Lal Mohan Mahto, son of Late Navin Mahto v. State of Jharkhand
2018-02-24
AMITAV K.GUPTA, D.N.PATEL
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused-appellant, being aggrieved and feeling dis-satisfied, by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.09.2010 and 23.09.2010 respectively, passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Ghatshila, in connection with Sessions Trial No.99 of 2004, corresponding to G.R. Case No.464 of 2003 arising out of Chakulia P.S. Case No.50 of 2003 whereby this appellant has been mainly punished for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for causing murder of his wife and is sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5000/-and in case of default, five months' simple imprisonment. Case of the prosecution: 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 27.10.2003 at 18.00 hrs the informant Tulsi Mahto (P.W-4) gave fardbeyan to police that today, at about 8-9 A.M. in the morning he had gone to field for cutting the grass, then Topti Mahto (aged about 8 years) who is the daughter of his nephew (Bhagina) came before him, raising alarm and told him that his father Lal Mohan Mahto had killed her mother Putul Mahto (deceased) by ‘KATARI’ (sharp cutting instrument) inside the house. Thereafter, informant alongwith villagers went there and saw Putul Mahto lying dead in the room and her head was cut away by sharp cutting weapon and blood was also found here and there. When informant again asked to Tapoti Mahto (PW-3) about the occurrence, then she told that there is a quarrel between her father and mother due to some house hold affairs and in anger her father Lal Mohan Mahto killed her mother by “KATARI’ and fled away. Thereafter informant alongwith villagers informed about the occurrence to Chowkidar and police. The informant claim that due to house hold quarrel, Lal Mohan Mahto had killed his wife Putul Mahto by ‘KATARI’. Ten witnesses were examined by the prosecution P.W-1 Jhilati Mahto She had seen the Lal Mohan Mahto carrying the head of Putul Mahto in his hand. P.W-2 Lakhan Mahto He deposed that Lal Mohan Mahto had confessed before him that he had killed Putul Mahto. He has proved his signature in the seizure list of ‘KATARI’ and Tangi i.e marked as Ext.1. P.W-3 Tapoti Mahto (age about 9 years) She is the daughter of deceased Putul Mahto and accused Lal Mohan Mahto.
P.W-2 Lakhan Mahto He deposed that Lal Mohan Mahto had confessed before him that he had killed Putul Mahto. He has proved his signature in the seizure list of ‘KATARI’ and Tangi i.e marked as Ext.1. P.W-3 Tapoti Mahto (age about 9 years) She is the daughter of deceased Putul Mahto and accused Lal Mohan Mahto. She is the Eye witness of the occurrence and has proved her signature in the statement recorded U/S 164 of Cr.P.C i.e marked as Ext.2. P.W-4 Tulsi Mahto He is the informant of this case and is a Hearsay witness. P.W-5 Ajit Kumar Singh (Judicial Magistrate 1 st Class) He has proved the statement of Topti Mahto recorded U/s 164 of Cr.P.C i.e marked as Ext.2/1 and has also proved the signature of Ramesh Chandra Mahto (Translator) in the statement recorded u/s 164 of Cr.P.C i.e marked as Ext.2/2. P.W-6 Dandu Ram Mardi He has proved the thumb impression of informant Tulsi Mahto in fardbeyan i.e marked as Ext.3 and has also proved his signature in the fardbeyan i.e marked as Ext.3/1. P.W-7 Bhakto Prasad Mahato He has proved his signature in the seizure list i.e marked as Ext.4. P.W-8 Gangadhar Mahato He has proved his thumb impression in the seizure list. P.W-9 Kartik Mahato He is the brother of deceased Putul Mahto. He has proved his signature in the seizure list of ‘KATARI’ i.e marked as Ext.1/1. P.W-10 Dr. Akhilesh Kumar Choudhary He is a Doctor who has conducted the Post-mortem on the dead body of Putul Mahto @ Bhawani Mahto and has proved the Post-mortem report and his signature in the Post-mortem report i.e marked as Ext.5 and 5/1 respectively. Argument canvassed by the counsel for the appellant: 3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that PW-3 is not an eye witness at all, especially looking to para-12 of her deposition, moreover, she is interested witness. There are major omissions and contradictions in the deposition of the prosecution witnesses. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial court. It is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that though PW-5 has narrated statement made by the appellant-accused under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which is a confession of this appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that deposition of PW-5 is of no help to the prosecution.
It is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that though PW-5 has narrated statement made by the appellant-accused under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which is a confession of this appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that deposition of PW-5 is of no help to the prosecution. It is also submitted that looking to the deposition of PW-9 it appears that there is an extra judicial confession by this appellant-accused, but, it is not appreciated by the trial court that he was in custody and any confession made by the appellant during his custody is of no help to the prosecution. These aspects of the matter is not properly appreciated by the learned trial court. It is also submitted by the counsel for the appellant that looking to the deposition of prosecution witnesses this appellant was a mad person and hence he was not knowing what he was doing nor he was knowing the consequences of his act. This aspect of the mater has also not been properly appreciated by the learned trial court and hence the judgment and order passed by the learned trial court of conviction and sentence deserves to be quashed and set aside. Argument canvassed by the A.P.P.; 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of State-A.P.P. has submitted that the case of the prosecution is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The murder has taken place in the house of PW-3 and in the house of the appellant-accused. Appellant has committed the murder of his wife. PW-3 is daughter of the deceased and the daughter of this appellant. She has clearly narrated the role played by this appellant-accused in the murder of deceased. This PW-3 has proved the date of occurrence, the place of occurrence, the time of occurrence and the manner in which the whole occurrence has taken place. Though, she is a minor and close relative of the deceased, she is a trustworthy and reliable witness. Her statement has also been recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. by PW-5 – Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class which is proved and marked as Exhibit 2/1 and 2/2. Her deposition is getting enough corroboration by the other prosecution witnesses, especially PW-10-Dr. Akhilesh Kumar Chaudhary and is getting enough corroboration from other prosecution witnesses – PW-2 who is a seizure list (panch) witness and PW-7.
Her deposition is getting enough corroboration by the other prosecution witnesses, especially PW-10-Dr. Akhilesh Kumar Chaudhary and is getting enough corroboration from other prosecution witnesses – PW-2 who is a seizure list (panch) witness and PW-7. There are no omissions or contradictions in the deposition of the prosecution witnesses, especially PW-3, PW-5, PW-2 and PW-7, hence, no error has been committed by the learned trial court in convicting and sentencing this appellant for causing murder of the deceased and hence, this criminal appeal may not be entertained by this Court. Reasons: 5. Having heard the learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the evidences on record, we see no reason to entertain this criminal appeal mainly for the following evidences and judicial pronouncements:- (i) The occurrence has taken place on 27th October, 2003 between 8 a.m. to 9 a.m., fardbeyan was recorded on 27th October, 2003 at 18 hours and F.I.R. was lodged on 27th October, 2003 at about 22 hours. Looking to the deposition given by PW-3, it appears that she is daughter of the deceased and daughter of this appellant. Appellant has caused murder of his wife i.e. mother of PW-3. Her presence at the place of occurrence is absolutely natural because the murder has taken place in the house where father, mother and this daughter were living. Even though she has stated in para-12 of her deposition that she rushed to the next room immediately and though she is not an eye witness of exactly the fact of inflicting blow by this appellant upon her mother, the fact remains that she is an eye witness of the fact immediately after the murder. Appellant has caused murder of his wife who is mother of PW-3. PW-3 has no reason to give false evidence against her father. She is minor, her presence at the place of occurrence is absolutely natural. Nothing is coming out in favour of this appellant in cross-examination of PW-3. Without any exaggeration PW-3 has given her deposition before the learned trial court. She is a trustworthy and reliable witness looking to the overall evidences given by PW-3 and moreover her deposition is getting enough corroboration by the deposition given by PW-5 to be read with Exhibit 2/1 and 2/2.
Without any exaggeration PW-3 has given her deposition before the learned trial court. She is a trustworthy and reliable witness looking to the overall evidences given by PW-3 and moreover her deposition is getting enough corroboration by the deposition given by PW-5 to be read with Exhibit 2/1 and 2/2. (ii) PW-5 is a Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class who has recorded the statement of PW-3 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. This witness has proved the statement of PW-3 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which is marked as Exhibit 2/1 and 2/2 in which she has narrated the whole occurrence in detail and there was nobody in the house other than this appellant. She has proved the fact of murder committed by this appellant of the mother of PW-3 and the deposition of PW-5 is corroborative to the depositio9n of PW-3. (iii) Looking to the deposition given by other prosecution witnesses who are PW-2 and PW-8, who are seizure list witnesses, they have proved the seizure list of the weapon which is marked as Exhibit-1. The weapon which was used for causing murder of the deceased was seized by the Investigating Officer. Thus the deposition of PW-2 is also corroborative to the deposition of PW-3. (iv) Looking to the medical evidence given by P W -1 0 -Dr. Akhilesh Kumar Choudhary who has carried out post mortem on the body of the deceased which is marked as Exhibit-5 and 5/1, the following were the injuries and opinion of the doctor:- (i) Head separated from trunk through mid neck by sharp cut, 12½ cm x 10 cm x through and through All the tissues in the line of wound inclusive of bones were severed. (ii) 15 cm x 2 cm x nasal cavity horizontal over mid face through nose. (iii) 4cm x 1½ cm x bone deep vertical along the right index finger with sharp cut fracture-mark over metacarpal and proximal phalanx. (iv) Sharp cut along the shoulder line right side horizontal 4cm x 2cm x skin deep. Head lying separately with the dead body. Opinion: (i) The above noted in juries are ante mortem in nature and caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon. (ii) Death was due to separation of head from the trunk through neck. (iii) Time since death within 24 to 36 hours approximately.
Head lying separately with the dead body. Opinion: (i) The above noted in juries are ante mortem in nature and caused by heavy sharp cutting weapon. (ii) Death was due to separation of head from the trunk through neck. (iii) Time since death within 24 to 36 hours approximately. The doctor also recovered male dead foetus recovered from uterus of about 5 months size length 22 cm and no scalp or lanugo hair weight 200 grams nails upto tip. In view of the aforesaid evidence given by PW-10, there is enough corroboration to the deposition of the prosecution witnesses especially of PW-3. Looking to the totality of the evidences on record and especially of PW-3, her deposition is getting enough corroboration with the deposition of other prosecution witnesses and PW-3 and other prosecution witnesses have proved the offence of murder committed by this appellant-accused of deceased Putul Mahto @ Bhawani Mahto. No error has been committed by the learned trial court in appreciating the deposition of the prosecution witnesses. (v) Much has been argued out by the learned counsel for the appellant about so-called madness of this appellant. This argument is not helpful to the appellant mainly for the reason that exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code has to be proved by this appellant. The burden of proof lies upon this appellant which is not discharged by this appellant. There is no proof brought on record to prove unsoundness of mind of this appellant. Just for the sake of argument, this argument has been canvassed by the appellant. (vi) It has been held by the Hon'be Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka reported in (2002) 1 SCC 219 as under:- “8. The principle embodied in the Chapter is based upon the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea i.e. an act is not criminal unless there is criminal intent. 9. Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exceptions mentioned in the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution.
9. Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exceptions mentioned in the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result of which he may succeed not because that he proves his case to the hilt but because the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case. 10. In State of M.P. v. Ahmadulla this Court held that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at the crucial point of time, such as is described by the section, lies on the accused who claims the benefit of this exemption vide Section 105 of the Evidence Act [Illustration (a)]. The settled position of law is that every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. Mere ipse dixit of the accused is not enough for availing of the benefit of the exceptions under Chapter IV. 11. In a case where the exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is claimed, the court has to consider whether, at the time of commission of the offence, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The entire conduct of the accused, from the time of the commission of the offence up to the time the sessions proceedings commenced, is relevant for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether plea raised was genuine, bona fide or an afterthought. Dealing with the plea of insanity, the scope of Section 84 IPC, the attending circumstances and the burden of proof, this Court in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat held: (AIR pp. 1566-67, para 5) “It is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
1566-67, para 5) “It is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under Section 105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the accused, and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of ‘shall presume’ in Section 4 thereof, the court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a ‘prudent man’. If the material placed before the court, such as oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of ‘prudent man’ the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a Judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself.
The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a Judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. If the Judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity.” 12. After referring to various textbooks and the earlier pronouncements of this Court, it was further held: (AIR p. 1568, para 7) “7. The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions: (1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a rebut table presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code: the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence — oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings.
(3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.” (emphasis supplied) (vii) Hon'be Apex Court in the case of Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand reported in (2011) 11 SCC 495 has held as under:- “8. Nobody had appeared on behalf of the respondent. However, we have perused the records and bestowed our consideration to the submission advanced by Mr Agarwal and we do not find any substance in the same. In view of the plea raised it is desirable to consider the meaning of the expression “unsoundness of mind” in the context of Section 84 of the Penal Code and for its appreciation, we deem it expedient to reproduce the same. It reads as follows: “84. Act of a person of unsound mind.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.” Section 84 of the Penal Code is found in its Chapter IV, which deals with general exceptions. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that an act will not be an offence, if done by a person who, at the time of doing the same by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or what he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law. 9. But what is unsoundness of mind? This Court had the occasion to consider this question in Bapu v. State of Rajasthan, in which it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 74, para 13) “13. The standard to be applied is whether according to the ordinary standard, adopted by reasonable men, the act was right or wrong.
9. But what is unsoundness of mind? This Court had the occasion to consider this question in Bapu v. State of Rajasthan, in which it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 74, para 13) “13. The standard to be applied is whether according to the ordinary standard, adopted by reasonable men, the act was right or wrong. The mere fact that an accused is conceited, odd, irascible and his brain is not quite all right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he suffered had rendered his intellect weak and had affected his emotions and will, or that he had committed certain unusual acts in the past, or that he was liable to recurring fits of insanity at short intervals, or that he was subject to getting epileptic fits but there was nothing abnormal in his behaviour, or that his behaviour was queer, cannot be sufficient to attract the application of this section.” 10. The scope and ambit of Section 84 of the Penal Code also came up for consideration before this Court in Hari Singh Gond v. State of M.P. in which it has been held as follows: (SCC pp. 111-12, para 10) “10. ‘17. Section 84 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged unsoundness of mind. There is no definition of “unsoundness of mind” in IPC. The courts have, however, mainly treated this expression as equivalent to insanity. But the term “insanity” itself has no precise definition. It is a term used to describe varying degrees of mental disorder. So, every person, who is mentally diseased, is not ipso facto exempted from criminal responsibility. A distinction is to be made between legal insanity and medical insanity. A court is concerned with legal insanity, and not with medical insanity.” 11. In our opinion, an accused who seeks exoneration from liability of an act under Section 84 of the Penal Code is to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity. Expression “unsoundness of mind” has not been defined in the Penal Code and it has mainly been treated as equivalent to insanity. But the term “insanity” carries different meaning in different contexts and describes varying degrees of mental disorder. Every person who is suffering from mental disease is not ipso facto exempted from criminal liability.
Expression “unsoundness of mind” has not been defined in the Penal Code and it has mainly been treated as equivalent to insanity. But the term “insanity” carries different meaning in different contexts and describes varying degrees of mental disorder. Every person who is suffering from mental disease is not ipso facto exempted from criminal liability. The mere fact that the accused is conceited, odd, irascible and his brain is not quite all right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he suffered had rendered his intellect weak and affected his emotions or indulges in certain unusual acts, or had fits of insanity at short intervals or that he was subject to epileptic fits and there was abnormal behaviour or the behaviour is queer, are not sufficient to attract the application of Section 84 of the Penal Code. 12. The next question which needs consideration is as to on whom the onus lies to prove unsoundness of mind. 13. In law, the presumption is that every person is sane to the extent that he knows the natural consequences of his act. The burden of proof in the face of Section 105 of the Evidence Act is on the accused. Though the burden is on the accused but he is not required to prove the same beyond all reasonable doubt, but merely satisfy the preponderance of probabilities. The onus has to be discharged by producing evidence as to the conduct of the accused prior to the offence, his conduct at the time or immediately after the offence with reference to his medical condition by production of medical evidence and other relevant factors. Even if the accused establishes unsoundness of mind, Section 84 of the Penal Code will not come to its rescue, in case it is found that the accused knew that what he was doing was wrong or that it was contrary to law. In order to ascertain that, it is imperative to take into consideration the circumstances and the behaviour preceding, attending and following the crime. Behaviour of an accused pertaining to a desire for concealment of the weapon of offence and conduct to avoid detection of crime go a long way to ascertain as to whether, he knew the consequences of the act done by him.
Behaviour of an accused pertaining to a desire for concealment of the weapon of offence and conduct to avoid detection of crime go a long way to ascertain as to whether, he knew the consequences of the act done by him. (emphasis supplied) (6) As a cumulative effect of the evidences on record, as discussed above, we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned trial court in deciding Sessions Trial No.99 of 2004 and no error has been committed by the learned trial court in convicting and sentencing this appellant-accused for causing murder of the deceased. Therefore, there is no substance in this criminal appeal and the same is therefore, dismissed.