JUDGMENT AND ORDER : MIR ALFAZ ALI, J. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.04.2008 passed by Civil Judge No.1, Cachar, Silchar in Title Appeal No. 13/2007, whereby learned First Appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree passed by Munsiff No.2, Cachar in Title Suit No. 109/2003 in favour of the respondents. 2. The respondent herein as plaintiff, (herein after referred to as plaintiff) instituted the Title Suit No.109/2003 for specific performance of contract and other relief’s. The case of the plaintiff was that the defendant/appellant (herein after referred to as defendant) entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to purchase a plot of land measuring 2 katha at a consideration of Rs.22,000/- and pursuant to such agreement for sale, the defendant accepted Rs.20,000/- as advance and executed a “binama” (a written agreement) for sale on 14.02.2002. It was stipulated in the said agreement that the defendant shall obtain NOC from the Deputy Commissioner within 2 years and shall execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff upon receiving the balance amount of Rs.2,000/-. After execution of the agreement for sale and acceptance of advance money, the defendant did not obtain the NOC/permission from the District Authority and was reluctant to execute the sale deed. The plaintiff/respondent finding no other way, issued notice on 06.09.2001, 02.10.2002 and 05.08.2003 asking the defendant to execute the sale deed, but the defendant did not execute the sale deed, though the plaintiff/respondent was always ready and willing to pay the balance amount and to perform his part of the contract. As the defendant failed to execute the sale deed as per the stipulation, the suit was instituted for the relief of specific performance of contract for execution of the sale deed, possession of the land and other relief’s. 3. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement denying all the averments made in the plaint. Besides raising formal pleas like lack of cause of action, bar of limitation, non joinder and mis joinder of parties etc, specific case of the defendant was that he never executed the alleged deed of agreement for sale, nor accepted any advance money. It was further stated that there was business relationship between the parties and because of such business relationship, the defendant put his signature on some blank papers at the request of the plaintiff on good faith. It was further stated that there was business relationship between the parties and because of such business relationship, the defendant put his signature on some blank papers at the request of the plaintiff on good faith. The plaintiff with the intention to grab the landed property of the defendant committed fraud upon the defendant. On the basis of the above pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court (Munsiff No.2, Cachar) framed the following issues: 1. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? 3. Whether plaintiff obtained any Binama vide which defendant agreed to convey the suit land in favour of the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff paid any consideration money to the defendant? 4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to any decree and/or relief as prayed for? 4. Both the parties examined 2 (two) witnesses each and also proved certain documents in support of their respective pleas and after hearing the parties, learned Munsiff decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff No.2, the defendant preferred an appeal and the learned Civil Judge No.1, Cachar, at Silchar, by the impugned judgment and decree dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff No.2. 5. Being aggrieved, the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal which was admitted to be heard on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the findings that the exhibit-1 is not falsely created or manipulated is perverse to the evidence on record? 2. Whether the exhibit-1 has been proved in accordance with law? 6. I have heard Mr. S. Banik, learned counsel for the appellant at length. However, none appears for the respondent. 7. The learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the suit land is a joint property of the defendant and one Rathindra Rai. A plot of land measuring 4 kathas was jointly purchased by the defendant and said Rathindra Rai, which was never partitioned and therefore, the suit was bad for non joinder of necessary party, being the said Rathindra Rai, submits Mr. Banik. A plot of land measuring 4 kathas was jointly purchased by the defendant and said Rathindra Rai, which was never partitioned and therefore, the suit was bad for non joinder of necessary party, being the said Rathindra Rai, submits Mr. Banik. Further contention of the learned counsel for the defendant was that the defendant never executed any agreement for sale and the Exhibit-1, alleged agreement for sale in the instant case was a fraudulent document and the learned trial Court, as well as, the appellate Court passed the decree without appreciating the case of the defendant with regard to the fraud practiced by the plaintiff in preparing the exhibit-1. 8. Before proceeding to answer the substantial questions of law framed in the instant second appeal, let me consider the submission of the learned counsel with regard to non joinder of necessary parties. 9. It is trite that non joinder of necessary parties is always fatal. However, mere non-joinder of parties does not affect the decision of the suit. In paragraph 11 of the written statement the defendant has categorically admitted that the defendant/appellant was the owner of the suit land by right of purchase and he has been possessing and enjoying the suit land by constructing residential Assam type house thereon. There was absolutely no whisper in the written statement by the defendant, that the suit land was joint property and it was not partitioned or the suit could not be maintained without impleading Rathindra Rai, with whom the defendant/appellant jointly purchased the land. The defendant, however, proved a sale deed marked as Exhibit-A showing, that 4 kathas of land was purchased jointly by the defendant/appellant and Rathindra Rai. Though the defendant did not raise any plea of joint property in the original suit, perhaps, on the basis of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the defendant, learned appellate Court formulated a point for decision with regard to non-joinder of necessary parties and decided against the defendant. 10. Referring to the sale deed (Ex-A), Mr. Banik contended that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the co-purchaser Rathindra Rai. Apparently, the specific plea of the defendant in the written statement was that, he being the owner of the suit land by right of purchase, had been possessing and enjoying the suit land by constructing the house. 10. Referring to the sale deed (Ex-A), Mr. Banik contended that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the co-purchaser Rathindra Rai. Apparently, the specific plea of the defendant in the written statement was that, he being the owner of the suit land by right of purchase, had been possessing and enjoying the suit land by constructing the house. In fact, except proving the sale deed (Ex-A), no other evidence was adduced to the effect that the defendant was the joint owner and had been jointly possessing the land measuring 4 kathas purchased by Ex-A. Be that as it may, when the defendant clearly pleaded in his written statement that he was the owner and had been possessing the suit land by right of purchase and there was no pleading in the written statement that the suit land was under joint possession, mere proving of Ex-‘A’ was not sufficient to establish that the suit property was joint property of the defendant and his co-purchaser. That apart, such evidence being contrary to the pleadings is also not permissible because of the celebrated principle of variance between pleadings and proof. It is the settled principle that no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was not put forward in the pleadings. The ordinary rule of law is that evidence is to be given only on a plea properly raised and not in contradiction of the plea (reliance can be placed on Om Prabha Jain Abnash Chand AIR 1968 (SC) 1083 ). Because of the well known maxim “allegans contraria non est audidendus” and “secundus allegate et probate” a party can succeed only by what he has pleaded and proved. Unless a plea is raised in the pleadings no evidence can be adduced on such plea. 11. In the instant case when defendant did not raise any plea of joint property and on the contrary, specific plea of the defendant in the written statement was that he was the owner of the property by right of purchase and he had been possessing the same by constructing house etc; defendant is debarred from adducing evidence of joint property, which goes contrary to his pleading and he cannot also succeed on such evidence which was never pleaded. This being the legal position, learned appellate Court rightly held that in absence of pleadings, the evidence adduced by the defendant/appellant making a new case of joint property cannot be accepted being contrary to the pleadings. 12. Looking from another angle, by the sale deed marked as Exhibit-A, 4 (four) kathas of land was purchased jointly by the defendant and one Rathindra Rai and the agreement for sale involved in the instant case was only for 2 kathas of land. Even if it is assumed for argument’s sake that defendant purchased 4 kathas of land jointly having equal share, there was no bar on the part of the defendant in entering into an agreement for sale of the land to the extent of his share. Be that as it may, when there was no pleading with regard to joint property and admittedly the defendant had been possessing the suit land being the owner, the evidence contrary to the pleadings was rightly reflected by the appellate Court. 13. Usually, in an action based on contract, only the parties to the contract are bound by the terms of contract and therefore, in a suit for specific performance of contract, there cannot be any other necessary party except the parties to the contract, inasmuch as, in order to adjudicate a claim of specific performance of contract for sale on the basis of an agreement for sale, the Court is competent to pass an effective decree in presence of the parties to the contract. Being of the above view, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and accordingly, this issue raised by the appellant is answered against the defendant/appellant. 14. It is the case of the plaintiff, that there was agreement between the plaintiff and defendant for sale of the suit land and the Exhibit-1 agreement was executed to that effect. The plaintiff examining himself as PW-1 stated on oath that the defendant executed the written agreement and proved the deed of agreement as Exhibit-1. He also proved the signature of the attesting witnesses and also of the defendant on the Exhibit-1. The plaintiff also examined one Gobinda Lal Rai as PW-2, who was an attesting witness to Exhibit-1. The plaintiff examining himself as PW-1 stated on oath that the defendant executed the written agreement and proved the deed of agreement as Exhibit-1. He also proved the signature of the attesting witnesses and also of the defendant on the Exhibit-1. The plaintiff also examined one Gobinda Lal Rai as PW-2, who was an attesting witness to Exhibit-1. The PW-2 deposed categorically that Exhibit-1 agreement for sale was executed by the defendant and he put his signature on Exhibit1 as witness. He also stated that the defendant/appellant pursuant to the said agreement for sale (Exhibit-1) accepted advance money of Rs.20,000/-. During cross-examination also it was confirmed that he signed the agreement for sale, Exhibit-1 as witness. The defendant examined one Ranu Rai as DW-2, who was also an attesting witness to the Exhibit-1. The DW-2 admitted that he put his signature on Exhibit-1. However, he further stated that he did not read the contents of the deed at the time of putting his signature. Thus, DW-2 examined by the defendant also admitted the execution of the Ex-1. 15. Section 64 of the Evidence Act lays down that a document must be proved by primary evidence except in case the parties are allowed to adduce secondary evidence of the document. When the transaction between the parties is taken down in a document, the document itself is the primary evidence and such document can be proved by adducing and proving document itself as per provisions of Section 67 of the Evidence Act. Section 67 of the Evidence Act provides that — If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person’s handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. The evidence of the plaintiff (PW-1) with regard to execution of the agreement for sale (Ex-1) has been supported by PW-2 an attesting witness to the document, who had stated categorically that it was executed by the defendant in his presence and he also put his signature as witness. In fact, the defendant has also not denied his signature on the Exhibit-1. DW-2, another attesting witness examined by the defendant/appellant also admitted the execution of Exhibit-1. In fact, the defendant has also not denied his signature on the Exhibit-1. DW-2, another attesting witness examined by the defendant/appellant also admitted the execution of Exhibit-1. However, he stated that he did not read the contents of the documents at the time of putting signature. Thus, the testimony of DW-2 belies the plea of the defendant that he put his signature on blank paper. Thus, the evidence of PW-1 coupled with the testimony of PW-2 as well as the DW-2, being the attesting witnesses to Exhibit-1 clearly established that Exhibit-1 had been proved as per requirement of Section 67 of the Evidence Act. 16. It is no doubt true, the defendant in his written statement pleaded that Exhibit-1 was fraudulently prepared by the plaintiff. Order VI Rule 4 CPC provides that in all cases, in which the party pleading, relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such, as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading. In the instant case, the defendant in his written statement simply made an omnibus statement that he had business relationship with the plaintiff/respondent and because of such relationship, he put his signature on some blank papers, on good faith as those signatures were required for earning a business contract. Nothing has been stated in the pleadings as to when such signature was obtained or for which business contract such signature was obtained. The date, time and place of obtaining such signature on blank paper has also not been stated. When the allegation of fraud or misrepresentation is brought by a party, it is obligatory in view of Order VI Rule 4 CPC on such party, pleading fraud, to give detailed particulars of such fraud, with date time etc, which is found to be absent in the instant case. In fact, no evidence was adduced to that effect. When the allegation of fraud or misrepresentation is brought by a party, it is obligatory in view of Order VI Rule 4 CPC on such party, pleading fraud, to give detailed particulars of such fraud, with date time etc, which is found to be absent in the instant case. In fact, no evidence was adduced to that effect. That apart, the plea of the defendant that his signature was obtained on blank papers had been belied by his own witness, the DW-2, who was also an attesting witness to Exhibit-1, and who did not deny the execution of Ex-1 inasmuch as, DW-2 clearly stated that he put his signature, on Exhibit-1 but he did not read the contents of the deed at the time of putting his signature. Thus, the evidence and materials brought on record clearly demonstrates that the plea of fraud taken by the defendant/appellant in the instant case has fallen through. When the document (Exhibit-1) had been duly proved by the plaintiff as per the requirement of law and the plea of defendant with regard to fraud in executing the said document has failed, the findings of the learned trial Court and the appellate Court that exhibit-1 was duly proved, cannot be faulted. Both the substantial questions of law framed in the instant case are accordingly answered in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. 17. In view of what has been stated above, the second appeal appears to be devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed. 18. Send back the LCR.