JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The plaintiffs' suit for rendition of a decree, for permanent prohibitory injunction besides for rendition of a decree, for declaration, stood partly decreed by the learned trial Court. In an appeal carried therefrom, before the learned First Appellate Court, by the defendants, the latter Court allowed his appeal besides obviously reversed the trial Court's judgment and decree. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the plaintiffs had instituted the suit for declaration and injunction to the effect that the plaintiffs and defendants No.1 to 3 were joint owners in possession of the land measuring 7.19 bighas, comprising Khata/Khatoni No123/156, situated in village Gehrwin, which was restricted estate of late Smt. Janki and that mutation No.1262 dated 13.6.1991 attested in favour of defendant No.1 as per registered Will dated 7.1.1977 was wrong and illegal as Smt. Janki was not competent to execute the Will nor she had executed the same and that the subsequent sale deed dated 19.6.1991 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 of land measuring 0-10 bighas, comprising Khasra No.290/1 and sale deed dated 19.6.1991executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3 of land measuring 1.4 bighas, bearing Khasra No.291/1 are illegal, null and void and that the defendants be restrained from interfering exceeding their share and on the share of the plaintiffs in the suit land. The case of the plaintiffs was that Rama Ram was owner of the suit land. Smt. Janki was widow of Rama Ram. The plaintiffs No.1 and 2 and defendants No.1 to 3 and late Chaman Lal were sons of Rama Ram. Plaintiffs No.3 to 5 are legal representative of late Chaman Lal. On the death of Rama Ram, the suit land was inherited by plaintiffs No.1 and 2, defendants No.1 to 3 and Chaman Lal. After the death of Rama Ram, his widow Smt. Janki had filed a suit on 14.5.1959 pertaining to the suit land against plaintiffs No.1 and 2, defendants No.1 to 3 and late Chaman Lal. The said civil suit was compromised and a compromise decree dated 14.8.1959 was passed, whereby, Smt. Janki was declared limited owner of the suit land till her life. However, plaintiffs No.1 and 2, defendants No.1 to 3 and Chaman Lal were held to be entitled to retain possession of suit land till her life time. The said civil suit was compromised and a compromise decree dated 14.8.1959 was passed, whereby, Smt. Janki was declared limited owner of the suit land till her life. However, plaintiffs No.1 and 2, defendants No.1 to 3 and Chaman Lal were held to be entitled to retain possession of suit land till her life time. Lateron Smt. Janki had transferred the suit land in favour of Thakur Dass son of plaintiff No.1, by way of a gift deed. Smt. Janki and defendants No.1 to 3 had filed a civil suit on 26.10.1970 before Senior Sub Judge, Bilaspur for declaration that Smt. Janki was limited owner of the suit land which was in possession of plaintiffs NO.1 and 2, defendants No.1 to 3 and Chaman Lal and a permanent injunction was also sought agianst Thakur Dass. The civil suit was decree vide judgment dated 2.11.1972, whereby, Smt. Janki was declared limited owner of suit land till her life and the plaintiffs No.1 and 2, defendants No.1 to 3 and Chaman Lal were held to be in possession of the same and a decree for permanent injunction was also passed against Thakur Dass for restraining him with their possession over the suit land. Thereafter on 1.9.1977 Smt. Janki filed another civil suit against plaintiffs NO.1 and 2, defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and Chaman Lal for declaration that she was absolute owner of the suit land but that civil suit was dismissed by the learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Ghumarwin, vide judgment of 20.9.1979. It has been averred that Smt. Janki was looked after and maintained by the plaintiffs as well as by the defendants till her death on 15.5.1991. The plaintiffs and defendants shared the expenses on the death ritual ceremonies of Smt. Janki, after death of Smt. Janki the suit land was inherited by plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, defendants No.1 to 3 and legal heirs of deceased Chaman Lal. But defendant No.1 got mutation No.1262 of 13.6.1991 attested in his favour on the basis of a forged Will of 7.1.1977 of Smt. Janki, which was not executed by Smt. Janki at all nor she was competent to execute the same. Smt. Janki was also not competent to execute the said Will as she was having only life interest in the suit land. Smt. Janki was also not competent to execute the said Will as she was having only life interest in the suit land. It has been averred that defendant No.1 executed a registered sale deed of 19.6.1991 of land measuring 0.10 biswas, bearing Khasra No.290/a, in favour of defendant No.2 and also executed registered sale deed of 19.6.1991 of land measuring 1.4 bighas, bearing Khasra No.291/1, in favour of defendant No.3. Both the registered sale deeds dated 19.6.1991 in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 are also illegal an without jurisdiction. The suit land was coming in possession of the plaintiffs No.1 and 2, defendants No.1 to 3 and legal representative of Chaman Lal. On 10.6.1992, the defendants had threatened to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit land. Hence the suit. 3. The defendants contested the suit and filed written statement, wherein, they have taken preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation, non joinder of necessary parties, cause of action and valuation. It was admitted that the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 and defendants No.1 to 3 and Chaman Lal were sons of Rama Ram and Smt. Janki Devi their mother was widow of Rama Ram. Previously Rama Ram was owner of the suit land which was inherited by six sons of Rama Ram. After death of Rama Ram, Smt. Janki had filed civil suit in the court of Senior Sub Judge, Bialspur, which was compromised and a comprise decree was passed. It is denied that the suit land was given to Smt. Janki Devi as a limited owner. Smt. Janki was already having pre-existing right of maintenance in the property of her husband Rama Ram. The suit land was given to her in lieu of her maintenance, therefore, she had become absolute owner of the same under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Smt. Janki being absolute owner of the suit land was competent to alienate the same. Smt. Janki had executed a valid Will of 4.1.1977 in favour of defendant No.1. After death of Smt. Janki mutation was attested on the basis of said Will by Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade, Ghumarwin, on 13.6.1991 in favour of defendant No.1. The appeal preferred by the plaintiffs against the order of Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, was pending before the Sub Divisional Ghumarwin. It is also alleged that Smt. Janki and the defendants had filed civil suit before the learned Senior Sub Judge, Bialspur. The appeal preferred by the plaintiffs against the order of Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, was pending before the Sub Divisional Ghumarwin. It is also alleged that Smt. Janki and the defendants had filed civil suit before the learned Senior Sub Judge, Bialspur. But it is denied that Smt. Janki Devi was declared as limited owner of the suit land. The subsequent transfer of a portion of the suit land by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 are legal and valid. In nutshell the defendants refuted the case of the plaintiffs as a whole and they prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. 4. The plaintiffs filed replication to the written statement of the defendants, wherein, they denied the contents of the written statement and re-affirmed and reasserted the averments, made in the plaint. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck the following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- 1. Whether Smt. Janki was limited owner of the suit land?OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs are joint owners in possession of suit land? OPP. 3. Whether the said deeds dated 19.6.19991 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant NO.2 are wrong and illegal? OPP. 4. Whether Smt. Janki Devi executed a valid will dated 4.1.1977 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 3, if so to what effect? OPP. 5. Whether the suit is not within time? OPD 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiffs entitled to the relief of permanent injunction? OPD. 8. Relief. 6. On an appraisal of evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court partly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/appellants herein. In an appeal, preferred therefrom, by the defendants/respondents herein before the learned First Appellate Court, the latter Court allowed the appeal and reversed the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 7. Now the plaintiffs/appellants herein, have instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court, wherein they assail the findings recorded in its impugned judgment and decree, by the learned first Appellate Court. When the appeal came up for admission, on 30.06.2006, this Court, admitted the appeal instituted by the plaintiffs/appellants against the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned first Appellate Court, on the hereinafter extracted substantial question of law:- 1. When the appeal came up for admission, on 30.06.2006, this Court, admitted the appeal instituted by the plaintiffs/appellants against the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned first Appellate Court, on the hereinafter extracted substantial question of law:- 1. Whether the finding of the first appellate Court that the decree of 1972 passed in a suit instituted by testatrix Janki Devi and defendant No.3 Kishan Dayal was passed on wrong interpretation of the provision of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, is illegal? Substantial question of Law No.1: 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended with vigour, (i) that, the verdicts respectively borne in Ex. P2, Ex. P-3, and, in Ex.P-4, rendered in lis' inter se the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs, one Janki Devi, and, the predecessors-ininterest of the defendants, and, vis-a-vis subject matters holding analogity with the lis at hand, (ii) thereupon, the verdicts borne in the aforesaid exhibits, when stand rendered inter partes, the respective predecessors-in-interest of the parties at lis here at, (iii) also theirs being recorded vis-a-vis a lis holding analogity with the lis at hand, (iv) thereupon, with the aforesaid verdicts, making, a declaration vis-a-vis one Janki Devi, and, other co-plaintiffs, namely, Krishan Dayal, Sukh Devi and Nand Lal, arrayed as defendants in the extant suit, qua thereunder the accrual of rights vis-a-vis the suit land, of, one Janki Devi, being in lieu of maintenance, and, surviving upto her life time, (v) hence, when vis-a-vis the suit land, a restrictive estate vested in her, (vi) thereupon, conclusivity of declarations pronounced thereunder vis-a-vis Janki Devi, qua hence hers, holding a restrictive estate in the suit property, restrictive estate whereof surviving only upto her life time, and, pointedly in lieu of maintenance, (vi) thereupon, the verdicts aforesaid operate as res judicata, (vii) hence, estopping the successors-in-interest of Janki Devi, to make any espousal of hers, during, her life time holding an indefeasible enlarged estate vis-a-vis the suit property nor theirs being empowered to canvass of hers, being capacitated to make any valid alienations vis-a-vis the suit property. The merit of the aforesaid submission is to be gauged, by making an allusion to the provisions, borne in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “14. The merit of the aforesaid submission is to be gauged, by making an allusion to the provisions, borne in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.” The learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submits with much vigour, that the mandate of subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Act, is squarely attractable vis-a-vis the previously recorded conclusive binding verdicts, embodied respectively in Exts. P-2, P-3 and P-4, (i) thereupon, with the aforesaid verdicts restricting the estate of Janaki Devi vis-a-vis the suit property, pointedly, qua hers holding only a life interest therein, hence, with the operation, of, sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act being effaced, by the statutory injunction cast under sub-section (2) of Section 14, of the Act, (ii) thereupon, even if, deceased Janki Devi has possessed the suit property, in pursuance to hers acquiring it, before or after the commencement of the Act, and, though the explanation appended to subsection (1), of Section 14 of the Act, ascribes vis-a-vis the statutory phrase “property in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance”, also the connotation of “property”, (iii) and, though the aforesaid manner of holding of the suit property by deceased Janki Devi, renders her capacitated, to, as enshrined in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, hence espouse of hers, being vested with an unrestricted absolute estate therein, (iv) yet, all the effects aforesaid of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act or of the explanation thereto, reiteratedly stand obliterated, by judgments and decrees aforesaid, whereunder rather a restricted estate is bestowed vis-a-vis deceased Janki Devi, (v) especially when sub section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, undermines, the clout of sub-section (1) of Section 14, of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants while arguing with vigour qua the attractability vis-a-vis the judgments, borne, in Exts. P-2, P-3 and P-4, of, the principle of res judicata, has placed reliance upon a verdict rendered in State of West Bengal vs. Heman Kumar Bhattacharjee, by the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1061 , the relevant paragraph No.14 whereof is stated extracted hereinafter: “14. Before proceeding with these arguments in detail, we can dispose of second contention very shortly. This argument proceeds on a fundamental misconception, as it seeks to equate an incorrect decision with a decision rendered without jurisdiction. A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides. This argument proceeds on a fundamental misconception, as it seeks to equate an incorrect decision with a decision rendered without jurisdiction. A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides. The learned Judges of the High Court who rendered the decision on 4.4.1952 had ample jurisdiction to decide the case and the fact that their decision was on the merits erroneous as seen from the latter judgment of this Court, does not render it any the less final and binding between the parties before the Court. There is, thus, no substance in this contention. The decision of the High Court dated 4.4.1952 bound the parties and its legal effect remained the same whether the reasons for the decision be sound or not.” (p.1066) (a) wherein it is expostulated, that, even any erroneous decision by a Court of law, holding jurisdiction, being binding between the parties, unless it is set aside, (b) thereupon, he contends that the purported conclusivity acquired by the verdicts, respectively borne in Ex. P-2, P- 3 and P-4, attracting vis-a-vis them, the principle of res judicata, (c) whereupon, the respondents are pointedly barred to stake any claim vis-a-vis the suit property, even by relying upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in a case titled as Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by LR's, reported in AIR 1977 (3) SC 1944, relevant paragraphs No.69 to 72 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “69. Indeed, if the contrary view is accepted, it will, in my opinion set at naught the legislative process of a part of Hindu Law' of the intestate succession and curb the social urges and aspirations of the Hindu women, particularly in the International Year of Women, by reviving a highly detestable legacy which was sought to be buried by the Parliament after independence so that the new legislation may march with the times. 70. We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above; on the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of s. 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. 70. We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above; on the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of s. 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated thus: (1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights. (2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been. couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends, sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation. (3) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of s. 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by s. 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. (4) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise preexisting rights. (4) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise preexisting rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s. 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of s. 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-s. (2) and would be governed by s. 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (5) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or arrears of maintenance" etc. in the Explanation to s. 14(1) clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s. (2). (6) The words "possessed by" used by the Legislature in s. 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same: Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of s. 14(1) she would get absolute interest. in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser with- out any right or title. in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser with- out any right or title. (7) That the words "restricted estate" used in s. 4(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in s. 14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also. any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee. 71. Applying the principles enunciated above to the facts of the present case, we find— (i) that the properties in suit were allotted to the appellant Tulasumma on July 30, 1949 under a compromise certified by the. Court; (ii) that the appellant had taken only a life interest in the properties and there was a clear restriction prohib iting her from alienating the properties; (iii) that despite these restrictions, she continued to be in possession of the properties till 1956 when the Act of 1956 came into. force; and (iv) that the alienations which she had made in 1960 and 1961 were after she had acquired an absolute interest in the properties. 72. It is, therefore, clear that the compromise by which the properties were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma in lieu of her maintenance were merely in recognition of her right to maintenance which was a preexisting right and, there- fore, the case of the appellant would be taken out of the ambit of s. 14(2) and would fail squarely within s. 14 (1) read with the Explanation thereto. Thus the appellant would acquire an absolute interest when she was in possession of the properties at the time when the 1956. Act came into force and any restrictions placed under the compromise would have to be completely ignored. This being the position, the High Court was in error in holding that the appellant Tula- samma would have only a limited interest in setting aside the alienations made by her. Act came into force and any restrictions placed under the compromise would have to be completely ignored. This being the position, the High Court was in error in holding that the appellant Tula- samma would have only a limited interest in setting aside the alienations made by her. We are satisfied that the High Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs on an erroneous view of the law.” (1977-1979) He also for fortifying the aforesaid submission, has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, rendered in a case titled as State of M.P. vs. Mulamchand, reported in AIR 1973 MP 293 , the relevant paragraphs No. 15, 16 and 17 whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “15. I have given anxious consideration to the above debate. In my view, the decision in Letters Patent Appeal (1960) MP LJ 195 = (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 152) operates as res judicata. The question in the present suit is whether the defendant-State can recover the outstanding balance of Rs. 58,500/- from the plaintiff on the basis of the Indentures executed by the Deputy Commissioner. In the Letters Patent Appeal it was held that the indentures were executed by the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of the authority vested in him by the rules made by the Governor and, therefore, there was no breach of Article 299(1) of the Constitution. It was further held that 'if however there be any lacuna in the form of these documents', since the contracts were ratified by the State Government, which had authorised the Deputy Commissioner to dispose of the forest produce and also allowed the plaintiff to exploit the forests according to the terms of the sales, there was no bar to the right of the State Government to realise due from the plaintiff. It was, also, held that the dues could be recovered as arrears of land revenue. When, in the present suit, the plaintiff again contends that the outstanding balance of Rs. 58,500/- could not be recovered on the ground that the indentures were not executed in compliance with the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution, it must be said that the matter directly and substantially in issue in the present (subsequent) suit is the same which was directly and substantially in issue in the former writ proceeding. 58,500/- could not be recovered on the ground that the indentures were not executed in compliance with the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution, it must be said that the matter directly and substantially in issue in the present (subsequent) suit is the same which was directly and substantially in issue in the former writ proceeding. The question was heard and finally decided between the same parties by this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal. 16. The issue in the present suit as also in the writ proceeding was the same. A decision on a question of law is res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, where the cause of action is the same. The words "matter in issue" as employed in Section 11, Civil P. C., mean the right litigated between the parties. It has reference not only to the facts on which the right is claimed or denied, but also to the applicability or non-applicability of a rule of law to the given set of circumstances. 17. Where a decision on a question of law in relation to a given set of facts attains finality, it operates as res judicata in a later suit or proceeding between the same parties. This will be so even if it was erroneous. In Bindeswari v. Bageshwari, AIR 1936 PC 46 it was held that "where the decision of the Court in a previous suit determined that the section had never applied to a transaction, a Court in a new suit between the same parties with regard to the same transaction cannot try anew the issue as to its applicability in face of the express prohibition in Section 11 of the Code." In Mohanlal v. Benoy Kishna, AIR 1953 SC 65 their Lordships have laid down thus :-- "There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as 'res judicata' between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata." (Para 23) It follows from this that even if in the earlier case an issue of law was wrongly interpreted in ignorance of a binding precedent, or if in a subsequent binding precedent the law has been interpreted otherwise, the earlier decision on the question of law, which has attained finality, will operate as res judicata between the parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding. This rule admits of certain exceptions. One is that where the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, it will not operate as res judicata, if in the subsequent case it is found to be erroneous because the question of jurisdiction of the Court is unrelated to the rights claimed by one party and denied by the other. Another exception is where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties. Here, it is nobody's case that there has been a subsequent legislation by which the law has been altered. Shri Verma's contention in this regard is that since every decision of the Supreme Court is "law" by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution, it should be said that when the Supreme Court decided AIR 1968 SC 1218 , it tantamounted to alteration in the law, since the earlier decision which was rendered by this Court in L. P. A. ( 1960 MPLJ 195 ) = (AIR 1960 Madh Pra 152). This argument is not well-founded. Article 141 of the Constitution enacts that the law declared by the Supreme Court "shall be binding on all Courts" within the territory of India. This means that when the Supreme Court expresses its view on any particular point of law, such expression of view shall be considered as overriding a contrary view expressed on the point in an earlier decision of any Court, Even obiter dicta of the Supreme Court if deliberately made upon a question with the intention of settling the law, are binding on all Courts. However, Article 141 does not confer on the Supreme Court any legislative function. The Supreme Court only interprets the law as it stands, but does not amend the law. However, Article 141 does not confer on the Supreme Court any legislative function. The Supreme Court only interprets the law as it stands, but does not amend the law. Their Lordships' decision declared the existing law but did not purport to enact any fresh law.” (p.296-297) (a) wherein it is expostulated, that, the expression “matter in issue” embodied in Section 11 of the CPC, encompassing also all questions of law applicable vis-avis the apposite lis, and, pronouncement vis-a-vis all questions of law, rendered in an earlier lis inter partes, acquiring conclusivity, and, also finality, (b) thereupon, the renditions, on all apposite questions of law, by the Courts concerned, in an earlier lis inter se analogous parties therein vis-a-vis analogous parties herein, rather holding absolute sway or clout, hence, the restrictive estate conferred, upon, one Janki Devi under earlier verdicts, respectively comprised in Ex.P-2 to P-4, (c) rather empowering, sub-section(2) of Section 14 of the Act, to hold the fullest might, and, neither sub section (1) of Section 14 of the Act nor the explanation appended thereto, being available, for espousal by the defendants. 9. All the aforesaid submissions addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants before this Court, are, highly misplaced, and, warrants rejection, for the reasons, (i) that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, reported both in AIR 1966 SC 1061 and AIR 1973 MP 293 , only attracting vigour herewith, only when the earlier rendered interpretation qua the question of law apposite to the lis hereat, remained undisturbed or unsettled, by a subsequent dis-concurring interpretation, rendered thereupon, by the Hon'ble Apex Court, (ii) sequelly and effectively, hence, any verdict rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, displaying, a dis-concurrent interpretation vis-a-vis the mandate of the apposite questions of law hereat, would obviously supersede, the earlier interpretation meted thereon besides would also hold clout. Now at, it is to be determined qua whether, Ex.P-2, and Ex. P-3, whereunder one Janki Devi was declared to be holding vis-a-vis the suit property onlya right in lieu of maintenance, hence in consonance therewith, was, also under Ex. Now at, it is to be determined qua whether, Ex.P-2, and Ex. P-3, whereunder one Janki Devi was declared to be holding vis-a-vis the suit property onlya right in lieu of maintenance, hence in consonance therewith, was, also under Ex. P-4 conferred a restrictive estate therein, (ii) and, was hence concomitantly non suited vis-a-vis her claim, for, conferment of an unrestricted, and, an absolute estate vis-a-vis the suit property, rather hence standing annulled or superseded, by an apposite declaration of law, emanating from the Hon'ble Apex Court, at the time contemporaneous, to the rendition borne in Ex.P-4. For determining the aforesaid factum, the date of rendition, of, Ex. P-4, is important. Apparently, the verdict borne in Ex.P-4 was rendered on 10.09.1979, whereas, in an earlier therewith judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case titled as Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by LR's, reported in AIR 1977 (3) SC 1944, the Hon'ble Apex Court, had made an interpretation, of, the scope and plenitude, of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, and, had also emphatically recorded a candid pronouncement, that where a female Hindu acquires, as evidently hereat one Janki Devi, also acquired, any property in lieu of her right of maintenance, thereupon, it being in recognition of her preexisting right, and, any acquisition thereof, rather falling outside, the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 14, of the Act, dehors any decree, and, order investing or allotting a restricted estate vis-a-vis her, in the property concerned. The verdict rendered in the aforesaid case, by the Hon'ble Apex Court, was hence clearly prior, to, the rendition borne in Ex.P-4, hence, the verdict rendered in Ex.P-4 is squarely per incuriam vis-a-vis the earlier therewith, apt applicable verdict rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in V. Tulasamma's case (supra), (a) thereupon, the principle of estoppel constituted in Section 11, of, the CPC against the non raising, of, the issue with respect, to, one Janki Devi, as enunciated in Ex.P-4, holding only a life time interest, in the suit property, cannot naturally, be attracted vis-a-vis the plaintiff, (b) nor hence, it can be construed to be either binding or conclusive, (c) nor it can be concluded, of it operating as res judicata, (d) rather the verdict borne in Ex.P-4, when, is clearly militative of the earlier therewith rendition, of, the Hon'ble Apex Court in V. Tulasamma's case (supra), thereupon, it warrants it being usurped, and, set aside. Further vigour to the aforesaid view is lent by the factum, of the verdict rendered in V. Tulasamma's case (supra), being prospective in nature. In sequel when the benefit of the verdict rendered by the Hon'ble Apex court, in V. Tulasamma's case (supra), was, accruable vis-a-vis Janki Devi, given hers being alive thereat, thereupon, hence, with hers in consonance therewith rather becoming an unrestricted owner of the suit property, hence, she was concomitantly vested with all rights to make valid alienations, of her estate. Predominantly, all purported nullifcatory effects, of, Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex. P-4 vis-a-vis her estate are, hence effaced. 10. The above discussion unfolds the fact that the conclusions as arrived by the learned first Appellate Court being based upon a proper and mature appreciation of evidence on record. While rendering the findings, the learned first Appellate Court has not excluded germane and apposite material from consideration. Substantial questions of law No.1 answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. 11. In view of above discussion, there is no merit in the instant appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. Consequently, the judgment and decree rendered by the learned First Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 127/13 of 2004/1999 is affirmed and maintained. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.