JUDGMENT & ORDER : The petitioner, who is an auditor in the Department of Co-operation, has, by means of this writ petition, challenged the order under No. F.PRS-523/Coop/82(ACF) dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure P/9 to the writ petition) and the order under No. F.PRS-523/Coop/82 (ACF-2) dated 19.04.2011 (Annexure-P/10 to the writ petition). The petitioner has further urged for prohibiting the respondents from giving any effect to these orders dated 04.10.2010 and 19.04.2011 and also for directing the respondents to treat the petitioner in the service by removing all effects of the order dated 04.10.2010 and further for releasing the financial and service benefits without any forfeiture of pay and allowances. In addition thereto, the petitioner has urged to give the benefit of the pay revision forthwith. 2. On culmination of the departmental proceeding, as lunched under Rule-14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 [CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965 in short] by the memorandum under No. F.PRS-523/Coop/82 (CF) dated 29.08.2003 (Annexure-P/2 to the writ petition) and after receipt of the report, it appeared to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the respondent No. 2 herein, that the petitioner had misappropriated a huge amount of fund in his capacity as the manager of Khowai Primary Marketing Cooperative Society Ltd. According to the inquiry report, as submitted by the Inquiry Officer namely, Sri M.K. Sengupta, Law Officer-cum-Draftsman, the charges as brought against the petitioner, were found proved. 3. The petitioner was held to be guilty of the misappropriation by the said report dated 29.07.2009. It has been observed in the said order dated 04.10.2010 as under: “On careful and meticulous examination, the undersigned being the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied and thus accepts the findings of the Inquiring Officer and the charges framed against the A.O. are also of a very serious in nature and as such deserves to be punished and as such canceling the earlier order No. F.PRS.523/Coop/82 (CF) dated 22.04.2009 a fresh order is issued as under: (a) Under Rule-11(iii) of CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965 the liable amount of Rs. 2,84,437/- (Rupees two lakhs eightyfour thousand four hundred thirtyseven only) fixed as per Audited accounts and reports of Khowai PMCS Ltd. for the year 1996-97 to 2001-2 is to be recovered along with the interest at the rate of Rs. 2,84,437/- (Rupees two lakhs eightyfour thousand four hundred thirtyseven only) fixed as per Audited accounts and reports of Khowai PMCS Ltd. for the year 1996-97 to 2001-2 is to be recovered along with the interest at the rate of Rs. 5% from the year of defalcation from the salary of Sri Debashis Roy Choudhury, Auditor (Coop), Ex-Manager of Khowai PMCS Ltd. by instalments not exceeding 1/3rd of the salary of Sri Roy Choudhury. (b) It is also ordered that Sri Debashis Roy Choudhury will not get promotion till the recovery of the liable amount. (c) Further, the pay of Sri Debashish Roy Choudhury is to be fixed reducing 1(one) increment of his time scale of pay. (d) He will not get any financial benefit for the suspension period.” 4. It is to be mentioned that a fresh order was passed in terms of the order of the appellate authority dated 22.09.2010. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura, Department of Co-operation against the said order dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure-P/9 to the writ petition). The appellate authority by an elaborate order dated 14.09.2011 (Annexure-P/10 to the writ petition) has disposed the said appeal with certain modification in the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 04.10.2010. The appellate authority has modified the punishment by way of substitution, the following penalty was imposed on the petitioner which reads as under: “(a) The financial liability of Sri Roy Choudhury to the Khowai PMCS Ltd. amounting to Rs. 2,84,437/- (Rupees two lakhs eighty-four thousand four hundred thirty-seven only) deducted through the Audit Report for the years from 1996-97 to 2001-2 and relevant documents & records is to be recovered with 5% penal interest from his salary not exceeding 1/3rd of salary from the year of defalcation. (b) The appeal filed by Sri Debashis Roy Choudhury, Auditor (Coop), Ex-Manager of Khowai PMCS Ltd. is disposed of.” 5. For purpose of appreciation of the challenge through the prism of the grounds of objection, it is essential to record the foundational facts as laid by the petitioner. The petitioner while serving as the Auditor had been deputed to Khowai PMCS Ltd. (in short KPMCS Ltd.) as the manager in April, 1996 and he continued in that capacity till May, 2000. The petitioner while serving as the Auditor had been deputed to Khowai PMCS Ltd. (in short KPMCS Ltd.) as the manager in April, 1996 and he continued in that capacity till May, 2000. The petitioner was placed under suspension by the order under No. F.PRS-523/Coop/82 dated 25/26.07.2003 under Sub-rule (1) of Rule-10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965. The petitioner’s Headquarter at the time of his suspension was the office of the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Khowai, West Tripura and he was debarred from leaving the Headquarters without obtaining the prior permission from the respondent No. 2, the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies. However, the said order of suspension was revoked by the respondent No. 2 by an order under No. F.PRS-523/Coop/82 (CF)-3152-54 dated 14.03.2007. In this regard, there is no dispute. 6. Thereafter by the memorandum under No. F.PRS-523/Coop/82(CF) dated 29.08.2003, the petitioner was leveled with charges of misconduct to be inquired under Rule-14 of the CCS(CC&A) Rules, 1965 for misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 2,62,437.54/-. The misappropriation has been alleged to have been committed during the period from 1996-97 to 2001-02. In addition thereto, the petitioner was charged of taking away a sum of Rs. 2,000/- from the society as T.A. advance for his journey for Guwahati to Kolkata. Thus, the petitioner’s misconduct was concerned with a sum of Rs. 2,64,437.54/-. 7. The petitioner by indulging in such misconduct has allegedly violated the provision of Rule-3 of the Tripura Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1988. That apart, there is a serious allegation for interpolating a cheque of Rs. 12,000/- converting the same to Rs. 32,000/-. Thus, he had further misappropriated a sum of Rs. 20,000/- by the said illegal act. In response to the said memorandum of charges dated 29.08.2003 (Annexure-P/2 to the writ petition) the petitioner by his written statement denied the charges and as consequence thereof, the Inquiring Officer was appointed for inquiring into the charges and giving the report on culmination. 8. The petitioner has submitted that the he had filed one application for supplying the additional documents. The documents were relevant and necessary for his defence. By the order dated 10.09.2004 in the inquiry proceeding being case No. 5(54)/Coop/INQ/LAW/2004, the Disciplinary Authority was asked to produce those records. It was also directed that the document should be produced by the Presenting Officer (PO in short). The documents were relevant and necessary for his defence. By the order dated 10.09.2004 in the inquiry proceeding being case No. 5(54)/Coop/INQ/LAW/2004, the Disciplinary Authority was asked to produce those records. It was also directed that the document should be produced by the Presenting Officer (PO in short). Similar orders were passed on 03.10.2004 and other subsequent dates, but no production was caused by the Presenting Officer. Consequently, on 29.01.2005, it has been observed by the Inquiry Officer as follows: “A.O. submitted before the Court that the Manager of the PMCS has supplied only a portion of the additional documents which is mentioned in Sl. No. II (sic) on his prayer. Manager also reluctant to supply of the documents as prayed before the Court (sic).” The Inquiring Authority directed the PO to contact the Manager of the PMCS and to direct the supply of the documents as per his order dated 20.11.2004, failing which, adverse observation would be made.” 9. Even on 21.05.2005, the I.O. directed to the P.O. to make necessary arrangement for supply of the documents on 27/28.05.2005. The petitioner was directed to collect the photocopies of the documents on defraying the cost. But the documents were not made available to the petitioner. It would be apparent from the order dated 10.06.2005 that the documents as requisitioned by the petitioner, the Charged Officer, were not produced. But for production, several dates were posted but the P.O. did not produce any document. 10. The petitioner has clearly stated that he could collect the documents except the documents as mentioned in the Sl. No. 11 of the application for production of the additional documents. Again it has been stated that the additional documents at Sl. No. 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 21 were not supplied by the Khowai PMCS Ltd. One Parimal Kanti Debroy was appointed as the Auditor Officer to make audit of the Khowai PMCS Ltd. According to the petitioner, Rule-71 of the Tripura Co-operative Societies Rules, 1976, prescribs the eligibility of a person to conduct audit. No. 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 21 were not supplied by the Khowai PMCS Ltd. One Parimal Kanti Debroy was appointed as the Auditor Officer to make audit of the Khowai PMCS Ltd. According to the petitioner, Rule-71 of the Tripura Co-operative Societies Rules, 1976, prescribs the eligibility of a person to conduct audit. For purpose of reference, Rule-71 is extracted hereunder: “71(1) The audit of accounts of societies shall be conducted by departmental auditors or by certified auditors appointed by the Registrar from time to time on such terms and conditions as he deems fit: Provided that, any society or class of societies as notified by the Registrar may get their accounts audited by an auditor selected from the panel of certified auditors maintained by the Registrar and published by him in the official Gazette. Explanation. - For purposes of this rule, a "Certified Auditor" Includes (a) A Chartered Accountant within the meaning of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (b) A person who holds a Government diploma in Co-operative Accounts or a Government diploma in Co-operative and Accountancy; or (c) A person who has served as an auditor in the Co-operative, Department of the State Government and whose name has been included by the Registrar in the panel of certified auditors maintained and published by him in the official Gazette at least once in every three years. (2) The audit under Section 79 shall in all cases extend back to the last date of the previous audit and shall be carried out up to the last date of the co-operative year immediately preceding the audit or where the Registrar so directs in the case of any particular society or class of societies, such other date as may be specified by the Registrar. (3) The auditor shall submit an audit memorandum to the society and to the Registrar in the Form specified by the Registrar, on the accounts examined by him and on the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts as on the date and for the period up to which the accounts have been audited, and shall state whether in his opinion and to the best of his information and according to the explanation given to him, the said accounts give all the information required by the Act in the manner so required and give true and fair view- (i) In the case of the balance sheet of the state of society's affairs as at the end of the co-operative year or any other subsequent date up to which the accounts are made up and examined by him; and (ii) In the case of the profits and loss accounts, or the profit or loss for the co-operative year, or the period covered by the audit, as the case may be. (4) The audit memorandum shall state- (i) Whether the auditor had obtained all the information and explanations which to the best of his knowledge and belief were necessary for the purpose of his audit; (ii) Whether in his opinion, proper books of accounts as required by the Act, there rules and the bye-laws of the society have been kept by the society so far as it appears from the examination of these books; and (iii) Whether the balance sheet and profits and loss account examined by him are in agreement with the books of accounts and returns of the society. (5) Where any of the matters referred to in sub-rule (4) are answered in the negative or with a qualification, the audit memorandum shall specify the reasons for the answer. (5) Where any of the matters referred to in sub-rule (4) are answered in the negative or with a qualification, the audit memorandum shall specify the reasons for the answer. (6) The audit memorandum shall also contain schedules with full particulars of- (i) All transactions which appear to be contrary to the provisions of the Act, the rules or the bye-laws of the society; (ii) All sums which ought to have been but have not been brought into account by the society; (iii) Any material impropriety or irregularity in the expenditure or in the realisation of moneys due to the society; (iv) Any money or property belonging to the society which appears to the auditor to be bad or doubtful debt; and (v) Any other matters specified by the Registrar in this behalf. (7) The summary of audit memorandum as prepared by auditor shall be read out in a general meeting. The audit memorandum together with its accompaniments shall be open to inspection by any member of the society. The Registrar may however direct that any portion of the audit memorandum which appears to him to be objectionable nature or not justified by facts shall be expunged and the portion so expunged shall not form part of the audit memorandum. (8) The Registrar may, from time to time, specify the form or forms in which the statements of accounts and information shall be prepared for audit by the society. (9) On completion of his statutory audit, the auditor shall award an audit classification letter in the audit note of the society whose accounts he has audited in accordance with the instructions issued by the Registrar from time to time. The list of societies to be published under sub-section (3) of Section 12 shall also specify the audit class of the society.” 11. It is apparent that the audit should be conducted by the departmental auditors appointed by the Registrar from time to time on such terms and conditions as he deems fit. Further, it has been also provided that any society or class of societies as notified by the Registrar may get their accounts audited by an auditor selected from the panel of the certified auditors maintained by the Registrar and published by him in the official Gazette. 12. By way of explanation, who should be treated as the certified officer has been provided below Rule-71 of the said Rules. 12. By way of explanation, who should be treated as the certified officer has been provided below Rule-71 of the said Rules. The person who can be called “the certified auditor” are (a) a Chartered Accountant within the meaning of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, (b) a person who holds a Government diploma in Co-operative Accounts or a Government diploma in Co-operative and Accountancy; or (c) a person who has served as an auditor in the Department of Co-operative and whose name has been included by the Registrar in the panel of the certified auditors maintained and published by him in the official Gazette, at least once in every three years. 13. The petitioner has succinctly stated that the respondent No. 3 could not be selected as the auditor inasmuch as the respondent No. 3 is neither a certified auditor nor his name appears in the panel of the departmental auditors and hence, the audit carried out by the respondent No. 3 cannot be the basis of any finding holding the petitioner guilty of misappropriation. The respondent No. 3 was examined as PW-2 in the departmental proceeding and he had categorically claimed that he was a certified auditor by the notification issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. 14. PW-2 had further stated that he had conducted the audit of Khowai PMCS Ltd for the year 1996-97 to 2001-02. He has categorically stated in his deposition made in the inquiry that he is a trained auditor and he has got training from West Bengal Coop. Training Institute, situated at Uttarpara, Netaji Subhas Coop. Training Institute, Kalyani and Indore Coop. Institute. These are all Cooperative Unions. But the petitioner has submitted that Rule-71 (1) (b) is very clear and the respondent No. 3 cannot be treated as the certified auditor. The petitioner has further stated that the petitioner was only posted in the State Cooperative Society since 12.04.1996 to 31.05.2000 and not beyond that. From the inquiry report as submitted by the Inquiry Officer, it is observed that : “13. Liability of Debasish Roy Choudhury, Ex-Manager : On examination of various records for the period under audit some cases of misappropriation of society’s fund had been detected and Manager Sri Debasish Roy Choudhury had been made liable for Rs. 3,17,730.39p. From the inquiry report as submitted by the Inquiry Officer, it is observed that : “13. Liability of Debasish Roy Choudhury, Ex-Manager : On examination of various records for the period under audit some cases of misappropriation of society’s fund had been detected and Manager Sri Debasish Roy Choudhury had been made liable for Rs. 3,17,730.39p. lying in asset side of Balance Sheet as on 31.03.2002 under head “Cash Suspense” details of which are given in schedules submitted which accounts for the period under audit. Similarly an amount of Rs. 55,292.84/- has been lying in liability side of balance sheet under same head “Cash Suspense” as on 31.03.2002 being the amount detected as error of omission, error in balancing, missing entries etc. in the books of accounts which may go in credit of Sri Ray Chowdhury and be adjusted with his liability as stated above. Thus, direct liability of Sri Roy Chowdhury may come as on 31.03.2002 at Rs. 2,62,437.54 (Rs. 3,17,730.38 – 55,292.84/-). Further it needs be mentioned here that before finalizing liability Sri Ray Chowdhury had been given sufficient time to examine related records for his clarification & defence and on receipt of confirmation from his end aforesaid liability had been fixed up and accounted for. In this connection letter of myself dt. 14.08.2002 and dt. 19.09.2002 addressed to Sri Debasish Ray Chowdhury, letter of Sri Ray Chowdhury dt. 28.08.2002 addressed to the Chairman, letter of the Chairman dt. 09.09.2002 addressed to the DRCS, West Tripura, copies of which were duly endorsed to all of concerning authorities may please be referred to. Now the authorities may take step as they think proper for such lapses and recovery may be made accordingly. In addition, Sri Ray Chowdhury may be held liable for Rs. 5,000/- more as the amount was received from society’s fund on 31.01.1997 being T.A. Advance for Guwahati/Calcutta journey without approval of the appropriate authority. Out of the amount Rs. 2,000/- was received in the name of Sri Ray Chowdhury and Rs. 3,000/- in the name of Sri Dilip Ray. The entire amount had been lying pending for adjustment since 31.01.1997. On query it was stated by Sri Ray Chowdhury that owing to some obvious reasons he failed to submit related T.A. bills for adjustment of said advance on or before his leaving the society. Now he submitted said T.A. bills in the month of August, 2002. The entire amount had been lying pending for adjustment since 31.01.1997. On query it was stated by Sri Ray Chowdhury that owing to some obvious reasons he failed to submit related T.A. bills for adjustment of said advance on or before his leaving the society. Now he submitted said T.A. bills in the month of August, 2002. But I came to learn from the Chairman of the society that there might have some technical difficulties to pass the T.A. bills which were not submitted in due time and according to procedure. However, since it is a long pending affairs, Management be requested to look into the matter and take appropriate step for its adjustment either by way of passing T.A. bills or by way of realizing cash money from them. Early decision in this regard is necessary for the interest of the society.” 15. It is thus apparent that some charges had been be admitted by the petitioner in the inquiry proceeding. In terms of Rule-15 of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965, the petitioner was supplied a copy of the findings of the inquiry officer dated 29.07.2009 by the memorandum under No. F.PRS-523/Coop/82 (CF) dated 20.02.2010 (Annexure-P/4 to the writ petition). 16. The petitioner has submitted his representation on 19.03.2010 (Annexure-P/5 to the writ petition) and he raised with emphasis that non-production of the additional documents generated serious prejudice to the petitioner. That apart, the audit report which has been referred by the inquiry officer cannot be valid as the audit was not carried out by a certified auditor as required under Rule-71 of the Tripura Co-operative Societies Rules, 1976. 17. These are the fundamental objections, in addition to the other objections as raised by the petitioner. After filing of the representation by the petitioner, the said final order dated 20.04.2010 was issued and according to the petitioner while passing the said order his objections were not at all considered and those were mechanically discarded. Even the appellate authority failed to look at the aspect of denial of the safeguards of the petitioner in terms of Sub-rule (16) (17) of Rule-14 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965. The petitioner had also taken a general ground that proper appreciation of the evidence was not made and thus the infirmities as pointed out in the memorandum of appeal at the time of hearing, were not properly taken care of. 18. The petitioner had also taken a general ground that proper appreciation of the evidence was not made and thus the infirmities as pointed out in the memorandum of appeal at the time of hearing, were not properly taken care of. 18. Even the appellate authority, according to the petitioner, did not appreciate the grounds in the relevant context and as such, finding which ought to have been returned has not been returned. The petitioner has also stated that both the orders of the disciplinary authority as well as of the appellate authority are thus outcome of total non-application of mind. In para-24 of the writ petition, the petitioner has averred as under : Your humble petitioner submits that since the order dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure-P/9 supra) has been passed not on an independent decision of the respondent No. 2 but on the order passed on 22.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8 supra) dictating upon the respondent No. 2, your humble petitioner did not prefer any appeal against the same since the same would be an appeal from Caesar to Caesar.” 19. The petitioner had earlier approached to this Court by filing a writ petition being WP(C) No. 579 of 2010 questioning the order dated 22.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8 to the writ petition) and the order dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure-P/9 to the writ petition). This Court by the order dated 21.12.2010 disposed of the writ petition by directing the petitioner to approach the respondent No. 1 by preferring an appeal against the order passed on 04.10.2010 and in terms of the said order, when the petitioner had filed an appeal and the respondent No. 1 passed the said order dated 19.04.2011 (Annexure-P/10 to the writ petition) by substituting the penalty as stated above. 20. While disposing the earlier departmental appeal by the order dated 22.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8 to the writ petition), the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura, Department of Co-operation has clearly observed as under : “8. In the light of the above said gross irregularities, which were also well established by the I.O’s findings, it does not call for any interference from the Appellate Authority (Principal Secretary, Cooperation Dept.). And as such the case is remitted to the Disciplinary Authority (Registrar of Cooperative Societies) for awarding proportionate punishment keeping in view the public interest/society’s interest.” 21. It is an admitted position that the petitioner did not challenge the said order dated 22.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8 to the writ petition). And as such the case is remitted to the Disciplinary Authority (Registrar of Cooperative Societies) for awarding proportionate punishment keeping in view the public interest/society’s interest.” 21. It is an admitted position that the petitioner did not challenge the said order dated 22.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8 to the writ petition). The inference so made by the said order in respect of the penalty as awarded by the order dated 22.04.2010 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition) was left unchallenged initially, but later, on direction of this Court the same was challenged. By the said order, recover of the said amount of Rs. 2,64,437.54/- was directed by deducting the same from the salary of the petitioner by instalments, not exceeding 1/3rd of the salary of the petitioner. That order was challenged in the earlier appeal and by the said order dated 22.09.2010 the finding was not interfered, but the penalty was found to be disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. 22. As in the earlier order, no direction or penalty was made or imposed in respect of the matters viz, (a) non-adjustment of TA advance of Rs. 2,000/-, (b) defalcation of Rs. 2,62,437/- of Khowai PMCS fund and (c) Tampering of a bank cheque of Rs. 12,000/- and drawl Rs. 32,000/- of Khowai PMCS. Hence, the said fresh order dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure-P/9) was issued and there is no dispute in this regard. 23. However, a fresh appeal was filed in terms of the direction of this Court and in that appeal even the findings of the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority were also challenged afresh. Even the appellate authority, without looking back to the earlier findings decided the appeal on the basis of fresh appreciation of the evidence and the grounds of objection and made a little bit of modification in the penalty. The appellate authority has provided a table, recording his observations against the points of objection raised by the petitioner in the appeal. For purpose of reference, the said table is reproduced hereunder: Points of objections Observations 1. During the suspension period the subsistence allowance of appellant was not revised under the revised pay Rules. 1. The appellant was provided with subsistence allowance during his suspension period regularly but pay could not be revised as because the DP was on going against him. 2. All the Addl. Documents, as sought for by the appellant, were not supplied. 2. During the suspension period the subsistence allowance of appellant was not revised under the revised pay Rules. 1. The appellant was provided with subsistence allowance during his suspension period regularly but pay could not be revised as because the DP was on going against him. 2. All the Addl. Documents, as sought for by the appellant, were not supplied. 2. All the Addl. Documents, as sought for by the appellant, were supplied, so far available. 3. The charges were made on the basis of the report of the Audit Officer Sri. P. K. Deb Roy who is not eligible to be a Certified Auditor. 3. The Audit Officer Sri P. K. Deb Roy Retd. Coop Officer who is a trained and Diploma holder too has been appointed as per the Rules, in force with due Notification. 4. The appellant has been served with a copy of the Findings of the I.O. with mere request to submit written representation on the findings, if desired. 4. The written representation submitted by the appellant has been examined by the Disciplinary Authority (RCS) very carefully as to the Credibility of the same. 5. The Audit Officer did not claim any explanation but claimed to have asked for explanation with respect to part-II & part-III 5. The Audit Officer clearly mentioned that after receiving due confirmation/clarification from the appellant the said Audit Report has been prepared. 6. Order passed on 04.10.2010 is an order different from earlier order dated 22.04.2010 inflicting different punishments recording no reason as to why earlier order dated 22.04.2010 was given a go-bye. 6. In the order dated 04.10.2010 the reference of the order of the appellate authority dated 22.09.2010 has been mentioned. The appellate authority has clearly mentioned that the order passed on 22.04.2010 was disproportionate in comparison to the gross irregularities and misconduct committed by the appellant and as such the case was remitted to the Disciplinary Authority for awarding punishment proportionately keeping in view of the public interest/society’s interest. 7. The audited period was a period beyond the period during which the appellant acted as the Manager of Khowai PMCS Ltd. 7. The incident of misappropriation was committed during the tenure of Sri Roy Choudhury as Manager of Khowai PMCS Ltd. as reflected in the audit report. 8. 7. The audited period was a period beyond the period during which the appellant acted as the Manager of Khowai PMCS Ltd. 7. The incident of misappropriation was committed during the tenure of Sri Roy Choudhury as Manager of Khowai PMCS Ltd. as reflected in the audit report. 8. The audit officer did not examine the counter foil of the cheque and also take any opinion of hand writing expert about tampering the bank cheque No. 073698. 8. The Audit Officer has clearly mentioned in his report that on 03.03.2000 at Page-301 a Bank drawal from Tripura State Coop. Bank Ltd. was found in the cash book for Rs. 12,000/- against cheque No. 073698 dated 21.02.2000. But on verification of Bank A/Cs it was detected that by tampering the aforesaid cheque drawal was made for Rs. 32,000/- by the Manager Sri Roy Choudhury himself. Also added that it was admitted by Sri Roy Choudhury as his personal liability. 24. The respondents by filing their reply have submitted that the writ petitioner has failed to make out any ground for interference by this Court. According to the respondents, the writ petition is structured on five grounds of objection (i) the petitioner was not supplied the additional documents as prayed and as reflected in his writ petition Annexure-P/3 to the writ petition (ii) the respondent No. 3 is not an auditor within the meaning of Rule-71 of the Tripura Cooperative Societies, Rules, 1976, (iii) the provisions of Sub-rule (16)(18) of Rule-14 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965, has not been complied with, (iv) Rule-21 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules has been violated and (v) the order dated 22.09.2010 has influenced the disciplinary authority. In reply, the respondents have categorically stated as follows : “in regard to first contention of the petitioner I state that the records maintained by the answering respondents reflects that the additional documents mentioned in Sl. No. 7, 8, 9, 1, 7, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 23 has been forwarded to the Presenting Officer, Sri Janardhan Bhattacharjee by a letter bearing No. F.PRS-523/COOP/82 (ACF) dated 08.10.2004 (Annexure-R-1 herein). It is further stated that the petitioner submitted before the Inquiring Authority that, except Sl. No. 11 of the application for additional documents the Khowai Primary Marketing Cooperative Society Ltd. (hereinafter referred as KPMCSL) is reluctant to supply other documents. It is further stated that the petitioner submitted before the Inquiring Authority that, except Sl. No. 11 of the application for additional documents the Khowai Primary Marketing Cooperative Society Ltd. (hereinafter referred as KPMCSL) is reluctant to supply other documents. After hearing that submission Sri Janardhan Bhattacharjee, the Presenting Officer on the order of the Inquiring Authority wrote a letter on 10.02.2005 to KPMCSL for explaining the aforementioned fact (Annexure-R-2 herein). The said letter was forwarded by the Deputy Registrar vide letter No. F.41977)/Coop/WD/2000/1311-15 dated 15th February, 2005 (Annexure-R-3 herein) addressed to the Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Society, khowai, West Tripura. In reply to the aforesaid letters dated 10.02.2005 and 15.02.2005 Manager of the KPMCSL has informed the Presenting Officer vide letter No. F.8(KMCS/STAT/2003 dated 23rd February, 2005 (Annexure-R-4 herein) that, the petitioner has already received the documents within the stipulated period as mentioned in the order dated 20.11.2004 directly from the KPMCSL. It was further informed by the Manager of KPMCSL that, as per order of the Inquiring Authority dated 20.11.2004 cost of Xerox copy was to be borne by the petitioner but, he did not make any payment for making photocopy to M/S Pradip Photostat Centre, Khowai for which M/S Pradip Photostat Centre as approached the Manager for the charges of making the photocopy of those documents. The Manager also forwarded the copy of the bill raised by M/S Pradip Photostat Centre which is amounting to Rs. 4,300/- for making photocopy of documents numbering 6,140 copies. The said letter dated 23rd February, 2005 (Annexure-R-4 herein) was forwarded to the Deputy Registrar by the Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies vide letter No. F.7/RGN-606/96/(Vol-1)231-35 dated 24.02.2005 (Annexure-R-5 herein). In view of these statements and elaborate statements made by me hereinbelow in para-10 of this counter affidavit I state that, the contention of the petitioner that he is prejudiced by the non supplying of additional documents is totally beyond the records maintained by the answering respondents herein; hence, denied. Thus, the first contention of the petitioner has no legs to stand upon; thus, liable to be rejected by the Hon’ble Court.” 25. According to the respondents, the respondent No. 4 is well within the definition of the auditor in terms of Section-2 of the Tripura Cooperative Societies Act, 1974, inasmuchas, the auditor includes a person appointed by the Registrar to audit the accounts of a society. According to the respondents, the respondent No. 4 is well within the definition of the auditor in terms of Section-2 of the Tripura Cooperative Societies Act, 1974, inasmuchas, the auditor includes a person appointed by the Registrar to audit the accounts of a society. The respondents have also clarified that Section-79 of the Tripura Cooperative Societies Act, 1974 which provides that the Registrar is to audit the accounts of every society and his power to cause the audit to be done by a person authorized by him by general or special order in writing in this behalf. For purpose of reference, Section-79 (1) of the Tripura Cooperative Societies Act, 1974 is reproduced hereunder : “79. (1) The Registrar shall audit or cause to be audited by a person authorized by him by general or special order in writing in this behalf, the accounts of every society at least once in each year. (2) The audit under the foregoing sub-section shall include an examination of overdue debts, if any, the verification of the cash balance and the securities, a valuation of the assets and liabilities of the society, examination of all transactions of [the society, the statement of accounts prepared by the committee and other particulars as may be prescribed. (3) The Registrar or the person authorised shall, for the purpose of audit, at all times have access to all [the books, accounts documents, papers, securities, cash and other properties belonging to, or in the custody of, the society, and may summon any person in possession or responsible for the custody of any such books, accounts, documents, papers, securities, cash or other properties, to produce the same at any place at the headquarters of the society or any branch thereof. (4) Every person who is or has at any time being, an officer or employee of the society, and every member and past member of the society, shall furnish such information in regard 10 the transactions and working of the society as the Registrar, or the person authorised by him, may require. (5) The auditor appointed under sub-section (1) shall have the right to receive all notices, and every communication relating to the annual general meetings of the society and to attend such meeting and to be heard thereat, in respect of any part of the business with which he is concerned as auditor. (5) The auditor appointed under sub-section (1) shall have the right to receive all notices, and every communication relating to the annual general meetings of the society and to attend such meeting and to be heard thereat, in respect of any part of the business with which he is concerned as auditor. (6) If it appears to the Registrar, on an application by a society or otherwise, [that it is necessary or expedient to re-audit any accounts of the society, the Registrar may, by order, provide for such re-audit and the provisions of this Act applicable to audit of accounts of the society shall apply to such re-audit. (7) For auditing the accounts of a society under this section the society shall be liable to pay audit fee as such scale as may be prescribed : Provided that, the Registrar may remit the whole or any part of the fee payable For audit by any society or class of societies for any co-operative year. (8) The statement of accounts audited together with modifications, if any, made therein by the Registrar, shall be final and binding upon the society. (9) If at the time of audit, the accounts of n society are not found complete, [the Registrar, or with his approval the auditor, may cause the accounts to be written up to date at the expense of the society. Explanation - For the purpose of this section audit shall include annual or periodical audit, running or continuous audit, test audit or super audit and re-audit.” 26. The respondent No. 3, according to the respondents, by way of issuing a notification engaged the respondent No. 3 on the basis of his qualification, training and experience as the auditor. The respondents have further stated that Rule-71 of the Tripura Cooperative Societies, Rules, 1976 has to be read along with the notification under No. F.20 (25)/COOP/62 dated 07.09.1981 (Annexure-R-2 to the writ petition) and not in isolation. 27. The respondents have categorically stated that a special request was made by the KPMCSL to the disciplinary authority to initiate the proceeding against the petitioner and hence, the contention of the petitioner that Rule-21 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965 has been violated by drawing up proceeding against him is totally misconceived and misplaced. 27. The respondents have categorically stated that a special request was made by the KPMCSL to the disciplinary authority to initiate the proceeding against the petitioner and hence, the contention of the petitioner that Rule-21 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965 has been violated by drawing up proceeding against him is totally misconceived and misplaced. The respondents have further stated that the petitioner had challenged the order dated 22.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8 to the writ petition) as well as the order dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure-P/9 to the writ petition) before this Court by filing a writ petition being WP(C) No. 579 of 2010. By the order passed on 21.12.2010, the writ petition was disposed by directing the petitioner to approach the respondent No. 1 by preferring an appeal against the order passed on 04.10.2010 (Annexure-P/9 to the writ petition). The respondents thereafter have contended as follows : “Thus, the order of remitting the proceeding by the Appellate Authority to the Disciplinary Authority has been confirmed by this Hon’ble Court and the petitioner has not preferred any inter Court Appeal against the said order of this Hon’ble Court dated 21.12.2010; as the order of remittance dated 22.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8), hence, the Hon’ble Court may not accept the contentions made by the petitioner in this regard being barred by the doctrine of estoppel and by way of waiver.” 28. The respondents have further stated that all safeguards are provided to the petitioner in the proceeding and in the post proceeding phase by supplying him the copy of the inquiry report and providing him reasonable opportunity to file the representation on that. Hence, in the context of overwhelming evidence against the petitioner and observance of the principle of natural justice as well as the safeguards being provided under Rule-14 and 15 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965 etc., this writ petition is totally bereft of any subsistence and the same is liable to be dismissed. 29. The respondents have categorically stated that all the documents were produced but not within the date as fixed but few documents as requisitioned by the petitioner were not found on the record and as such those could not be produced. But the petitioner has failed to show how for non-production of those documents, he has been prejudiced. 29. The respondents have categorically stated that all the documents were produced but not within the date as fixed but few documents as requisitioned by the petitioner were not found on the record and as such those could not be produced. But the petitioner has failed to show how for non-production of those documents, he has been prejudiced. In this regard, the respondents have further averred as follows: “From the order sheet dated 28.03.2005 it is evident that the petitioner filed an application for supply of remaining documents and the presenting officer was directed to contact with Primary Marketing Cooperative Society whether the documents at Sl. No. 3, 6, 10, 11 (from 2000 to 2002) 12, 14, 15 and 16 are available in the KPMCSL or not and the presenting officer was also directed to confirm whether the petitioner made the entire payment to the M/S Pradip Photostat Centre, Khowai and the case was fixed on 28.04.2005. From the order sheet dated 21.05.2005 it is evidence that the presenting officer submitted before the Court of Inquiry that all the documents are available in the KPMCSL and the petitioner was directed to collect the additional documents in Xerox at his own cost from the KPMCSL and the presenting officer was directed to make necessary arrangement for supply on 27th and 28th May, 2005 and the petitioner was directed to collect the same KPMCSL on payment of the cost of Xerox and the case was fixed on 10.06.2005. It is evident from the order sheet dated 10.06.2005 that the petitioner submitted before the Inquiring Authority that some additional documents are yet to be collected from KPMCLS and the said statement was admitted by the presenting officer. Accordingly, it was directed that the petitioner was to collect all the additional documents from MPMSCL by Xerox on before the next date. Accordingly, the case was fixed on 29.06.2005. From the order sheet dated 29.06.2005 it is evident that the presenting officer stated before the Inquiring Authority that as per order of the Inquiring Authority all the documents are ready in KPMCSL and the petitioner is supposed to receive those by Xerox; so, the petitioner was directed to collect the same b y the next day and to start the case for examination of witnesses. Accordingly, the case was fixed on 29.06.2005 for confirmation of the petitioner about the receipt of the additional documents from KPMCSL. From the order sheet dated 29.10.2005 it is evident that the petitioner stated before the Inquiring Authority that the concerning society did not supply the additional documents though same are lying in the concerning society and the presenting officer submitted before the Inquiring Authority that once he was present in the concerning society for supply of the additional documents as per direction of the Court and suggestion was made for direction upon the society for entrustment of an employee of the said society for supply of remaining additional documents. After hearing both the sides it was ordered that the Manager of KPMCSL with the consent of the President of the Board of the said Primary Marketing Society should entrust an employee who will supply the remaining documents to the petitioner by Xerox at his own cost on or before 26.11.2005. From the order sheet dated 26.11.2005 it is evident that the petitioner stated before the Inquiring Authority that the process of receiving documents from KPMCLS is in progress and the said society is helping him in collection of the documents and prayed for 15(fifteen) days time for the collection of the documents and accordingly the case was fixed on 19.12.2005 for reporting by the petitioner about the collection of additional documents. From the order sheet dated 19.12.2005 it is evident that the petitioner started before the Inquiring Authority that he has collected the documents except Sl. No. 2. The Inquiring Authority recorded in his order that the case cannot progress for last 1(one) year only on the issue of collection of additional documents; though ample scope is given to the petitioner. Accordingly, the case was fixed on 31.12.2005 for examination of the prosecution witness namely, Sri Parimal Kanti Roy. From the order sheet dated 16.06.2006 it is evident that the prosecution witness Sri Parimal Kanti Deb Roy was present and the petitioner submitted an application on 22.05.2006 stating that the additional documents at Sl. No. 3, 4, 5, 6,13, 14, 15, 16 and 21 could not be supplied b y the KPMCSL and if the witness is examined before supply of the additional documents he will be highly prejudiced. No. 3, 4, 5, 6,13, 14, 15, 16 and 21 could not be supplied b y the KPMCSL and if the witness is examined before supply of the additional documents he will be highly prejudiced. Accordingly, it was ordered that the Manager of KPMCSL will take necessary steps to supply the additional documents as mentioned above with the cost of petitioner from 10th to 15th July, 2006 and the presenting officer was requested to take necessary steps in this regard and the case was fixed on 22.07.2006. It is evident from the order sheet dated 25.11.2006 that to ascertain the exact position for delivery of the remaining additional documents the Inquiring Authority has decided to sit at KPMCLS on 08.12.2006 at 12 noon. From the order sheet dated 08.12.2006 it is evident that the Manager of the KPMCSL stated before the Inquiring Authority that all the documents are lying in the society except Sl. No. 3 and some of the documents has been taken by the petitioner and the presenting officer submitted before the Inquiring Authority that considering the bulk of the documents it will not be possible to supply by Xerox; however, the petitioner has liberty to examine the documents in the KPMCSL office. Considering the entire situation the Inquiring Authority ordered that carrying of huge documents by the prosecution to Agartala will be trouble one and the Court of Inquiry decided to proceed the entire case in KPMCSL office and the petitioner was directed to remain present at KPMCSL office on the date fixed. It was also observed of the said order that the petitioner is under suspension and his station is at Khowai and it will be hardship for him to attend the case at Agartala. Accordingly, the Manager of the KPMCSL was directed to arrange the verification of additional documents lying in his custody from 11.12.2006 to 16.12.2006 in between 2.00 pm to 5.00 pm and the case was fixed on 29.12.2006 for examination of Sri Parimal Kanti Dey Roy and Deputy Registrar Cooperative Society, West Tripura. It is to be mentioned here that the order dated 25.11.2006 was passed in the presence of the petitioner and his Defence Assistant and the order dated 08.12.2006 was passed in presence of the petitioner. It is to be mentioned here that the order dated 25.11.2006 was passed in the presence of the petitioner and his Defence Assistant and the order dated 08.12.2006 was passed in presence of the petitioner. From the order sheet dated 29.12.2006 it is evident that the petitioner filed an application on 20.12.2006 with a prayer to transfer the Court of Inquiring Authority in the office of the Registrar Cooperative Society, Agartala instead of KPMCSL on the ground that his Defence Assistant is unable to proceed to Khowai. The presenting officer submitted before the Inquiring Authority the case is pending for last 2(two) years, only for supply of additional documents and almost all documents are already been supplied. Some documents which are claimed by the petitioner are not justified and those were exemplified by him before the Inquiring Authority. After considering the rival contentions the Inquiring Authority passed an order directing the petitioner to submit a fresh application mentioning the specific date the copy of which of the bill peon book needed for him at Sl. No. 13, counter case memo at Sl. No. 14 mentioning the specific date and time, for which need for him, regarding Sl. No. 15 the date for which the stock verification statement as needed for his defence and the document mentioned at Sl. No. 16 is not necessary at all at this stage and this may be verified by the petitioner at the time of hearing and prior to hearing in the office of KPMCSL during office hours. It was further ordered that if the petitioner fails to submit the petition as stated above no or before 06.01.2007 it will be presumed that the petitioner has not claimed to the additional documents as prayed before and the case may proceed. Lastly, the Inquiring Authority transferred the case to the office of Registrar Cooperative Society, Agartala and the next date is fixed for filing application, if any, for reconsideration of the additional documents. From the order sheet dated 06.01.2007 it is evident that the petitioner was absent without any step and no application was filed by the petitioner for reconsideration of the additional documents in pursuance of the order dated 29.12.2006. From the order sheet dated 06.01.2007 it is evident that the petitioner was absent without any step and no application was filed by the petitioner for reconsideration of the additional documents in pursuance of the order dated 29.12.2006. As the petitioner did not file any application as stated hereinabove it was presumed by the Inquiring Authority that the petitioner has nothing to submit anything further on the issue of additional documents and the same was accordingly recorded. Thereafter the case was fixed for examination of witnesses 31.01.2007. Thus, the whole contentions of the petitioner regarding the issue of non supply of additional documents is baseless and the petitioner has not clean breast canvass of the orders of the Inquiring Authority before this Hon’ble Court with ulterior motive and to misguide this Hon’ble Court by suppressing the real and relevant fact.” [Emphasis added] 30. The document at Sl. No. 2 a copy of the charge list regarding the taking over of the charge by Sri Debasish Roy Choudhury as the manager KPMCSL on 12.04.1996 from Sri Dhirendra Biswas, the acting manager custodian, KPMCSL. 31. Admittedly, except that document, all the documents were reportedly received by the petitioner and the same has been reflected in the proceeding by way of orders as stated above. Thus, the respondents have clearly stated that a bubble has been created that has fizzled out on the face of the record. Even on 08.12.2006, the proceeding had taken place in the premises of the KPMCLS for production of the documents. During that time the manager has stated that the document except Sl. No. 3, all the documents were supplied to the petitioner. 32. It proceed thereafter. As the Inquiry Officer did not prefer to take the bulk documents to the ordinary place of inquiry at Agartala, the documents were verified by the Manager of the KPMCSL and the proceeding continued there. After examination of the reply which has been elaborately met the petitioner’s objection this Court finds that over the issue of production of additional documents umpteen orders have been passed all possible efforts had been made to cause production of the document. The respondents have further submitted that the petitioner has made desperate attempt to hold some objections as the last resort to overcome the allegation of misappropriation of the fund of the society. But in the audit report, the period of audit has been provided. The respondents have further submitted that the petitioner has made desperate attempt to hold some objections as the last resort to overcome the allegation of misappropriation of the fund of the society. But in the audit report, the period of audit has been provided. Even if, by mistake the name of the petitioner is referred for a period where he was not In-charge, that will not take out the substance of the audit observations. Finally, the respondents have stated that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in any manner. 33. The petitioner did not file any rejoinder after the reply was filed by the respondents. Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has reiterated the grounds of non-production of the additional documents and lack of competence of PW-2 to audit the society’s accounts in view of the Rule-71 of the Tripura Cooperative Societies Rules, 1976. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, in order to buttress those grounds has relied a few decisions of the Apex Court. In the course, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has referred a decision in Institute of Chartered Accounts of India v. L. K. Ratna and Others, reported in (1986) 4 SCC 537 , but the said case does not have any relevantce in the present context. 34. Reference has been made to S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 , for showing that absence of reasons makes an order arbitrary inasmuch as the orders without reasons may turn out to be an important weapon for abuse of power, if the reasons for an order are to be given, it will effectively restrain such abuse, as the order would disclose extraneous or irrelevant consideration. Hence, that will be subject to the judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and its worst is at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. A catena of precedents has been referred for having the following observations: “Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. A catena of precedents has been referred for having the following observations: “Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donough more Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The committee expressed the opinion that "there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise" and that "where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity." (P 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also ex-pressed the view that "natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice." (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edn. P. 548). In Siemens Engineering Co. case (Supra) this Court has taken the same view when it observed that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audialteram parlem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process." This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well-known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a Judge in his own cause and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1970] 1 SCR 457, wherein it has been held: "The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1970] 1 SCR 457, wherein it has been held: "The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (i) no one shall be a Judge in his own cause (nemodabet essejudex propriacausa) and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audialterampartem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice." (P. 468-69) A similar trend is discernible m the decisions of English Courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. (See: R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex P. Moore, [1965] 1 Q.B. 456; Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd., [1984] A.C. 648. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fairplay in action." As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that affect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.” 35. In Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd & Anr. v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Apex Court has held as under : “48. But, however, the present trend of the law has been towards an increasing recognition of the duty of Court to give reasons (See North Range Shipping Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping Corporation, (2002) 1 WLR 2397 ). It has been acknowledged that this trend is consistent with the development towards openness in Government and judicial administration. 49. In English vs. Emery Reimbold and Strick Limited, (2002) 1 WLR 2409 , it has been held that justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost. The House of Lords in Cullen vs. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, (2003) 1 WLR 1763 , Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Steyn, on the requirement of reason held, "First, they impose a discipline ... which may contribute to such decisions being considered with care. Secondly, reasons encourage transparency ... Thirdly, they assist the Courts in performing their supervisory function if judicial review proceedings are launched." (Para 7, page 1769 of the report) 50. The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) in paragraph 11 at page 1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the United States the Courts have always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) in paragraph 11 at page 1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the United States the Courts have always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. It was further held that such recording of reasons is required as "the Court cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review". In S.N. Mukherjee (supra) this court relied on the decisions of the U.S. Court in Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corporation, (1942) 87 Law Ed 626 and John T. Dunlop vs. Walter Bachowski, (1975) 44 Law Ed 377 in support of its opinion discussed above. 51. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds : a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of instrumentalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or 'rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process". 36. Further reliance has been placed on Manohar S/o Manikrao Anchule v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2012) 13 SCC 14 where the proposition of Kranti Associates (supra) has been restated by the Apex Court. 37. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that if the order of the disciplinary authority dated 04.10.2010 is seen, no reason would be found. Mr. 37. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that if the order of the disciplinary authority dated 04.10.2010 is seen, no reason would be found. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has further submitted that denial of the additional documents as considered relevant has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and hence, the finding of the inquiry officer is bound to fall through and the absence in the reasons in the disciplinary order has also made the said order bad and hence, the orders as challenged under this writ petition shall be interfered with by granting other consequential reliefs. 38. From the other side, Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the scope of the judicial review is very narrow in this matter. The Court may not embark on the roving inquiry as is done by an appellate court by way of re-appreciating the evidence to explore whether any different and well-caused finding can be arrived at or not. The purpose of judicial review as by development of law is now well entrenched that the purpose is to find whether the process suffers from any infirmity or not. The process in the departmental proceeding as carried out in the present case has been so done in full observance of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965 and the principles of natural justice even the inquiry proceeding waited for more than two years for ensuring the production of the additional documents as requisitioned by the petitioner and finally the documents except the document at Sl. No. 2 were placed and supplied. The proceeding started thereafter. 39. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has further submitted that the other objections as to the competence of the auditor is extraneous to the circumstances inasmuch as any person can be appointed as the auditor if according to the Registrar of the cooperative societies he is fit to act as the auditor. There had been no challenge from any quarter including the society concerned about the competence of the respondent No. 3 (Pw-2). The petitioner is none to challenge his competence simply for the reason the report has gone against him. As such, relying on the said report after giving all opportunities of defence, the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority have done no wrong, as alleged or at all. 40. Mr. The petitioner is none to challenge his competence simply for the reason the report has gone against him. As such, relying on the said report after giving all opportunities of defence, the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority have done no wrong, as alleged or at all. 40. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has categorically stated that when the order dated 22.09.2010 has not been challenged by the petitioner. The findings of the I.O. cannot be challenged by a subsequent writ petition. 41. Having appreciated the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinized the records including the records of the disciplinary proceeding as produced by Mr. Majumder, learned counsel, this Court would now proceed to decide the question as raised by the petitioner viz, whether the petitioner was denied the safeguards e.g. production of records of relevance an or whether the petitioner has suffered any detriment for purported non-production and whether the I.O. or the disciplinary authority by relying on the report of the respondent No. 3 (PW-2) in the proceeding has done any illegality inasmuch as according to the petitioner, he had no competence to be a certified auditor. 42. Before we make the endeavour to response to meet those questions, it would be appropriate to look back at the order or to the judgment and order dated 21.12.2010 as delivered in WP(C) No.579 of 2010 (Sri Debashis Roy Choudhury v. State of Tripura and Ors.), whereby the petitioner had challenged the order dated 22.09.2010 passed by the appellate authority and the order dated 04.10.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority. 43. It has been observed that the appellate authority in the order dated 22.09.2010 has recorded that the finding of the I.O. does not call for any interference and on the basis of the order dated 22.09.2010, the disciplinary authority had passed the order dated 04.10.2010 by enhancing the punishment. 44. Similar issues were also raised in that proceeding but this Court has observed that asking the writ petitioner to approach the appellate authority cannot be Caesar to Caesar syndrome and it cannot be also said that the appellate authority will not consider objectivity and in accordance with law, the case of the petitioner vis-à-vis the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority subject to that, the petitioner could clarify the grounds properly before the appellate authority. There cannot be any doubt that the alternative remedy like a statutory appeal cannot prohibit the writ court from exercising its jurisdiction as the disciplinary authority acted on alleged audit report submitted by a non-certified auditor, but at the same the court should also consider whether it would be proper for it to take away the jurisdiction vested in the appellate authority by the statute. 45. Thus, the matter was remanded to the appellate authority without setting aside the order dated 22.09.2010 or the order dated 04.10.2010. It was also directed that the points as raised by the petitioner in the writ petition or the other points as would be raised in the appeal be considered by the appellate authority. 46. In view of that, the jurisprudential objections as raised by the respondents have become meritless inasmuch as the petitioner was permitted to raise all the grounds in the appeal for consideration by the appellate authority. As shown in the table, the appellate authority has considered all the grounds meticulously and came to its conclusion and to some extent reduced the penalty within its power given under Rule-27 of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965. 47. What this Court has noted with surprise is that the order dated 22.04.2010 was not challenged by the petitioner before the order dated 04.10.2010 was passed. Though, in the order dated 22.04.2010 the appellate authority had categorically observed that the findings of the inquiry officer do not suffer any infirmity. On confirmation, the appellate authority had remitted the matter for imposing the penalty proportionate to the misconduct. However, since this Court in its earlier decision has given leave to the petitioner for raising the grounds of objection in the appeal against the said order dated 04.10.2010, this Court cannot now turn from the earlier position. 48. We have scrutinized every orders passed by the I.O. for production of the records. One or two insignificant mistakes in the orders are located in respect of the production of the records. In one order it has been stated that the documents at Sl. No. 2 had not been produced in another order it has been stated that the document at Sl. No. 3 has not been produced. Since this Court would not embark on the roving inquiry, it appears on the face of the records that only the document in the Sl. No. 2 had not been produced in another order it has been stated that the document at Sl. No. 3 has not been produced. Since this Court would not embark on the roving inquiry, it appears on the face of the records that only the document in the Sl. No. 2 of the petition for additional documents (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) was not produced, whereas other documents as requisitioned were subject to inspection of the petitioner or the petitioner was given the copies thereof. 49. But this Court has failed to find out any averments on how for non-production of the documents at Sl. No. 2 or for that matter at Sl. No. 3, the petitioner has suffered detriment, save and except for some general statement of the petitioner as averred. Nothing has been laid in the writ petition or in the memorandum of appeal, filed twice before the appellate authority in this regard. A statement without substance in such circumstances cannot justify the cause. Thus, this Court is unable to accept that ground. 50. So far the competence of the auditor is concerned, this aspect can be viewed from two different angles. First of all, to raise any objection is the society’s prerogative but the society never raised such objection and secondly, apart from the analogy as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that whether that report can be treated as a preliminary report in support of the charge of misappropriation of the fund of the cooperative society or not. As this Court has already observed that L.K. Ratnan (supra) does not support this objection. The said judgment can be referred for a limited purpose or can be used for giving the reasons in an order in the quasi-judicial proceeding or by the administrative authority. 51. The said case relates to a disciplinary proceeding against a person who was charged with misconduct. In that case, the question that was dwelled upon by the Apex Court is whether the member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India is entitled to a hearing by the council of the Institute after the disciplinary committee has submitted his report to the council after completing the inquiry into allegations of misconduct against the member when the council proposes to consider the report of the disciplinary committee. Any question of that nature, has not sprang up in the present proceeding. Any question of that nature, has not sprang up in the present proceeding. 52. Initially an impression was created when L.K. Ratnan (supra) was relied that the judgment must be in respect of the competence of a person working under a statute but unfortunately that is not so. Now in respect of the competence of PW-2 to act as the auditor has to be responded by virtue of the provisions laid down in the Tripura Co-operative Societies Act, 1974 and the rules made thereunder. Rule-2 (ii) has defined the auditor in a very widening the manner. Rule-2(ii) of Tripura Cooperative Societies Act, 1974 reads as under: “Auditor includes a person appointed by the Registrar to audit the accounts of a society.” 53. Now the question that has been raised that the auditor shall only include the person who has been catalogued under Rule-71 as reproduced above. There had been no objection in this regard, in the disciplinary proceeding either in the course of the inquiry or later, to decide that issue, in the appellate proceeding. Revisit to the provision of Rule-71 (I) would shed further light over that controversy. It postulates that the audit of accounts of the society shall be conducted by the departmental auditors appointed by the Registrar from time to time on such terms and conditions as it deems fit. 54. It is provided thereunder that any society or class of societies notified by the Registrar may get accounts audited by an auditor and selected from the panel of the certified auditors maintained by the Registrar and published by him in the official Gazette. Thereafter, by way of explanation the catalogue of the certified auditors has been accommodated. 55. The said Rule has cleared two parts: (i) the audit can be conducted by the departmental auditors appointed by the Registrar, but the society also can audit their accounts by an auditor selected from the panel of the certified auditors. Therefore, to understand the meaning of the “departmental auditors” this Court has to be guided by the definition as provided by Section-2(ii) of the Tripura Cooperative Societies Act, 1974. These connotes that any person as appointed by the Registrar as the auditor has to be treated as the departmental auditor. As a part of the record, the respondents have produced the office order dated 20.09.2004 whereby the respondent No. 3 had been empanelled as the certified auditors. These connotes that any person as appointed by the Registrar as the auditor has to be treated as the departmental auditor. As a part of the record, the respondents have produced the office order dated 20.09.2004 whereby the respondent No. 3 had been empanelled as the certified auditors. For purpose of record, the text of the order without the list of the persons is reproduced hereunder: “Government of Tripura Office of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies No. F.6(1)/Coop/ADT/2003-IV dated Agartala, the 20th Sep, 2004 OFFICE ORDER In accordance with the proviso under Sub-Rule-1 of Rule-71 of the Tripura Cooperative Societies Rules, 1976 along with subsidiary Rules of Audit of Accounts of Cooperative Societies framed thereat and in continuation of the office order No. No. F.6(1)/Coop/ADT/96 dated 27.03.2000 and No. F.6(1)/Coop/ADT/96 dated 30.05.2000 the period of the following paneled Certified Auditors had been further extended with effect from 01.04.2003 to until further order for causing the Audit of Accounts of Cooperative Societies in Tripura.” 56. The name of the respondent No. 3 appears at Sl. No. 10 of the said office order dated 20.09.2004. As such, the objection raised in this regard, does not have substance and accordingly, the same is discarded. 57. Now what Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised is of paramount interest but the other objections, he has not pressed. According to him, the order passed by the disciplinary authority suffers from absence of reasons and thus, those orders are in arbitrary and hence at takes away the safeguards as provided by the principles of natural justice. 58. As discussed, to buttress his plea, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has relied on few decisions of the Apex Court and the relevant passages of these reports have been reproduced gainfully above. There is no quarrel with the said analogy. But whether that analogy has provided the foundation for interference of the impugned orders in this writ petition. 59. Before we proceed further, it would be appropriate to recall the land mark decision of the Apex Court in A.K. Karipak & Ore. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1996 (2) SCC 262, where it has been espoused as under : “It is not necessary to examine those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding..... v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1996 (2) SCC 262, where it has been espoused as under : “It is not necessary to examine those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding..... The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it.-The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily Or unreasonably (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala and Ors. (1) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala and Ors. (1) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” [Emphasis added] 60. The first and foremost imposition is that the petitioner has not challenged the first order dated 22.04.2010 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition) of the disciplinary authority, even though the subsequent order dated 04.10.2010 is the continuation of the said order dated 22.04.2010 inasmuch as remand was limited by the appellate order dated 22.09.2010 (Annexure-P/8 to the writ petition) to awarding the proportionate punishment keeping in view of the public interest/society’s interest. Therefore, the disciplinary authority was not under any obligation while passing the order dated 04.10.2010 to give the fresh reason except for the penalty. This aspect of the matter was not addressed by the petitioner. 61. In the order dated 22.04.2010, the required reason has been provided and no ground of objection was taken in the appeal filed by the petitioner against the said order that the said order is bereft of any reason. The said appeal is confined to the non-production of the additional documents and the competence of Mr. Parimal Kanti Deb Roy, the respondent No. 3, functioning as the auditor etc. and as such, whether the petitioner can be allowed now to raise these questions that the order dated 22.04.2010 was bereft of any reason or not, the answer must in the negative absence of the reasons in the proceeding must be overwhelming. Even the fresh appeal that was filed by the petitioner after the judgment and order dated 21.12.2010, no such point raised at least it does not find any reference in the order dated 19.04.2011 of the appellate authority (Annexure-P/10 to the writ petition). 62. Even the fresh appeal that was filed by the petitioner after the judgment and order dated 21.12.2010, no such point raised at least it does not find any reference in the order dated 19.04.2011 of the appellate authority (Annexure-P/10 to the writ petition). 62. The memorandum of appeal has not been filed with the writ petition for scrutiny of this Court. But a combined reading of the orders dated 22.04.2010 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition) and the order dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure-P/8 to the writ petition) does satisfy the requirements of the reason. Even from the previous writ petition, it does appear that the said ground was taken by the petitioner that the reasons were not provided in the order of the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. 63. Moreover, the order dated 19.04.2011 (Annexure-P/10 to the writ petition) as passed by the appellate authority is quite neatly embroiled reasons to assign why the appellate authority was not inclined to interfere with the findings as returned by the I.O. which findings were accepted by the disciplinary authority. Hence, this ground has failed to provide requisite foundation for interference in the orders as challenged under this writ petition. Finally, whether there is any violation of Rule-21 of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965, while drawing up the disciplinary proceeding as the petitioner was deputed to a “foreign agency”. 64. The respondents in their reply have categorically stated that by the memorandum under No. F.4 (88-Misc)/Estt/Coop/81 dated 17.11.1997 (Annexure-R/8 to the reply filed by the respondents) the petitioner’s service was withdrawn from the Khowai PMCS Ltd. and his pay and allowances was drawn from the department of Co-operation w.e.f. 01.12.1997. Thus, when the memorandum for proceeding against the petitioner under Rule-14 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965 was drawn on 29.08.2003 (Annexure-P/2 to the writ petition), the petitioner was working in the Department of Co-operation and thus, the authority was quite within their competence to draw up the departmental proceeding and Rule-21 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965 could not creat road-block. 65. Rule-21 has also acknowledged the dominant power of the disciplinary authority meaning the lending authority and as such, in this circumstance, this Court does not find that there was any contravention of Rule-21 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965. 66. 65. Rule-21 has also acknowledged the dominant power of the disciplinary authority meaning the lending authority and as such, in this circumstance, this Court does not find that there was any contravention of Rule-21 of the CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965. 66. As already discussed that the delinquent officer has the right to ask for production of the documents in addition to what has been cited in the memorandum of charges. Unless the Inquiring Authority is of the view that the documents are not relevant for the case or the production of such documents will cause the public interest suffer or the security of the State, the production is a matter of right. In this case we have seen that a serious endeavour was made for production of the documents and all the documents except one or two documents as stated above could not be produced or could not be allowed to be inspected, but the petitioner has failed to show how he had suffered prejudice for non-production of the said documents. 67. No other grounds have been pressed against the finding of misconduct. The procedural contravention as pleaded by the petitioner has been answered by this Court and hence, the cumulative results of all these observations would irresistibly be that the writ petitioner has failed to make out a case warranting this Court to interfere with the orders dated 04.10.2010 (Annexure-P/9 to the writ petition) and the order dated 19.04.2011 (Annexure-P/10 to the writ petition). 68. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed. It is clarified that for the penalty being imposed by the order dated 19.04.2011, the petitioner is not debarred from getting the benefit of the revision of pay. The respondents if have held back the revision of pay, they shall give effect to the revision of pay forthwith as no penalty can neither by way of implication or by interpretation be understood. No additional charge can be created by implication when an expressed order of penalty has been passed by the competent authority. There shall be no order as to costs. Return the records as produced by Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.