ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for both the sides. 2. This petition has been preferred on behalf of the accused-petitioner to quash and set aside FIR No. 137/2017 registered at Police Station Ashok Nagar, Jaipur for the offence under Sections 420 & 406 IPC. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the intention of the accused-petitioner was not malafide or fraudulent at the initiation of transaction between the parties and out of the amount of Rs.52 lacs advanced by the complainant, amount of Rs. 16,80,000/- has been repayed to him. In support of this argument, learned counsel wants the Court to go through the statement of the bank account maintained by the accused-petitioner. He further submits that in reply to the notice issued to the accused he has stated that gradually he will pay the amount due to be paid by him. Counsel submits that in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in (2000) 4 SCC 168 it has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the offence of cheating depends upon intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this, subsequent conduct is not the sole test. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the complainant-respondent No.2 submits that the facts mentioned in the FIR, if prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offence, there is no reason to quash and set aside the FIR. He further submits that the fraudulent intention of the accused-petitioner is clear from the fact that the cheques issued by him in repayment of the money advanced to him were bearing signatures which were different. The cheques were dishonoured for the reason that the signatures on the cheque were different than the specimen signature of the drawer. Counsel further submits that this fact has been stated in the status report given by SHO, P.S. Ashok Nagar, Jaipur in his letter dated 23.01.2018. It has further been stated that as per the said report, charge-sheet for the offence under Sections 420 & 406 IPC as also under Section 66 I.T. Act has been prepared on 13.12.2017 and only remains pending to be filed before the competent Court. Counsel for the respondent has relied on the judgment in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 2018 Cr.L.R. (SC) 54 5. Counsel for the respondent has relied on the judgment in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 2018 Cr.L.R. (SC) 54 5. In the judgment of Dineshbhai Chandubhai (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “26. The law on the question as to when a registration of the F.I.R. is challenged seeking its quashing by the accused under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code and what are the powers of the High Court and how the High Court should deal with such question is fairly well settled. 27. This Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. ( AIR 1982 SC 949 ) had the occasion to deal with this issue. Y.V. Chandrachud, the learned Chief Justice speaking for Three Judge Bench laid down the following principle: “Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences.” 28. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences.” 28. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle of law, which was consistently followed by this Court in later years and on perusing the impugned judgment, we are constrained to observe that the High Court without any justifiable reason devoted 89 pages judgment (see-paper book) to examine the aforesaid question and then came to a conclusion that some part of the F.I.R. in question is bad in law because it does not disclose any cognizable offence against any of the accused persons whereas only a part of the F.I.R. is good which discloses a prima facie case against the accused persons and hence it needs further investigation to that extent in accordance with law. 29. In doing so, the High Court, in our view, virtually decided all the issues arising out of the case like an investigating authority or/and appellate authority decides, by little realizing that it was exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code at this stage. 30. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possess to exercise while examining the legality of any F.I.R. complaining commission of several cognizable offences by accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the F.I.R. disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an Appellate Court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the F.I.R. and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. 31. At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the F.I.R. and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the Complainants and visa-se-versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the Court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 32. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the Court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 32. In our considered opinion, once the Court finds that the F.I.R. does disclose prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code.” 6. As per the observations made above by Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is not in the domain of this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to perform the duty of the Investigating Agency. It is only within the domain of the Investigating Agency to look into the bank accounts of the petitioner to ascertain as to how much amount remains due to be paid by the accused-petitioner. Difference in the signatures of drawer of the cheque is sufficient to show his intention. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that if the facts mentioned in the FIR prima facie disclose the commission of the cognizable offence, then the facts need to be further investigated by the Investigating Agency in accordance with law and the FIR is not to be quashed. 7. In light of the facts mentioned above, this Court is not inclined to exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash and set aside the FIR No. 137/2017, P.S. Ashok Nagar, Jaipur. 8. Hence, the petition is dismissed.