JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner, who is the holder of a regular stage carriage permit operating on the route Tholanur-Walayar with stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-49/G-2020, which is a 2015 model vehicle with seating capacity of 38 in all, has approached this Court in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the 1st respondent to allow replacement of the said vehicle with another stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-5/P-4010, which is a 2003 model vehicle with seating capacity of 38 seats in all, by finalising Ext.P2 application within a period of five days, as the incoming vehicle is in better roadworthy condition, though an inferior model vehicle, in view of the judgment of this Court dated 18.7.2017 in W.A.No.1466/2017. 2. The averments made in paragraph 2 of the writ petition as to roadworthiness of the vehicles read thus; "2. As the existing vehicle was giving frequent complaints, it requires major works and replacement. Now the petitioner obtained a better road worthy condition 2003 model vehicle KL-5/P-4010 with a seating capacity of 38, and sought for replacement. The true copy of the replacement of vehicle application dated 5.12.2017 is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit P2 and the Chelan receipt is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit P3." (underline supplied) 3. Relying on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 18.7.2017 in W.A.No.1466/2017 [Regional Transport Authority and another v. Shaju (ILR 2017 (3) Kerala 720)] the petitioner contended that, replacement is permissible with an inferior model vehicle, provided the vehicle is in better condition. The averments made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the writ petition as to roadworthiness of the vehicles read thus; “6. In the instant case, though the incoming vehicle is an inferior model vehicle, entire works are completed with and that vehicle is in a par excellent condition than the outgoing vehicle. 7. If the replacement of vehicle is not allowed immediately, it will affect the public as the existing service will come to an immediate stop as the vehicle is becoming not roadworthy and the petitioner will be put to difficulties. This Honourable Court has occasion to consider similar matters and one of the judgment in W.P.(C)No.17116/2016 dated 10.5.2016 is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit P4.” (underline supplied) 4. This Honourable Court has occasion to consider similar matters and one of the judgment in W.P.(C)No.17116/2016 dated 10.5.2016 is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit P4.” (underline supplied) 4. The averments made in Grounds B and C of the writ petition as to roadworthiness of the vehicles read thus; “(B) The replacement of vehicle with a better condition one is in the interest of travelling public. The petitioner has procured such a vehicle and sought for replacement. The inaction to consider that application is against the interest of public. (C) The replacement application has to be effected with immediate effect as the outgoing vehicle requires maintenance and the incoming vehicle is a better condition one.” (underline supplied) 5. On 8.12.2017, when this writ petition came up for admission, the learned Senior Government Pleader was directed to get instructions and also to file statement with reference to the averment in the writ petition that, the petitioner wants to replace a 2015 model vehicle bearing registration No.KL-49/G-2020 with a 2003 model vehicle bearing registration No.KL-5/P-4010, as the 2015 model vehicle is not roadworthy. 6. On 19.12.2017, when this writ petition came up for further consideration, the learned Senior Government Pleader on instructions submitted that the 2003 model vehicle offered by the petitioner bearing registration No.KL-5/P-4010 is having various damages and it is also not roadworthy. The learned Senior Government Pleader was granted two weeks' time to file statement. Pursuant to the said order, a statement has been filed by the 1st respondent dated 4.1.2018, enclosing therewith an inspection report dated 15.12.2017 of the Motor Vehicle Inspector, Regional Transport Office, Palakkad as Annexure R1(a). As per the said statement and the inspection report, the 2015 model outgoing vehicle is garaged at Lakshmi Body Works to replace its front cowl in order to enhance its body appearance. On the other hand the 2003 model incoming vehicle is having various defects including damaged platform. As per Annexure R1(a) inspection report, the weakness to the platform is a major issue and the rectification of this defect requires total platform replacement, which is not economical for a stage carriage of 2003 model, which is having life only upto 7.7.2018. 7. On the other hand the 2003 model incoming vehicle is having various defects including damaged platform. As per Annexure R1(a) inspection report, the weakness to the platform is a major issue and the rectification of this defect requires total platform replacement, which is not economical for a stage carriage of 2003 model, which is having life only upto 7.7.2018. 7. Since the statement filed by the 1st respondent and Annexure R1(a) inspection report prima facie indicate that the averments made in the writ petition as to the condition of the outgoing vehicle and the roadworthiness of the incoming vehicle are factually incorrect, this Court by the order dated 8.1.2018 directed the petitioner to file an affidavit within a week explaining the facts and circumstances of the case, with reference to the said statement and inspection report. 8. Pursuant to the said order, a reply affidavit dated 9.1.2018 has been filed by the petitioner. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the reply affidavit read thus; “2. It is respectfully submitted that if any wrong information is made in the Writ Petition, I may be pardoned. There was no such intention and it is not also willful. Therefore it is prayed that the Writ Petition may be allowed to be withdrawn if this Hon'ble Court permit. 3. As regards to the report of the field officer is concerned, it is stated that the outgoing vehicle was undergoing renovation and that the vehicle was not checked by driving the vehicle. As regards to the incoming vehicle is concerned it is stated in the report that except the defect of platform all other defects are minor in nature. If it is permitted to replace the vehicle, that defect also can be cured as required.” (underline supplied) 9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2. 10. Section 83 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with replacement of vehicle. As per Section 83, the holder of a permit may, with the permission of the authority by which the permit was granted, replace any vehicle covered by the permit by any other vehicle of the same nature. The procedure for replacement of vehicle is contemplated under Rule 174 of the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, which reads thus: “174. As per Section 83, the holder of a permit may, with the permission of the authority by which the permit was granted, replace any vehicle covered by the permit by any other vehicle of the same nature. The procedure for replacement of vehicle is contemplated under Rule 174 of the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, which reads thus: “174. Permit-Replacement of vehicles (1) If the holder of a permit desires at any time to replace a vehicle covered by the permit with another vehicle, he shall forward the permit and apply in the form “P.V.A” with the fee prescribed in Rule 180 to the Transport Authority which granted the permit stating the reasons for the proposed replacement and shall:- (a) If the new vehicle is not in his possession, state the material particulars in respect of which the new vehicle differs from the old; and (b) If the new vehicle is in his possession forward the certificate of registration thereof. (2) Upon receipt of the application, the Transport Authority may in his discretion, reject the application- (a) If it has previous to the date of receipt of the application given reasonable notice of its intention to reduce the number of Transport Vehicles of that class generally or in respect of the route or area to which the permit applies; or (b) if the new vehicle proposed differs in material respects from the old; or (c) if the new vehicle proposed is older than the one sought to be replaced; or (d) if the holder of the permit has contravened the provisions thereof or has been deprived of possession of the old vehicle under the provisions of any agreement of hire purchase, hypothecation or lease. (3) If the new vehicle proposed does not differ in material respects from the old, the application for replacement of the vehicle may be allowed. If there is material difference between the two vehicles, the application shall be treated as if it were for a fresh permit.” 11. (3) If the new vehicle proposed does not differ in material respects from the old, the application for replacement of the vehicle may be allowed. If there is material difference between the two vehicles, the application shall be treated as if it were for a fresh permit.” 11. After considering the provisions under Section 83 of the Act and also Rule 174 of the Rules, a Division Bench of this Court in Shaju's case (supra) held that Clause (c) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 174 of the Rules to the extent it restricts the use of an older model vehicle (stage carriage) to replace the existing vehicle is inconsistent with Section 83 of the Act and hence inoperative. As per Section 83 of the Act, the vehicle has to be replaced by another vehicle of same nature and the provision does not interdict replacement of the existing vehicles with an older model vehicle. The Division Bench held further that, if the vehicle is roadworthy, then it cannot be said that by replacing a vehicle with an older roadworthy vehicle the safety of passengers would in any manner be jeopardised. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment read thus; “9. We may now come to the Act. Section 83 clearly predicates replacement of the vehicle by vehicle of the “same nature”. The Legislature have used the expression purposely. They could have used various other expressions. To us, the expression is clear. Same nature would mean; a bus by a bus, a mini bus by a mini bus, an air-conditioned bus by an air-conditioned bus, a truck by a truck and not a bus by a mini bus and an air-conditioned bus by a non air-conditioned bus or mini bus by a regular bus; that is the only restriction. When in exercise of delegated authority the subordinate authority, i.e., the State, makes the rules, the rules have to be consistent with the Act. The Rules cannot override the Act or restrict the ambit of the Act. When the expression is vehicle of same nature, then if Rule, 174(2)(c) restricts that an older vehicle cannot be brought in, it would be restricting the right conferred to a person by the provisions of the Act. Surely such an exercise by a delegate cannot be permitted. Rules have to be consistent with the Act and not restricting or in derogation thereto. Surely such an exercise by a delegate cannot be permitted. Rules have to be consistent with the Act and not restricting or in derogation thereto. The Rules to that extent cannot thus be held to be consistent with the Act and would have to be held to be inoperative. 10. Learned Government Pleader then submitted that this restriction has been placed for safety of the passengers. We fail to understand how safety of passengers would be jeopardised, if the vehicle is replaced by an older vehicle, subject of course to the vehicle being certified as roadworthy. If the vehicle is roadworthy, then it cannot be said that by replacing a vehicle with an older roadworthy vehicle the safety of passengers would in any manner be jeopardised. Nothing has been brought on record to even substantiate such a submission.” (underline supplied) 12. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench in Shaju's case (supra) no request made by a permit holder for replacement of vehicle can be declined merely for the reason that the incoming vehicle is an older model, subject, of course, to the older model vehicle being certified as roadworthy. In Ext.P4 judgment dated 10.5.2016 in W.P.(C)No.17116/2016, this Court noted the contention raised by the permit holder that the existing vehicle can be replaced by an older model vehicle provided the same is roadworthy. 13. Section 56 of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with certification of fitness of transport vehicles. As per sub-section (1) of Section 56, subject to the provisions of Sections 59 and 60, a transport vehicle shall not be deemed to be validly registered for the purposes of Section 39, unless it carries a certificate of fitness in such form containing such particulars and information as may be prescribed by the Central Government, issued by the prescribed authority, or by an authorised testing station mentioned in sub-section (2), to the effect that the vehicle complies for the time being with all the requirements of the Act and the rules made thereunder. As per sub-section (4) of Section 56, the prescribed authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, cancel a certificate of fitness at any time, if satisfied that the vehicle to which it relates no longer complies with all the requirements of the Act and the rules made thereunder; and on such cancellation the certificate of registration of the vehicle and any permit granted in respect of the vehicle under Chapter V shall be deemed to be suspended until a new certificate of fitness has been obtained. Going by the proviso to sub-section (4), no such cancellation shall be made by the prescribed authority unless such authority holds such technical qualification as may be prescribed or where the prescribed authority does not hold such technical qualification on the basis of the report of an officer having such qualifications. 14. Therefore, a transport vehicle which is registered under Section 39 of the Act can be driven or plied on road only if it possesses a valid fitness certificate. If it is not having a valid fitness certificate, it shall be deemed to be an unregistered motor vehicle. Further, the certificate of fitness issued under Section 56 of the Act in respect of a transport vehicle is liable to be cancelled at any time, for reasons to be recorded in writing, if the prescribed authority is satisfied that the vehicle to which it relates no longer complies with all the requirements of the Act and the rules made thereunder. 15. Rule 62 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 deals with “validity of certificate of fitness”. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 62, a certificate of fitness in respect of a transport vehicle granted under Section 56 shall be in Form No.38 and such certificate when granted for a new vehicle shall be valid for two years and the renewal of such certificate shall be valid for a period of one year. The proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 62 mandates that the renewal of a fitness certificate shall be made only after the inspecting authority or authorised testing station as referred to in subsection (1) of section 56 of the Act has carried the tests specified in the Table given in Rule 62. The method of checking the condition/functioning of each item has been prescribed in the remarks column of the Table. 16. The method of checking the condition/functioning of each item has been prescribed in the remarks column of the Table. 16. Rule 62 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules contemplates checking the condition of spark plug/suppressor cap/high tension cable, head lamp beams, other lights, reflectors, bulbs, rear view mirror, safety glass, horn, silencer, dash board equipment, windshield wiper, exhaust emission, braking system, speedometer and steering gear. Rule 62 provides for checking the functioning of all the aforesaid items except the reflectors, bulbs, rear view mirror, safety glasses and exhaust emission. It also provides for checking the make/rating, etc. of spark plug/ suppressor cap/high tension cable, bulbs and safety glass as per original equipment recommendations. As per the remarks column of the Table, beam focus of head lamp beams has to be checked as per Annexure VII. While checking other lights it has to be ensured that unauthorised lights are not fitted; while checking reflectors it has to be ensured that the colour of reflectors and reflective tapes are as per Rule 104; while checking bulbs it has to be ensured that head light bulbs wattage, especially halogen, is not higher than those indicated in IS 1606-1993 and also that halogen bulbs with P45t caps are not used in all vehicles; while checking safety glasses it has to be ensured that laminated windscreen glass is used for vehicles manufactured from April, 1996 onwards; etc. The certificate of fitness of a transport vehicle issued in Form No.38 contains a certification by the inspecting authority or the authorised testing station that the vehicle complies with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules made there under. 17. In M.C. Metha v. Union of India [ (1997) 8 SCC 770 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the existing provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act alone are sufficient to clothe the members of the police force and the transport authorities with ample powers to control and regulate the traffic in an appropriate manner so that no vehicle being used in a public place poses any danger to the public in any form. The requirement of maintaining the motor vehicles in the manner prescribed and its use if roadworthy in a manner which does not endanger public, has to be ensured by the authorities and this is the aim of the provisions enacted in the Motor Vehicles Act. 18. The requirement of maintaining the motor vehicles in the manner prescribed and its use if roadworthy in a manner which does not endanger public, has to be ensured by the authorities and this is the aim of the provisions enacted in the Motor Vehicles Act. 18. It cannot be disputed that, use of a transport vehicle which is not roadworthy in the manner prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules made thereunder would endanger the life of the travelling public and also the public on the road, as there is every possibility that driving of such vehicles may lead to major road accidents. Therefore, strict compliance with the provisions of Rule 62 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, read with the relevant provisions under Chapter V of the said Rules, in so far as the same are applicable to transport vehicles, is highly essential for permitting the use of a transport vehicle on the road. A vehicle which no longer complies with all the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules made thereunder cannot be permitted to be driven or plied on the road. Therefore, roadworthiness and viability of the incoming vehicle shall be the consideration in an application for replacement, rather than the model of the incoming vehicle. 19. In the instant case, on 5.12.2017, the petitioner filed Ext.P2 application before the 1st respondent for replacement of the existing vehicle bearing registration No.KL-49/G-2020, which is a 2015 model vehicle with seating capacity of 38 in all with another stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-5/P-4010, which is a 2003 model vehicle with seating capacity of 38 seats in all. Thereafter, on 7.12.2017, the petitioner filed this writ petition before this Court seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the 1st respondent to allow replacement as sought for in Ext.P2 application, in view of the law laid down by this Court in Shaju's case (supra), raising a specific contention that, the incoming vehicle, though an inferior model vehicle, is in better roadworthy condition. 20. In the writ petition, the specific case of the petitioner is that, as the existing 2015 model vehicle is giving frequent complaints, it requires major works and replacement. Hence she obtained a 2003 model vehicle in better roadworthy condition and sought for replacement. 20. In the writ petition, the specific case of the petitioner is that, as the existing 2015 model vehicle is giving frequent complaints, it requires major works and replacement. Hence she obtained a 2003 model vehicle in better roadworthy condition and sought for replacement. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition it is averred that, though the incoming vehicle is an inferior model vehicle, entire works are completed and that vehicle is in an excellent condition than the outgoing vehicle. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition it is averred that, if replacement of vehicle is not allowed immediately, it will affect the public as the existing service will come to an immediate stop, as the vehicle is becoming not roadworthy. In Ground B of the writ petition, the petitioner raised a specific contention that, the replacement with a better condition vehicle is in the interest of travelling public. 21. The statement filed by the 1st respondent, pursuant to the orders of this Court dated 19.12.2017, and Annexure R1(a) inspection report dated 15.12.2017 of the Motor Vehicle Inspector, Regional Transport Office, Palakkad would show that the 2015 model outgoing vehicle is garaged at Lakshmi Body Works to replace its front cowl in order to enhance its body appearance. Though the said vehicle could not be driven and tested since it was undergoing bodywork, on inspection the vehicle was found in very good fitness. No mechanical defects or physical damages were pointed out by the representative of the petitioner, who was present at the garage. On the other hand, the 2003 model incoming vehicle which was inspected, driven and tested, is having various defects including damaged platform. As per Annexure R1(a) inspection report, the weakness to the platform is a major issue and the rectification of this defect requires total platform replacement, which is not economical for a stage carriage attaining 15 years on 7.7.2018. The damages of the 2003 model incoming vehicle noted in Annexure R1(a) inspection report are as follows; “(1) Front glass frame left bottom broken. (2) Door shutters bent/turned at several places. (3) Wheel nut missing on right rear wheel. (4) Platform chequered plywood/aluminium sheets damaged at several areas, which are as such not safe. (5) Rear foot board side sheets/pipes torn/broken. (6) Rear right corner body broken. (7) Some of the seat frames are loosely held and seat rexin torn.” 22. (2) Door shutters bent/turned at several places. (3) Wheel nut missing on right rear wheel. (4) Platform chequered plywood/aluminium sheets damaged at several areas, which are as such not safe. (5) Rear foot board side sheets/pipes torn/broken. (6) Rear right corner body broken. (7) Some of the seat frames are loosely held and seat rexin torn.” 22. Pursuant to the order dated 8.1.2018, the petitioner has filed reply affidavit dated 9.1.2018, wherein she has absolutely no case that the 2015 model outgoing vehicle is having any mechanical defect or physical damage requiring major repair or replacement. In the said affidavit, the petitioner has also not denied the defects pointed out, in respect of the 2003 incoming vehicle, in Annexure R1(a) inspection report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector. The stand taken by the petitioner in the said affidavit is that, except the defect of platform all other defects are minor in nature. If she is permitted to replace the vehicle, that defect also can be cured. In the reply affidavit dated 9.1.2018, the petitioner has stated that “if any wrong information is made in the writ petition, she may be pardoned” and that she may be permitted to withdraw the writ petition. 23. In Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana and others [ (1995) 3 SCC 757 ] the Apex Court held that filing of false affidavit, or making false statement on oath in courts aims at striking a blow at the Rule of Law and no court can ignore such conduct which has the tendency to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions, because the very structure of an ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by anyone resorting to filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements and fabricating false evidence in a court of law. 24. In Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi [ (2011) 5 SCC 496 ], the Apex Court expressed the view that filing of a false affidavit should be effectively curbed with a strong hand. In Sciemed Overseas Inc. 24. In Muthu Karuppan, Commissioner of Police, Chennai v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi [ (2011) 5 SCC 496 ], the Apex Court expressed the view that filing of a false affidavit should be effectively curbed with a strong hand. In Sciemed Overseas Inc. v. BOC India Limited [ (2016) 3 SCC 70 ], the Apex Court held that though the observations in Muthu Karuppan's case cited supra was made in the context of contempt of court proceedings, the view expressed must be generally endorsed to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings. 25. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [(2008) 12 SCC 481] the Apex Court held that, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Apex Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play 'hide and seek' or to 'pick and choose' the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, "the court knows law but not facts". In the said decision, the Apex Court held further that, if the primary object as highlighted in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486] is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of the court with 'soiled hands'. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for Contempt of Court for abusing the process of the court. 26. In Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik v. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar [2017 SCC Online SC 211] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the court must view with dis-favour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth. 27. A litigant who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands and clean objects. Any attempt made by a litigant to mislead this Court, either by suppressing materials facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements should be curbed with an iron hand. A litigant has every right to withdraw the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, once it is found that he has approached this Court suppressing materials facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements, this Court has ample power to decline the permission sought for withdrawal of that writ petition. Dismissal of such writ petitions imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, and even necessary, in order to prevent abuse of the process of this Court and to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings. 28. Dismissal of such writ petitions imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, and even necessary, in order to prevent abuse of the process of this Court and to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings. 28. In the instant case, a reading of the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner dated 9.1.2018 would show that the said affidavit has been drafted in a casual manner harbouring the notion that this Court is required to grant permission for withdrawal of the writ petition as a matter of course. Once it is found that the petitioner has approached this Court suppressing materials facts and making false statements, such an attempt made by the petitioner to abuse the process of this Court has to be dealt with appropriately. In such circumstances, the dismissal of this writ petition imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, declining the permission sought for withdrawal of the same. 29. In such circumstances, this writ petition is dismissed imposing a cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) on the petitioner, which she shall pay to the Kerala State Legal Services Authority, an authority constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 providing free legal service to the weaker sections of the society. Such payment shall be made within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. In case the petitioner fails to pay the cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) within the time limit specified as above, it would be open to the Kerala State Legal Services Authority to recover the said amount by initiating revenue recovery proceedings, in terms of G.O.(Ms.)No.107/ 2011/RD dated 26.2.2011, whereby the provisions under the Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 were made applicable to the recovery of amounts due from any person or class of persons to the said Authority. The Registry shall issue a copy of this judgment to the Member Secretary, Kerala State Legal Services Authority, Kochi. All pending interlocutory applications are closed.