ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 16.01.2018 (Annexure-15 to the writ petition) passed by the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Tribunal’), Ranchi in Appeal No. 03/2017 whereby, the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed on the ground of delay. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant documents placed on record. On perusal of the impugned order dated 16.01.2018, it appears that the petitioner, who happens to be the borrower/judgment-debtor, preferred an appeal against the order dated 23.11.2016 of the Recovery Officer before the learned Tribunal on 31.01.2017 under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1993’). An application for condonation of delay in preferring the said appeal was also filed along with the memo of appeal. It has been observed in the impugned order dated 16.01.2018 that the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993 is 30 days from the date of issuance of the order to the judgment-debtor. The said order was passed by the Recovery Officer on 23.11.2016 and a copy of the said order was received by the petitioner on 25.11.2016. Though the certified copy of the said order was made ready on 14.12.2016, but the petitioner’s representative reported to the office for receiving the same on 16.01.2017 i.e. after delay of one month and two days. Thus, the Presiding Officer reached a conclusion that the delay in preferring the appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993 was beyond one month and it refused to entertain the application for condonation of delay referring an order/judgment dated 24.10.2017 rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd. Vs. the Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Ors. 2017 (4) JLJR (SC) 261 [Civil Appeal No. 19962/2017]. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned Tribunal committed an error in not entertaining the application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal as well as the merit of the appeal. the Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Ors. 2017 (4) JLJR (SC) 261 [Civil Appeal No. 19962/2017]. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned Tribunal committed an error in not entertaining the application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal as well as the merit of the appeal. It is further submitted that irrespective of the fact that the learned Tribunal has not condoned the delay in preferring the appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993, the High Court while exercising the Writ jurisdiction, may direct the learned Tribunal to condone the delay in preferring the appeal with further direction to entertain the appeal on merit. 4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd. (Supra) has categorically held that the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the Act, 1993 for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer cannot be condoned by moving an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. For appreciating the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties, it would be relevant to consider the provisions of Section 30 of the Act, 1993, which is quoted as under: “30. Appeal against the order of Recovery Officer.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 29, any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer made under this Act may, within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, and after making such enquiry as it deems fit, confirm, modify or set aside the order made by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under Sections 25 to 28 (both inclusive).” 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd. (Supra) while interpreting the provisions of Section 30 and other related provisions of the Act, 1993 has held as under: “14. The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the Legislature has provided for application of the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the Legislature has provided for application of the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The appellate tribunal has been conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days under Section 20(3) of the Act. The proceedings before the Recovery Officer are not before a Tribunal. Section 24 is limited in its application to proceedings before the Tribunal originating under Section 19 only. The exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclusion was express. The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 therefore does not arise. The prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer therefore cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 7. On perusal of the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it would be evident that exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993 clearly manifests that the legislative intent for such exclusion was express and thus the period of 30 days prescribed under Section 30(1) of the Act, 1993 for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer cannot be condoned by moving an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 8. In the present case, the Recovery Officer passed an order on 23.11.2016 confirming the sale and rejecting the petitioner’s application dated 05.11.2016. A copy of the said order was made available to the representative of the petitioner on 25.11.2016. Subsequently, the petitioner filed requisition for obtaining the certified copy of the said order on 13.12.2016, which was made ready by the office on 14.12.2016. However, the same was received by the petitioner’s representative on 16.01.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993 before the learned Tribunal on 31.01.2017 i.e. beyond the period of 30 days from the date of issuance of a copy of the order to him. However, the same was received by the petitioner’s representative on 16.01.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993 before the learned Tribunal on 31.01.2017 i.e. beyond the period of 30 days from the date of issuance of a copy of the order to him. Thus, in my considered opinion, the impugned order dated 16.01.2018 rejecting the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993 does not suffer from any infirmity. 9. The present writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.