ORDER ON BOARD : Heard. 1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.12.1992 passed by learned Second Additional District Judge to the Court of District Judge, Bastar in Civil Suit No.5-A/1989 by which the learned trial Court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of agreement of sale between the parties in respect of the house in dispute as stated in the plaint. 2. The original deceased respondent/plaintiff Manohar Lal Soni filed a suit seeking a decree of specific performance of contract on the pleadings that appellant/defendant Rajendra Kumar Jha (appellant herein) had entered into an agreement to sell his house standing on the land admeasuring 1034 sq.ft situated in sheet No.92 of khasra No. 124/1 at Jagdalpur on 14.3.1981. It was further pleaded that the parties had agreed for consideration of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.2,000/- was paid in advance. Further pleadings were that the plaintiff gave two cheques one of Rs. 10,000/- and the other of Rs.5,000/- to the defendant on 24.4.1981, which was also encashed. According to plaintiff, Rs.2000/- was given to the defendant on 7.9.1981 for purchase of stamp. When defendant did not proceed to execute the sale deed, initially a legal notice was sent on 3.6.1989 through the Advocate and thereafter the plaintiff himself gave a notice on 21.6.1989. Thereafter, suit was filed. 3. The appellant defendant, however, denied existence of any agreement between the parties and it was pleaded that the transaction was of sale. According to defendant, the father of the defendant had demanded loan to fulfill his needs and a cash loan was taken. According to defendant, various amounts were given only in the series of loan advanced by the plaintiff from time to time and there was no agreement to sell the property. The defendant further denied that any amount was given for the purpose of purchase of stamps. The defence of the defendant was that the plaintiff had obtained the defendant's signature on certain documents at the time when defendant was mentally upset due to critical illness of his father. According to defendant, the signatures were obtained on the assurance that the documents were required for some other purpose including security for re-payment of loan. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed as many as seven issues. Later on, two additional issues, issue No. 6-A and 6-B were also framed. According to defendant, the signatures were obtained on the assurance that the documents were required for some other purpose including security for re-payment of loan. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed as many as seven issues. Later on, two additional issues, issue No. 6-A and 6-B were also framed. On the issue as to whether there was an agreement of loan transaction, learned trial Court recorded a finding in affirmative that there was an agreement between the parties for sale of the property in dispute and the plaintiff had paid various amounts to the defendant from time to time between the period from 14.3.1981 to 7.9.1981 towards purchase of the suit house. The defendant's case and issue framed thereon that there was a loan transaction was answered in negative. Learned trial Court also recorded that the defendant was obliged to respect the agreement and execute sale deed. On these findings, plaintiff's suit was decreed. The said decree has given rise to this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant- defendant contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to decree of specific performance because the plaintiff failed to prove that there was an agreement of sale between the parties. The defendant not only pleaded but led weighty evidence that the transaction was, in fact, a loan transaction and the plaintiff was made to sign certain documents under peculiar circumstances and on certain assurance other than it being a transaction relating to an agreement of sale of the property. Next submission of learned counsel for the appellant-defendant is that the plaintiff did not take any steps towards execution of the sale deed under so called agreement executed in the year 1981 until the suit was filed in the year 1989 and in the absence of there being any pleading or evidence of any steps having been taken by the plaintiff towards execution of sale deed so as to establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract, the plaintiff was not entitled to decree. He would submit that unreasonable delay on the part of plaintiff to file a suit would be fatal and in such case, the learned trial Court was not justified in exercising jurisdiction to grant a decree in favour of the plaintiff and on the contrary, delay in filing of suit were compelling circumstances for refusing to grant decree of specific performance in the spirit of provision contained in Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Another substantial argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant- defendant is that even according to the plaintiff and as per the terms and condition of written document (Ex.P-7) the contract was a contingent one. Contingency stipulated was that the sale deed would be executed only after the tenant is evicted by the Court of law. Till the date of filing of the suit, it is argued, the contingency did not happen. There is no ground and pleading or any evidence on record that either on the date of filing of suit, during pendency of sale or at the time of passing decree, tenant in the disputed premises was evicted by any process of law. Therefore, such a contingent contract was not enforceable by a decree of specific performance. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant-defendant placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of M.V. Shankar Bhat and Anr. Vs. Claude Pinto since (deceased) by Lrs. & Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 86 , Manjunath Anandappa URF Shivappa Hansi Vs. Tammanasa and Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 390 , Saradamani Kandappan S. Rajalakshmi and Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 18 , Nanjappan Vs. Ramasamy and Anr. (2015) 14 SCC 341 , Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs. New Era Fabrics Private Ltd. & Ors. (2015) 9 SCC 755 and Jayakantham and Ors. Vs. Abay Kumar (2017) 5 SCC 178 . 6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent-plaintiff would support the impugned judgment and decree and submit that the plaintiff's case that the plaintiff received various amount between the period from 14.3.1981 to 7.9.1981 as loan is highly improbable and contrary to oral and documentary evidence on record. It was submitted that the plaintiff's case is fully proved from the documents of the defendant placed on record as Ex.P-2-A, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-7 which all unmistakably show that the defendant had knowledge that he received total amount of Rs. It was submitted that the plaintiff's case is fully proved from the documents of the defendant placed on record as Ex.P-2-A, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-7 which all unmistakably show that the defendant had knowledge that he received total amount of Rs. 19,000/- from time to time towards consideration for sale of the disputed house. Next submission of learned counsel for the respondent is that the requirement of law as provided under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act is of readiness and willingness on the part of plaintiff to perform the part of contract. The plaintiff had paid substantial amount of Rs.19,000/- out of total amount of Rs.25,000/- and rest of the amount was agreed to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed. Except this, the plaintiff was not required to do anything more under the agreement between the parties. The appellant-defendant, right from the beginning, did not take any steps to get the tenant evicted until a suit was filed in the year 1989. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited on the ground that the suit was filed after a long period. Further submission of learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff is that learned trial Court has rightly exercised discretion in his favour because the grant of decree of specific performance is an equitable remedy and the plaintiff-respondent having paid huge amount, the defendant-appellant was expected to respect the agreement but despite having entered into agreement in the year 1981, for 8 years, the defendant-appellant did not file suit for eviction of tenant nor led any evidence before the Court to prove that he had taken step to perform his part of contract, therefore, the equity is in favour of the plaintiff which was duly taken into consideration by the learned trial Court to grant decree of specific performance. On the aspect of enforceability of agreement on the ground of it being contingent in nature, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff would argue that the defendant having already taken steps to evict the plaintiff by filing a suit in 1989, the agreement of sale became enforceable in law. 7. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the case. 8. 7. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the case. 8. The first issue which requires consideration is as to whether the plaintiff-respondent has succeeded in proving that there was an agreement to sell the property in dispute between the plaintiff and defendant. 9. The plaintiff has categorically pleaded in the plaint that an agreement was entered into between the parties on 14.3.1981 for sale of house situated in sheet No.92, khasra No124/1 standing on the land admeasuring 1034 sq.ft. at Jagdalpur. The specific pleading with regard to payment of Rs.2,000/- followed by two cheques one of Rs.10,000/- and the other of Rs.5,000/- and another payment of Rs.2,000 on 7.9.1981 have been made. The defendant has not denied receipt of these amount but his plea was that the amount was accepted towards loan and not under any agreement of sale between the parties. In order to prove its case, plaintiff-respondent has examined two witnesses. Plaintiff himself has been examined as PW.2. In his evidence, he has deposed that on 14.3.1981, the agreement was entered into between the parties towards purchase of defendant's house for consideration of Rs. 25,000/- and on that date itself, Rs.2,000/- cash was paid to the defendant. The receipt thereof (Ex.P-3) has also been filed. He has further deposed that the house was occupied by one Murli Manohar, as tenant. According to this witness, he had given a cheque of Rs.5,000/- as also cheque of Rs.10,000/- and thereafter Rs.2,000/-. The receipt of giving cheque of Rs.10,000/-, Rs. 5,000/- has been filed as Ex.P-4 which also includes acknowledgment of receipt of Rs. 2,000/- in cash. The plaintiff has also relied upon the written declaration in Ex.P-7 given by the defendant himself as evidence of transaction being that of agreement between the parties. This witness has been subjected to detailed cross-examination but in his cross-examination, nothing material has been elicited. The defendant's plea that he had executed various documents only as security towards repayment of loan at the time when his father was critically ill cannot be accepted and is liable to be disbelieved as against coherent, strong and reliable oral and documentary evidence of there being an agreement of sale between the parties and payment of various amount by the plaintiff to defendant between the period from 14.3.1981 up to 7.9.1981. Therefore, the finding of learned trial Court in this regard is affirmed. 10. The case of the plaintiff-respondent has been that the execution of sale deed was contingent upon eviction of tenant who at that time was occupying the house in dispute. In para-1 of the plaint, the plaintiff averred as below: ^^1- ------izfroknh 25]000-00 iS- v{kj esa iPphl gtkj dher ij fnukd 14-3-1981 dks cspus jkth gqvkA izfroknh us oknh ls vkxzg fd;k fd mls jde dh vko';drk gS- dher esa ls dqN jde izfroknh dks nsos- edku ds fodz;i= fy[kus ds ckjs esa izfroknh dk lq>ko Fkk fd Jh eqjyhejksgj oekZ ds fo:} edku [kkyh djkus ds fy;s nhokuh nkok nk;j djuk iMsxk A U;k;ky; ds }kjk edku [kkyh djk dj izfroknh oknh ds fgr es fodz;i= fy[k nsxk o fodz;i= dh jftLVªh djk nsxk vkSj oknh dks edku dk dc~tk ns nsosxk- ;g ekSf[kd lafonk 1981 esa gqbA bl ekSf[kd lafonk gksus ij izfroknh oknh ls viuh vko';drk crkrs gq, jde ysrk jgk- mijksDr lkSnsokys edku dh bl okni= es fooknxzLr edku dgk tkosxk A^^ 11. The plaintiff having been examined as PW.2 deposed as under : ^^5- izfroknh us ml edku dk fcdzhukek eq>s fu"ikfnr ugah fd;k mldk dguk Fkk fd eqjyheuksgj ls edku [kkyh djkdj fcdzhukek fu"ikfnr djsxk A 11- EkSus viuh rjQ ls izfroknh ds le{k ,slk 'krZ ugh j[kk fd og okn xzLr edku dks esjs uke ls fcfdzukek fu"ikfnr dj ns] vkSj fdjk;snkj ls eSa [kkyh djok nwaxk A izfroknh us dgk fd edku [kkyh djkdj fcfdzukek fu"ikfnr djk nsxk vkSj eSus eatwj dj fy;kA------- 13- ;g lgh gS fd esjs }kjk orZeku izdj.k nk;j djus le; rd ;g 'krZ ;Fkkor Fkk fd oknxzLr edku [kkyh gksus ij izfroknh fcdzhukek fu"ikfnr djsxk A^^ 12. Thus, from the plaintiff's own pleadings and evidence, it is clear that the agreement between the parties was that the defendant would be executing sale deed in favour of plaintiff after eviction of the tenant. It is also clear from the recital of declaration given by defendant in Ex.P-7, execution of which has not been disputed by the plaintiff. In that document, it has been recited as below: “This is the house occupied by Shri Murli Manohar Vemra as a licensee. I have to deliver the possession of the house to the purchaser after evicting Shri Murli Manohar Verma. In that document, it has been recited as below: “This is the house occupied by Shri Murli Manohar Vemra as a licensee. I have to deliver the possession of the house to the purchaser after evicting Shri Murli Manohar Verma. Suit against Murli Manohar Verma for eviction is pending in Court.” 13. It is thus clear that the execution of sale deed under agreement of sale of the property in dispute was contingent upon the eviction of the tenant. There is no pleading much less any evidence led by the plaintiff to prove that on or before the date of filing of the suit (filed on 5.9.1989) or during the pendency of the suit or at the time of passing decree by the learned trial Court, the tenant was evicted so as to say that agreement of sale between the parties had become enforceable in law. At this juncture, I consider it appropriate to refer to the Supreme Court's decision in the cases of Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta (supra). That was a case where the agreement of sale between the parties was contingent upon condition that the sale would be subject to the seller being able to settle with its labour and the labour agreeing to the sale. On facts, it was found that labour did not agree to the sale contemplated. In this factual backdrop, their Lordships in the Supreme Court held that the owner of the property in dispute was not bound to sell the property and a decree of specific performance could not be granted in favour of plaintiff. It was held:- “43. The submission that the appellant has waived the condition regarding taking of consent from the labour for the proposed sale and, therefore, this could not be a ground for cancelling the contract is misconceived. In the agreement dated 19.10.1977, it was specifically mentioned that the sale also be subject to your (defendants) being able to settle with your labour and your labour agreeing to the sale contemplated herein and if you are not able to settle with your labour and to get them to agree to the sale herein contemplated you will not be bound to complete the sale. The moment labour do not agree to the sale contemplated, under the terms of the contract, the respondents were not bound to complete the sale. The moment labour do not agree to the sale contemplated, under the terms of the contract, the respondents were not bound to complete the sale. The maximum period of nine (9) months does not mean that once the labour had declined to give their consent for the proposed sale, the contract subsists for a period of nine (9) months and it cannot be terminated before that period. The agreement for sale is a contingent agreement depending upon obtaining permission under Section 22 and Section 27 of the ULC Act, property being converted from industrial zone to residential use and settlement with the labour and the labour agreeing to the sale contemplated therein. If any of the conditions are not fulfilled, the respondents were not bound to complete the sale and the appellant was only entitled for return of the money with interest @ 18% per annum from the date of refusal of any of the permission or consent or agreement mentioned above. As in the present case we find that the Mill Mazdoor Sabha has not given its consent to the proposed sale, agreement for sale could not have been performed and had ceased. The appellant is only entitled to refund of the amount along with interest @ 18% per annum stipulated therein.” 14. The principle of law propounded by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision is apparently in the light of statutory provision contained in Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which reads as under: “32. Enforcement of contracts contingent on an event happening- Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if any uncertain future event happens, cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened.” If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void.” 15. The aforesaid conclusion of the Supreme Court on the aspect of enforceability of a contingent contract with the happening of the contingency by itself is sufficient to non-suit the plaintiff and dis-entitles him to the decree of specific performance of contract. 16. As far as the submission advanced on the basis of provision contained in Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act is concerned, there are abundance of authorities laid down by the Supreme Court that the Court is not bound to grant decree of specific relief only on the proof of execution of agreement of sale between the parties. 16. As far as the submission advanced on the basis of provision contained in Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act is concerned, there are abundance of authorities laid down by the Supreme Court that the Court is not bound to grant decree of specific relief only on the proof of execution of agreement of sale between the parties. The consideration relevant for exercise of discretion would be required to be examined by the Court before such decree could be granted. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to relevant provision contained under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, which is reproduced herein-below: “20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance -(1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance: (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its nonperformance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation 1 : Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Explanation 2: The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. Explanation 2: The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party.” 17. In the case of M.V. Shankar Bhat (supra), their Lordships in the Supreme Court held that a decree of specific performance may not be granted in a case where the intending purchaser happened to be a lawyer and the suit was filed by him to seek enforcement of an agreement with his own client. 18. In the case of Manjunath Anandappa (supra), the Supreme Court, amongst other things, found that the plaintiff filed suit after almost six years from the date of entering into agreement and he failed to bring on record any material to show that he had ever asked defendant, the owner of the property, to execute sale deed. In those circumstances, the law applicable in such cases where suits are not filed within reasonable period and its impact on plaintiff's entitlement to get discretionary relief was considered thus : “30. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The plaintiff filed the suit almost after six years from the date of entering into the agreement to sell. He did not bring any material on records to show that he had ever asked defendant No. 1, the owner of the property, to execute a deed of sale. He filed a suit only after he came to know that the suit land had already been sold by her in favour of the appellant herein. Furthermore, it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiff for obtaining a discretionary relief having regard to Section 20 of the Act to approach the court within a reasonable time. Having regard to his conduct, the plaintiff was not entitled to a discretionary relief. 31. Furthermore, it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiff for obtaining a discretionary relief having regard to Section 20 of the Act to approach the court within a reasonable time. Having regard to his conduct, the plaintiff was not entitled to a discretionary relief. 31. In Veerayee Ammal vs. Seeni Ammal reported in (2002) 1 SCC 134 , the law is stated in the following terms: "11. When, concededly, the time was not of the essence of the contract, the appellant-plaintiff was required to approach the court of law within a reasonable time. A Constitution Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani (1993) 1 SCC 519 held that in case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being of the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of contract, the court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are (i) from the express terms of the contract; (ii) from the nature of the property; and (iii) from the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of making the contract. For the purposes of granting relief, the reasonable time has to be ascertained from all the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. In K. S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan (1997) 3 SCC 1 this Court held : (SCC p. 11, para 14) "Even where time is not of the essence of the contract, the plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property." 13. The word "reasonable" has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the "reasonable time" is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. The dictionary meaning of the "reasonable time" is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean : "A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than 'directly'; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea"." 32. In Lourdu Mari David and Ors. vs. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy and Ors. reported in (1996) 5 SCC 589 this Court observed: "2. It is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the equitable jurisdiction of a court and specific performance being equitable relief, must come to the court with clean hands. In other words the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief." 19. In a subsequent decision in the case of Saradamani Kandappan (supra), the principles laid down earlier were reiterated and restated, noting various other circumstances relevant for exercise of discretion whether or not to grant a decree of specific relief even though the plaintiff may have succeeded in proving agreement of sale between the parties. It was held: “43. Till the issue is considered in an appropriate case, we can only reiterate what has been suggested in K.S. Vidyanadam : (i) The courts, while exercising discretion in suits for specific performance, should bear in mind that when the parties prescribe a time/period, for taking certain steps or for completion of the transaction, that must have some significance and therefore time/period prescribed cannot be ignored. (ii) The courts will apply greater scrutiny and strictness when considering whether the purchaser was “ready and willing” to perform his part of the contract. (iii) Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring the time-limits stipulated in the agreement. (ii) The courts will apply greater scrutiny and strictness when considering whether the purchaser was “ready and willing” to perform his part of the contract. (iii) Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring the time-limits stipulated in the agreement. The courts will also “frown” upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean a purchaser can wait for 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. The three year period is intended to assist purchasers in special cases, as for example, where the major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor and possession has been delivered in part performance, where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser.” 20. In a recent decision in the case of Jayakantham (supra), the relevant consideration and the applicable principles in the matter of exercise of discretion to grant or not to grant decree of specific relief were re-visited upon survey of decisions in the past, to hold that the Court is not bound to grant relief of specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so and that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary to be exercised on sound and reasonable principles and in appropriate cases even if it is lawful to do so, the Court may refuse to grant decree of specific performance and equity could be balanced between the parties by directing repayment of loan paid by the plaintiff to defendant along with certain interest. 21. Viewed from any angle, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is therefore allowed and the impugned judgment and decree is set aside. The amount paid by the plaintiff to the defendant i.e. Rs.19,000/- between the period from 14.3.1981 up to 7.9.1981 shall be liable to be refunded by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff along with simple interest @ 6% p.a. within a period of 3 months. If the amount so directed is not paid, the plaintiff may seek to recover the amount, through execution of decree in accordance with Law. 22. Let a decree be drawn accordingly. Costs as certified.