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2018 DIGILAW 50 (MAN)

Lourembam Iboyaima Singh v. State of Manipur

2018-09-20

K.H.NOBIN SINGH

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri A. Romenkumar, learned counsel appearing for petitioner No.2 to 5; Shri R.K. Banna, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner No.1; Shri Y. Nirmolchand, learned, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri L. Raju, learned counsel appearing for the respondent University and Smt. Th. Sobhana, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondent. 2. By the instant writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari to quash the Notification dated 23.05.2018 issued by the Registrar, Manipur Technical University and to issue a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to provide regular appointment to the petitioners from the date of their initial appointment. 3.1. Facts and circumstances as narrated in the writ petition, are that the Manipur Technical University (hereinafter referred to as “the University”) came to be established pursuant to the promulgation of an ordinance called “The Manipur Technical University Ordinance, 2016 vide Notification dated 23.04.2016 and in order to make the University functional, the Registrar issued a Notification for appointment to the posts of Assistant Professor on contract basis in respect of some subjects including Humanities (Communication); Computer Engineering; Electrical Engineering Mathematics; Civil Engineering and Mechanical Engineering. The petitioners being eligible applied for appointment to the posts of Assistant Professor and after the interview having been held, the Selection Committee recommended the names of the petitioners for appointment to the posts of Assistant Professor against the posts shown as against their names. On the basis of the said recommendation, the petitioners were appointed on contract basis vide orders date 08.08.2016, 30.07.2016 and 15.07.2016 issued by the Vice-Chancellor and their contractual appointment was extended for six months or till the regular appointees joined the said posts, whichever was earlier, vide order dated 30-12-2016 issued by the Vice-Chancellor. 3.2. From the day they joined their services, the petitioners worked very hard to bring up the standard of the University and because of their excellent and outstanding services, the petitioners were declared as the heads of the concerned Departments. Keeping in mind the responsibilities shouldered by them, the petitioners submitted a representation dated 22-01-2018 to the Vice-Chancellor to regularize their contract appointments. 3.3. Keeping in mind the responsibilities shouldered by them, the petitioners submitted a representation dated 22-01-2018 to the Vice-Chancellor to regularize their contract appointments. 3.3. To the petitioner’s utter surprise and dismay, the University notified for fresh recruitment of all the posts of the University vide Notification dated 23.05.2018 and being aggrieved by it, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioners on the inter-alia grounds that since the petitioners had been appointed after following the due procedure, their appointment was within the ambit, province and scope of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India; that in terms of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petitioners ought to have been provided with orders of regular appointment and that the initial period of two years ought to have been treated as probation. 4. An affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondent University has been filed wherein it has been stated that the selection was done only by interview but was not done in consonance with the procedure for regular appointment and the engagement of the petitioners was done for a short period in order to start the University. The appointment of the petitioners was made after an agreement having been entered into between the petitioners and the University with the undertaking being given by the petitioners that they will not claim for regularisation on the basis of the engagement order. At the time of their contract engagement, the criteria laid down under the UGC regulations on minimum qualification for appointment of teachers and other staff in the University and College was not followed and therefore, a corrigendum dated 11-06-2018 was issued in adherence of the UGC regulations. Moreover, the petitioners have applied for the post of Assistant professor in their respective subjects in terms of the Notification dated 23-05-2018 and corrigendum dated 11-06-2018 and therefore, the writ petition is not sustainable in law. 5. In the rejoinder filed by the petitioners, it has been reiterated that although the form of appointment is contractual, it is regular appointment in nature, character and status because the recruitment fulfilled the constitutional mandate. As per the norm of AICTE and as is evident from the letter dated 20-05-2017 addressed to the Under Secretary (Hr. & Tech. 5. In the rejoinder filed by the petitioners, it has been reiterated that although the form of appointment is contractual, it is regular appointment in nature, character and status because the recruitment fulfilled the constitutional mandate. As per the norm of AICTE and as is evident from the letter dated 20-05-2017 addressed to the Under Secretary (Hr. & Tech. Edn.) by the Registrar, out of the total posts, 80% thereof namely 7 posts ought to have been filled up on regular basis but in violation thereof, the petitioners were appointed on contract basis which is unreasonable being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The UGC guidelines are not applicable to the selection process because the same were adopted by the University only on 24-01-2018. The averment in the affidavit-in-opposition that the petitioners were appointed for a short period, has been denied relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and even assuming, there was irregularity, it was the mistake of the University for which it cannot take advantage. The agreement signed between the petitioners and University was valid for six months and the same could not be altered unilaterally and moreover, the compulsive undertaking being contrary to law, was not enforceable in law. Such transaction was vitiated on account of undue influence in the absence of any mention thereof in the advertisement. The principle of estoppels was not applicable as the contract stood concluded. The law has been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the right of a party to claim appointment, cannot be denied on the ground that an undertaking has been given by the party that he will not claim for it because such an undertaking is unconscionable and violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. The corrigendum cannot be put in existence because it was neither published in the newspaper nor was it uploaded in the website of the University. 6. The corrigendum cannot be put in existence because it was neither published in the newspaper nor was it uploaded in the website of the University. 6. Relying upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Shri A. Romenkumar Singh, the learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners has made submissions, one of which being that since the petitioners had been appointed after following due procedure, their appointment was within the ambit, province and scope of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petitioners ought to have been provided with orders of regular appointment and the initial period of two years ought to have been treated as probation. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union Public Service Commission Vs. Girish Jayantilal Vaghela & ors., (2006) 2 SCC 482 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “12. Article 16 which finds place in Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The main object of Article 16 is to create a constitutional right to equality of opportunity and employment in public offices. The words “employment or appointment” cover not merely the initial appointment but also other attributes of service like promotion and age of superannuation, etc. The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution. (See B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute.) Secondly, it has been submitted by him that the agreement with the undertaking was only for six months and after the expiry of six months, it cannot be renewed unilaterally but can be renewed only by mutual consent for which he has relied upon the decision in Delhi Development Authority & anr. Vs. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats & ors., (2008) 2 SCC 672 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that terms and conditions of the contract can indisputably be altered or modified but they cannot be done unilaterally unless there exists any provision either in contract itself or in law. Novation of contract in terms of Section 60 of the Contract Act must precede the contract-making process. A similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & anr. Vs. BPL Mobile Cellular Ltd., (2008) 13 SCC 597 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the parties were ad idem as regards terms of the contract, any change in the tariff could not have been made unilaterally. Any novation in the contract was required to be done on the same terms as are required for entering into a valid and concluded contract. Such an exercise having not been resorted to, we are of the opinion that no interference with the impugned judgment is called for. In Saroj Screens Private Ltd Vs. Ghanshyam & ors., (2012) 11 SCC 434 also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “45. We are also of the view that the resolution dated 29-10-1975 though passed in consonance with Clause 10 of the lease dated 28-10-1944, has to satisfy the test of reasonableness, equality and fairness. In Saroj Screens Private Ltd Vs. Ghanshyam & ors., (2012) 11 SCC 434 also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “45. We are also of the view that the resolution dated 29-10-1975 though passed in consonance with Clause 10 of the lease dated 28-10-1944, has to satisfy the test of reasonableness, equality and fairness. Though, the initial lease was granted to Gopaldas Mohta before coming into force of the Constitution, while considering the issue of renewal of lease the Corporation was duty-bound to take action and decision strictly in consonance with the constitutional principles and decision to renew the lease in favour of Parmanand Mundhada could not have been taken except after following a procedure consistent with the equality clause, which was not done.” Thirdly, it has been submitted by him that the requirement of signing an undertaking by the petitioners is vitiated on account of undue influence as contemplated in S.16 of the Indian Contract Act. He has relied upon the decision rendered in State of Bihar & ors. Vs. Chandreshwar Pathak, AIR 1963 SC 1279 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a transaction may be vitiated on account of undue influence where the relations between the parties are such that one of them is in a position to dominate the will of the other and he uses his position to obtain undue advantage over the other. Further in Rakesh Ranjan Verma & ors Vs. State of Bihar & ors, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 343, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Board cannot deny the right of the appellants for appointment on the posts of Junior Electrical Engineers on the ground that appellants had given an undertaking at the time of their appointment as Operators. Fourthly, the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the principle of estoppels is not applicable to the facts of the present case when the mistake is committed by the University. He has placed reliance on many decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and that of this court, one of which being the one rendered in Raj Kumar & ors. Vs. Shakti Raj & ors, (1997) 9 SCC 527 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the principle of estoppels by conduct or acquiescence will not apply, when the Government has committed glaring illegalities. In Lisham Henthoiba & ors. Vs. Vs. Shakti Raj & ors, (1997) 9 SCC 527 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the principle of estoppels by conduct or acquiescence will not apply, when the Government has committed glaring illegalities. In Lisham Henthoiba & ors. Vs. State of Manipur & ors., (2017) 4 NEJ 413 (Man), this court, while deciding the issue therein, has relied upon the decision in Raj Kumar case. In Bhartaya Seva Samaj Trust Vs. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel & anr., (2012) 9 SCC 310 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a person alleging his own infamy cannot be heard at any forum, what to talk of a writ court, as explained by the legal maxim allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus. If a party has committed a wrong, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own wrong. In Indore Development Authority Vs. Shailendra, 2018 (2) Scale 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is well settled proposition that one cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The doctrine of “commodum ex-injuria sua nemo habere debet” means convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. No person ought to have advantage of his own wrong. In M/S Advanta India Ltd. Vs. B.N. Shivanna, AIR 2018 SC 1073 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that after going through the record, we find that the BCI has shown undue indulgence to the respondent by allowing him to take advantage of his own wrong, in the guise of exercising its review power. It is a case of Nullus Commodum Capere Potest De Injuria Sua Propria meaning thereby a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong. Fifthly, it has also been submitted that at the time of advertisement being issued by the University, regular vacancies were available; the UGC Regulations, 2010 were already in operation and the University could have initiated recruitment process for appointment on regular basis which the University failed to do so and therefore, the petitioner should not be allowed to suffer for no fault of theirs. He has relied upon the decision in Shalini Vs. He has relied upon the decision in Shalini Vs. Kurukshetra University & anr., (2002) 2 SCC 270 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, accepting the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the appellant should not be made to suffer for no fault of hers, directed that the appellant shall be treated as a regular student of B.Sc (HSc) Part–II course of study and the result of her examination shall be declared forthwith. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Governing Body, LP Shahi Collge, Patna & anr. Vs. Seema Mishra & ors., (2016) 9 SCC 449 . Sixthly, it has further been submitted by him that in the absence of any procedure prescribed by rules and there is no impediment in law, the authority can prescribe minimum mark for written test as well as viva voce. He has placed reliance in Ramesh Kumar Vs. High Court of Delhi & anr., (2010) 3 SCC 104 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in case the statutory rules prescribe a particular mode of selection, it has to be given strict adherence accordingly. In case, no procedure is prescribed by the rules and there is no other impediment in law, the competent authority while laying down the norms for selection may prescribe for the tests and further specify the minimum benchmarks for written test as well as for viva voce. In Union of India & anr. Vs. K.P.S Raghuvanshi & ors., (2017) 8 SCC 334 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “42. In our considered opinion, the posts in question had been created only in the year 2009. They were not in existence earlier. There was no delay in calling DPC. Thus, determinative date for applicability of procedure would be the date of DPC. CGO No. 02/09 which was issued after exercise of 4 years was in force. Thus, the High Court has committed grave error in law in holding that CGO No. 02/05 should be applied and complied with, particularly, when the date of DPC was 23-7-2009. It is the date of DPC which matters in the instant case and the procedure which is prevalent on the date on which the DPC is held is applicable. Thus, the High Court has committed grave error in law in holding that CGO No. 02/05 should be applied and complied with, particularly, when the date of DPC was 23-7-2009. It is the date of DPC which matters in the instant case and the procedure which is prevalent on the date on which the DPC is held is applicable. Thus, the provisions contained in CGO No. 02/09 would hold the field and DPC was rightly held as per instructions relating to ACRs contained in CGO No. 02/09.” 7. On the other hand, it has been submitted by Shri Y. Nirmolchnad, Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent University that the appointment of the petitioners was purely on contract basis and as per the terms and conditions of the agreement and the undertaking given by them, they cannot claim for regular appointment at all. In support of his contention, he has relied upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The first decision being the one rendered in Secretary, State of Karnataka & ors. Vs. Uma Devi & ors., (2006) 4 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “34. In A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies a three-Judge Bench made a survey of the authorities and held that when appointments were made in contravention of mandatory provisions of the Act and statutory rules framed thereunder and by ignoring essential qualifications, the appointments would be illegal and cannot be regularised by the State. The State could not invoke its power under Article 162 of the Constitution to regularise such appointments. This Court also held that regularisation is not and cannot be a mode of recruitment by any State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or any body or authority governed by a statutory Act or the rules framed thereunder. Regularisation furthermore cannot give permanence to an employee whose services are ad hoc in nature. It was also held that the fact that some persons had been working for a long time would not mean that they had acquired a right for regularisation. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. In State of Orissa & ors. Vs. Prasana Kumar Sahoo, (2007) 15 SCC 129 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “12. Even a policy decision taken by the State in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162 of the Constitution of India would be subservient to the recruitment rules framed by the State either in terms of a legislative Act or the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. A purported policy decision issued by way of an executive instruction cannot override the statute or statutory rules far less the constitutional provisions. 13. In A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies this Court has held: (SCC p. 126, para 45) “45. No regularisation is, thus, permissible in exercise of the statutory power conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution if the appointments have been made in contravention of the statutory rules.” In State of MP Vs. Mohd. Abrahim, (2009) 15 SCC 214 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “12. Appellant 1 is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In making offers of public appointment, it is necessary to follow the constitutional scheme laid down in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. For the purpose of legal and valid recruitment, the provisions of the recruitment rules are required to be complied with. In making offers of public appointment, it is necessary to follow the constitutional scheme laid down in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. For the purpose of legal and valid recruitment, the provisions of the recruitment rules are required to be complied with. An appointment through side door being an appointment in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be illegal. It has been so held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3). (See also Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh.)” In State of MP & ors. Vs. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “13. The contention that the executive orders issued from time to time or the appointment letters issued in accordance with such executive orders will prevail over the Rules cannot be accepted. When there is conflict between the statutory rules and the executive orders, the statutory rules will prevail (see K. Dayanandalal v. State of Kerala, T.N. Housing Board v. N. Balasubramaniun, State of Karnataka v. KGSD Canteen Employees? Welfare Assn. and Punjab National Bank v. Astamija Dash). Executive orders cannot be made or given effect in violation of what is mandated by the Rules. If appointment letters provide for payment of NPA which is not in consonance with the Rules, they can be corrected or set right by the tribunals/courts.” In State of Maharastra & ors. Vs. Anita & anr., (2016) 8 SCC 293 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “14. It is relevant to note that the respondents at the time of appointment have accepted an agreement in accordance with Appendix „B? attached to the Government Resolution dated 15-9-2006. The terms of the agreement specifically lay down that the appointment is purely contractual and that the respondents will not be entitled to claim any rights, interest and benefits whatsoever of the permanent service in the Government. We may usefully refer to the relevant clauses in the format of the agreement which read as under: “1. The terms of the agreement specifically lay down that the appointment is purely contractual and that the respondents will not be entitled to claim any rights, interest and benefits whatsoever of the permanent service in the Government. We may usefully refer to the relevant clauses in the format of the agreement which read as under: “1. The First Party hereby agrees to appoint Shri/Smt ________ (Party II) as a ________ on contract basis for a period of 11 months commencing from __________ to __________ (mention date) on consolidated remuneration of Rs ___________ (Rupees ___________ only) per month, and said remuneration will be payable at the end of each calendar month according to British Calendar. It is agreed that IInd party shall not be entitled for separate T.A. and D.A. during the contract period.… 2. ……………… 3. ……………… 4. ……………… 5. Assignment of 11 months? contract is renewable for a further two terms of 11 months (i.e. total 3 terms), subject to the satisfaction of the competent authority, and on its recommendations. 6. Party II will not be entitled to claim any rights, interest, benefits whatsoever of the permanent service in the Government. 15. The above terms of the agreement further reiterate the stand of the State that the appointments were purely contractual and that the respondents shall not be entitled to claim any right or interest of permanent service in the Government. The appointments of the respondents were made initially for eleven months but were renewed twice and after serving the maximum contractual period, the services of the respondents came to an end and the Government initiated a fresh process of selection. The conditions of the respondents? engagement are governed by the terms of agreement. After having accepted the contractual appointment, the respondents are estopped from challenging the terms of their appointment. Furthermore, the respondents are not precluded from applying for the said posts afresh subject to the satisfaction of other eligibility criteria.” 8. It is not in dispute that the University was established vide Notification dated 23-4-2016 for the advancement and development of technical education and for connected matters. Furthermore, the respondents are not precluded from applying for the said posts afresh subject to the satisfaction of other eligibility criteria.” 8. It is not in dispute that the University was established vide Notification dated 23-4-2016 for the advancement and development of technical education and for connected matters. The Registrar of the University issued Notifications dated 20-06-2016, 12-07-2016 and 23-07-2016 for contract engagement in respect of various subjects and in response thereto, the petitioners applied for it and after the interviews being conducted, the Selection Committee recommended the names of the petitioners who were appointed on contract basis for a period of six months subject to the conditions mentioned therein vide orders dated 15-07-2016 30-07-2016 and 08-08-2018 issued by the Vice-Chancellor on consolidated remuneration. The terms and conditions are inter-alia that the appointment is purely on contract basis; that the appointee shall not claim for regularisation and that the appointee is required to sign an agreement. The contractual appointment of the petitioners was extended vide order dated 30-12-2016 for a period of six month or till the post was filled up on regular basis, whichever was earlier and accordingly, the petitioners were allowed to continue in that capacity. From the letter dated 20-05-2017 addressed to the Under Secretary (Higher & Tech. Edn.) by the Registrar, it is seen that as per the AICTE norms, there should be a minimum of 80% regular/full time faculty and that there is an urgent need to fill up minimum requirement of staff on regular basis. The petitioners along with others submitted a representation dated 22-01-2018 to the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar requesting them to consider their cases and to initiate process for regularisation. The Board of Management in its meeting held on 24-01-2018 passed many resolutions, one of which being that the UGC Regulations, 2010 relating to selection process shall be adopted and incorporated in relevant statutes and ordinances. On 23-05-2018 the University issued a notice inviting applications from amongst the eligible persons for appointment to various posts-teaching and non-teaching including the posts held by the petitioners. This notice dated 23-05-2018 is under challenge in this writ petition. 9. The question, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, is as to whether the petitioners are entitled for regular appointment. In order to decide this main issue, this court will be required to examine the ancillary issues. This notice dated 23-05-2018 is under challenge in this writ petition. 9. The question, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, is as to whether the petitioners are entitled for regular appointment. In order to decide this main issue, this court will be required to examine the ancillary issues. The first ancillary issue is as to whether the recruitment process has been done by conforming to the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The answer ought to be in the affirmative for the reason that while undertaking the selection process, the same has been done in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India which provides for equal opportunity and employment, in the sense that the advertisement was issued inviting applications from amongst the eligible candidates; that the interview was held by the Selection Committee and that only on its recommendation, the petitioners were appointed by the University. The second ancillary issue is as to whether the appointment was purely on contract basis and since the petitioners having given undertaking that they will not claim for regularisation, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. It is an undeniable fact that the appointments were purely on contract basis as is evident from the advertisement itself and the appointment orders issued by the University and moreover, the petitioners have given the said undertakings. But the contention of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners is that it was a mistake on the part of the University when it did not initiate the recruitment process for appointment on regular basis and therefore, it cannot take an advantage of it. His submission has merit and substance. The clear vacancies were admittedly available at the time when the advertisement was issued by the University and as per the ACTE norms, 80% of the posts ought to have been filled up on regular basis, which the University failed to do so. However, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent University has heavily relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi case (supra) to contend that the petitioners are not entitled to be regularised at all. It is no doubt true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the law as regards the constitutional mandate in matters relating to public employment including the appointment on contract basis. It is no doubt true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the law as regards the constitutional mandate in matters relating to public employment including the appointment on contract basis. But the decision in Uma Devi case will have no application at all to the facts of the present case for the reason that all that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in respect of contract appointment, is that if the contract appointments have been made without following due process of law, they are not entitled to be regularised. This is not so in the present case because due process of law has been duly followed and there are many instances where the appointments on contract basis after following due process of law, have been regularised by way of policy decisions. It has been further submitted by him that the recruitment process has not been done in terms of the regulations of the UGC and therefore, the new recruitment process is being taken up in accordance with the UGC Regulations, 2010. It is true to that extent but it may be noted that the UGC Regulations, 2010 were already in operation at the time when the University was established and the advertisement was issued but the University had chosen not to follow them at the relevant time. Nothing prevented the University from conducting the recruitment process in accordance with the UGC guidelines at that point of time itself and without doing that, it had conducted the recruitment process as per the existing rules. Surprisingly, the Board of Management in its meeting held on 24-01-2018 resolved to adopt the UGC Regulations, 2010. But it is not clear as to whether the UGC Regulations, 2010 are required formally to be adopted by the University or Institutions. The Regulations are notified by the UGC in exercise of power conferred under the provisions of the Act and therefore, the formal adoption appears to be unnecessary. Since the issue whether the adoption of UGC Regulations, 2010 is required by the University or not, is not the subject matter herein, this court refrains itself from making any observation thereon. But the fact remains that the Board of Management resolved to adopt the UGC Regulations, 2010 on 24-01-2018 only after the recruitment process being completed. Since the issue whether the adoption of UGC Regulations, 2010 is required by the University or not, is not the subject matter herein, this court refrains itself from making any observation thereon. But the fact remains that the Board of Management resolved to adopt the UGC Regulations, 2010 on 24-01-2018 only after the recruitment process being completed. It is not clear as to whether the University has ever issued any order or notification thereafter declaring that the UGC Regulations, 2010 have been adopted by it. In any case, these are the problems concerning the University but the mistake committed by the University cannot be attributed to the petitioners. 10. Having decided the ancillary issues in favour of the petitioners, this court proposes to deal with the main issue. As is seen from the aforesaid, the petitioners have been subjected to recruitment process as per the existing rules which can never be said to be illegal because the University on its own had stated that the UGC Regulations, 2010 were adopted only in the year, 2018. The Selection Committee, after examining their qualifications including the certificates and their performance in the interview, have recommended the names of the petitioners, on the basis of which the appointment orders were issued by the University. It is not the case of the University that the petitioners are not eligible at all as per the recruitment rules and all that it has submitted, is that the recruitment process has not been done in accordance with the UGC Regulations, 2010 which, according to it, was adopted in the year 2018. Obviously, the University was required to conduct the recruitment process as per the existing rules applicable at the time of advertisement and the interview is also one of the methods of adjudging the suitability of candidates which have been recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. Moreover, so far as the University is concerned and it being an Institution, it doesn’t make any difference to it whether the petitioners or any other persons are appointed as the Assistant professors of the University. The only thing to be noted is that whoever is appointed by it, should be well qualified and eligible as per the relevant recruitment rules and he or she shall be appointed on the basis of the recommendation of a Selection Committee or a Recruitment Board. The only thing to be noted is that whoever is appointed by it, should be well qualified and eligible as per the relevant recruitment rules and he or she shall be appointed on the basis of the recommendation of a Selection Committee or a Recruitment Board. As regards the relief to be granted by this court, the issue is as to whether the petitioners can be denied appointment on regular basis. The learned counsels appearing for the petitioners have submitted that in terms of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjun Singh & ors. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 713 , a direction ought to be issued to provide the petitioners with orders of regular appointment from the date of their initial appointment. The facts of that case are not exactly the same as that of the present case but the background or the circumstances on which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the matter, may be relevant for this case as well. In that case, about 14 posts of Assistant Accounts Officers were required to be filled by the HP Electricity Board on regular basis and accordingly, it requested the State Government to fill up the said posts by direct recruitment on regular basis and to send a requisition thereof to the Public Service Commission. The requisition was duly sent to the Public Service Commission. When the advertisement was issued by the Public Service Commission, the nature of appointment was shown to be on contract basis. The appellants applied for the said posts and after they being recommended by the Public Service Commission, they were appointed on contract basis. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while observing that the respondents failed to disclose the circumstances in which the advertisement was issued showing the nature of appointment to be on contract basis, held that it was not a case of regularisation of service of the appellants but was a case where a direction ought to have been issued on the respondents to provide the appellants with orders of regular appointment from the date of initial appointment and to treat the initial period of two years as probation and to provide them with consequential benefits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that such action on the part of the authorities not only amounts to unfair employment practice but also arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, it is not in dispute that at the time when the advertisement was issued, the vacant posts were available and the University could have initiated the recruitment process for appointment on regular basis. But it failed to do so for the reasons best known to it. The recruitment processes remain almost the same except the determination of scores on academic records. Moreover, since the UGC Regulations, 2010 were in operation, the University could have done the recruitment process in accordance with the said Regulations, if it really wished to do it. Failure to do so by the University in accordance with the UGC Regulations, 2010 was due to its fault and cannot be attributed to the petitioners. Since the petitioners have already been subjected to recruitment process without the same being questioned by anyone, there is no need for them to undergo another such recruitment process. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, this court is of the view that the petitioners cannot be denied appointment on regular basis for no fault of theirs and that too, after they being subjected to a long process of recruitment. 11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition is allowed and consequently, the Notification dated 23-05-2018 issued by the Registrar of the University, in respect of the petitioners, is quashed and set aside with the direction that the University shall provide regular appointments to them from the date of their initial appointment. There shall be no order as to costs.