Zamorin Raja, as voiced through his learned counsel Sri. M. P. Sreekrishnan, is that these documents are fabricated and forged. Obviously, therefore, there exists unresolved disputes in relation to the applicable facts, which consequently disentitles us from any further jurisdiction in evaluation of these issues. 43. The learned standing counsel for the Malabar Devaswom Board Sri. R. Lakshmi Narayan makes his submission virtually in support of the submissions made by the learned Amicus Curiae and Sri. M. P. Sreekrishnan as afore, but adds that, as is clear from Exts. P1 and P2 lease deeds, the properties were always owned by the Devaswom and that the Zamorin Raja had executed them only in his capacity as the trustee of the Devaswom. He, therefore, says that the properties are indubitably owned by the temple and the Devaswom and therefore, that Section 94A of the HR & CE Act is fully relevant. He thus supports the action taken by the competent authorities under the KLC Act by asserting that they are enjoined to do so under the provisions of Section 94A of the HR & CE Act read with the various other provisions of the KLC Act. He thus supports the action taken by the competent authorities under the KLC Act by asserting that they are enjoined to do so under the provisions of Section 94A of the HR & CE Act read with the various other provisions of the KLC Act. The learned standing counsel also adds that since the properties are Devaswom lands, the petitioner would not obtain locus to claim fixity of tenure going by the provisions of Section 3 (1) (x) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. 44. We are, of course, cognizant that Sri. Joseph Kodianthara, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, refutes with grate force the above submissions of Sri. R. Lakshmi Narayan by predicating that the Devaswom cannot even be heard to be the owner of the property, since by the automatic operation of Section 72 of the KLR Act, the property would become vested with the Government. This submission, we must say, is certainly ingenious in its nature but we refrain ourselves from answering it one way or the other, for the simple reason that whether the property belongs to the Government or to the Devaswom Board, it would be of no consequence or relevance to the petitioners since, in either case, they will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law. Unless and until they are able to do so, the attempted distinction drawn by Sri. Joseph Kodianthara would be nothing more than academic in its nature. We are firm in our mind of this because it is only if they are able to prove that they are a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, can the first petitioner obtain the locus to challenge action under the KLC Act, invoked on the strength of Section 94A of the HR & CE Act, on the ground that property does not belong to the Devaswom. As long as they have not established their claim over the property, adjudication as to if the property is owned by the Government or the Devaswom would not be of any relevance to the petitioners at this point of time. 45. As long as they have not established their claim over the property, adjudication as to if the property is owned by the Government or the Devaswom would not be of any relevance to the petitioners at this point of time. 45. Thus, from an over view of what we have said above, it becomes irrefutable that the action now taken by the competent Authorities under the KLC Act, on the support of the provisions of Section 94A of the HR & CE Act, to evict the petitioners from the property in question because the lease granted to Sri. K. M. Cheriyan by Panthallor Devaswom, through Exts. P1 and P2 deeds, had expired on 04.09.2003, is irreproachable, at least until the first petitioner is able to establish their right as a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, over it under the KLR Act. 46. We further notice that the proceedings under Section 5 of KLC Act was initiated on the basis of a report obtained by the Additional Tahasildar from the Village Officer on 26.02.2008, which was after the coming into force of Section 94A of the HR & CE Act and that the proceedings through Ext.P18 was issued thereafter. We cannot find anything wrong in Ext. P18 proceedings taken by the Tahasildar and subsequently ratified by the Revenue Divisional Officer, as also the Government, and we, therefore, cannot conclude that the orders, namely Ext. P18, P22, P27 and P32, are in any manner contrary to law or issued in excess of jurisdiction. Au contraire, we are of the firm view that the concerned Authorities have acted within their powers and that it will be upto the petitioners to invoke remedies as may be available to them, to establish their rights, including their entitlement of fixity of the tenure over the property in question, through a process that is sanctioned in law. We do not in any manner intend to restrict such rights of the petitioners through this judgment and we leave all such remedies open to them, without being manacled, influenced or trammalled by any of our observations in this judgment. 47. We record our deepest appreciation for Sri. We do not in any manner intend to restrict such rights of the petitioners through this judgment and we leave all such remedies open to them, without being manacled, influenced or trammalled by any of our observations in this judgment. 47. We record our deepest appreciation for Sri. M. Ramesh Chander, the learned senior counsel who was kind enough to assist this Court as an amicus curiae, for his incisive and in-depth analysis of the issues involved and we record that it would not have been possible for this Court to resolve the issue in the manner we have done without his assistance. This Writ Petition is thus dismissed. After this judgment was dictated in Court, the learned senior counsel, Sri. Joseph Kodianthara, sought certificate from this Court for leave to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution of India. He also pleaded that his clients may be given some time to approach the Honourable Supreme Court, during which time the eviction of the first petitioner from the property may be stayed. 2. We have considered the submissions of Sri. Joseph Kodianthara with care but we are unable to hold that a substantial question of law of general importance is involved, so as to warrant a certificate from this Court. Most of the observations that we have made in this judgment have been done within the realm of facts and solely since we are unable to adjudicate on these issues, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we have only relegated the petitioners to avail appropriate remedy under law. 3. In such view of the matter, the request of Sri. Joseph Kodianthara is rejected and we see no reason to give a certificate under Articles 133 (1) and 134A of the Constitution of India because no substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this case. 4. As regards the request of the petitioners for time is concerned, even though we have rejected all their contentions in our judgment, since we notice, as is voiced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, that they intend to take up the matter further, we deem it appropriate to direct the concerned respondents to defer all further action under the KLC Act for a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 5. 5. We caution the petitioners that no trees may be cut and no change made to the lie and nature of the property under the guise of this order and that if any such action is noticed by the competent Authorities in defiance of this order, the benefit of time granted herein shall stand vacated.