JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the four appellants, who are convicted and sentenced by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Deoghar, in Sessions Case No.99 of 2007 vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25th September, 2008 and 27th September, 2008, respectively. These appellants are mainly punished for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to be read with Section 149 thereof, for life imprisonment for causing murder of the deceased – Chirauddin Mian. These appellants have also been punished to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code to be read with Section 149 thereof. Both the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. Separate sentences for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code have not been imposed. 2. Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 26.11.2006 at 06.00 a.m., informant Pairu Ansari (PW.8) gave fardbeyan to the police that on 25.11.2006 at 03.30 p.m., his maternal grandfather, namely, Chirauddin Mian, had gone to attend nature's call towards Northern Hill, where Samshul Mian, Sabbir Mian, Jagdul Mian, Salim Mian, wife of Samshul Mian, Maniruddin Mian and Fulwa Mian @ Jalal Mian, after forming an unlawful assembly, having Lathi and rod in their hands, surrounded his maternal grandfather and gave brutal assault on him. Thereafter, all of them entered into the house of the informant (PW.8) and gave assault to him with Lathi and Rod with an intention to kill him and when alarm was raised, the villagers came to rescue. The accused persons had also taken away silver ornaments, cash of Rs.1600/-and bicycle. It is further alleged that the accused persons also entered into the house of his maternal grandfather and gave assault to Shakina Bibi (PW.6). Later on, the villagers brought all the injured persons to Sadar Hospital, Deoghar for treatment, but on the way, informant's maternal grandfather, namely Chirauddin Mian, succumbed to his injuries. According to the informant (PW.8), the cause of occurrence is the previous land dispute between the parties. 3. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts. According to the informant (PW.8), the cause of occurrence is the previous land dispute between the parties. 3. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts. There are major omission and contradiction in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, which have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court and, hence, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court deserve to be quashed and set aside. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the so-called eyewitnesses i.e. PW.6 and PW.8, are not, in fact, the eyewitnesses at all. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court. Moreover, as per the evidence given by PW.6, there was a witness to the occurrence namely Wajir Mian, but the said witness has not been examined by the prosecution. This aspect of the matter has also not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellants that though the charge was framed also under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, but, the conviction is under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, there is too much exaggerated version given by the prosecution witnesses, which make them unreliable, especially, for PW.6 and PW.8. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellants that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause murder of the deceased. In fact, there was a land dispute as alleged by prosecution witnesses and looking to the nature of injuries, there is no injury at vital part of the body of the deceased. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court deserve to be quashed and set aside. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court deserve to be quashed and set aside. These appellants have undergone the sentence of 10 years and 05 months and, hence, let the sentences be converted into a sentence for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I and Part III of the Indian Penal Code and whatever sentences undergone may kindly be imposed, so that purpose of the prosecution may be achieved and these appellants may be enlarged from judicial custody by modifying the order passed by the trial Court on the quantum of punishment, by altering the Sections under Indian Penal Code of conviction. 4. We have heard counsel for the State who has submitted that no error has been committed by the trial Court in appreciating the evidences of the prosecution witnesses. There are no major omission or contradiction in the deposition of prosecution witnesses. PW.6 Sakina Bibi is an injured eyewitness, whose injury certificate has also been proved by Dr. Ramchandra Prasad, who has been examined as PW.9. She has clearly narrated the role played by the appellants-accused. PW.6 has proved the date of offence, time of offence and place of offence and the manner in which the whole incident has taken place. This witness has identified the accused persons and the weapons with which the offence was committed. There is nothing in the cross-examination in favour of these appellants-accused. Hence, she is a trustworthy and reliable witness. In no uncertainty theory, this PW.6 has narrated that these appellants were beating the deceased with lathi. Even if she is not treated as eyewitness, she has also narrated that the deceased had pointed out the names of these appellants-accused, who had caused injury upon the body of the deceased. It is submitted by the State-A.P.P. that PW.8 Pairu Ansari is the eyewitness of the incident, who is the informant, whose statement was recorded immediately after the occurrence. He has given the names of these appellants. He has also proved the place of occurrence, time of occurrence and date of occurrence and there is no question of misidentification of the accused. There is no exaggeration in the deposition of PW.8. He has given the names of these appellants. He has also proved the place of occurrence, time of occurrence and date of occurrence and there is no question of misidentification of the accused. There is no exaggeration in the deposition of PW.8. He has also an injured eyewitness and the injury certificate has been proved by the medical evidence given by PW.9. There is nothing in the cross-examination which is in favour of these appellants-accused. He has clearly narrated the role played by these appellants-accused in causing murder of the deceased. It is also submitted by the counsel for the State-A.P.P. that PW.9 is a Doctor, who has proved the injury certificate of the injured eyewitnesses – PW.6 and PW.8. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court. Looking to the medical evidence given by PW.1 Dr. Rameshwar Mahto, who has carried out post mortem of the body of the deceased, he has narrated several injuries prior to the death of the deceased including fracture of radius and ulna and fracture of tibia and fibula. Looking to the nature of injuries, it appears that all the four appellants-accused have caused injury upon the body of the deceased and looking to injuries upon the hands, it appears that the deceased while receiving the injuries, must have tried to save his body and the appellants have not spared even his hands. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court. These injuries were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased and, hence, the present case is falling within Clause (iii) and Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and not under the exception of murder and, hence, this appeal may not be entertained by this Court. 5. We have also heard counsel for the informant and he had adopted the argument canvassed by the State-A.P.P. and has submitted that in this case, there are injured eyewitnesses and they have given clear deposition. Though they are rustic villagers, there is no exaggeration in their version and even in their cross-examination, they have maintained what they have said in their examination-in-chief. They are trustworthy and reliable witnesses. Their injury certificates have also been proved by the medical evidence given by PW.9 Dr. Ramchandra Prasad. Though they are rustic villagers, there is no exaggeration in their version and even in their cross-examination, they have maintained what they have said in their examination-in-chief. They are trustworthy and reliable witnesses. Their injury certificates have also been proved by the medical evidence given by PW.9 Dr. Ramchandra Prasad. There are no major omission or contradiction in the depositions of these two injured eyewitnesses and, hence, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed may not been interfered with in this Criminal Appeal. Reasons:- 6. Having heard both sides and looking t the evidences on record, we see no reason to entertain this Criminal Appeal mainly for the following evidences, reasons and judicial pronouncements: - (i) The occurrence has taken place on 25th November, 2006 at about 3.30 p.m.; fardbeyan was given on 26th November, 2006 at about 6.00 a.m. at Sadar Hospital, Deoghar; F.I.R. was lodged on the same day i.e. 26th November, 2006 at about 10.30 hours. (ii) It appears that PW.8 is the informant and a grandson of the deceased, who has also received injuries and another important is witness PW.6 – Shakina Bibi, who has also an injured witness; whose injury certificates have been proved by PW.9 and their injury certificates are at Exts.3, 3/1 and 3/2, Ext.5 and Ext.5/1. (iii) PWs.2, 3, 4 and 7 have turned hostile. Nonetheless, looking to the deposition given by PW.2, he has clearly narrated what the deceased had conveyed to him. Looking to the deposition of PW.2, though he has been declared as hostile witness, the fact is proved that the deceased had given the names of these appellants-accused, who had severely beaten the deceased and who has expired while going to Sadar Hospital, Deoghar. On this point, he has not turned hostile. Similar is the narration given by PW.5. Thus, these witnesses have been declared hostile. He has clearly narrated the time when he reached the place of occurrence. He asked the deceased Chirauddin Mian, who conveyed the names of these appellants who had caused injuries to him. On this point, he has not turned hostile. Similar is the narration given by PW.5. Thus, these witnesses have been declared hostile. He has clearly narrated the time when he reached the place of occurrence. He asked the deceased Chirauddin Mian, who conveyed the names of these appellants who had caused injuries to him. On this point, he has not turned hostile. (iv) Looking to the deposition given by PW.6 – Shakina Bibi, who is daughter-in-law of the deceased, she has clearly narrated the fact that the appellants came at her residence; they were in search of her husband and father-in-law (deceased); they caused injury to Shakina Bibi (PW.6); they had taken certain articles from the home of PW.6. She has further narrated that immediately she had rushed where her father-in-law (deceased) was there and there her father-in-law had narrated that these appellants had caused grievous injuries to him. We have perused the cross-examination of this witness. Nothing is carried out in favour of these appellants. Her injury certificate has also been proved by PW.9 Dr. Ramchandra Prasad. Injury certificate of Shakina Bibi is marked Ext.3 and Ext.5. Though, she is a rustic villager and though she has given evidence after 1½ years approximately in the Court, there are no major omission or contradiction in her deposition. There is no embroidery of untruthfulness in her deposition. She has proved the date of occurrence, place of occurrence and time of occurrence. She has identified the accused and there is no question of mis-identification of the accused whatsoever arises. She has also pointed out the weapons with which the assault was committed and she herself is an injured eyewitness, as her injury certificate has been proved by medical evidence given by PW.9 and there is nothing in her cross-examination which is in favour of these appellants-accused. All these things make this witness trustworthy and reliable and as per her evidence, these appellants have caused injuries upon the body of the deceased by lathi. Her deposition is getting enough corroboration by medical evidence given by PW.1 Dr. Rameshwar Mahto, who has carried out post mortem of the body of the deceased. (v) Looking to the deposition given by PW.8 it appears that he is also an injured eyewitness. His injury certificate has been proved by PW.9 which has been marked as Exts.3/1, 3/2 and 5/1. Rameshwar Mahto, who has carried out post mortem of the body of the deceased. (v) Looking to the deposition given by PW.8 it appears that he is also an injured eyewitness. His injury certificate has been proved by PW.9 which has been marked as Exts.3/1, 3/2 and 5/1. This witness has clearly narrated the fact that these appellants had not only beaten this PW.8 Pairu Ansari, but, they had also beaten the deceased Chirauddin Mian by lathi. This witness has also proved the date of occurrence, place of occurrence, time of occurrence and the manner in which the whole incident has taken place, without any major omission and contradiction. We have also perused his cross-examination. There is nothing in the cross-examination which is in favour of these appellants-accused. Looking to the medical evidence given by PW.1 Dr. Rameshwar Mahto, there is enough corroboration by medical evidence to the deposition given by PW.8. PW.8 is also a trustworthy and reliable witness. (vi) Looking to the deposition given by PW.9 Dr. Ramchandra Prasad, he has proved the injuries sustained by the two prosecution witnesses i.e. PW.6 and PW.8. Their injuries have been narrated by the learned trial Court. These injuries were caused by these appellants and, therefore, these appellants were rightly punished for the offence under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code to be read with Sections 149 thereof, for five years' rigorous imprisonment. The deposition given by PW.9 is corroborative to the deposition given by PW.6 and PW.8. The deposition given by PW.9 also proves the presence of PW.6 and PW.8 on the date of occurrence and at the place of occurrence. (vii) Looking to the deposition given by PW.10 Santosh Kumar, Investigating Officer, he has proved fardbeyan which is marked as Ext.7 and the F.I.R. and the inquest report, which is at Ext.4 and Ext.6. Looking to the deposition of PW.10 to be read with the deposition given by PW.6 and PW.8, the defence has failed to prove the existence of any major omission or major contradiction. It was duty of the defence to point out if any major omission and contradiction in the deposition of PW.6 and PW.8 to the Investigating Officer (PW.10), pointing out the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Thus, there is no existence of major omission and contradiction as per proviso of Section 162 Cr.P.C. (viii) Looking to the deposition given by PW.1 Dr. Rameshwar Mahto, who has carried out post mortem of the body of the deceased, it appears that there are several injuries upon the body of the deceased, which are as under: - “External Injury: - (i) Lacerated wound over middle of right lower leg 4” x 2” x bone deep. (ii) Lacerated wound below injury No.(i) 3”x2”x bone deep. Clinically fracture of both bones of right lower leg tibia and fibula in pieces. (iii) Clinically fracture of radius and ulna of both hands in pieces. (iv) Multiple bruises on chest and back, blackish in colour. On Dissection of skull: -Brain and meningitis in tact and pale. Neck – NAD. Heart – empty. Abdomen – Stomach contents about 100 ml food juice. Liver spleen and kidneys – Pale. Urinary bladder – Empty.” In the opinion of this PW.1, time elapsed since death within 24 hours; death was caused due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of above noted ante mortem injuries caused by hard and blunt substance. The injury report has been marked as Ext.1. (ix) In view of the aforesaid injuries, it appears that the deceased was beaten so severely that he expired when he was taken to hospital. Further, looking to the injury upon radius and ulna, which were torn into pieces and there were fractures, it appears that the deceased must have tried to save his head or vital part of the body, but, these appellants have not spared even his hands, meaning thereby too, these appellants had an intention to cause injuries upon the vital parts of the body, but, looking to the attempts made by the deceased to save his vital parts of the body by hands, he must have received injuries on his hands, but, the fact remains that these appellants intentionally wanted to cause death of the deceased, or, the intention of these appellants was to cause such bodily injuries as are likely to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Hence, assuming without admitting that there was no intention on the part of these appellants to cause death of the deceased, but, their case is falling under Clause (iii) of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and not under the exception. Hence, assuming without admitting that there was no intention on the part of these appellants to cause death of the deceased, but, their case is falling under Clause (iii) of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and not under the exception. These facts have been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court and he has convicted the appellants for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to be read with Section 149 thereof and they have rightly been punished for life imprisonment, which is a minimum punishment for the murder of the deceased. (x) It has also been submitted by the counsel for the appellants that Wajir Mian was not examined, though he was present with PW.6 at her house. This argument is not accepted for altering the conviction and for acquittal of the appellants mainly for the reason that quantity of witnesses are not to be seen by the Court, but, the quality of the witnesses. As per Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any act. Meaning thereby too, if the prosecution can bring home their case by injured eyewitnesses, there is no need for the prosecution that more witnesses are to be examined by them. (xi) It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Namdeo Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 14 SCC 150 in paragraphs 16, 26 and 28 as under: - “16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, no interference is called for in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is no doubt true that there is only one eyewitness who is also a close relative of the deceased viz. his son. But it is well settled that it is quality of evidence and not quantity of evidence which is material. Quantity of evidence was never considered to be a test for deciding a criminal trial and the emphasis of courts is always on quality of evidence. 26. In Chittar Lal v. State of Rajasthan this Court had an occasion to consider a similar question. In that case, the sole testimony of a young boy of 15 years was relied upon for recording an order of conviction. Following Mohd. 26. In Chittar Lal v. State of Rajasthan this Court had an occasion to consider a similar question. In that case, the sole testimony of a young boy of 15 years was relied upon for recording an order of conviction. Following Mohd. Sugal and reiterating the law laid down therein, this Court stated: (SCC p. 400, para 7) “The legislative recognition of the fact that no particular number of witnesses can be insisted upon is amply reflected in Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘the Evidence Act’). Administration of justice can be affected and hampered if number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of unknown occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If plurality of witnesses would have been the legislative intent, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available, in number of crimes the offender would have gone unpunished. It is the quality of evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be tested on the touchstone of credibility and reliability. If the testimony is found to be reliable, there is no legal impediment to convict the accused on such proof. It is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact.” (emphasis supplied) 28. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that Indian legal system does not insist on plurality of witnesses. Neither the legislature (Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872) nor the judiciary mandates that there must be particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against the accused. Our legal system has always laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. The bald contention that no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary eyewitness, therefore, has no force and must be negatived.” (Emphasis supplied) (xii) It has also been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanju alias Balachandran Vs. The bald contention that no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary eyewitness, therefore, has no force and must be negatived.” (Emphasis supplied) (xii) It has also been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanju alias Balachandran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2008) 2 SCC 151 in paragraph 11 as under:- “11. “8. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras this Court had gone into this controversy and divided the nature of witnesses in three categories, namely, wholly reliable, wholly unreliable and lastly, neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the case of the first two categories this Court said that they pose little difficulty but in the case of the third category of witnesses, corroboration would be required. The relevant portion is quoted as under: (AIR p. 619, paras 11-12) ‘11. … Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses.’ 9. Vadivelu Thevar case was referred to with approval in Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P. This Court held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. Vadivelu Thevar case was referred to with approval in Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P. This Court held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘the Evidence Act’). But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise.” The above position was highlighted in Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, SCC pp. 370-71, paras 8-9.” (Emphasis supplied) (xiii) It has further been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yanob Sheikh alias Gagu Vs State of West Bengal reported in (2013) 6 SCC 428 in paragraphs 20 and 21 as under:- “20. We must notice at this stage that it is not always the quantity but the quality of the prosecution evidence that weighs with the court in determining the guilt of the accused or otherwise. The prosecution is under the responsibility of bringing its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot escape that responsibility. In order to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence produced by the prosecution has to be qualitative and may not be quantitative in nature. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held as under: (SCC p. 161, para 28) “28. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that Indian legal system does not insist on plurality of witnesses. Neither the legislature (Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872) nor the judiciary mandates that there must be particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against the accused. Our legal system has always laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. Neither the legislature (Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872) nor the judiciary mandates that there must be particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against the accused. Our legal system has always laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. The bald contention that no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary eyewitness, therefore, has no force and must be negatived.” (emphasis in original) 21. Similarly, in Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., this Court took the view: (SCC p. 99, para 31) “31. … In fact, it is not the number [and] quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy [and reliable].” (Emphasis supplied) (xiv) It has also been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Singh alias Harbhajan Singh and others Vs State of Haryana reported in (2011) 7 SCC 421 in paragraph 36 as under:- “36. The evidence of the stamped witness must be given due weight age as his presence on the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present at the time of occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailants in order to falsely implicate someone. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. Such a witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailants in order to falsely implicate someone. “Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.” Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P.; Kailas v. State of Maharashtra; Durbal v. State of U.P. and State of U.P. v. Naresh.)” (Emphasis supplied) (xv) It has also been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mano Dutt and another Vs State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2012) 4 SCC 79 , in paragraph 30 as under:- “30. Salik Ram was examined as PW 2 and his statement is cogent, coherent, reliable and fully supports the case of the prosecution. However, the other injured witness, Nankoo, was not examined. In our view non-examination of Nankoo, to which the accused raised the objection, would not materially affect the case of the prosecution. Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain protect the real culprit. We need not discuss more elaborately the weight age that should be attached by the Court to the testimony of an injured witness. In fact, this aspect of criminal jurisprudence is no more res integra, as has been consistently stated by this Court in uniform language.” (Emphasis supplied) (xvi) In fact, the accused persons are more than five. Others are absconding and hence, it is rightly pointed out by the prosecution witnesses that charge-sheet has been filed against four accused persons and investigation is pending for rest of the accused and presence of all the accused persons at the place of occurrence, points out existence of unlawful assembly and their participation in causing injuries on the body of the deceased. These aspects of the matter have also been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court while convicting these appellants under Sections 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code and no separate sentence has been imposed for the offences punishable under Sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code, because life imprisonment has already been awarded to these appellants. Every member of unlawful assembly is guilty of the offence committed in prosecution of the common object. These appellants came together; they came with lathi in their hands; they were searching the deceased; while searching they caused injury upon PW.6 and PW.8 also. Togetherness and jointly they all had gone where father-in-law of PW.6 or grandfather of PW.8 was there. They jointly assaulted the deceased, which is corroborated by injury certificate proved by PW.9 and the injuries upon the body of the deceased proved by PW.1, vis-a-vis no material cross-examination of PW.6 and PW.8 reflects as to the existence of unlawful assembly for prosecution of the common object. Even if these PW.6 and PW.8 are the nearby relatives of the deceased, that does not mean that their evidence should be brushed aside by this Court. (xvii) It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mano Dutt and another Vs State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2012) 4 SCC 79 , in paragraphs 24 and 33 as under: - “24. Another contention raised on behalf of the appellant-accused is that only family members of the deceased were examined as witnesses and they being interested witnesses cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the prosecution did not examine any independent witnesses and, therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. This argument is again without much substance. Firstly, there is no bar in law in examining family members, or any other person, as witnesses. More often than not, in such cases involving family members of both sides, it is a member of the family or a friend who comes to rescue the injured. Those alone are the people who take the risk of sustaining injuries by jumping into such a quarrel and trying to defuse the crisis. More often than not, in such cases involving family members of both sides, it is a member of the family or a friend who comes to rescue the injured. Those alone are the people who take the risk of sustaining injuries by jumping into such a quarrel and trying to defuse the crisis. Besides, when the statement of witnesses, who are relatives, or are parties known to the affected party, is credible, reliable, trustworthy, admissible in accordance with the law and corroborated by other witnesses or documentary evidence of the prosecution, there would hardly be any reason for the Court to reject such evidence merely on the ground that the witness was a family member or an interested witness or a person known to the affected party. 33. The court can convict an accused on the statement of a sole witness, even if he was a relative of the deceased and thus, an interested party. The condition precedent to such an order is that the statement of such witness should satisfy the legal parameters stated by this Court in a catena of judgments. Once those parameters are satisfied and the statement of the witness is trustworthy, cogent and corroborated by other evidence produced by the prosecution, oral or documentary, then the court would not fall in error of law in relying upon the statement of such witness. It is only when the courts find that the single eyewitness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure its defect. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of this Court, in Anil Phukan v. State of Assam.” (Emphasis supplied) (xviii) It has also been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Babu Vs State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2012) 8 SCC 651 in paragraph 22 as under:- “22. This Court has repeatedly held that the version of an eyewitness cannot be discarded by the court merely on the ground that such eyewitness happened to be a relative or friend of the deceased. It is also stated that where the presence of the eyewitnesses is proved to be natural and their statements are nothing but truthful disclosure of actual facts leading to the occurrence, it will not be permissible for the court to discard the statement of such related or friendly witnesses. It is also stated that where the presence of the eyewitnesses is proved to be natural and their statements are nothing but truthful disclosure of actual facts leading to the occurrence, it will not be permissible for the court to discard the statement of such related or friendly witnesses. To put it clear, there is no bar in law on examining family members or any other person as witnesses. In fact, in cases involving family members of both sides, it is a member of the family or a friend who comes to rescue the injured. If the statement of witnesses, who are relatives or known to the parties affected is credible, reliable, trustworthy and corroborated by other witnesses, there would hardly be any reason for the court to reject such evidence merely on the ground that the witness was a family member or an interested witness or a person known to the affected party or friend, etc. These principles have been reiterated in Mano Dutt v. State of U.P. and Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal. (Emphasis supplied) 7. Thus, looking to the evidence given by prosecution witnesses, PW.6 and PW.8 are trustworthy and reliable witnesses. They are also injured witnesses. They have clearly narrated the role played by the accused in causing murder of the the deceased. Their injury certificates have also been proved by PW.9 Dr. Ramchandra Prasad and the injuries sustained by the deceased have been proved by PW.1 Dr. Rameshwar Mahto. The evidences of PW.1, PW.9 and PW.10 (Investigating Officer) are corroborative to the depositions given by PW.6 and PW.8. By these evidences on record, the prosecution has proved the occurrence of murder of Chirauddin Mian committed by these appellants. Hence, no error has been committed by the trial Court in appreciating these evidences on record and in convicting the appellants for offence under Section 302 to be read with Section 149 thereof for causing murder of the deceased and further, in convicting the appellants for offence punishable under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code to be read with Section 149 thereof for causing grievous injuries upon the injured witnesses. Hence, there is no substance in this Criminal Appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed. Let the Lower Courts Records be sent back to the Trial Court.