JUDGMENT : Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. Facts in brief: Petitioner C.P. Paul obtained a building on lease from his father in December 1989 and established a hotel: Paulson Tourist Home. He ran the hotel, as he pleads, only for seventeen months, that is, up to 01.06.1991. Later, because of the labour problems, he closed the establishment. 2. When Paul was running the hotel, the authorities under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 ('the Act') visited the establishment and found that it had twenty-two employees. Therefore, on 05.02.1990 it issued Ext.R1(a) notice, said to be a Provisional Coverage Notice, under Section 1(3)(b) of the Act. 3. Soon thereafter, Paul replied through Ext.P1(a) contending that in the premises, inspected by the authorities, there are three establishments: (1) Paulson Tourist Home; (2) Tripti Restaurant; and (3) House Keeping Department. He contended that all these three establishments had different employers and, therefore, the authorities wrongly treated all three as one establishment, under one employer, with twenty-two employees. 4. After six years, on 24.05.1996 the authorities issued a notice, initiating proceedings under Section 7A of the Act. Through Ext.P5, Paul raised his objections. He pleaded that he closed the establishment in June 1991 and that now the establishment has three employers: K.G. Avarachan, K.P. Abraham, and Tomy J. Thekkekara. But he did not participate in the enquiry. 5. Eventually, through Ext.P6, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner passed an order, holding that the Paul is liable to pay the Provident Fund contribution. 6. Assailing Ext.P6, Paul filed O.P. No.1087 of 1997. This Court through Ext.P7 judgment clarified that Paul could assail Ext.P6 before the appellate authority, under Section 7I of the Act, which Paul did. Eventually, the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, the 2nd respondent, on a contest, dismissed the appeal. Therefore, Paul is before us. Submissions: Petitioner's: 7. Sri R. Sudhir, the learned Counsel for C.P. Paul, has strenuously contended that Paul has been mulcted with dues unjustifiably. According to him, first, the establishment is not one, but are three independent entities, all having different employers. Therefore, each with fewer than 20 employees will fall beyond the mischief of the Act. Second, Paul, to avoid any protracted litigation, paid the Provident Fund contribution until June 1991, when he closed the establishment. According to him, first, the establishment is not one, but are three independent entities, all having different employers. Therefore, each with fewer than 20 employees will fall beyond the mischief of the Act. Second, Paul, to avoid any protracted litigation, paid the Provident Fund contribution until June 1991, when he closed the establishment. And third, Paul informed the authorities through Ext.P1(a) itself that he had closed the establishment and that the very building was let out to somebody else, who later established a similar business. 8. Sri Sudhir has further contended that once Paul has informed the authorities, both through Ext.P1(a) and through Ext.P5, that the establishment had ceased to exist, the authorities have no manner of right to insist that Paul is the employer and he should pay the Provident Fund arrears. The learned Counsel has also drawn my attention to Section 7A(3) to hold that the authorities have never allowed the new employers to establish their contentions that they are not liable to contribute any money. In the end, he has urged this Court to allow the writ petition. Respondents': 9. Sri Arjun Venugopal, representing the learned Standing Counsel Sri S. Prashant, has submitted that the authorities have inspected the establishment, perused the records, including the attendance registers, and concluded that C.P. Paul is the owner of the establishment. So followed the direction from them that Paul should contribute to the Provident Fund. 10. About the cessation of business, Sri Venugopal submits that though Paul submitted Ext.P5 objection to the notice under section 7A, he did not establish in the enquiry that the establishment had different employers with fewer employees than 20. In fact, Paul did not participate in the enquiry, despite opportunities, submits Sri Venugopal. 11. Taking me through the statement filed by the department, Sri Venugopal further contended that the Act is beneficial, aimed at providing financial assistance to the low-paid employees in the establishment. Besides, both the authorities have concurrently held that Paul is the employer and he is liable. In other words, Sri Venugopal has contended that Paul has failed to discharge his burden, except merely pleading that he is not the owner. Besides, both the authorities have concurrently held that Paul is the employer and he is liable. In other words, Sri Venugopal has contended that Paul has failed to discharge his burden, except merely pleading that he is not the owner. In this regard, he has drawn my attention to Section 17B of the Act to assert that both the former employer and the person to whom the establishment is transferred will jointly and severally be liable to contribute under any provision of the Act or the Scheme. He eventually contended that the writ petition lacks merits. Any judicial review of a decision rendered by a quasi-judicial authority, he asserts, must concern itself with only the jurisdictional errors, not the errors of fact or law. Therefore, he has urged this Court to dismiss the writ petition. 12. Heard Sri R. Sudhir, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Arjun Venugopal, for the Employees Provident Fund, besides perusing the record. Analysis: 13. Paul was the lessee and his father was the lessor. His singular plea is that he ran the establishment only for seventeen months, i.e., from December 1989 to June 1991. He has pleaded that it is not one establishment, but three entities. Among those three, he is the employer of only Paulson Tourist Home. 14. Granted, Paul has taken meticulous care to ensure that his establishment would not be covered by the Act. Yet it is difficult to understand how there could be a House Keeping Department in a hotel, as in entity independent of that hotel. Restaurant's claim to be distinct may have a semblance of justification. Nor is it Paul's case that House Keeping has been outsourced. At any rate, the authorities physically inspected the establishment, found that it is homogeneous, and accordingly put Paul on notice about his liability as an employer to contribute under the Act. 15. Despite various pleas taken by Paul against his liability, the learned Counsel now pleads that he has paid all the arrears of contribution until June 1991. But the learned Standing Counsel is quick to contradict this. 16. First, Paul has produced no proof that he has paid the amounts. Equally, the Department, too, failed to traverse Paul's assertion that he had paid. In Ext.P1(a), Paul pleaded that he had closed the establishment. But the learned Standing Counsel is quick to contradict this. 16. First, Paul has produced no proof that he has paid the amounts. Equally, the Department, too, failed to traverse Paul's assertion that he had paid. In Ext.P1(a), Paul pleaded that he had closed the establishment. Much later, after about five years, the Department revived its efforts to collect the arrears of Provident Fund contribution and issued Ext.P6 notice under Section 7A of the Act. By then Paul became the owner of the building, after his father's death. Thus he transformed himself from the role of a lessee to that of a lessor. In his Ext.P5 reply, Paul gave the names of people allegedly running the business, as his lessees. 17. So, faced with the contradiction, the Primary Authority under the Act decided to conduct an enquiry. He issued summons on 24.05.1996 asking Paul to appear in person on 18.06.1996 "with relevant records and documents." Later, the hearing was adjourned to 11.07.1996 and to 21.08.1996, because Paul failed to appear. On 21.08.1996 one Albert, said to be the Manager, appeared and pleaded on behalf of "Paulson Park Hotel, " the successor establishment. He contended that the hotel was started in October 1991; he claimed "infancy protection" under the then prevailing provisions of the Act. Albert also requested for more time to produce the records from October 1991 onwards. 18. So the Primary Authority adjourned the hearing to 25.09.1996, later to 16.10.1996, and to 27.11.1996-again for nonappearance. On 27.11.1996, Albert appeared. But he produced no records to support the defence Paul set up in Ext.P5 reply. Under those circumstances, the authority passed the Ext.P6 order. 19. Here we may have to note two aspects. Paul has all along contended that he ceased to carry on business from June 1991 and that new employers had been running the establishment or establishments, i.e., Paulson Park Hotel. Admittedly, Paulson Park Hotel or its proprietor had never been put on notice. Yet its Manager appeared and pleaded protection under the Act, besides undertaking to produce the records. He produced none, though. Therefore, the Primary Authority was justified in drawing an adverse inference and in proceeding further. To be fair to the Primary Authority, I may note that Paul has been given ample time to appear and to defend himself, but he did not use that opportunity. 20. He produced none, though. Therefore, the Primary Authority was justified in drawing an adverse inference and in proceeding further. To be fair to the Primary Authority, I may note that Paul has been given ample time to appear and to defend himself, but he did not use that opportunity. 20. Another aspect: Paul himself betrayed before the authorities what could be termed his close nexus with the new establishment if there were one. Ext.P5 reply to the Department was in the name of Paulson Park Hotel, not Paulson Tourist Home. But it was signed by Paul himself. If he had nothing to do with the new establishment, I fail to understand how he signed, as its proprietor or in any other capacity, using that establishment's letterhead. 21. Therefore, the twin factors of his pleading on behalf of Paulson Park Hotel and its Manager appearing on behalf of Paul-yet not producing any material to sustain their defence-inexorably establish one fact: Paul had tried his best to create a smokescreen to hide the true nature of the establishment, but the authorities could somehow pierce it. Conclusion: 22. In these circumstances, I cannot but hold that the impugned order suffers from no legal infirmity. 23. At this juncture, I enquired about who continued to contribute under the Act, after June 1991, when Paul had allegedly closed the business. Sri Sudhir, the petitioner's Counsel, submitted that there had been no demand after that. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel has said that though he is not sure about it, the authorities may have been awaiting the result of this writ petition to proceed further. 24. Nevertheless, I cannot comment on what could have happened after June 1991. Yet, in the interest of justice, I observe thus: If at all the authorities demand from Paul arrears for the period beyond June 1991, he may contest the claim. He is free to produce material to establish that he ceased to be the employer and that the liability must be fastened on those presently running the establishment. 25. On the dispute whether Paul had paid, as contended by him, the contribution up to June 1991, the learned Standing Counsel maintained his objection. So, when Paul pays the arrears, he may as well produce sufficient proof before the authorities to have that amount deducted from the arrears. Subject to these observations I dismiss the writ petition. 25. On the dispute whether Paul had paid, as contended by him, the contribution up to June 1991, the learned Standing Counsel maintained his objection. So, when Paul pays the arrears, he may as well produce sufficient proof before the authorities to have that amount deducted from the arrears. Subject to these observations I dismiss the writ petition. No order on costs.