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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 467 (MP)

S. M. Chincholkar v. State of M. P.

2018-05-08

NANDITA DUBEY, S.K.SETH

body2018
ORDER Seth, J.--1. In this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, applicant is seeking quashment of FIR dated 10.5.2010 registered by the Special Police Establishment- Lokayukt and charge-sheet dated 15.3.2017 as well as criminal proceedings in Special Case No. 64/2015 pending before the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Bhopal. 2. In brief, the prosecution case is that at the relevant point of time, applicant was working as Accounts Officer in Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation. In the capacity of Accounts Officer, applicant made an excess payment of Rs. 84,00,000/- to M/s. LandT Finance. An FIR to this effect was registered and the matter was investigated. 3. On the basis of FIR, Crime No. 35/2010 has been registered against the applicant for the offences punishable under sections 13 (1)(d), 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sections 409, 420, 468, 471 and 120B of the IPC and ultimately charge sheet has been filed in the Court of Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) Bhopal for the offences mentioned above. Learned trial Judge considering the material filed along with the charge-sheet framed charges against the applicant in Speical Case No. 64/2015. Hence, this petition has been filed to quash the FIR as well as framing of charges against the applicant. 4. We have heard rival contentions at length and perused the material available on record. 5. It is well settled principle of law that if the allegation made in the FIR are taken at their face value constitute offence, the criminal proceedings instituted on the basis of such FIR should not be quashed. 6. In the case of “Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1999 SC 2554 ”, it has been held by their Lordships as under : “It is true that under section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well neigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code.” 7. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise, when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically specified in the section itself. 8. The law relating to quashing of the FIR is well-settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 37 , wherein it has been held as under : “Great care should be taken by the High Court before the embarking to scrutinizes the FIR/chargesheet/complaint.In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that FIR is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence .” 9. In view of the principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Arun Shankar Shukla (supra), we are conscious of limitations and it would not be in ends of justice to torpedo the criminal investigation in the mid-session. It is not one of those rarest of rare case, which calls for exercise of inherent powers. 10. At the stage of framing charges, Court is required to consider only the material placed by the prosecution, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 giving right to the accused to place material in defence at the stage of framing of charge. 10. At the stage of framing charges, Court is required to consider only the material placed by the prosecution, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 giving right to the accused to place material in defence at the stage of framing of charge. That stage would come later in the trial at the time of defence. We find no fault with the view taken by the trial Court. 11. In this context, we may profitably refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568 . Even in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar and others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 1 , wherein it was held that at the time of framing of charge, the material produced by the defence cannot be considered by the Court. 12. In view of this, the legal position is clear that no right is conferred by the Code to the accused person to prove his innocence at the stage of framing of charge. We, therefore, find no flaw with the FIR 13. It is settled law that the Court is not expected to marshal the record with a view to decide the admissibility and reliability of document on record. The trial Court is justified in framing charge against the accused. The defence of the applicant would not be considered at the time of framing of charges. It can be considered at an appropriate stage of defence evidence. 14. We find no force in this contention of counsel for the applicant for the simple reason that Court has to see whether from material produced on record it could be said that accused might have committed offence. In this connection, Court framing charge is not required to hold a mini trial and come to the conclusion that material produced warrants conviction. At this stage the probative values of the material submitted along with charge sheet is not required to be examined or evaluated under a microscope. That stage would come later at the proper stage of the trial. Prior to it the Court has only to see that material does make out a prima facie case. 15. At this stage the probative values of the material submitted along with charge sheet is not required to be examined or evaluated under a microscope. That stage would come later at the proper stage of the trial. Prior to it the Court has only to see that material does make out a prima facie case. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussions and the statement of law, we do not find any merit and substance in the present petition, therefore, present MCrC under section 482 of the CrPC is hereby dismissed. 16. Ordered accordingly.