JUDGMENT 1. The first appeal under section 96 of CPC has been preferred by the appellant arising out of judgment and decree dated 10.10.2012 passed by 10th Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 71-A/2010 whereby suit filed by respondent/ plaintiff has been decreed and appellant/ defendant has been directed to vacate the suit premises. The suit was filed under section 12(1)(a),(c) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as “Act of 1961”), out of which decree under section 12(1)(c) and (f) of the Act of 1961 was granted and under section 12(1)(a) of the Act of 1961 was rejected. 2. Brief facts of the case necessary for adjudication are that respondent/ plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction and arrears of rent on the grounds of sections 12(1)(a) and (f) of the Act of 1961 with the allegations that over the defendant who is tenant of the plaintiff, rent @ 2,000/- per month w.e.f. 1.1.2008 amounting to Rs.30,000/- is due and plaintiff is doing business of ladies wear (Saris and Shawls) in a showroom as Wool Corner. Defendant happened to be the brother of plaintiff and is a tenant in the adjacent tenanted shop which is required by the plaintiff for establishment of bigger showroom. Since defendant raised doubt over the ownership of the suit premises of plaintiff therefore, plaintiff incorporated by way of amendment the ground of denial of title under section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961. 3. Defendant appeared and filed written statement and denied the plaint allegations contending therein that plaintiff is not in bonafide need of the suit shop since he is carrying on business in sufficient space available to him. Tenancy was also denied. Plaintiff was not receiving the rent inspite of issuing cheques and seeking it through money order. No notice was sent demanding arrears of rent. By way of amendment, appellant/ defendant took the plea that on 5.4.1975 partition was executed through registry amongst the brothers i.e. plaintiff, defendant and other brothers whereby suit shop came in the share of Kapoor Chand (one of their brothers) therefore, plaintiff is not the owner and is not entitled to get vacant possession of the suit shop on the ground of section 12(1)(c) and (f) of the Act of 1961. 4. Trial Court framed as many as 8 issues and recorded evidence led by the parties. 5. 4. Trial Court framed as many as 8 issues and recorded evidence led by the parties. 5. Thereafter, arguments were heard and trial Court decreed the suit for eviction on the ground under section 12(1)(c) and (f) of the Act of 1961 vide judgment and decree dated 10.10.2012. hence this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/ tenant. 6. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that Court below erred in deciding issues No.2,3,5 and 6 in affirmative in favour of the plaintiff because plaintiff made the pleadings that he is already doing business in his show-room but he has not filed the suit with the allegations that his business has been expanded therefore, he required tenanted premises and in case of expansion of business, plaintiff needed the premises. Mere statement that he is in need of the tenanted premises does not suffice, unless he shows objectively that his business has been expended. Plaintiff failed to prove through documents and through evidence that suit premises is required for expansion of business. When the tax return, sale register and other documents do not indicate that business has expanded and it is difficult for the plaintiff to run the business from the same premises which he was having at the time of institution of suit, then it could not have been inferred that the suit premises is required for expansion. It was a facade created by the plaintiff to get the tenanted premises evicted. 7. While relying upon the judgment rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in the matter of Damodar Sharma v.Nandram, [ 1960 JLJ 473 ], it is submitted that need of the landlord to grow business is to be determined objectively. Once the plaintiff has not pleaded the case of expansion of business but only shown his desire to enlarge the showroom that too had to explain the circumstance that his business has grown, thus the trial Court erred in passing the impugned judgment and decree under section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961. He relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan [1999) 1SCC 439.] It is further submitted that for seeking eviction on the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961, plaintiff has to prove his title therefore, defendant/ tenant can ask the plaintiff to prove his title and need. He relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan [1999) 1SCC 439.] It is further submitted that for seeking eviction on the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961, plaintiff has to prove his title therefore, defendant/ tenant can ask the plaintiff to prove his title and need. In the present case, there is no denial of title but the defendant has accepted the plaintiff to be his landlord therefore, on the basis of judgment of the apex Court in the case of Sheela and others v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, [ (2002)3 SCC 375 ], submits that the denial/ disclaimer must be in clear and unequivocal terms. He also relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Devasahayam (D) By LRs v. P. Savithramma and others. [ (2005)7 SCC 653 . It is also submitted on behalf of the appellant that without there being any dispute of arrears of rent and without making demand of arrears, plaintiff instituted a suit. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer made by the appellant on the ground of liability. It was submitted before the trial Court that case of the plaintiff was that he is doing business in the name of Wool Corner of ladies wear and as per the plaint allegations, plaintiff wanted to start bigger showroom for attracting more and elite customers and therefore, he wanted to induct the back portion of shop for such showroom. It was further stated in the plaint that plaintiff is doing business since 1965 and therefore, was not a new player in the field and more than 40 years, doing the business activities in the present shop. Bona fide requirement of the plaintiff was pleaded and proved by the plaintiff. In the earlier suit filed for injunction by the appellant against the respondent vide Ex.P/10 in which defendant sought relief of injunction against the plaintiff in respect of disposal of the same property and on the basis of said document, the trial Court inferred that plaintiff has been restrained from alienating the property in question, which means that plaintiff is owner of the suit property. Similarly, affidavit of the appellant in a civil suit filed against his tenant, in para 7, he admitted title of the present respondent over the suit property. Similarly, affidavit of the appellant in a civil suit filed against his tenant, in para 7, he admitted title of the present respondent over the suit property. The trial Court in its judgment considered Ex.D-1 i.e. memorandum of partition and held that the property went in title and possession of the plaintiff and he was title and possessor of the suit property. The trial Court considered the documents and thereafter, came to the conclusion that plaintiff is owner of the suit property and also concluded that even if plaintiff is treated as co-owner along with Kapoor Chand even then one co-owner can file a suit for eviction against the tenant. 9. According to him, the trial Court considered the bonafide need of the plaintiff and came to the conclusion that no suitable alternative accommodation is available to the plaintiff. It was also submitted that mere availability of the alternative accommodation is not sufficient and he referred the judgment of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Goyal v. Avneet Kumar Gupta [ 2017(1) MPLJ 69 ]. From the cross-examination of Nirmal Chandra Jain (PW1), Mahesh Kumar (PW2), Munnalal (DW1), Narendra Kumar Jain (DW2), Satpal Batra (DW3) and Raghuraj Kishore (DW4), respondent/ plaintiff submits that plaintiff brought his suit within the ambit of section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 as the ownership required to be proved, is proved through; rent note, affidavit of the appellant, rent receipts and therefore, he was not only owner of the suit property but having bona fide requirement and in absence of any suitable accommodation he was entitled to get the decree of eviction. 10. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent that plaintiff averred his ownership which was challenged by the defendant by incorporating para 4 (a) in the w ritten statement on dated 23.7.2010 therefore, amendment was incorporated later on for claiming decree under section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 on the ground of denial of title. Although defendant admitted landlord and tenant relationship but not admitted the status of the enant as owner therefore, plea of section 12(1)(c) was rightly incorporated and the trial Court decreed the suit under section 12(1)(c) also. He relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Majati Subbarao v. P.K.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by LRs. Although defendant admitted landlord and tenant relationship but not admitted the status of the enant as owner therefore, plea of section 12(1)(c) was rightly incorporated and the trial Court decreed the suit under section 12(1)(c) also. He relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Majati Subbarao v. P.K.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by LRs. [ AIR 1989 SC 2187 ] and judgment of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Ram Kishan Soni v. Dr. Surendra Bahre [ 2010(1) MPHT 252 ]. Here the tenant has admitted existence of landlord-tenant relationship therefore, could not have denied title as per the mandate of apex Court in Ram Kishan Soni (supra). He prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The case in hand pertains to eviction of defendant/ tenant at the instance of plaintiff and for arrears of rent. Initially plaintiff sought eviction of defendant on the ground of sections 12(1)(a) and (f) of the Act of 1961 and later on ground under section 12(a)(c) of the Act of 1961 was added because of disclaimer of title by the defendant. Trial Court framed following issues for adjudication of the case : 1- D;k izfroknh us tuojh 2008 ls fookfnr nqdku dk cdk;k fdjk;k oknh dks vnk ugha fd;k gS \ Ukgha 2- D;k oknh dks Lo;a dh nqdku dks cM+k 'kks:e cukus ds fy, fookfnr nqdku dh Hkh okLrfod o ln~Hkkfod vko';drk gS \ izekf.kr 3- D;k oknh ds ikl Xokfy;j uxj fuxe {ks= ds vUrxZr mDr vko';drk dh iwfrZ gsrq dksbZ vU; oSdfYid LFkku miyC/k ugha gS \ izekf.kr 4- D;k oknh izfroknh ls cdk;k fdjk;k 30]000@& :- rFkk fookfnr nqdku dk fjDr vkf/kiR; izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ vizekf.kr 5- D;k oknxzLr nqdku dk Lokeh] oknh u gksus ds dkj.k mldk fjDr vkf/kiR; izkIr djus dk gdnkj ugha gS \ Ukgha 6- D;k izfroknh }kjk oknh ds LokfeRo dks budkjh fd, tkus ds dkj.k LFkku fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&12 ¼1½ ¼lh½ ds rgr oknh dks vkKfIr ,oa vuqrks”k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkj gS \ izekf.kr 7- D;k oknh }kjk nqHkkZoukiwoZd nkos dk vfr ewY;kadu dj /kkjk&15 lh-ih-lh- ds izkoèkkuksa ds foijhr okn izLrqr fd;k x;k gS \ vizekf.kr 8- Lkgk;rk ,oa O;; \ vafre in ds vuqlkj 13. Since issue No.1 in respect of section 12(1)(a) of the Act of 1961 has been decided against the plaintiff and trial Court found no arrears of rent to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff and since challenge has not been made to the finding by the plaintiff in cross-appeal/ cross-objection preferred by the defendant or in a statutory proceedings therefore, the said finding attained finality. 14. Now the case is to be seen from the angle of section 12(1)(c) and (f) of the Act of 1961. Plaintiff has pleaded that he is owner of the suit property which is required for expansion of the business. He is already doing business of ladies wear material and with the modern time, he wants to have big showroom to sustain himself in the competition. Defendant in the present case accepted him as landlord but denied his title, therefore, title is to be seen first. Plaintiff has filed certain documents to establish his title over the suit property and led oral evidence of himself and another witness Mahesh Kumar (PW2) in this regard whereas defendant appeared himself as the defendant’s witness and submitted certain documents vide Ex.D-1, D-20 and D-39 as rent receipts. Ex.P-6 and P-7 which are compromise decrees but the said documents have been declared inadmissible in evidence therefore, have not been taken into consideration. Ex.P-2 is the rent agreement executed between plaintiff and defendant and signed by both the parties and the execution of the same has been admitted by the defendant. Besides that, rate of rent and ownership, other conditions were also accepted by the parties. The said agreement in para 1 categorically says that the suit shop is of the ownership of the plaintiff in which defendant is in occupation as tenant. This is a material document because in para 5 both the parties reiterated that between them relationship of landlordtenant has already been established. The said document is accepted by the defendant and therefore, impliedly accepted the relationship. Ex.P-8 and P-9 are the property tax receipts, although they are not conclusive proof regarding title. 15. Ex.P-10 is the copy of the suit for permanent and mandatory injunction filed by the defendant against the plaintiff in the Court of District Judge Gwalior in respect of the same property wherein relief was sought not to sale the same property (suit property). 16. 15. Ex.P-10 is the copy of the suit for permanent and mandatory injunction filed by the defendant against the plaintiff in the Court of District Judge Gwalior in respect of the same property wherein relief was sought not to sale the same property (suit property). 16. Besides that, defendant filed a suit for eviction against his own tenant in which he preferred affidavit under Order XVIII rule 4 CPC in which in para 7 he categorically mentioned about the suit property that the present plaintiff is owner of the suit property and for eviction, present plaintiff filed a suit against him. In fact he is referring the present suit therefore, as per section 146 of the Indian Evidence Act, his credibility is shaken when he denies title of the plaintiff. 17. The apex Court in the case of Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra, [ 1988 JLJ 560 ], held that tenant admitted landlord to be the owner in reply to the quick notice and also rent receipts then ownership is established. Here the tenant accepted the landlord tenant relationship but denied the ownership in written statement but through the rent agreement dated 1.12.1997 (Ex.P-2) (execution of the same is accepted by the tenant) and accepted the ownership of the shop in question of plaintiff, therefore, by the mandate of the said judgment of the apex Court, ownership is established. Not only this, while relying upon this judgment as well as other pronouncements by this Court, wherein this Court had the occasion to dwell upon the same controversy and in the case of Ram Kishan Soni (supra), held that once the tenant accepted the landlord-tenant relationship and paying rent to the landlord regularly then it is not open for the tenant to challenge title of the respondent as per section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act would come into operation. Here in the present case, through the documents referred above defendant has accepted that owner of the suit shop is the plaintiff then he has accepted not only the ownership but also the landlordship of the plaintiff therefore, he is estopped to raise such plea. 18. Here in the present case, through the documents referred above defendant has accepted that owner of the suit shop is the plaintiff then he has accepted not only the ownership but also the landlordship of the plaintiff therefore, he is estopped to raise such plea. 18. Defendant produced the memorandum of partition in which properties between the brothers was partitioned as per para 2 of the deed, Wool Corner (shop of the plaintiff) and Jain Brothers (suit shop) came in possession of both the brothers and both are occupying the said shop as respective owners. As far as possession is concerned, admittedly defendant is in it since 1972. As per Ex.D-1, para 3, plaintiff and Kapoor Chand are joint owners of the property. Since matter pertains to eviction and not of title therefore, going into such details was not the domain of the trial Court and the trial Court rightly refrained to do so. Even otherwise, it is settled in law that one co-owner can file a suit for eviction on behalf of other co-owner (See: 1990 JLJ 97 FB, Harbans Singh (Lt. Col.) v. Smt. Margret G. Bhingardive).Therefore, the ownership of the plaintiff was proved beyond doubt. 19. Defendant relied upon the judgment rendered by the apex Court in the case of Sheela and others v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash (supra), the same is not applicable in the present fact situation of the case because in the written statement filed by the defendant (and later on amended) by way of para 1(a) and 4(a), the title of the owner i.e. present plaintiff has been challenged and the said title has been set up in third party i.e. Kapoor Chand, brother of plaintiff, therefore, defendant has challenged the title of the plaintiff in categorical terms. Therefore, the benefits tried to be extracted by the defendant on the basis of legal pronouncement by the apex Court in the case of Sheela and others v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash (supra), is not available. Therefore, it can be inferred that defendant has challenged the title of plaintiff and plaintiff proved his ownership through various documents and therefore, defendant was liable to be evicted under section 12(1)(a) and (c) of the Act of 1961. 20. Therefore, it can be inferred that defendant has challenged the title of plaintiff and plaintiff proved his ownership through various documents and therefore, defendant was liable to be evicted under section 12(1)(a) and (c) of the Act of 1961. 20. As regards section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 is concerned, plaintiff averred his ownership by specifically pleading in the plaint but the same was challenged by the defendant by incorporating para 1(a) and 4(a) in the written statement. From the record, it appears that Ex.P-6, Family Settlement and Ex.P-7 i.e. the decree, were held to be inadmissible in evidence only on 9.2.2011 by the trial Court and affirmed by this Court on 8.5.2012 in Writ Petition No. 1247/2011. Meaning thereby till 9.2.2011, title of the plaintiff was in no-way under clouds, it was clear like a noon day but still defendant challenged title on 27.3.2010 itself by incorporating para 4(a) in the written statement therefore, amendment was caused and decree was prayed under section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 also. From the documents discussed above, it revealed that plaintiff was the owner of the suit property and even if Ex.P-6 and P-7 are excluded from the list of exhibited documents, nevertheless other documents were sufficient to reach home all the conclusions about the ownership vis-a-vis the plaintiff. The defendant challenged the ownership therefore, he attracted the rigors of section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961. 21. As far as his bona fide need is concerned, plaintiff proved his bona fide need through oral evidence led in this regard. Plaintiff Nirmal Chand (PW1) deposed that his shop Wool Corner and the suit shop are adjacent to each other and situate in Sarafa Bazar which is the prime location for the business. Since Gwalior city is expanding and incorporating malls and big showrooms therefore, plaintiff wanted to expand his business. The said aspect has been verified by the evidence of Mahesh Kumar (PW2). Defendant on the other hand although tried to rebut the claim, by leading evidence that no shops and malls exist in the vicinity and plaintiff is already having a big showroom therefore, he does not have bonafide requirement for expansion, but defendant could not lead any evidence which would have taken the plea of bona fide requirement into doubt. Defendant on the other hand although tried to rebut the claim, by leading evidence that no shops and malls exist in the vicinity and plaintiff is already having a big showroom therefore, he does not have bonafide requirement for expansion, but defendant could not lead any evidence which would have taken the plea of bona fide requirement into doubt. The cross-examination of plaintiff’s witness remained un-rebutted and defendant’s witness (DW1 to DW4) could not able to establish any point of rebuttal in respect of bona fide need. One shop which got vacated from a tenant Jugal Kishore does not satisfy the need of the plaintiff as it was towards the back side therefore, cannot be said to be alternative accommodation. 22. Similarly, age of plaintiff cannot be a bar to grant relief under section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961. It is settled in law that plaintiff is the best person to assess the need of bonafide requirement and once the bonafide need is proved, the plea of suitability cannot be interfered with by the Court and it is to be assessed on the basis of subjective satisfaction of the land lord. The judgment rendered by the parties have been appropriately dealt with by the trial Court and while considering the judgment rendered by the apex Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [ (1999)6 SCC 222 ], as well as Damodar Sharma v. Nandram [ 1960 JLJ 473 ], the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion about the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff. 23. Plea of alternative accommodation as raised by the defendant could not reach home. Here in the present case, it is nowhere established that plaintiff has alternative suitable accommodation. Mere availability of another accommodation with the landlord does not disqualify him from claiming eviction. The judgments rendered by this Court in this regard in the case of Rajkumar v. Vedprakash, [ 1982 JLJ 451 ], Sujata Sarkar (Smt.) v. Anil Kumar Duttani, [ILR (2009) MP 1374] are worth consideration. Similarly, in the case of Vinod Kumar Goyal (supra), this Court has reiterated the legal position that mere availability of the alternative accommodation of landlord does not disqualify him from claiming eviction. Similarly, in the case of Vinod Kumar Goyal (supra), this Court has reiterated the legal position that mere availability of the alternative accommodation of landlord does not disqualify him from claiming eviction. The said judgment has been passed after considering the judgments rendered by the apex Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) etc., therefore, the trial Court rightly passed the impugned judgment and decree on the basis of section 12(1)(f) of the Act and did not find any suitable alternative accommodation available with the plaintiff to expand his business. 24. Expansion of Business is the concept which differs from person to person in the business. Expansion carries commercial connotation and it could not be interfered through statistics only. The landlord is the best judge to decide about the expansion of his business. It is not necessary that a person with reduced sale over the years cannot undertake expansion, rather that person has the urgency and urge to expand his business. 25. Even otherwise as per his own submission, defendant took the defence on the basis of Ex.D-1 (partition deed), recital of which indicates that the suit property was owned by the plaintiff and Kapoor Chand in joint ownership as coowners and as per the mandate of this Court in the case of Kanhaiya Readymade Stores and others v. Rameshchand, [ 2012(1) MPLJ 443 ], one of the co-owners can file the suit for eviction therefore, taking the controversy from the said vantage point, no other inference can be drawn then to decree the suit. 26. Regarding jurisdiction of the case, no documentary or oral evidence was led by the defendant to establish any jurisdictional error. Defendant appeared in the suit proceedings and participated with full vigour. In fact, the said issue (No.7) was in respect of pecuniary jurisdiction and not otherwise. Once the controversy is concluded by the trial Court and the appeal was admitted for final hearing. Now, after pending for last six years therefore, this plea is not maintainable. The trial Court rightly discussed the issue and decided it in the judgment. From the cumulative analysis, considering the over all fact situation, evidence, documentary as well as oral and pleadings, case of the plaintiff was rightly proved by the trial Court and the trial Court did not err in passing the impugned judgment and decree. The trial Court rightly discussed the issue and decided it in the judgment. From the cumulative analysis, considering the over all fact situation, evidence, documentary as well as oral and pleadings, case of the plaintiff was rightly proved by the trial Court and the trial Court did not err in passing the impugned judgment and decree. No illegality, perversity or irregularity has been caused by the trial Court. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is affirmed and the appeal preferred by the appellant/ defendant is hereby dismissed.