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2018 DIGILAW 5 (SC)

Vaithegi v. Gurusamypillai

2018-01-04

NAVIN SINHA, ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN

body2018
ORDER : 1. Leave granted. 2. Pursuant to a final decree dated 3rd January, 2007, the defendant was directed to pay a sum of Rs.5,37,268/-. If any such payment is made, the decree further went on to state that the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof shall be directed to be sold. Since, within the time stipulated, no such payment was made, by an order dated 15th February, 2008 a sale was directed of the mortgaged property. This took place on 18th November, 2011 in a Court auction, in which the appellant was the highest bidder at Rs.5,02,000/-. An application under Order XXI Rule 89 C.P.C. was filed on 23rd January, 2012 by the judgment-debtor in which it was stated that the sum of Rs.7,00,000/-covering the entire amount had been paid directly to the creditor on 21st December, 2011. On these facts, the learned Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputtur, by an order dated 18th November, 2014, dismissed the aforesaid application stating:- “Point:7) Admittedly in execution petition NO.83/2008, the property was brought for sale and in the court auction dated 18.11.11, the present 2nd respondent has become a successful bidder and she has purchased the property for Rs.5,02,000/-and even on the same day, she has deposited 1/4th amount with boundage and the remaining sale consideration was deposited by her on 25.11.11. 8) On the other hand, the present petitioner who is the judgment-debtor has filed this application on 23.1.2012. The said application has been filed beyond 60 days. Even otherwise the petitioner who wants to set aside the sale under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. has to deposit 5% of the sum equal to the purchase money. It is a condition precedent for entertaining an application under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. Admittedly from the perusal of the records, the present petitioner has deposited the said amount of 5% with boundage only on 3.4.12 for the said delay there is no exercise and in fact it cannot be excused P.W.1 and P.W.2 have stated in their oral evidence that they have reached a compromise out of court and the 1st respondent has executed Ex.P1 to the petitioner. Admittedly the said Ex.P1 has been filed into the Court only on 23.1.2012 which is subsequent to 60 days from the date of Court auction sale. Moreover, in Ex.P1 there is no date mentioned in respect of the execution of the said receipt. Admittedly the said Ex.P1 has been filed into the Court only on 23.1.2012 which is subsequent to 60 days from the date of Court auction sale. Moreover, in Ex.P1 there is no date mentioned in respect of the execution of the said receipt. Furthermore, the said decree amount has not been deposited into the Court which is also a condition precedent. In these aspects, P.W.1 and 2 have contradictorily stated about the date of execution of Ex.P1.” 3. In a revision petition filed before the Madras High Court, the impugned judgment dated 9th July, 2015 has set aside the aforesaid judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge as follows:- “10. In the case on hand, it is not disputed that within the stipulated period of one month from the date of final bid in Court, the petitioner-judgment-debtor paid the decree amount to the decree-holder and also filed a memo for setting aside the sale in the form of objections. The executing court noted this aspect. By this payment the requirement under Rule 89(1)(b) of Order 21 was fulfilled. It is also noted that the Respondent 1-auction-purchaser refused to accept the solatium and he subsequently filed an application for confirmation of sale. Meanwhile, the executing Court ordered for the deposit of solatium with the Court. This deposit complied with the second requirement under Rule 89(1)(a) of Order 21.” 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has argued before us that Order XXI Rule 89 has to be strictly observed and the High Court was incorrect in interfering with the learned Subordinate Judge's order inasmuch as it it clear that neither was the principal amount deposited in Court nor was any date mentioned on the only document, namely, Receipt (Exhibit P1) which evidenced payment of Rs.7,00,000/-. Further, admittedly 5% was deposited in Court only on 3rd April, 2012 i.e. long after the period of 60 days. In this view of the matter, according to the learned counsel, the High Court's judgment deserves to be set aside. 5. Learned counsel on behalf of the respondents has argued before us that even if Rs.7,00,000/-was paid directly it makes no difference in view of the judgment of this Court in Solasa Ramachandra Rao and others v. Maddi Kutumba Rao and another, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1637 . 5. Learned counsel on behalf of the respondents has argued before us that even if Rs.7,00,000/-was paid directly it makes no difference in view of the judgment of this Court in Solasa Ramachandra Rao and others v. Maddi Kutumba Rao and another, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1637 . He further strongly relied upon certain observations made in Challamane Huchha Gowda v. M.R. Tirumala and Another, (2004) 1 SCC 453 , for the proposition that where a Court orders payment of 5% beyond the period of 60 days, such deposit in obedience to such Court order would be valid. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties, we are of the view that neither the principal amount can be said to have been paid within 60 days nor 5%. It is clear that Order XXI Rule 89 is a provision which is to be strictly construed in view of the fact that it is a last opportunity to a judgment-debtor to clear his dues after default has been made. That this is the law stated by this Court is clear from the decision in Ram Karan Gupta v. J.S. Exim Limited and Others, reported in (2012) 13 SCC 568 . This judgment states:- “23. We have already indicated that the rule is in the nature of a concession shown to the judgment-debtor, so he has to strictly comply with the requirements thereof and a sale will not be set aside unless the entire amount specified in sub-rule (1) is deposited within 60 days from the date of the sale and if it is beyond 60 days, the Court cannot allow the application. We have already found that the appellant-judgment-debtor did not pay the amount within the stipulated time and he only made an application on 1-12-2010 without depositing the amount and hence the Court cannot entertain such an application and bound to confirm the sale which, in this case, the Court did on 23-10-2010.” 7. Learned counsel for the respondents cited a decision of this Court in Solasa Ramachandra Rao (supra), for the proposition that where the decree has been satisfied or adjusted already, deposit of any money for payment to the decree-holder is not called for. Learned counsel for the respondents cited a decision of this Court in Solasa Ramachandra Rao (supra), for the proposition that where the decree has been satisfied or adjusted already, deposit of any money for payment to the decree-holder is not called for. We are afraid that the ratio of this judgment would not help in the facts of the present case inasmuch as the High Court has missed the vital fact that the only document evidencing the payment of Rs.7,00,000/-directly to the judgment-debtor is a receipt, which is exhibit P1, which bears no date. This being the case, it cannot be said, merely on a reading of the judgment-debtor's application, that Rs.7,00,000/-has been paid directly to the creditor within a period of 60 days. Also, the High Court is not correct in stating that the ratio of the decision of this Court in Challamane Huchha Gowda (supra) would come to the rescue of the respondents. There is no Court order directing the respondents to pay the sum of 5%. That apart, it is clear that this sum was deposited only on 3rd April, 2012, which on the facts of the present case, is way beyond 60 days. In this view of the matter, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 9th July, 2015 and restore the order of the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputtur, dated 18.11.2014. 8. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. 9. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.