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Gujarat High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 479 (GUJ)

CHAIRMAN MANAGING COMMITTEE v. BHAVESHKUMAR MANUBHAI PARAKHIA

2018-02-09

BIREN VAISHNAV, M.R.SHAH

body2018
JUDGMENT : M.R. SHAH, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 08.02.2017 passed by the learned Single in Special Civil Application No.10029/1999 by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said petition preferred by the appellants herein – original petitioners and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal”) in Application No.156/1998, the original petitioners – school management has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 2. That the respondent No.1 herein was appointed as an Assistant Teacher of special subject of physical training in the year 1995. That his appointment was continued from time to time by giving artificial break. That in the year 1998 more particularly vide order dated 24.09.1998, his services were terminated by the appellants – school management and therefore, the respondent No.1 approached the learned Tribunal challenging his termination by way of Application No.156/1998. It was the case on behalf of the original applicant – Teacher that his termination was in breach of the provisions of the Bombay Primary Education Act (hereinafter referred to as “said Act”) and Schedule F to the Bombay Primary Education Act. It was the case on behalf of the original applicant that before terminating his services the school management has not followed the procedure as required to be followed under Section 40 of the Bombay Primary Education Act. It was the case on behalf of the original applicant – Teacher that before terminating his services, neither any show-cause notice was given nor any opportunity of being heard was given to him. Therefore, it was the case on behalf of the original applicant that his termination was absolutely illegal. 2.1 The application was opposed by the school management by submitting that the school is affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, and therefore, the provision of Bombay Primary Education Act shall not be applicable. That on appreciation of evidence the learned Tribunal observed that initially the Trust started English Medium School at Porbandar and thereafter, in the year 1989-90 started the Hindi Medium School in which the original applicant was appointed in the primary school in the year 1995. On appreciation of evidence the learned Tribunal held that the Primary Hindi Medium School was affiliated by the Government of Gujarat. On appreciation of evidence the learned Tribunal held that the Primary Hindi Medium School was affiliated by the Government of Gujarat. Therefore, the learned Tribunal held that the school/school management was governed by the Bombay Primary Education Act. The learned Tribunal further observed that the primary school in which the original applicant was appointed, run by the management/Trust, was recognized by the Director of Primary Education as a private primary school and therefore, they are governed by the provisions of Bombay Primary Education Act. The learned Tribunal also observed that in the year 1981, the English Medium was affiliated with the Central Board, however in the year 1989, the management started the Hindi Medium Primary School for which the Director of Primary Education granted the permission/recognition. Thereby the learned Tribunal held the termination illegal and in breach of section 40 of the Bombay Primary Education Act. Consequentially, the learned Tribunal allowed the said application and held the order of termination dated 24.09.1998 illegally and directed the reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 2.2 That feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal in Application No. 156/1998 of reinstatement with all consequential benefits, the appellants herein preferred Special Civil Application No.10029/1999 before the learned Single Judge. 2.3 That while issuing the Rule and admitting the main Special Civil Application, the learned Single Judge vide interim order dated 20.09.2002 granted interim relief against implementation and execution of the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal subject to the terms and conditions that (i) The respondent teacher shall either be reinstated in service by 01.10.2002 or the respondent teacher shall be paid (by an account payee cheque in the name of the respondent) the salary last drawn by him at the time of termination i.e. Rs.2600/- per month regularly on or before 10th day of every subsequent month with effect from 01.10.2002, that is to say, the first such payment shall be made for the month of October by 10th November, 2002. (ii) The appellant – management shall pay to the respondent – Teacher by 20.10.2002 the arrears of salary at the rate of Rs.2600/- per month for the period from 25.09.1998 to 30.09.2002. The amount of Rs.25,000/- paid by the appellant – management to the respondent – teacher recently shall be adjusted against the aforesaid amount. (ii) The appellant – management shall pay to the respondent – Teacher by 20.10.2002 the arrears of salary at the rate of Rs.2600/- per month for the period from 25.09.1998 to 30.09.2002. The amount of Rs.25,000/- paid by the appellant – management to the respondent – teacher recently shall be adjusted against the aforesaid amount. (iii) The arrears of difference of salary payable to the respondent – teacher as per the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal for the period from 14.06.1995 to 30.09.2002 shall be worked out by the appellant – management and the same shall be deposited with the Registry of this Court by 20.11.2002 and the Registrar shall invest the same in Fixed Deposit in cumulative interest scheme with State Bank of India. The amount shall be invested for a period of three years and shall continue to be invested until further orders of this Court. (iv) As far as difference of salary for the period from 1.10.2002 onwards is concerned, the Court shall pass appropriate orders at the time of final hearing. 2.4 It appears that against the aforesaid interim order passed by the learned Single Judge the school management preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.807/2002 before the Division Bench. That vide order dated 26.11.2002 the Division Bench disposed of the said Letters Patent Appeal and did not interfere with the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge. It appears that thereafter instead of reinstating the original applicant – Teacher, the management paid the salary last drawn by the Teacher at the time of termination i.e. Rs.2600/per month. That thereafter by impugned judgment and order the learned Single Judge has dismissed the aforesaid petition and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal. 2.5 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition and confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal, the original petitioners – management has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. At this stage it is required to be noted that the school is closed since the year 2012. 3. Shri Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate has appeared with Shri Nandish Chudgar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri A.D. Oza, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the original applicant – Teacher. At this stage it is required to be noted that the school is closed since the year 2012. 3. Shri Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate has appeared with Shri Nandish Chudgar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri A.D. Oza, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the original applicant – Teacher. Shri Dhawan Jayswal, learned Assistant Government Pleader has appeared on behalf of the respondent Nos.2 to 4 – State Authorities. 4. Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has reiterated what was submitted before the learned Single Judge as well as before the learned Tribunal. It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge has materially erred in dismissing the petition and confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal. 4.1 It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that as the English Medium School/school run by the Trust/appellant – management was affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), considering section 2(17) and section 2(18)(a) of the Bombay Primary Education Act, the provisions of Bombay Primary Education Act shall not be applicable to the school run by the appellants in which the original applicant was working. In support of his above submissions, he has heavily relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raj Narain Bajpai & Ors. v. Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi & Ors. reported in 1989 (1) GLR 367 as well as the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Mrs. Ranjan Odedara vs. Birla Sagar Higher Secondary School and Another reported in 2004(1) GLH 175 . 4.2 It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge erred in interpreting and arriving at the finding that the school run by the appellant is a Primary School as defined under Section 2(17) of the Act. It is also submitted that the provisions of the Act are clear and unambiguous insofar as the definition of Primary School is concerned. It is also submitted that the provisions of the Act are clear and unambiguous insofar as the definition of Primary School is concerned. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider that definition of Primary School under Section 2(17) of the Act has to be read with the definition of Primary Education under Section 2(15) of the Act. It is further submitted that the education in subjects and up to standards which are determined by the Government from time to time is the only criteria to define Primary Education under Section 2(15) of the Act. It is submitted that a Primary School under the Act is a school which means Primary Education as decided by the Gujarat Education Board. It is further submitted that insofar as the school run by the appellants is concerned, the school was not affiliated with the Gujarat Board nor is recognized or affiliated with the Gujarat Board but affiliated with the Central Board and is only imparting education in the subjects, courses and syllabuses as prescribed by the Central Board. It is, therefore, submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel that the school run by the appellants though in common parlance is called a Primary School for the public at large, but cannot be termed as a Primary School as defined under the provisions of the Act, more particularly, to bring the school under the ambit of the provisions of the Act. Hence, the school run by the appellants is beyond the purview of the provisions of the Act and as such, the provisions of the Act do not apply to the school of the appellants. It is submitted that as a result, the learned Tribunal established and governed under the provisions of the Act would not have any jurisdiction so far as the school of the appellants is concerned. 4.3 It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge erred in arriving at a finding that an affiliation of a school to one Board or another is irrelevant, insofar as the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal established under Section 40F of the Act is concerned. 4.3 It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge erred in arriving at a finding that an affiliation of a school to one Board or another is irrelevant, insofar as the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal established under Section 40F of the Act is concerned. 4.4 It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate any disputes concerning the schools of the appellants, more particularly, when the provisions of the Act do not apply to the school of the appellants and therefore the learned Tribunal, which is a creation of the Statute, which is not applicable to the school of the appellants, cannot adjudicate upon the disputes concerning and/or against the school of the appellants. 4.5 It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that section 40E of the Act is unambiguous and empowers the learned Tribunal to decide the disputes of a “Recognized Private Primary School” only. It is submitted that the school of the appellants is not a Primary School under the provisions of the Act, more particularly, under Section 2(17) read with Section 2(15). It is submitted that at no point of time has either the State Government or the Gujarat Board recognized or affiliated itself with the school of the appellants and therefore, the school of the appellants cannot be termed as recognized private primary school upon which the learned Tribunal has jurisdiction. 4.6 It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the alternative argument of the appellants which was to the effect that if the provisions of the Act were made applicable to the school then the appointment of the respondent No.1 itself was illegal under the provisions of the said Act. It is submitted that if the provisions of the Act are applied then the appointment would be null and void and therefore, the termination which is the epicenter of the dispute would not be illegal under the provisions of the Act, inasmuch as the appointment of the respondent No.1 was itself void ab initio. It is submitted that if the provisions of the Act are applied then the appointment would be null and void and therefore, the termination which is the epicenter of the dispute would not be illegal under the provisions of the Act, inasmuch as the appointment of the respondent No.1 was itself void ab initio. 4.7 It is further submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that even otherwise the school is closed since 2012 and therefore, the learned Single Judge has materially erred in dismissing the petition and confirming the order passed by the learned Tribunal. 5. Present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri A.D. Oza, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original applicant. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Oza, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original applicant – Teacher that the issue with respect to jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal and/or applicability of the provisions of the Bombay Primary Education Act have been considered by the learned Tribunal in detail. It is submitted that the primary school run by the appellants was recognized by the Director of primary education and the same was affiliated school. The learned Tribunal as such has rightly held that the provisions of Bombay Primary Education Act shall be applicable and thereafter has rightly held that the termination of the Teacher was in breach of the provisions of the Bombay Primary Education Act. 5.1 It is submitted by Shri Oza, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original applicant that at the time of admitting the petition, the interim relief was granted on certain conditions and one of the condition was that the respondent – Teacher shall either be reinstated in service by 01.10.2002 or the respondent – Teacher shall be paid the salary last drawn at the time of termination i.e. Rs.2600 from 01.10.2002. It is submitted that the appellant – school management decided not to reinstate the respondent – Teacher in service but to pay the last salary drawn with the result, the appellants – school management is paying Rs.2600 per month since 01.10.2002 and even today, though the Special Civil Application has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 08.02.2017. It is submitted that the appellant – school management decided not to reinstate the respondent – Teacher in service but to pay the last salary drawn with the result, the appellants – school management is paying Rs.2600 per month since 01.10.2002 and even today, though the Special Civil Application has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 08.02.2017. It is submitted that the respondent has received the arrears of the amount deposited in the Registry of this Court for the period between 14.06.1995 to 30.09.2002 after the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 08.02.2017. It is submitted that therefore since 177 months the appellants – school management is paying Rs.2600 per month only and it is very difficult to maintain himself and the family members. It is submitted that because of the pending proceedings initiated by the appellants, as such helpless Teacher had to suffer mentally, socially, economically with the result that his health is deteriorating and huge amount is required since last few years for the treatment. It is submitted that as per the medical opinion the respondent is suffering from systematic sclerosis, myositisschleroderma overlap, SLE, Polymyositis, Sjogren’s Syndrome, which is more dangerous than the other disease of this kind. It is submitted that condition of the respondent is serious and health is deteriorating day by day and therefore, even on humanitarian ground also, some grace is required to be shown. Making above submissions and further submitting that both, the learned Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have held in favour of the respondent – Teacher and have held the termination absolutely illegal and in breach of the provisions of the Bombay Primary Education Act and in breach of principles of natural justice, it is requested not to interfere with the same in exercise of the intra Court Appellate jurisdiction. Making above submissions it is requested to dismissed the present Letters Patent Appeal. 6. Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. At the outset it is required to be noted that as such there are concurrent findings of fact given by the learned Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge so far as holding the termination/dismissal of the original applicant illegal and in breach of the provisions of the said Act. At the outset it is required to be noted that as such there are concurrent findings of fact given by the learned Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge so far as holding the termination/dismissal of the original applicant illegal and in breach of the provisions of the said Act. By impugned judgment and order the learned Single Judge has confirmed the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal declaring the termination illegal and ordering reinstatement of the original applicant in service with full back-wages. The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is the subject matter of the present Letters Patent Appeal at the instance of the original respondent – management. 6.1 The main submission on behalf of the appellant herein – original respondent – management is that as the school is not affiliated with the Gujarat Secondary Education Board and was affiliated with the CBSE/Central Board, the provisions of the said Act shall not be applicable. In support of the above, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has heavily relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raj Narain Bajpai & Ors. (Supra). Now, so far as the aforesaid ground is concerned, as such the learned Tribunal has considered the same in its judgment and order in extenso and in detail and on appreciation of evidence more particularly considering the document produced at Exh.65, the learned Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the primary school run by the Trust was recognized by the Director of Primary Education. The learned Tribunal has also, on appreciation of evidence on record and/or considering the material on record has specifically observed and held that primary school viz. Nirmala Sagar Primary School, Porbandar was recognized by the Director of Primary Education and therefore, the provisions of the said Act shall be applicable. So it has been found and even according to the original applicant he was appointed in the Hindi medium primary school in the year 1995 run by the appellant Trust which was recognized by the Director of Primary Education. It may be that the Trust might be running the secondary/higher secondary school affiliated with the central board. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the learned Tribunal has rightly held the termination/dismissal in breach of the provisions of the said Act and rightly ordered reinstatement. It may be that the Trust might be running the secondary/higher secondary school affiliated with the central board. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the learned Tribunal has rightly held the termination/dismissal in breach of the provisions of the said Act and rightly ordered reinstatement. The same is rightly confirmed by the learned Single Judge. 6.2 We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Tribunal, confirmed by the learned Single Judge. So far as the reliance placed upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raj Narain Bajpai & Ors. (Supra) is concerned, in view of the aforesaid finding the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, as such there is no substance in the present Letters Patent Appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9644/2017 In view of dismissal of main Letters Patent Appeal, Civil Application No. 9644/2017 also stands dismissed. It is reported that since 1998 the original petitioner has been paid the arrears/back-wages at the rate of Rs.2600/- per month only. Even after the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal, the original applicant has been paid the wages at the rate of Rs.2600/- per month only and that too it has been paid belatedly. The aforesaid has led to economic death of the original applicant. It is reported that the original applicant who is out of service since 1998 is at present suffering from systematic sclerosis, myositisschleroderma overlap, SLE, Polymyositis, Sjogren’s Syndrome, which is more dangerous than the other disease of this kind. Therefore, on dismissal of the present Letters Patent Appeal and the Civil Application, the appellants herein are directed to pay all consequential benefits flowing from the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal, confirmed by the learned Single Judge and further confirmed by this Court, at the earliest but not later than eight weeks from today.