JUDGMENT : Krishna Pratap Singh, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal has been filed against a judgement and order dated 07.03.1983 passed by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr in Sessions Trial No. 394 of 1982 arising out of Case Crime No. 159 of 1982, under section 302/34 IPC, police station Chandpur. By the impugned order the learned Additional Sessions Judge has convicted and sentenced the accused Rohtash, Sheodan, Suresh and Rajendra to life imprisonment under section 302 read with section 34 IPC. 2. After the appeal was filed in this Court, the appellants were granted bail by order dated 09.3.1983. 3. However, during the pendency of the appeal, appellants Sheodan, Suresh and Rajendra have died during the pendency of the appeal and vide order dated 04.4.2016 appeal filed on their behalf stands abated and only the appeal filed on behalf of appellant Rohtash survives. 4. The facts, as unfolded by the prosecution, in brief are that a written report (Ext. Ka-1) was handed over by the first informant Smt. Gajendri, wife of Raghuraj Singh, the deceased to the effect that litigation was going on between her husband on one side and Kamal Singh, son of Sher Singh of his village and others on the other over the land. Today at 10.30 AM when she along with her mother-in-law Kasturi Devi and husband Raghuraj Singh were working in her field, Rohtash, son of Tarif, armed with "Pharsa", Suresh, son of Tarif, armed with Balkati, Sheodan, son of Tarif was having axe and Rajendra son of Kamal Singh came to the field. Rajendra told Raghuraj that you pose yourself to be a big litigant, today I will teach you a lesson. At his instance accused Rohtash, Suresh and Sheodan with an intention to kill, attacked her husband with their respective weapons, due to which he fell down. On the shriek of her mother-in-law, Kunwar Pal, Fakira Khan, Jagvir and several other persons rushed to the spot. On the challenge of the witnesses, the accused fled away. She brought her injured husband to the District Hospital in a bullock cart. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, a chik FIR, at case crime No. 159 of 1982, under Section 307 IPC, Ext. Ka-5 was prepared by the Clerk-Constable Shri Rajeshwar, who also made necessary GD entry in respect of registration of the case (Ext. Ka-6). 6. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, a chik FIR, at case crime No. 159 of 1982, under Section 307 IPC, Ext. Ka-5 was prepared by the Clerk-Constable Shri Rajeshwar, who also made necessary GD entry in respect of registration of the case (Ext. Ka-6). 6. After the registration of the case, the investigation of the case was entrusted to PW-5 SI Mahavir Prasad, who after recording the statement of chik writer, straight away went to the District Hospital where the victim was hospitalized. In the hospital, the investigating officer, recorded the statement of the first informant Smt. Gajendri. Statement of Smt. Kasturi, could not be recorded by the investigating officer as she left the place for arranging money for the treatment of the victim. The statement of the victim could also not be recorded as he was unconscious. Thereafter this witness sketched the site plan on the pointing out of the informant, which he proved as Ext. Ka-7. He also collected the bloodstained and plain earth from the place of occurrence and sealed it in two separate containers and prepared their memos, which he proved as Ext. Ka-8. After the information about the death of the appellant was conveyed at the police station, the case was converted to one under section 302 IPC. 7. After the conversion of the case to one under Section 302 IPC, the investigation of the case was transferred to SI Mahavir Prasad, who after completing the necessary investigation, submitted the charge sheet against all the accused. 8. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions and learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr vide order dated 09.091982 framed the charges against all the accused. 9. To bring home the guilt of the accused-appellant the prosecution has examined as many as nine witnesses. 10. PW-1, Fakira, in his examination-in chief has deposed that on the date of incident when he was returning to the village from his field along with Jagvir and as soon as he reached near the "Gher" of Naval Singh, he saw that accused Rohtash, Sheodan, Suresh and Rajendra were assaulting Raghuraj. There was a ditch near the place of assault. The mother and wife of Raghuraj were also present. The accused were armed with 'Pharsa', 'Balkati' and axe. There was a ditch near the place of assault. The mother and wife of Raghuraj were also present. The accused were armed with 'Pharsa', 'Balkati' and axe. On the spot, in addition to him and Jagvir, Kunwar Pal and others have also arrived there. On their recognition, the accused fled away towards north. 11. PW-2, Kunwar Pal has deposed that when he was going to Jungle via Yakoob Pur and when he reached near the field of Yadram, where he only saw Jagvir. Jagvir's mother along with several other women were also present there. However, he did not see anyone assaulting Raghuraj. 12. On his statement, this witness has been declared hostile and learned D.G.C. was permitted to cross-examine this witness. 13. PW-3, Smt. Gajendri is the complaint of the case and wife of the deceased Raghuraj Singh. She deposed that accused Sheodan, Rohtash and Suresh are real brothers, whereas Rajendra is their cousin. On the date of incident, when she along with her mother-in-law Kasturi Devi and husband Raghuraj Singh were working in her field, Rohtash, son of Tarif, who was carrying "Pharsa", Suresh, son of Tarif armed with Balkati, Sheodan, son of Tarif was having axe and Rajendra son of Kamal Singh came to the field. Rajendra told Raghuraj that you pose yourself to be a big litigant, today I will teach you a lesson. At his instance accused Rohtash, Suresh and Sheodan with an intention to kill, attacked her husband with their respective weapons, due to which he fell down. On the shriek of her mother-in-law, Kunwar Pal, Fakira Khan, Jagvir and several other persons rushed to the spot. On the challenge of the witnesses, the accused fled away. Due to the injury her husband became unconscious. Thereafter he was taken to the hospital on a bullock cart. She further deposed that after getting her husband hospitalized, she got the report scribed by one Devendra and put her thumb impression and handed over the same at the police station, which he proved as Ext. Ka-1. On the same day, her husband has been referred to Safdarganj Hospital where he succumbed to the injury after nine days on 27.5.1982, information whereof was conveyed to the police station by her. The clothes, which the deceased was wearing were handed over to the police by her mother-in-law. 14. Ka-1. On the same day, her husband has been referred to Safdarganj Hospital where he succumbed to the injury after nine days on 27.5.1982, information whereof was conveyed to the police station by her. The clothes, which the deceased was wearing were handed over to the police by her mother-in-law. 14. Smt. Gajendri further deposed that when she came to the Court on the date fixed along with her mother-in-law and four years old child, her child was got abducted by the accused in collusion with Jagvir. 15. PW-4, Dr. R.R. Tyagi has deposed in his examination-in-chief that on 18.5.1982 he was posted as Medical Officer at the District Hospital, Bulandshahr. On that date at 2.30 PM, he has medically examined the victim-Raghuraj Singh, who was brought by her wife, Smt. Gajendri. On medical examination, Dr. Tyagi found the following injuries: "1. Incised wound 11 cm x 5 cm over right upper scapular region. Depth was not proved. X-ray was advised. 2. Incised wound 19 cm x 2 cm, depth not proved, over and around the neck involving lower part of fact. 3. Incised wound 1-1/2 cm x 1/3 cm x cartilage deep over lower ½ of left ear 16. PW-4, Dr. Tyagi, however, kept all the injuries under observation. Doctor further noted that all the injuries were caused by sharp edged weapon and their duration was fresh. The condition of the victim was very poor. He has proved his injury report as Ext. Ka-2. 17. Initially Dr. Tyagi stated that all the injuries could have been caused at 10.30 on 18.5.1982 as they were caused within 6 hours, but later on he changed his version and stated that the injuries could have been caused at 10.30 AM. 18. Dr. Tyagi further deposed that on 18.5.1982, when the dying declaration of the injured, which was recorded at 7.40 PM by the Magistrate, he was present. Dr. further deposed that the injured was fully conscious at that time. He proved his endorsement as Ext. Ka-3. He further deposed that the first dying declaration of the injured was recorded at 2.40 PM by the Executive Magistrate in his presence. At that time, the injured was not fully conscious. He proved his endorsement at Ext. Ka-4. 19. Dr. Dr. further deposed that the injured was fully conscious at that time. He proved his endorsement as Ext. Ka-3. He further deposed that the first dying declaration of the injured was recorded at 2.40 PM by the Executive Magistrate in his presence. At that time, the injured was not fully conscious. He proved his endorsement at Ext. Ka-4. 19. Dr. Tyagi further deposed that he considers the injury fresh, which is caused within six hours and hence the possibility that the injuries were caused at 10.30 AM on the date of incident, cannot be ruled out. 20. PW-5 is SI Mahavir Prasad, who has conducted most part of the investigation and his evidence has already been discussed above. 21. PW-6 is ASI Harpal Singh. In his examination-in-chief, he deposed that on 28.8.1982 he was posted at police station Vinay Nagar, South Delhi as ASI. On that date he got the information that Raghuraj, son of Girdhari, resident of Daulat Gargh, police station Chand Pur, district Bulandshahr has died in Safdarganj Hospital. When he reached the hospital, he got the dead body of the victim in the mortuary. He conducted the inquest on the body of the deceased, which he proved it as Ext. Ka-14. 22. PW-7, Shri Bahadur Singh has deposed that on 19.5.1982 he was posted as Executive Magistrate at Bulandshahr. On that date at 2.40 PM, on being called, he had gone to the district hospital, Bulandshahr where he has recorded the dying declaration of the injured Raghuraj Singh. At that time the victim was unconscious and was not in a position to speak correctly. 23. PW-8 Shri Rama Shanker has deposed that on 18.5.1982 he was posted as Executive Magistrate. On that day at 7.30 PM he has recorded the dying declaration of the injured in the hospital. Before recording his dying declaration, doctor has examined the victim and has given certificate that he is fully conscious and is in a position to give his statement. Thereafter he has recorded his dying declaration, which he proved as Ext. Ka-16. 24. PW-9 is Dr. Chandra Kant, Lecturer, Forensic Medicine Department, All India Medical Sciences, New Delhi, who had performed the autopsy on the corpse of the deceased on 28.5.1982 at 11.55 AM and noted that the physique of the deceased was good. His height was 164 cms and weight 67.5 kgs. His head was shaved. Ka-16. 24. PW-9 is Dr. Chandra Kant, Lecturer, Forensic Medicine Department, All India Medical Sciences, New Delhi, who had performed the autopsy on the corpse of the deceased on 28.5.1982 at 11.55 AM and noted that the physique of the deceased was good. His height was 164 cms and weight 67.5 kgs. His head was shaved. His both the eyes were closed and rigor mortis was present in both upper and lower limbs. Post-mortem staining was present. 25. Dr. Chanda Kant found the following ante-mortem injuries on the body of the deceased: "1. One transversely placed stitched wound extending from the middle of left cheek below the lobule of left ear then on the back, 6 cms below the superior nuchal line and then further extended towards the right side of neck and below the right lobule of right ear. Total length 21 cms. 2. One transversely placed stitched wound on the back at the root of neck size (total length) 4 cms. Margins are healed. 3. One stitched wound transversely placed below injury No. 2 extending from the middle of the root of neck towards back of right shoulder region outer and towards shoulder region showing unhealthy granulation tissue with formation of pus. Total length 8 cms x size ata the outer and (towards shoulder region).5 cms. 4. One stitched wound transversely placed back on the shoulder region extending from the outer medial of left supra-scapular region towards right side of back on the scapular region gradually extending downwards on the right side (total length) 13.5 cms. 5. Lacerated wound showing unhealthy granulation tissue on the outer aspect of the left ear lobule and middle of left pinna. Pus discharged present. Size 4.5 cms x 2.2 cms. 6. Healed abrasion with black scabs on the middle of anterior aspect of left size 6 cm x 2 cm. 7. Healed abrasion with black scabs on the middle of anterior aspect of right leg, size 4 cm x 2 cms. 8. Healed abrasion showing healthy margins on the right middle of cheek, size 2.5 cms x 2.5 cms. 9. Swelling on dorsum of left hand. 10. Lungs-right lung has two lobes, upper and lower, weight 900 gms congested and oedematous, on the posterior aspect of lower end and upper lobe, contusion and healed laceration present. Left lung 610 gms, congested and oedematous. 26. 9. Swelling on dorsum of left hand. 10. Lungs-right lung has two lobes, upper and lower, weight 900 gms congested and oedematous, on the posterior aspect of lower end and upper lobe, contusion and healed laceration present. Left lung 610 gms, congested and oedematous. 26. Doctor Chandra Kant opined that cause of death was septicemia shock and hemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injuries and the rupture of right lung. Doctor further opined that cumulative effect of all the injuries was sufficient to cause the death. 27. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused-appellants were recorded under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In his evidence accused-appellant Rohtash has stated that he has falsely been implicated due to enmity and village party bandi. He further stated that the witnesses have falsely deposed against him. Accused-appellant Rohtash has stated that his brother Sheodan-co-accused has lodged a report against Naval, the brother of the deceased and due to that the complainant and her family was having enmity against him as well as his family members. However, accused claimed to be tried. 28. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after scanning and scrutinizing the evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated in the first paragraph of the judgement. 29. Heard Shri M.L. Shukla, learned amicus curiae for the appellant and Shri Vikas Sahai, learned Additional Government Advocate representing the State and perused the record of the case. 30. Learned counsel for the appellant has hammered the impugned conviction order on the ground that in the dying declaration the deceased has not assigned any role to the appellant. Shri Shukla has next contended that the appellant has been implicated in the case due to previous enmity between the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the motive for murder of the deceased. He also argued that role of causing injuries has been assigned to all the appellants and no specific role has been assigned to the present appellant and in absence of specific role, the appellant cannot be held guilty of the offence. 31. He also argued that role of causing injuries has been assigned to all the appellants and no specific role has been assigned to the present appellant and in absence of specific role, the appellant cannot be held guilty of the offence. 31. On the other hand Shri Vikas Sahai has vehemently opposed the appeal by contending that the appellant had, in fact, participated in the offence and as a result caused grievous injuries on the vital part of the body of the deceased Raghuraj Singh. He further argued that prosecution has proved its case beyond the hilt against the appellant. 32. Admittedly in this case two dying declarations were recorded. The first dying declaration of the deceased was recorded at 2.40 PM on 19.5.1982 and the second one was recorded at 7.40 PM on the same day. 33. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to quote the dying declaration of the deceased: The first dying declaration of the deceased Raghuraj Singh, son of Girdhari, resident of village Daulat Garh, police station Chandpur, recorded on 19.5.1982 at 2.40 PM reads as under: **c;ku fd;k fd%& esjk lxk HkS;k esjs lkFk nxk dj jgk gSA mldk uke ohjiky gSA eq>ls feyus vk;kA ;g pkj lkS chl gSA eq>s fdlus ekjk gS uke ekywe ugha gSA** 34. The second dying declaration of the deceased which was recorded at 7.30 PM on 18.5.1982 reads as under: **dey flag] uoy] rjhdk ds ckyd us /kjrh dk pqipki bdjkjukek fy[kok fy;kA uoy] uoy ds yM+dss] rjhdk ds ckyd jksglkr cnek'k gS] dV~Vk j[ks gSA rjhdk ds ckyd ds ckyd ';kSnku us ekjk gSA ekSoh rFkk ekSoh dk ykSaMk rFkk uoy ds ckyd us ekjk FkkA iUuk fljnkl Hkh ogkW Fks tks esjh /kjrh gM+iuk pkgrs gSA jksgrk'k uoy ds nksuks ckyd cnek'k o MdSr gS vkSj dqN ugha dguk gSA** 35. The maxim "Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire" is the basis for "dying declaration", which means, " a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth". A dying declaration is called as "Laterm Mortem" which means "word said before death. 36. Recording of dying declaration is very important task and utmost care is to be taken while recording a dying declaration. A dying declaration is called as "Laterm Mortem" which means "word said before death. 36. Recording of dying declaration is very important task and utmost care is to be taken while recording a dying declaration. If a dying declaration is recorded carefully by a proper person, keeping in mind the essential ingredients of the dying declaration such declaration. Retains it full value. 37. Law on the subject is very clear after the decision of five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 , Prior to this judgement, there were conflicting decisions of three Judges Benches of the Supreme Court, i.e. Poparambaka Rosamma and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1999 (7) SCC 695 and Koli Chunilal Savji and another Vs. State of Gujarat, 1999 (9) SCC 562 . 38. In Paparambaka Rosamma and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1999 (7) SCC 695 the dying declaration in question had been recorded by a judicial Magistrate and the Magistrate had made a note that on the basis of answers elicited from the declarant to the questions put, he was satisfied that the deceased is in a fit disposing state of mind to make a declaration. Doctor had appended a certificate to the effect that the patient was conscious while recording the statement, yet the court came to the conclusion that it would not be safe to accept the dying declaration as true and genuine and was made when the injured was in a fit state of mind since the certificate of the doctor was only to the effect that the patient is conscious while recording the statement. Apart from the aforesaid conclusion in law the court also had found serious lacunae and ultimately did not accept the dying declaration recorded by the magistrate. 39. In Koli Chunilal Savji and another Vs. State of Gujarat, 1999(9) SCC 562 it was held that the ultimate test is whether the dying declaration can be held to be a truthful one and voluntarily given. It was further held that before recording the declaration the officer concerned must find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement in question. The court relied upon the earlier decision in Ravi Chander Vs. It was further held that before recording the declaration the officer concerned must find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement in question. The court relied upon the earlier decision in Ravi Chander Vs. State of Punjab, 1998 (9) SCC 303 wherein it had been observed that for not examining by the doctor the dying declaration recorded by the executive magistrate and the dying declaration orally made need not be doubted. The Magistrate being a disinterested witness and is a responsible officer and there being no circumstances or material to suspect that the magistrate had any animus against the accused or was in any way interested for fabricating a dying declaration, question of doubt on the declaration, recorded by the magistrate does not arise. 40. The court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this court in Harjeet Kaur VS. State of Punjab 1999(6) SCC 545 case wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. 41. The Supreme Court in Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra), while affirming the law laid down in Koli Chunilal Savji and another Vs. State of Gujarat, 1999(9) SCC 562 has laid down the principle to the following effect: "The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the court insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however has to always be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate is absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise." (emphasis supplied) 42. Admittedly, when the first dying declaration of the deceased was recorded, he was semi-conscious as was certified by the doctor, wherein the victim had stated that his real brother had deceived him, whose name is Virpal. He further stated that his brother, who had come to meet him is cheat. He, however, could not tell as to who had assailed him. 43. As the victim was semi-conscious when his statement was recorded as certified by Dr. Tyagi and, therefore, the same cannot be relied up by any of the parties. 44. However, so far as second dying declaration of the deceased was concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has attacked the authenticity of this dying declaration that after the recording of the first dying declaration, there was no occasion to call another Magistrate for recording of a dying declaration and Doctor Tyagi has categorically denied to have sent any requisition to call the Magistrate. 45. From the perusal of the second dying declaration of the deceased it is apparent that his mind was not working properly even though he was conscious as certified by the doctor. Perusal of the dying declaration further shows that it was in a broken language and in ambiguous terms, which also includes the name of Panna and Sirdar, who had absolutely no concern with the incident as held by the learned trial court. 46. As per the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Laxman Vs. Perusal of the dying declaration further shows that it was in a broken language and in ambiguous terms, which also includes the name of Panna and Sirdar, who had absolutely no concern with the incident as held by the learned trial court. 46. As per the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra) that the court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant, we are of the opinion that when the second dying declaration of the deceased was recorded, though he was in sense, but he was not in a fit state of mind and, therefore, no reliance can be placed by either of the parties on his dying declaration. 47. Now coming to the next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has been falsely roped in the present case due to previous enmity and the witnesses have not deposed correct facts. 48. Admittedly, the enmity between the accused and the complainant is admitted. However, the same cannot be a ground for false implication. It is a broad day light murder, which was committed at 10.30 AM in the field in the present of eye-witnesses including the informant, the wife of the deceased and her-mother-in law. There is eyewitness account coupled with injuries report. 49. We are not convinced with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that either on account of enmity or relationship, the witnesses are not deposing the correct facts and framed a false case against the appellants leaving the real culprits to go scot free. Moreover, the witnesses were put to lengthy cross-examination, but nothing adverse could be taken out from their mouth to destroy the prosecution case. 50. In Arjun and others Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1994 Suppl (1) SCR 616, it was argued before the Supreme Court that as the parties were on inimical terms and some criminal proceedings were pending between them even at that time when the occurrence took place. Further PW-1 in that case was the brother of the deceased and informant in that case was son of the deceased. 51. Further PW-1 in that case was the brother of the deceased and informant in that case was son of the deceased. 51. The Supreme Court brushed aside the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants therein and has held as under: "We are not convinced by the aforesaid argument that either on account of animosity or on account of relationship, the witnesses did not divulge the truth but fabricated a false case against the appellants. It is needless to emphasis that enmity is a double edged sword which can cut both ways. However, the fact remains that whether the prosecution witnesses are close relatives of the deceased victim or on inimical terras with the deceased involved in the crime of murder, the witnesses are always interested to see that the real offenders of the crime are booked and they are not, in any case, expected to leave out the real culprits and rope in the innocent persons simply because of the enmity. It is, therefore, not a safe rule to reject their testimony merely on the ground that the complainant and the accused persons were on inimical terms. Similarly the evidence could not be rejected merely on the basis of relationship of the witnesses with the deceased." 52. In Hari Obula Reddy and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1981) 3 SCC 675 , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has observed thus: " It is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony, nor can it be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence." 53. The Supreme Court in Ramashish Rai Vs. Jagdish Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 498 , has held that the requirement of law is that the testimony of inimical witnesses has to be considered with caution. If otherwise the witnesses are true and reliable their testimony cannot be thrown out on the threshold by branding them as inimical witnesses. By now, it is well-settled principle of law that enmity is a double-edged sword. It can be a ground for false implication. It also can be a ground for assault. If otherwise the witnesses are true and reliable their testimony cannot be thrown out on the threshold by branding them as inimical witnesses. By now, it is well-settled principle of law that enmity is a double-edged sword. It can be a ground for false implication. It also can be a ground for assault. Therefore, a duty is cast upon the court to examine the testimony of inimical witnesses with due caution and diligence." 54. In State of U.P. Vs. Kishan Chand and others, (2004) 7 SCC 629 , the Supreme Court observed : "The submission of the counsel for the accused that the testimony of PWs cannot be acted upon as they are interested witnesses is to be noted only to be rejected. By now, it is well-settled principle of law that animosity is a double-edged sword. It cuts both sides. It could be a ground for false implication and it could also be a ground for assault. Just because the witnesses are related to the deceased would be no ground to discard their testimony, if otherwise their testimony inspires confidence. In the given facts of the present case, they are but natural witnesses. We have no reason to disbelieve their testimony. Similarly, being relatives, it would be their endeavour to see that the real culprits are punished and normally they would not implicate wrong persons in the crime, so as to allow the real culprits to escape unpunished." 55. So far as the last submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution has failed to prove any motive for the commission of the crime is concerned, it has no leg to stand. 56. It is a case of direct evidence. It settled legal proposition that motive has great significance in a case involving circumstantial evidence, but where direct evidence is available, which is worth relying upon, motive loses its significance. 56. It is a case of direct evidence. It settled legal proposition that motive has great significance in a case involving circumstantial evidence, but where direct evidence is available, which is worth relying upon, motive loses its significance. The prosecution has come out with a clear cut that litigation was going on between the deceased on one side and Kamal Singh, son of Sher Singh of his village and others on the other over the land and when the deceased along with his wife, Smt. Gajendri and his mother Kasturi Devi were working in the field, Rohtash, son of Tarif armed with "Pharsa", Suresh, son of Tarif, armed with Balkati, Sheodan, son of Tarif was having axe and Rajendra son of Kamal Singh came to the field. Rajendra told Raghuraj that you pose yourself to be a big litigant, today I will teach you a lesson. At his instance accused Rohtash, Suresh and Sheodan with an intention to kill, attacked the deceased with their respective weapons, due to which he fell down. 57. In her examination-in-chief, the complainant has stated that litigation was going on between her husband, the deceased and the accused-appellant. We are of the opinion that motive was with the appellant to eliminate him to grab his property. Further in a case of direct evidence, the motive looses its important. 58. In a catena of judgement, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where there is a direct evidence, the motive looses its importance. 59. In Sheo Shankar Singh Vs. Sate of Jharkhand, (2011)3 SCC 654 , the Apex Court has held as under: "Proof of motive, however, recedes into the background in cases where the prosecution relies upon an eye-witness account of the occurrence. That is because if the court upon a proper appraisal of the deposition of the eye-witnesses comes to the conclusion that the version given by them is credible, absence of evidence to prove the motive is rendered inconsequential. Conversely even if prosecution succeeds in establishing a strong motive for the commission of the offence, but the evidence of the eye-witnesses is found unreliable or unworthy of credit, existence of a motive does not by itself provide a safe basis for convicting the accused. Conversely even if prosecution succeeds in establishing a strong motive for the commission of the offence, but the evidence of the eye-witnesses is found unreliable or unworthy of credit, existence of a motive does not by itself provide a safe basis for convicting the accused. That does not, however, mean that proof of motive even in a case which rests on an eye-witness account does not lend strength to the prosecution case or fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion. Proof of motive in such a situation certainly helps the prosecution and supports the eye-witnesses." 60. In Darbara Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2912)10 SCC 476, the Apex Court held thus: "So far as the issue of motive is concerned, it is a settled legal proposition that motive has great significance in a case involving circumstantial evidence, but where direct evidence is available, which is worth relying upon, motive loses its significance. In the instant case, firstly, there is nothing on record to reveal the identity of the person who was convicted for rape, there is also nothing to reveal the status of his relationship with the appellant and further, there is nothing on record to determine the identity of this girl or her relationship to the co-accused Kashmir Singh. More so, the conviction took place 20 years prior to the incident. No independent witness has been examined to prove the factum that the appellant was not on talking terms with Kashmir Singh. In a case where there is direct evidence of witnesses which can be relied upon, the absence of motive cannot be a ground to reject the case. Under no circumstances, can motive take the place of the direct evidence available as proof, and in a case like this, proof of motive is not relevant at all. 10. Motive in criminal cases based solely on the positive, clear, cogent and reliable ocular testimony of witnesses is not at all relevant. In such a fact-situation, the mere absence of a strong motive to commit the crime, cannot be of any assistance to the accused. The motive behind a crime is a relevant fact regarding which evidence may be led. The absence of motive is also a circumstance which may be relevant for assessing evidence. (Vide: Gurcharan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 ; Rajinder Kumar & Anr. The motive behind a crime is a relevant fact regarding which evidence may be led. The absence of motive is also a circumstance which may be relevant for assessing evidence. (Vide: Gurcharan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 ; Rajinder Kumar & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 1322 ; Datar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1193 ; and Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 160 )." 61. In Gosu Ramachandra Reddy and others Vs. State of A.P., AIR 2011, SC 3147, the Apex Court has held that it is settled by a series of decisions of this Court that in cases based on eye witness account of the incident proof or absence of a motive is not of any significance consequence. If a motive is proved it may supports the prosecution version. But existence or otherwise of a motive plays a significant role in cases based on circumstantial evidence. 62. So, in view of the above, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that prosecution has failed to prove the motive is of no consequence. 63. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that no specific role has been assigned to the present appellant and in absence of specific role, the appellant cannot be held guilty of the offence, has no force. 64. PW-9, Dr. Chandra Kant in the additional remark of the post-mortem report has stated that cumulative effect of all the injuries was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Further, the appellant was shown to have been armed with Pharsa. From the perusal of the injury report as well as post-mortem report, it transpires that most of the injuries can be caused by Pharsa, with which the present appellant was armed with. 65. Moreover, each one of the appellants was armed with deadly weapons. They come together and death was caused to the deceased. They attacked the deceased in front of his wife and mother. Three of the appellants, including the present one, inflicted blows with Pharsa, Balkari, and axe. We are, therefore, of the opinion that common object on the part of each of the appellants stand proved. Once formation of common object amongst the accused is proved, it is not necessary for the Court to consider specific overt act played by each of them. We are, therefore, of the opinion that common object on the part of each of the appellants stand proved. Once formation of common object amongst the accused is proved, it is not necessary for the Court to consider specific overt act played by each of them. 66. In view of what has been indicated herein above, we are of the view that the prosecution has fully established its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. The impugned judgement and order of conviction and sentence dated 07.3.1983 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshshr in ST No. 394 of 1982, which has been assailed in this appeal, calls for no interference. 67. The appellant is stated to be in jail. He shall remain in jail to serve out the remaining sentence awarded by the trial court. 68. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 69. Office is directed to transmit a certified copy of this judgement to the court concerned for compliance. 70. Compliance report be positively submitted to this court within eight weeks.