ORDER : 1. In compliance of the order dated 08.01.2018, complainant Bhagwan Sahay has been impleaded as party respondent in this misc. petition. Amended cause title has also been filed, which is taken on record. 2. Heard counsel for both the sides on the application filed on behalf of respondent for placing on record the agreement to sale and registered sale deed executed by the petitioner in favour of Deepak Kumar Sharma. 3. The application is allowed and documents annexed with the application are taken on record. 4. Heard learned counsel for both the sides. 5. This Misc. Petition has been preferred on behalf of accused petitioners with the prayer to quash and set-aside FIR No. 0789/2017 registered at P.S. Gangapurcity, District Sawaimadhopur for the offences under Sections 420 and 406 IPC and also seeking direction to the police authorities for fair and transparent investigation. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegations made in the FIR in regard to the agreement to sale executed on 16.06.2017 are vague and incorrect. He has drawn attention of the Court to various infirmities occurring in the said agreement to sale. He further submits that no receipt for huge amount of Rs. 15 lacs. has been submitted by the complainant. What was hurry in getting the agreement to sale executed in such a cursory and imperfect manner, has not been clarified by the complainant, which shows that no such transaction ever took place. 7. Per contra, counsel for the respondent-complainant states that the stamp paper on which the said agreement to sale was executed, was purchased by accused-petitioner No. 1 Aruna Gupta herself. The agreement bears her signature on all the pages. Counsel submits that as per the sale agreement dated 16.06.2017, period of four months was permitted to get the sale deed executed by paying the remaining amount of Rs. 10 lacs. But before expiry of period of four months, the said property was sold out by the accused-petitioner in favour of one Deepak Kumar Sharma vide sale deed dated 11.10.2017. Counsel submits that this clearly shows criminal intention of accused-petitioners to defraud the complainant and make unlawful gain from him. 8. Taking note of the rival arguments advanced by both the sides, this Court is of the view that all these points require a thorough and fair investigation. Counsel submits that this clearly shows criminal intention of accused-petitioners to defraud the complainant and make unlawful gain from him. 8. Taking note of the rival arguments advanced by both the sides, this Court is of the view that all these points require a thorough and fair investigation. Further, the facts mentioned in the FIR, even if taken on their face value, prima facie disclose the commission of the offences under Section 420 and 406 IPC, which needs to be investigated by the concerned police authority. 9. It is apt to note that in the case of Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat and Others, 2018 Cr. L.R. (SC) 54, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “26. The law on the question as to when a registration of the F.I.R. is challenged seeking its quashing by the accused under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code and what are the powers of the High Court and how the High Court should deal with such question is fairly well settled. 27. This Court in State of West Bengal and Others vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and Others, AIR 1982 SC 949 had the occasion to deal with this issue. Y.V. Chandrachud, the learned Chief Justice speaking for Three Judge Bench laid down the following principle: “Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R. prima-facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R. prima-facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences.” 28. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle of law, which was consistently followed by this Court in later years and on perusing the impugned judgment, we are constrained to observe that the High Court without any justifiable reason devoted 89 pages judgment (see-paper book) to examine the aforesaid question and then came to a conclusion that some part of the F.I.R. in question is bad in law because it does not disclose any cognizable offence against any of the accused persons whereas only a part of the F.I.R. is good which discloses a prima facie case against the accused persons and hence it needs further investigation to that extent in accordance with law. 29. In doing so, the High Court, in our view, virtually decided all the issues arising out of the case like an investigating authority or/and appellate authority decides, by little realizing that it was exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code at this stage. 30. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possess to exercise while examining the legality of any F.I.R. complaining commission of several cognizable offences by accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the F.I.R. disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an Appellate Court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the F.I.R. and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. 31. At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the F.I.R. and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the Complainants and visa-se-versa. 31. At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the F.I.R. and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the Complainants and visa-se-versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the Court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 32. In our considered opinion, once the Court finds that the F.I.R. does disclose prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code.” 10. Having considered the legal proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, there appears no justification to quash and set-aside FIR No. 0789/2017, registered at P.S. Gangagpurcity, District Swaimadhopur. However, it will be proper to issue direction to the concerned police authority for fair and impartial investigation to be made in the said FIR and the same is accordingly issued. 11. The Misc. Petition is partly allowed in the aforesaid manner.