JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This criminal revision petition, under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been filed by Sri Paresh Chandra Neog challenging the legality and validity of the order, dated 7.8.2012, passed by the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Additional Court No. 1, Assam in connection with Special Case No. 1/2011 whereby the petition filed by the petitioner for dropping the proceedings against him for the offences under the Indian Penal Code for want of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was rejected. 2. I have heard Mr. P Kataki, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. SC Keyal, learned Standing Counsel for the CBI. The case of the petitioner may be briefly stated as follows; 3. That one Nirmalendu Bhattacharya lodged an FIR with the Officer in Charge, CID Police Station, stating, inter alia, that the pay and allowance of 10th AP Battalion were fraudulently withdrawn to the tune of Rs. 18,89,57,335/- much in excess than the actual dues and that the petitioner and the other accused persons were co-conspirator in the alleged excess withdrawals. On completion of investigation, a charge sheet was laid against the petitioner and 7 others for the offences under Section 120B/420/409/477A of Indian Penal Code read with Section 13 (1) (c) and 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner further contends that at the time of consideration of charges, the petitioner filed a petition for dropping the proceedings under Sections 120B/409/420/477A of Indian Penal Code for want of sanction under Section 197 CrPC. The petitioner further contends that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate that in the decisions of Harihar Prasad vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1972) 3 SCC 89 , Ramesh Lal Jain vs. Nagendra Singh, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 294 and Rakesh Mishra vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 557 , it has been laid down that if on facts it is prima facie found that act or omission for which the accused was charged had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his duties and then it must be held to be an official act to which applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C. cannot be disputed. The petitioner also contended that he had made vicariously liable for acts of others, and therefore, sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is required to prosecute him. 4. The petitioner also contended that he had made vicariously liable for acts of others, and therefore, sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is required to prosecute him. 4. The learned Court below, having heard the parties, rejected the petition for dropping the charges under Sections 120B/409/420/477A of Indian Penal Code. 5. Since the moot question raised in this case is based on law, therefore, exhaustive reference to facts may not be necessary. 6. As to when a sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is necessary, has always been a contentious issue. It would be proper to discuss some case laws on this aspect in order to decide the present petition. 7. In Harihar Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1972) 3 SCC 89 it was held that it is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while so observing had placed reliance on the cases of Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1955 SC 287 ] and Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu [ AIR 1955 SC 309 ]. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Harihar Prasad (supra), further held that the real question therefore is whether the acts complained of were directly concerned with the official duties of the public servant. As far as the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B, read with Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned and also Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are concerned they cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To put it shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, no bar. 9. To put it shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, no bar. 9. In Romesh Lal Jain v. Naginder Singh Rana, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 294 the Hon’ble Supreme Court, having placed reliance on the cases of P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim [ (2001) 6 SCC 704 , Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli, AIR 1955 SC 287 and Matajog Dubey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 laid down the law in the following terms: "15. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions, it will be clear that for claiming protection under Section 197 of the Code, it has to be shown by the accused that there is reasonable connection between the act complained of and the discharge of official duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. For invoking protection under Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained of must be such that the same cannot be separated from the discharge of official duty, but if there was no reasonable connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. If the case as put forward by the prosecution fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped. It is well settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time after the cognizance; maybe immediately after cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accused that the act that he did was in course of the performance of his duty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial." Emphasis supplied 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, further held in Romesh Lal Jain (supra), that whereas an order of sanction in terms of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is required to be obtained when the offence complained of against the public servant is attributable to the discharge of his public duty or has a direct nexus therewith, but the same would not be necessary when the offence complained of has nothing to do with the same. A plea relating to want of sanction although desirably should be considered at an early stage of the proceedings, but the same would not mean that the accused cannot take the said plea or the court cannot consider the same at a later stage. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. Furthermore, there may be cases where the question as to whether the sanction was required to be obtained or not would not be possible to be determined unless some evidence is taken, and in such an event, the said question may have to be considered even after the witnesses are examined. 11. The question as to whether an order of sanction would be found essential would, thus, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a case where ex facie no order of sanction has been issued when it is admittedly a prerequisite for taking cognizance of the offences or where such an order apparently has been passed by the authority not competent therefor, the court may take note thereof at the outset. In a case where ex facie no order of sanction has been issued when it is admittedly a prerequisite for taking cognizance of the offences or where such an order apparently has been passed by the authority not competent therefor, the court may take note thereof at the outset. But where the validity or otherwise of an order of sanction is required to be considered having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and furthermore when a contention has to be gone into as to whether the act alleged against the accused has any direct nexus with the discharge of his official act, it may be permissible in a given situation for the court to examine the said question at a later stage. 12. In view of the legal position, discussed above, it comes to light that question of prosecution sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. can be decided at any stage of trial. In order to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accused that the act which he did was in course of the performance of his duty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial. 13. In the present case, the petitioner has also been charged for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner had challenged the order of framing of charge against him in Criminal Petition No. 3 of 2015. The prayer for quashing the charges stood rejected and hence the petitioner will be subjected to trial. It would be open to the petitioner to raise the plea of sanction even at the stage of evidence. At this stage of trial it would be highly prejudicial to adjudicate the factual pleas regarding the role played by the petitioner in the entire transaction nor is it possible for this Court to ascertain whether there was absence of any criminal intent on the part of the petitioner. 14. In view of the law, discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that this revision petition is devoid of merit. Therefore, this revision petition stands dismissed. 15. 14. In view of the law, discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that this revision petition is devoid of merit. Therefore, this revision petition stands dismissed. 15. A copy of this order be communicated to the learned Special Judge, CBI, Additional Court No. I, Chandmari, Guwahati.