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2018 DIGILAW 497 (HP)

Mangat Rai v. State of H. P.

2018-03-29

SURESHWAR THAKUR

body2018
JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant appeal is directed, against, the concurrently recorded verdicts by both the learned Courts below, whereby, the plaintiff's suit for permanent prohibitory injunction as well as for declaration qua the suit khasra numbers, was, hence dismissed. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the Smt. Vidya Devi, the mother of the appellant and proforma respondents No. 4 to 7, hereinafter called plaintiff, filed a suit for declaration that she was owner in possession of 9 biswas of land bearing Khasra No.37, situate in village Deli, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. (hereinafter called the suit land) and by way of further relief, she prayed for issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from causing any interference in her possession over the suit land. The cause of action, pleaded by her, was like this. The husband of plaintiff late Sh. Teja Singh had been in occupation of suit land for the last 35 years. Initially, he was a tenant on the suit land and used to pay Rs.600/- per month to defendant No.4, Shri Badi Nath (now deceased). In the year 1972, the suit land was purchased by Teja Singh, husband of the plaintiff, for a sum of Rs.5000/- from defendant No.4 Badi Nath. Ever since the possession of suit land had been with the plaintiff and prior to her, her husband late Shri Teja Singh, in the capacity of owner. Defendants No.1, 2 and 3 without any right, title or interest in the suit land, issued a notice to the plaintiff directing her to vacate the premises. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and injunction as aforesaid. It may be noticed that during the pendency of suit Badri Nath, who was impleaded as defendant NO.4, expired and his LRs were brought ton record. However, they have not been made party to the present appeal. 3. The defendants contested the suit and filed separate written statements. In his written statement filed by Badrinath (now deceased), he has denied that he had sold the suit land to Teja Singh, the husband of plaintiff, though, he admitted that Teja Singh remained in occupation of suit land as tenant upto the year, 1972. He alleged that in the year 1972, the tenancy came to an end. 4. In his written statement filed by Badrinath (now deceased), he has denied that he had sold the suit land to Teja Singh, the husband of plaintiff, though, he admitted that Teja Singh remained in occupation of suit land as tenant upto the year, 1972. He alleged that in the year 1972, the tenancy came to an end. 4. Defendants No.1, 2 and 3, in their written statement claimed themselves to be the owners of the suit land by alleging that in the year 1972, the suit property had been acquired by State of H.P. in the public interest, under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and hence the state of H.P., impleaded defendant NO.1, was the owner of suit land. It is alleged that plaintiff had no cause of action nor did she have any locus standi to file the suit. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck the following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit premises? OPP. 2. Whether notice dated 3.2.1987 issued by defendant No.2 to the plaintiff to vacate the premises in seven days, is wrong, illegal, without jurisdiction? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi? OPD. 5. Whether husband of the plaintiff was tenant under defendant NO.4 of the property in suit, if so, what effect? OPD. 6. Relief. 6. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/appellants herein. In an appeal, preferred therefrom by the plaintiff/appellants herein before the learned First Appellate Court, the latter Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 7. Now the plaintiff/appellant herein, has instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal, before, this Court, wherein he assails the findings, recorded in its impugned judgment and decree, by the learned first Appellate Court. When the appeal came up for admission, this Court, on 14.03.2007 admitted the appeal instituted by the plaintiff/appellant against the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned first Appellate Court, on the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law:- 1. When the appeal came up for admission, this Court, on 14.03.2007 admitted the appeal instituted by the plaintiff/appellant against the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned first Appellate Court, on the hereinafter extracted substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the learned Courts below were correct in negativing the claim of the appellant for adverse possession by misinterpreting Ex.PW3/A, the agreement to sell dated 29.4.1972 and relying upon the statement of DW3 and report Ex.DW3/A? 2. Whether the judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below can be sustained when they ignore the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 in their entirety? 3. Whether the learned Courts below have wrongly come to the conclusion that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant as well as proforma defendants had not become owners by way of adverse possession, by not considering the judgment of this Court in Civil Revision No.74 of 1998 dated 2.7.1999, whereby the application for amendment filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant and proforma respondents, namely, Smt. Vidya Devi, was allowed? Substantial questions of Law No.1 to 3: 8. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), borne in Ex. D-1, was issued in the year 1970, for hence bringing the suit land to acquisition. The acquisition proceedings launched in pursuance thereof, culminated in rendition of an award by the Land Acquisition Collector. The award rendered on 29.7.1972, by the Land Acquisition Collector, is, borne in Ex.D-3, in sequel thereto, compensation amount comprised in a sum of Rs.5,429.15/- was received, on 28.7.1972 by one Badrinath. However, prior thereto, the plaintiff espouses of the suit land being sold under Ex.PW3/A, exhibit whereof stood purportedly executed inter se Badri Nath, and, her husband Teja Singh. On strength of agreement to sell, borne in Ex.PW3/A, the plaintiff has claimed rendition of a decree, for, permanent prohibitory injunction, for hence restraining the defendants, from, evicting the plaintiff, from, the suit land besides on anvil thereof, hence sought a declaratory decree qua hers being pronounced to be owner-in-possession of the suit property. Apparently, the agreement to sell, borne in Ex.PW3/A, was executed inter se one Badrinath, and, one Teja Singh, prior to the rendition of an award vis-a-vis the suit property, by the Land Acquisition Collector concerned. Apparently, the agreement to sell, borne in Ex.PW3/A, was executed inter se one Badrinath, and, one Teja Singh, prior to the rendition of an award vis-a-vis the suit property, by the Land Acquisition Collector concerned. The plaintiff, who is the successor-in-interest of Teja Singh, though espoused of the acquisition proceedings, being launched besides pronounced behind the back of her husband, by the Land Acquisition Collector concerned, hence it being not binding upon her, nor thereupon Ex.PW3/A nor award borne in Ex.D-3, pronounced vis-a-vis the suit property, hence, affecting the right, title or interest of the plaintiff, in the suit land. Yet, the aforesaid simplicitor plea, is not carried forward by further averments, being cast, in the plaint of hence the award borne in Ex. D-3 being a sequel of fraud or misrepresentation, nor any apposite issue thereto stands struck besides no evidence stood adduced thereon, whereas, for rearing the aforesaid plea, it was important to rear the aforesaid pleas in the plaint besides striking of issue thereon was also important, also adduction of evidence thereon was imperative. In aftermath, omission of the plaintiff, to, rear the aforesaid plea, cannot, render the simplicitor plea of the plaintiff of Ex. D-3, not, affecting her rights, title or interest in the suit property, title whereof was acquired by her predecessor-in-interest under Ex.PW3/A, to rather hence, hold any tenacity. Furthermore, even the report, of the Handwriting Expert, rendered with respect to the authenticity of signatures borne in Ex.PW3/A, of Badrinath, unfolds the trite factum of the purported signatures of Badrinath borne thereon, not being his authentic signatures. The report of the handwriting expert concerned vis-a-vis the aforesaid facet, borne in Ex.DW3/A, does rip apart, the effect of reliance, if any, upon Ex.PW3/A, for hers staking a claim qua the suit property, more so, when opinion comprised therein is not torn of its efficacy. The report of the handwriting expert concerned vis-a-vis the aforesaid facet, borne in Ex.DW3/A, does rip apart, the effect of reliance, if any, upon Ex.PW3/A, for hers staking a claim qua the suit property, more so, when opinion comprised therein is not torn of its efficacy. Be that as it may, the plea of acquisition of title vis-a-vis the suit land by adverse possession, by the plaintiff, though is antithetical vis-a-vis her dependence upon Ex.PW3/A, yet the aforesaid plea is also not rearable against the State, whereon, title vis-a-vis the suit property, is vested under an award, borne in Ex.D-3, given a catena of judgments of the Courts of law, making, a clear pronouncement qua rearing, of, plea of acquisition of title, by prescription, ensuing from elapse of the statutorily mandatory period of time, rather being unavailable to the plaintiff. 9. As aforestated, the simplicitor plea of award, Ex. D-3 being not binding upon the right, title or interest of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the suit property, even if, garners any force in law, yet with the award vis-a-vis the suit property, being pronounced on 29.7.1972, hence, when the apposite entries in respect of the suit property, were subjected, to change, and, with no averment being cast in the plaint that since 1972 upto the revenue records, being corrected, in consonance with the award borne, in Ex. D-3, the plaintiff holding no knowledge with respect, to the pronouncement of the award, borne in Ex. D-3, visa- vis the suit property, (i) thereupon, it appears that the plaintiff despite, holding knowledge vis-a-vis the pronouncement of the award, borne in Ex. D-3, hers intentionally derelicted to, assumingly if, Ex. PW3/A, vested in her any right to receive compensation, to constitute a legal challenge thereto, by resorting to the provisions of Section 30 of the Act. The aforesaid remedy, was, the appropriate remedy vis-a-vis the plaintiff, yet it remaining unavailed besides unexercised, renders the belated claim reared, by the plaintiff vis-a-vis the suit property, to be not amenable to any credence. 10. The above discussion, unfolds, that the conclusions as arrived by the learned first Appellate Court as also by the learned trial Court, being based, upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the findings, the learned first Appellate Court as well as the learned trial Court, have not, excluded germane and apposite material from consideration. 10. The above discussion, unfolds, that the conclusions as arrived by the learned first Appellate Court as also by the learned trial Court, being based, upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the findings, the learned first Appellate Court as well as the learned trial Court, have not, excluded germane and apposite material from consideration. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the respondents and against the appellants. 11. In view of the above discussion, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. In sequel, the judgments and decrees rendered by both the learned Courts below are maintained and affirmed. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.