JUDGMENT : In this Regular Second Appeal, the appellant has laid a challenge to the judgment and decree dated 03.10.2009 made by the learned District Judge, Haveri, in respondents’ R.A. No.36 of 2001 whereby the judgment and decree dated 13.01.1984 made by the trial court in O.S. No.7 of 1979 is confirmed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that : (a) The suit for partition and separate possession filed by the deceased father of the appellants herein was decreed for partition and separate possession. The aggrieved respondents had preferred R.A. No.36 of 2001 and during the pendency of the same, a memo was moved by the appellants reporting compromise which was partial as to the parties. However, since some of the respondents did not agree to the terms of the compromise, they had not put their signature to the said memo and therefore, the appellants filed an application seeking permission of the Court to withdraw the memo. (b) The First Appellate Court rejected the said application by order dated 03.10.2009 and that the regular appeal itself came to be disposed of in terms of the said compromise memo. The appellants had preferred Writ Petition No.20089 of 2004 challenging the said order passed on the application for withdrawal of the memo. The writ petition was dismissed on 04.11.2006. (c) The appellants’ preferred Writ Appeal No.2187 of 2006 (first appellate court wrongly stated Writ Appeal No.20187 of 2006) challenging the same. The said writ appeal also came to be disposed of without setting aside the order made by the learned Single Judge. However, liberty was reserved to the appellants herein to take up an appropriate contention at an appropriate stage. (d) Thus, the order made by the lower appellate court rejecting the appellants’ application for permission to withdraw the compromise memo has merged into the order of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.20089 of 2004 which in turn has merged into the order of the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal because of the doctrine of merger. The matter thus had attained finality by the order passed on the compromise petition although alleged to be partial as to the parties. 3. With this background, the appellant had filed a Review Petition in Civil Misc. The matter thus had attained finality by the order passed on the compromise petition although alleged to be partial as to the parties. 3. With this background, the appellant had filed a Review Petition in Civil Misc. Petition No.27 of 2009 seeking review of the judgment and decree dated 03.10.2009 passed by the lower appellate court in R.A. No. 36 of 2001. The said review petition has been dismissed by the judgment and order dated 28.07.2011. This is put in challenged in the present Regular Second Appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that there is error apparent on the face of the record; the doctrine of merger does not apply since the Writ court is not an appellate court inasmuch as the doctrine in the case of Kuhayammed and others Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587 , the Supreme Court has held is confined to the orders passed in the hierarchical courts of appeal and therefore, the court below has grossly erred in law in pressing into service the doctrine of merger. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contends that the compromise memo itself was not in terms of the Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and therefore, the Court below has not justified in rejecting the appellants’ application for review of the judgment and decree. 6. I have carefully considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants. A question was posed to the learned counsel as to whether the order now sought to be challenged in the Regular Second Appeal would amount to a decree. Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines ‘decree’. The ingredients of the definition are militantly lacking in the impugned judgment and order and therefore, the same does not amount to a decree and consequently, invocation of appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is thoroughly misconceived. 7. That apart, going by the memorandum of appeal and the arguments of the counsel, I am not convinced that any substantial question of law arises in this appeal. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed as being unworthy of admission. Hence, the need to consider pending IAs does not arise. Accordingly they are disposed of.