JUDGMENT : Soumen Sen, J. 1. Both the applications are taken up together and disposed of by this common order. 2. The plaintiff has filed an application being G.A. no.3181 of 2017 praying inter alia for a mandatory direction upon the respondents to handover peaceful and vacant possession of the property described in scheduled, A to the plaint. 3. The defendant has filed an application in G.A. no. 3529 of 2017 for rejection of the plaint. 4. In order to decide both the applications it is necessary to narrate the facts pleaded by the plaintiff in the suit. 5. The plaintiff claims to be in exclusive possession of unit no.3, 4 and 5 on the first and ground floor of premises situated at Azimganj House, 7 Camac Street, Kolkata-700 017 (hereinafter referred to as “the said property”) at a monthly rent of Rs.3,36,755/- under four several agreements. 6. The plaintiff was previously known as ABN Amro Bank NV. Subsequently, in or around 2000, the plaintiff had acquired ABN Amro Bank NV globally together with all their rights and obligations out of which the possession of ABN Amro Bank NV in the said property became transferred, to Royal Bank of Scotland NV. 7. Subsequently, Royal Bank of Scotland NV became Royal Bank of Scotland PLC in 2017 and all rights of Royal Bank of Scotland NV stood transferred by way of a scheme of arrangement in favour of Royal Bank of Scotland PLC. 8. The plaintiff claims that by a letter of 27th October, 2016 the plaintiff made a conditional offer of terminating the aforesaid monthly tenancy under Clause 6.24 of the Agreement of 12th February, 2004, with effect from 30th April, 2017, in compliance of the six months’ notice period subject to compliance of various obligations cast on the respondents, inter alia, include the refund of various deposits for security and otherwise, held by the respondents under the four several agreements. 9. In the said letter the plaintiff claims that a sum of Rs.5,31,67,098.30 is payable by the defendant to the plaintiff upon adjustment of all rents, car parking charges and terrace usage charges from the security deposit as held by the defendant upon the plaintiff surrendering the tenancy. 9. In the said letter the plaintiff claims that a sum of Rs.5,31,67,098.30 is payable by the defendant to the plaintiff upon adjustment of all rents, car parking charges and terrace usage charges from the security deposit as held by the defendant upon the plaintiff surrendering the tenancy. The defendants, however, by a letter dated 17th February, 2017 did not accept the validity of the termination notice and also did not agree to refund the security deposits of the plaintiff. 10. The plaintiff, in contemplation of an earlier termination of tenancy by a letter dated 4th August, 2017, intimated the defendant that it would vacate the premises on or about 12th September, 2017 upon repayment of the security deposit by defendants without any adjustment or setoff. The plaintiff alleged that prior permission was sought for by the defendants to enter into the said property solely for the purpose of dismantling and removing the fixtures and fittings installed by the plaintiff and the plaintiff had agreed to bear the expenses thereof, on the representation of the defendants, being the landlord, that they would take full care to ensure that neither the said property nor the furniture, fixtures and fittings were damaged in any manner and the possession will thereafter be parted upon refund of the security deposit. 11. The plaintiff claims to have allowed the defendants to have access to the said property relying upon the said representations and in good faith only for the purpose of dismantling and removal of the furniture, fixtures and fittings. The plaintiff refers to letters dated 4th August 2017, 9th August 2017, 14th August 2017 and contends that an agreement was reached by and between the parties that only upon refund of the security deposit, possession of the property would be parted with by the plaintiff. However, during the pendency of such discussion and to the utter dismay and shock of the plaintiff, on 5th September, 2017 when the authorized personnel of the plaintiff, Mr. Anik Majumdar wanted to lock up the said premises between 6.30 p.m and 7.00 p.m, he was shocked and surprised to note that personnel of the respondents, who had been provided access to the said property for dismantling, removing the fittings and fixtures of the movable property of the plaintiff flatly refused to leave the said property. The personnel of the defendant physically stopped Mr. The personnel of the defendant physically stopped Mr. Anik Majumdar, representative of the plaintiff from pulling down the shutter at the entrance of the said property and put his padlock. An altercation followed when the plaintiff’s personnel alleged to have been forcibly thrown out from the said property. The plaintiff asserts that on and from 5th September, 2017 the defendants through their men, agents, musclemen and goons have forcibly evicted and dispossessed the petitioner from the said property there from without due course or authority of law or procedure established by law by using brute force and illegal means. The plaintiff claims to have been in rightful, settled and peaceful possession of the suit property until forcibly dispossessed. 12. On such basis the plaintiff filed a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 for the limited purpose of recovery or restoration of peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property. 13. In the suit the plaintiff has taken out an interlocutory application praying, inter alia, for a mandatory direction upon the respondents to restore and forthwith handover peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property. Initially an interim order was passed restraining the respondents from creating any third party interest or to part with possession of the property or any portion thereof, as described in Schedule A to the petition till the disposal of the said application. 14. The defendants have filed an affidavit-in-opposition. 15. The defendants have also taken out the application for dismissal of the plaint. The common thread of challenge in both is the maintainability of the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 16. Mr. Pratap Chatterjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has submitted that the plaintiff was wrongfully dispossessed from the suit property on 5th September, 2017 with the authorized personnel of the petitioner, namely Mr. Anik Majumdar in terms of the agreed understanding, wanted to lock up the said premises between 6.30 p.m. and 7.00 p.m. Mr. Chatterjee submits that the possession of the plaintiff in the subject premises is not in dispute inasmuch as the respondent was allowed to enter only for the purposes of removing and/or dismantling the equipment and the plaintiff had retained both dominion and control over the suit premises till the date the plaintiff was wrongfully dispossessed. 17. Mr. Chatterjee submits that the possession of the plaintiff in the subject premises is not in dispute inasmuch as the respondent was allowed to enter only for the purposes of removing and/or dismantling the equipment and the plaintiff had retained both dominion and control over the suit premises till the date the plaintiff was wrongfully dispossessed. 17. Mr. Chatterjee has referred letter dated 4th August, 2017 and submits that the said letter is the offer by which the plaintiff wanted to vacate the said premises. The defendant only had reservation about Clauses 3(b) and 7(b). Apart from that, the defendant had no other reservation about any of the other Clauses. It is explicit from the letter dated 4th August, 2017 that possession would be handed over immediately on receipt of the balance amount of the security deposits. The security deposit was never returned, although the plaintiff had agreed to accept refund of a lesser amount of the security deposit. Mr. Chatterjee submits that in the suit is under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff was in possession at the time of dispossession. The possession was not taken with the consent of the defendant. In view thereof the property should be immediately restored to the defendant. 18. Mr. Anindya Mitra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that the plaintiff has made over possession of the property in question to the respondents on its own volition and if anything happened thereafter with regard to possession of the plaintiff the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is not maintainable. Mr. Mitra submits that the provision of Section 6 would only apply if the possession is taking forcibly and without the consent of the occupier. Mr. Mitra has referred to the letter dated 5th September, 2017 of the plaintiff and submitted that a bare reading of the said letter would show that on 4th August, 2017 the plaintiff had agreed to surrender possession and on the basis thereof the possession was taken. This letter has been conveniently suppressed in the plaint as well as in the petition. This, of course, is the second limb of challenge to the maintainability of the suit and also for the dismissed of the inter locutory application. Mr. This letter has been conveniently suppressed in the plaint as well as in the petition. This, of course, is the second limb of challenge to the maintainability of the suit and also for the dismissed of the inter locutory application. Mr. Mitra has submitted that on 16th May, 2016 the respondents no.2 received a letter from the petitioner informing closure of operations of the plaintiff’s branches in India in a phased manner. This was followed by a similar posting on the website of the petitioner. On 27th October, 2016 a notice of termination of the monthly tenancy was issued by the petitioner to the respondent no.1 which is to take effect after six months with a request for refund of the security deposit. The respondent no.1, by letter dated 17th February, 2017 did not accede to the requests since the petitioner was obliged under the agreement to continue till 31st March, 2019. In or about April 2017 the branch of the plaintiff operating from the suit premises was shut down and the employees were retrenched. The furnitures and fixtures were not removed by the petitioner. On 23rd June, 2017 the respondent no.1 informed the petitioner that its engineers had deputed and were looking into the matter and the dismantling work would be undertaken and the petitioner would be informed of the estimate of charges, this letter according to Mr. Mitra has been suppressed. The said letter was followed by another letter of 1st July, 2017 regarding the charges for removal of the furniture and fixture. The petitioner was also informed that the cost of repairing and restoration of damaged portion if any, would be separate. The respondent no.1 thereafter on 1st August, 2017 by an email in furtherence to the discussion between the parties, forwarded the particulars, the manner and the calculations on the issue of refund of the security deposits. The letter dated 4th August, 2017 recording that joint site inspection would be carried out to ascertain structural damage, calculation of refund of security deposit was also suggested. The petitioner agreed that compensation towards repair and restoration was to be determined later and was deduct able from the security deposit. 19. Mr. Mitra submits that in response to the said letter the respondent no.1 communicated its acceptance of the terms suggested in the petitioner’s letter dated 4th August, 2017. The petitioner agreed that compensation towards repair and restoration was to be determined later and was deduct able from the security deposit. 19. Mr. Mitra submits that in response to the said letter the respondent no.1 communicated its acceptance of the terms suggested in the petitioner’s letter dated 4th August, 2017. By the letter dated 9th August, 2017 only two changes have been suggested. The petitioner accepted the two changes suggested by the respondent no.1 as is evident from the letter dated 14th August, 2017. Mr. Mitra submits that in view of such acceptance the agreement for surrender of possession of the suit premises stood complete. On 31st August, 2017 the respondent no.1 by a letter recorded after delivery of the site, it was seen that there had been large scale damage to the suit premises. The nature and extent of damage appear from a certificate issued by Adroit Consultant dated 1st September, 2017. Following such assessment the respondents on 1st September, 2017 by a letter recorded the damage to the structure and furnished particulars of the compensation which would have to be paid by the plaintiff. 20. Mr. Mitra submits that the enclosure to the said letter would show that removal of fixtures had been completed. Mr. Mitra has strongly relied upon the letter dated 4th September, 2017 issued by the petitioner and submits that the said letter would show that the petitioner, in fact, has admitted vacating the premises and had only requested for refund of the security deposit. Mr. Mitra has relied upon the last paragraph of the said letter where the plaintiff has demanded release of a sum of Rs.379,51,983.10/- within 7 days failing which the concessions offered by the letter dated 4th August, 2017 shall stand withdrawn and the plaintiff shall then proceed in accordance with law and the terms of the tenancy agreement for recovery of the security deposit amount. 21. Mr. Mitra submits that this letter makes it abundantly clear that the petitioner has never claimed possession of the said property. Mr. 21. Mr. Mitra submits that this letter makes it abundantly clear that the petitioner has never claimed possession of the said property. Mr. Mitra has referred to the letter exchanged by and between the parties between 5th September, 2017 and 11th September, 2017 to show that the plaintiff by way of a clear afterthought has now spun a story of dispossession which is absurd and is ruled out by its own admission, in its letter dated 4th September, 2017, that they have already vacated the said premises. Mr. Mitra submits that this letter along with few other earlier letters, have been conveniently suppressed in order to mislead the Court. 22. Mr. Mitra submits that even if possession is obtained by a trick a suit Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is not maintainable and in this connection Mr. Mitra has relied upon the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sukhjeet Singh vs. Sirajunnisa reported at AIR 2001 MP 59 , paragraph 8, 9, 11 and 12 and the Division Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. vs K.S. Naravana Iyer reported at AIR 1965 Mad 122 . It is submitted that the ratio laid down in the said decisions clearly show that even if possession is handed over with a promise to return possession after the event is over, it does not come to the purview of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and a suit under Section 6 would not be maintainable. 23. Mr. Mitra submits that since the petitioner has deliberately and intentionally suppressed the letters dated 23rd June, 2017, email dated 21st August, 2017, the letters dated 31st August, 2017, 1st September, 2017 and 4th September 2017 this application is liable to be dismissed. 24. Mr. Mitra submits that since the plaint is demurable, as the ingredient of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is absent, the plaint is liable to be dismissed. 25. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is a recognition of an invaluable right of a person in possession of an immovable possession irrespective of the nature and character of his possession to continue to remain in possession unless dispossessed in due course of law. It does not make any distinction between a person in lawful possession and a trespasser. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is a recognition of an invaluable right of a person in possession of an immovable possession irrespective of the nature and character of his possession to continue to remain in possession unless dispossessed in due course of law. It does not make any distinction between a person in lawful possession and a trespasser. The law is well settled that, he who possesses has, by the mere fact of his possession, more right in the thing than the non-possessor has. This right was recognized by the Privy Council in Midnapore Zamindar Company Limited Vs. Naresh Narayan Ray reported at AIR 1924 PC 144 . In the said decision the Privy Council observed “In India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court”. The object and rationale of the said provision is eminently and clearly brought out in those few words in Midnapore Zamindar Company Limited (supra). The proceeding under Section 6 is intended to be a summary proceeding as the object is to provide an immediate and speedy remedy to restore possession to a person who has been unjustly and forcibly dispossessed. Section 6 does not contemplate a decision, adjudication and declaration on title. In a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act the plaintiff has to prove (i) that he was in possession, (ii) that he has been dispossessed, that is, deprived of actual physical possession of land, (iii) that the dispossession took place without his consent (iv) that it was done otherwise than in due course of law and (v) that the dispossession took place within 6 months before institution of the suit under Section 6. 26. ‘Dispossession’ implies actual ouster and the essence of ouster is that the person ousting is in actual possession. 27. The possession contemplated under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act contemplates a settled possession or an effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The possession contemplated under Section 6 includes constructive, joint and formal possession. This is the width and ambit of the said section. 28. The possession contemplated under Section 6 includes constructive, joint and formal possession. This is the width and ambit of the said section. 28. The facts narrated above would show that the plaintiff was a lessee under the defendant and in terms of the agreements the plaintiff is entitled to use, occupy and enjoy the leasehold property under its possession upto 31st March, 2019. The defendant can not dispute that the plaintiff was in settled possession of the suit premises atleast upto 1th September, 2017, if not, thereafter until dispossessed. The correspondence exchanged by and between the parties as disclosed in this proceeding would show that the plaintiff in view of its decision to close down its business in India in a phased manner, has expressed its desire to vacate the suit premises upon refund of the security deposit prior to the expiry of the lease. The plaintiff in contemplation of surrendering its tenancy has issued a letter on 4th August, 2017 in which they have reduced its claim for refund of security deposit to Rs.3,79,51,983/- after deducting the cost to be estimated on account of compensation towards premises reinstatement and compensation towards premises repair and restoration if any, to be completed within 1st September, 2017. 29. The defendant has suggested modifications and/or clarifications in respect of Clause 3(b) and 7(b) of the letter dated 4th August, 2017 which relates to compensation to be paid by the plaintiff and thereafter the plaintiff by letter dated 14th August, 2017 permitted the defendant and its personnel to remove the installations of the plaintiff from the premises in presence of the representative of the bank. 30. The plaintiff alleged that on 5th September, 2017 the defendant has forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit premises. Mr. Mitra has relied upon the letter dated 1st September, 2017 of the defendant and its reply by the plaintiff on 4th September, 2017 to show that the defendant has taken possession of the suit premises with the consent of the plaintiff prior to 5th September, 2017 and, accordingly, the claim of the plaintiff of alleged dispossession on 5th September, 2017 is untrue and untenable. The defendant in its letter dated 1st September, 2017 has alleged that on receiving delivery of the premises and dismantling the installation of the plaintiff they found enormous damage of the leasehold property and demanded compensation for a sum of Rs. The defendant in its letter dated 1st September, 2017 has alleged that on receiving delivery of the premises and dismantling the installation of the plaintiff they found enormous damage of the leasehold property and demanded compensation for a sum of Rs. 183 lacs (approximately) after adjusting the security deposit. The plaintiff replied to the said letter on 4th September, 2017 in which it has refuted the allegations and demanded payment of a sum of Rs.3,79,51,983.10/- within 7 days failing which it was categorically stated that the concessions given by the plaintiff earlier shall stand withdrawn and the plaintiff would take appropriate steps in accordance with law. The four paragraphs of the letter on which both sides have placed reliance are:- “Our vacating of the premises, being the unit no. 3, 4 and 5 on the First and Ground Floors of the premises no.7, Camac Street, Kolkata 700 017, commonly known as ‘Azimganj House’ containing by admeasurements 4535 sq. ft. (premises) rented under you was specifically discussed with you and now that we have already acted upon it, you are seeking to bring in new issues which is not acceptable. The works undertaken during the period of our tenancy were undertaken with your knowledge and consent, and at no point you raised any objection with regard thereto. The objections are now purportedly being made to justify you non refunding the security deposit amount back. If you still wish to pursue you alleged claims, then bona fide on your part requires that you forthwith release to us the security deposit amount to the extent of at least Rs.3,79,51,983.10/- offered in our letter said dated 4th August, 2017 while we discuss and negotiate the amount which could be payable to you under clauses 6(b) and 7(b) of our said letter dated 4th August, 2017. Please note you have maximum 7 days to release the aforesaid amount of Rs.3,79,51,983.10/- to us, failing which the concessions offered vide our said letter dated 4th August, 2017 shall forthwith stand withdrawn, and we shall then proceed in accordance with law and the terms of the original tenancy agreement for recovery of the security deposit amount, which please note.” 31. The first paragraph of the letter cannot be read out of context. It clearly refers to the agreement by which the plaintiff had agreed to surrender its tenancy. The first paragraph of the letter cannot be read out of context. It clearly refers to the agreement by which the plaintiff had agreed to surrender its tenancy. The phrase “are vacating our premises” cannot be read out of context. It refers to the subject matter of the agreement between the parties and the said letter nowhere has stated that the plaintiff had surrendered the tenancy and would initiate proceeding only for recovery of its security deposit. This letter, read with the earlier letter dated 4th August, 2017 clearly shows that the plaintiff had agreed to hand over vacant possession immediately on receipt of balance security deposit. There appears to be a dispute with regard to the quantum of the security deposit to be refunded. It is apparent that the plaintiff has allowed access to the premises for the purposes of dismantling and removal of certain fixtures without giving up its right to possession. Although it is submitted that if possession is obtained by trickery the person dispossessed cannot maintain the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and has to file regular suit for recovery of possession and in this regard two decisions were cited, apart from the fact that such a stand shocks the conscience of the court and against morality, in the instant case, unlike the two cited decisions, the plaintiff has not handed over possession to the defendant completely. Dominion and control over the property by the plaintiff appears to have been retained till the plaintiff has been dispossessed by the defendant. Once the plaintiff is able to prove its possession and prime facie proves that its dispossession is not legal or with its consent or in accordance with law the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession based upon his possessory title as the possession is the ninth point in law and law respects possession over a title. Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act possession is sufficient evidence. 32. From the facts narrated above as well as from the affidavit evidence it is clear that the plaintiff did not surrender possession in favour of the defendant, and there is no document to indicate that the plaintiff has willingly handed over the possession of the suit premises. Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act possession is sufficient evidence. 32. From the facts narrated above as well as from the affidavit evidence it is clear that the plaintiff did not surrender possession in favour of the defendant, and there is no document to indicate that the plaintiff has willingly handed over the possession of the suit premises. If the petitioner was willing to hand over possession the petitioner then they would not have immediately lodge a police complaint for taking action nor would they have immediately filed a suit for recovery of possession. 33. Under such circumstances, the defendant is directed to hand over possession of the premises in question to the plaintiff within two weeks from date. However, in the event the defendants deposit a sum of Rs.3.79 crores with the Registrar, Original Side within two weeks from date the defendants shall be entitled to deal with the said premises and in that case the defendant would not be required to make over possession of the property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff however in the meantime shall be entitled to have the property inspected by a reputed Chartered Engineer at its own expense upon notice to the defendants without claiming immediate possession for two weeks. 34. In view of the aforesaid the G.A. No. 3181 of 2017 is allowed. 35. In view of the aforesaid findings the application for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action fails and accordingly stands dismissed. G.A. No. 3529 of 2017 stand dismissed.