JUDGMENT : The appellants have filed this appeal against the judgment and award dated 20.09.2014 made in M.A.No.15/2012 on the file of II Addl. District and Sessions Judge, at Raichur dismissing the application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act and consequently also dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and award passed by the Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Raichur in LAC.No.69/2001 dated 31.03.2009. 2. It is the case of the appellants that lands of the appellants bearing Sy.No.528 and 529 measuring 01 acre 19 guntas was acquired by the respondentsState Government for formation of road by issuing preliminary notification on 12.01.1999. The Land Acquisition Officer has awarded compensation of Rs.12,000/per acre. Aggrieved by the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the appellants have filed protest petition under Section 18 (1) of Land Acquisition Act before the Reference CourtAddl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn) at Raichur in LAC.No.69/2011. The same is confirmed by the learned Judge by awarding Rs.12,000/per acre and Rs.95,000/is awarded in respect of the WELL acquired in the lands. Being aggrieved by the judgment and award passed by the reference Court, the appellants have filed appeal in M.A.No.15/2012 before II Addl. District and Sessions Judge, at Raichur and there was a delay of 03 years 03 months and 14 days i.e., 1199 days in filing the appeal. The appellants also filed application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, explaining the delay in filing the appeal contending that after completion of their evidence they have approached to their previous counsel before the Lower Appellate Court to know the progress of the case on many occasions. But their counsel told that he would intimate them as and when their presence required or after disposal of the matter. Therefore, by believing the version of their counsel they were under the impression that the counsel will intimate them as and when their presence is required. 3. But in spite of waiting for longer period they could not get any information from their previous counsel. Hence, in the year 2010 and 2011 they had been to the office of their counsel, but counsel could not met them. Therefore, finally in the first week of June 2012 they had met their previous counsel and enquired about the progress of the case. At that time their counsel told that the matter was disposed off in the year 2009 itself. Therefore, finally in the first week of June 2012 they had met their previous counsel and enquired about the progress of the case. At that time their counsel told that the matter was disposed off in the year 2009 itself. But due to rush of work in the office counsel forgotten to intimate the same to them. After hearing the said fact they put to shock and surprise. Immediately they approached to their present counsel and verified the records and confirmed about the passing of the impugned judgment on 31.03.2009. Thereafter they have applied for certified copy of the impugned judgment and award and obtained the same and without loss of further time, they have filed the appeal. 4. It was further contended that appellants are poor and illiterate rustic villagers. If the appeal is not admitted only on the technical point of limitation, then their lawful claim will be defeated. In that event substantial loss and immense hardship will be caused and purpose of filing the appeal will be frustrated and ultimately they will not be in a position to get the enhanced compensation. It was further contended that they have lost their valuable properties, for the formation of road acquired by the respondents and awarded meager compensation of Rs.12,000/confirming the award passed by the reference Court. Therefore, appellants contended that the delay caused in filing the appeal is due to the bonafide reasons and not intentional and due to the mistake of their previous counsel who has not intimated to them. Therefore, they sought for allow the application for condonation of delay. 5. The said application was opposed by Government by filing objections contending that there is no sufficient cause and reason assigned in the affidavit to condone the delay. If delay is condoned the respondent-Government will be put to great loss, which cannot be compensated in terms of money. It was further contended that the appellants have not made out any prima facie case to allow the application. The appellants are not diligent in prosecuting the case. Therefore, sought for dismissal of the application. 6. The Lower Appellate Court without holding any enquiry as contemplated proceeded to pass the impugned judgment and award based on the averments made in the application of condonation and objections filed by the respondent Government and dismissed the application as well as appeal. Hence, the present appeal is filed by the appellant. Therefore, sought for dismissal of the application. 6. The Lower Appellate Court without holding any enquiry as contemplated proceeded to pass the impugned judgment and award based on the averments made in the application of condonation and objections filed by the respondent Government and dismissed the application as well as appeal. Hence, the present appeal is filed by the appellant. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis. 8. Sri.Harshavardhan.R.Malipatil, learned counsel for the appellants contended that, the impugned judgment and award passed by the Lower Appellate Court dismissing the application for condone the delay and consequently dismissing the appeal without deciding the appeal on merits is erroneous and contrary to the material on record. He would further contend that because of mistake committed by the counsel, the appellants were not aware the disposal of the case by the reference court within the time. Admittedly, appellants are landloosers should not be deprived their rights accrued in respect of lands which were acquired by the respondents-State Government for the public purpose. He would further contend that the mistake on the part of learned counsel, the parties should not be deprived their rights and that is not intention of the legislature while enacting the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, he sought to set-aside the judgment and award passed by the Lower Appellate Court by allowing the present appeal. 9. Smt.Archana.P.Tiwari, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents No.1, 3 and 4, sought to justify the judgment and award passed by the Lower Appellate Court. She strenuously contended that there was inordinate delay of 1199 days i.e., 03 years 3 months 14 days in filing the appeal. Except bare statement that previous counsel has not communicated about the dismissal of appeal, there are no other reasons assigned to condone the delay. In the absence of sufficient cause, the Lower Appellate Court has justified in dismissing the appeal. Therefore, she submits that appellants are not entitled for enhancement before this Court. Therefore, she sought for dismissal of the appeal. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for he parties, it is not in dispute that the lands of the appellants were acquired by respondent for formation of road to the extent of 01 acre 19 guntas by issuing preliminary notification dated 12.01.1999. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value of the land at Rs.12,000/per acre. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for he parties, it is not in dispute that the lands of the appellants were acquired by respondent for formation of road to the extent of 01 acre 19 guntas by issuing preliminary notification dated 12.01.1999. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value of the land at Rs.12,000/per acre. The same was confirmed by the Reference Court. The claimants have filed appeal before the Lower Appellate Court explaining the delay of 1199 days in filing the appeal, same was opposed by respondent by filing objections. 11. The Lower Appellate Court without holding any enquiry as contemplated that whether the appellants have made out case to condone the delay in filing the appeal, has proceeded to dismiss the application as well as appeal on the ground that the parties have made a severe allegation against their own previous Advocate, which is not permissible under the law. It is the duty of the every litigant to appear in all the dates and to know the progress of the case and stages of the case. Instead of doing so they have made a reckless allegations against the counsel. Therefore, dismiss the application as well as appeal. The material on record clearly depicts that the appellants lost their lands in acquisition made by the Government to the extent of 01 acre 19 guntas and not satisfied with the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer a sum of Rs.12,000/. The appellants have filed protest petition before reference Court. The reference Court also confirmed the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer fixing the market value of the land at Rs.12,000/per acre. The appellants have filed the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court. 12. The Lower Appellate Court while dismissing the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal has not held any enquiry as contemplated and failed to notice that the villagers in our country are by and large illiterate and are not conversant with the intricacies of law. They are usually guided by their covillagers, who are familiar with the proceedings in the courts or the advocates with whom they get in touch for redressal of their grievance. Affidavits filed in support of the applications for condonation of delay are usually drafted by the advocates on the basis of half-baked information made available by the affected persons. They are usually guided by their covillagers, who are familiar with the proceedings in the courts or the advocates with whom they get in touch for redressal of their grievance. Affidavits filed in support of the applications for condonation of delay are usually drafted by the advocates on the basis of half-baked information made available by the affected persons. Therefore, in the acquisition matters involving claim for award of just compensation, the court should adopt a liberal approach and either grant time to the party to file better affidavit to explain delay or suo motu take cognizance of the fact that large number of other similarly situated persons who were affected by the determination of compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer or the Reference Court have been granted relief. 13. Admittedly, in the present case, it is specific case of the appellants that they had faith in their counsel under the impression that the previous counsel would intimate about the dismissal of the case. But same has not been done by the previous counsel. Therefore, they could not filed appeal within the time. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another /vs/ Msr. Katiji and others, reported in 1987 (2) SCC 107 , at Para No.3 held that : “The legislature has conferred the power to condone the delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justicethat being the lifepurpose for the existence of institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’ delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 15. Admittedly, in the present case, there was a delay of 1199 days in filing the appeal and the appellants have explained the delay. The same was opposed by the Government by filing objections. Absolutely, there was no enquiry held by the learned Sessions Judge before passing the impugned judgment and award. Therefore, the delay has to be condoned denying the interest for the delayed period in the event the appellants succeed in the appeal to protect the substantial justice to the parties who loose their right in respect of the immovable properties. 16. It is well settled that because of the mistake on the part of the counsel, the parties should not be suffered. My view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rafiq and Another vs. Munshilal and Another reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 and held in paragraph No.3 as under: “3. 16. It is well settled that because of the mistake on the part of the counsel, the parties should not be suffered. My view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rafiq and Another vs. Munshilal and Another reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 and held in paragraph No.3 as under: “3. The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things. The party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the court's procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench. Maybe he is better informed on this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may discourage such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute. What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. Maybe that the learned advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the costs of the respondent here. As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs.200/should be recovered from the advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr. A.K.Sanghi.” 17. For the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment and award passed by the Sessions Judge cannot be sustained in law and liable to be set aside. 18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and award dated 20.09.2014 made in M.A.No.15/2012 on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Raichur is set aside. I.A.1 filed by the appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay is allowed subject to condition that the appellants are not entitled to any interest for the delayed period of 1199 days in filing the appeal in case they succeed in the appeal. The matter is remanded back to the lower appellate Court for fresh consideration on merits after giving opportunity to both the parties and pass judgment and award in accordance with law. The matter is remanded back to the lower appellate Court for fresh consideration on merits after giving opportunity to both the parties and pass judgment and award in accordance with law. The appellants are entitled for refund of the Court fee in terms of the provisions of Section 64 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1958.