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2018 DIGILAW 503 (UTT)

Harish Kumar v. S. C. Gairola

2018-12-20

RAMESH CHANDRA KHULBE, RAMESH RANGANATHAN

body2018
JUDGMENT : Ramesh Ranganathan, J. 1. This writ petition is filed, both under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Dehradun (the “Tribunal” in short) in Contempt Petition No.331/00125 of 2017 in O.A. No.331/39/2015 dated 28.09.2018. 2. The petitioner herein invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal contending that the respondents had disobeyed the order passed in O.A. No.331/39/2015 dated 05.05.2016. The petitioner had earlier filed O.A. No.331/39/2015, under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, before the Tribunal which, in its order dated 05.05.2016, observed that a mere change of qualification of a post, subsequent to the date of joining of the applicant therein, could not be a ground for cancelling his promotion by merely following the advice of the DoPT and the DST; there was no order of retrospective amendment in the service rules; it was for the appellate authority of the Indian Council of Forestry Research & Education (hear-in after referred to as the ‘ICFRE’) to apply its mind to such cases where the qualifications had been changed, so that the accrued right of previously recruited persons is protected, and they are not adversely affected; and further the applicant was correct in alleging that he had not received an opportunity for hearing on his request for his in-situ up-gradation as Scientist F. 3. Thereafter, the Tribunal observed:- “……….. For the reasons recorded above the order of respondent no.4 dated 05.09.2013 cancelling the promotion of the applicant to the post of Scientist F is set aside. Respondents are directed to issue a fresh order after considering the representation given by the applicant to Respondent No.4. Thereafter following the rules of procedure, if the applicant is still aggrieved by the order passed by Respondent No.4 he will be entitled to file an appeal before the Chairman, ICFRE who shall decide the same after giving the applicant an opportunity of personal hearing……….” 4. Thereafter following the rules of procedure, if the applicant is still aggrieved by the order passed by Respondent No.4 he will be entitled to file an appeal before the Chairman, ICFRE who shall decide the same after giving the applicant an opportunity of personal hearing……….” 4. The petitioner approached the Director General of ICFRE who, in his order dated 24.10.2016, observed that, having adopted the DoPTs Modified Flexible Complementing Scheme in toto, he being bound by the directives of Government of India, and the previous representations of the petitioner having been decided by the Secretary, MoEFCC and Chairman, BOG, ICFRE, the petitioner could not be granted in-situ promotion from the grade of Scientist E to Scientist F under the FCS scheme; however, if he still disagreed, he may appeal to the Secretary, MoEFCC and Chairman, BOG, ICFRE as per the directives of the Central Administrative Tribunal passed in O.A. No.331/00039/2015 dated 05.05.2016. 5. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Director General, IFCRE dated 24.10.2016, the petitioner approached the Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change, Government of India (Appellate Authority) who, by his order dated 19.06.2017, rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order passed by the Director General dated 24.10.2016. The petitioner chose not to question the validity of the order passed by the Appellate Authority (Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change, Government of India dated 19.06.2017), but instead invoked the contempt jurisdiction of the Tribunal alleging that the respondents had willfully disobeyed its earlier order in O.A. No.331/00039-2015 dated 05.05.2016. 6. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Union of India & others vs. Sh. Chattarsal Sehrawat & others, 183 (2011) DLT 495 and on the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mahaveer Prasad Verma vs. Central Administrative Tribunal Lucknow & others, 2013 (2) ADJ 18 . The Tribunal was of the view that no case of willful contempt was made out against the respondents and, accordingly, the contempt application was dismissed, and the notices were discharged. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition. 7. Mr. The Tribunal was of the view that no case of willful contempt was made out against the respondents and, accordingly, the contempt application was dismissed, and the notices were discharged. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition. 7. Mr. Gyanant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, since this Court exercises the power of judicial review and the power of judicial superintendence over the Administrative Tribunal under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court against an order passed by the Tribunal dismissing a contempt petition; the Delhi High Court, in Sh. Chattarsal Sehrawat, had entertained such a challenge and had rejected the plea, urged on behalf of the Union of India, that the Court, exercising Contempt jurisdiction, cannot go into the correctness of the implementation of the order passed by the Tribunal earlier; the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Mahaveer Prasad Verma, had entertained and adjudicated a challenge to the order of the Tribunal; this Court should, in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, do so likewise; the order of the Tribunal, setting-aside the order dated 05.09.2013 whereby the petitioner’s promotion was cancelled, necessitated the respondents considering the petitioner’s case for promotion afresh; the orders passed by the Tribunal obligated the Director General, and the Secretary, Government of India to consider the petitioner’s case for promotion; and failure on their part to do so was a willful and deliberate violation of the order of the Tribunal. 8. Learned counsel would also place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India & others vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147 (Paragraph Nos.30, 31 and 33), and on Hope Plantations Ltd. vs. Taluk Land Board, Peermade & another, (1999) 5 SCC 590 to submit that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice over, because such a procedure would be contrary to considerations of fair play and justice. He would also submit that, on a conjoint reading of Sections 11 and 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, a right of appeal is conferred against the order of the Tribunal dismissing a contempt case, before the High Court. 9. He would also submit that, on a conjoint reading of Sections 11 and 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, a right of appeal is conferred against the order of the Tribunal dismissing a contempt case, before the High Court. 9. The question which necessitates examination is whether, in a case where the Tribunal dismisses the contempt petition and discharges the respondents holding that no case of willful contempt has been made out, would it then be open, to the applicant in the O.A., to question the said order, whereby the contempt case was dismissed and the contemnors discharged, in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India; and whether this Court would be justified in interfering with such an order. 10. Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (the “1985 Act” for short) confers power on the Tribunal to punish for contempt and, thereunder, the Tribunal shall have, and exercise, the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has and may exercise and, for this purpose, the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 shall have effect subject to the modification that the references therein to a High Court shall be construed as including a reference to such Tribunal etc. While statutorily conferring the power to punish for contempt, of its orders, on the Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1985 Act, Parliament has also stipulated that the power, which the Central Administrative Tribunal can exercise under Section 17 of the 1985 Act, would be akin to that of the High Court and, for this purpose, the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act shall have effect with the modification that the references therein to the High Court shall be construed as a reference to the Tribunal. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act in examining whether or not the petitioner herein is justified in his submission that a writ petition should be entertained against the order passed by the Tribunal dismissing a contempt case, and in holding that no case of willful contempt had been made out. 11. Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines “contempt of court” to also mean a civil contempt. 11. Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines “contempt of court” to also mean a civil contempt. Section 2(b) defines “civil contempt” to mean willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court. Section 12 provides for punishment for Contempt of Court and, under sub-section (1) thereof, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or in any other law, a Contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both. Since the powers conferred on the Tribunal, under Section 17 of the 1985 Act to punish for Contempt, is akin to that of the High Court, and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act have been made applicable to the Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1985 Act, all the aforesaid provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act would also be applicable to the Tribunal in exercising its jurisdiction to punish for Contempt of itself. 12. One other provision, which is of considerable significance, is Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which relates to “appeals”. Under sub-section (1) thereof an appeal shall lie, as of right, from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-(a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court. The right of appeal under Section 19 is conferred only against an order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, if the words “High Court” were to be substituted with the word “Tribunal”, the right of appeal would only lie against the order or decision of the Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 13. The question, which necessitates examination, is whether orders passed by the Tribunal, discharging the respondents holding that no case of willful contempt has been made out, and in dismissing the contempt case, can be subjected to challenge in proceedings under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India? 14. 13. The question, which necessitates examination, is whether orders passed by the Tribunal, discharging the respondents holding that no case of willful contempt has been made out, and in dismissing the contempt case, can be subjected to challenge in proceedings under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India? 14. In examining this question, it must be borne in mind that a contempt proceeding is not a dispute between two parties. The proceeding is, primarily, between the Court and the person who is alleged to have committed Contempt of Court. The person, who informs the court or brings to its notice that Contempt of such Court has been committed, does not stand in the position of a prosecutor. He simply assists the Court in ensuring that its dignity and majesty is maintained and upheld. It is for the Court which initiates the proceedings to decide, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the person, against whom such proceeding has been initiated, should be punished or discharged [State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another, (1996) 4 SCC 411 ]. As the petitioner is merely an informant, who has brought to the notice of the Court that its orders have been violated, he cannot claim to be a person aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal discharging the contemnors, and in refusing to punish them on the ground that no case of willful contempt has been made out. 15. It must also be borne in mind that an appeal is a creature of a statute. Unless a statute provides for an appeal and specifies the order against which an appeal can be filed, no appeal can be filed or entertained as a matter of right or course. If the High Court passes an order in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for Contempt of Court, then alone would an appeal be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. The words ‘any order’ or “decision” in Section 19(1) are in the alternative, and in either case must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. (Mahboob S. Allibhoy). 16. Section 17 of 1985 Act is a piece of legislation by reference. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are not lifted and incorporated in the text of the 1985 Act (as is in the case of legislation by incorporation). (Mahboob S. Allibhoy). 16. Section 17 of 1985 Act is a piece of legislation by reference. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are not lifted and incorporated in the text of the 1985 Act (as is in the case of legislation by incorporation). They remain where they are, yet the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, in the context of the Tribunal, must be so read that the word “Tribunal” is substituted in the place of the word “High Court” wherever it occurs, subject to the modifications set out in Section 17 of the 1985 Act. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for appeals. In its text also, by virtue of Section 17 of the 1985 Act, the word ‘High Court’ should be read as ‘Tribunal’. [T. Sudhakar Prasad vs. Government of A.P. & others., (2001) 1 SCC 516 ] When so read, an appeal would lie as of right, under Section 19(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of the 1985 Act, from any order or decision of the Tribunal, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, to the Supreme Court. 17. A right of appeal is available under Section 19(1) only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution. Article 215 of the Constitution of India does not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the High Courts. It merely recognises that the High Courts are Courts of Record and, by virtue of being Courts of Record, have inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt of themselves. Such inherent power to punish for contempt is summary. It is not governed or limited by any rule of procedure excepting principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by Article 215 is inalienable. It cannot be taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the Constitution. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and not in derogation of Article 215 of the Constitution. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the said Article. (T. Sudhakar Prasad). The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and not in derogation of Article 215 of the Constitution. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the said Article. (T. Sudhakar Prasad). The High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power, as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution, when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When it decides not to impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to hold that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. [D.N. Taneja vs. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 ; Mahboob S. Allibhoy]. 18. On whether an appeal lies against the order of the Tribunal, punishing the respondents for contempt, the Supreme Court, in T. Sudhakar Prasad, observed: “..............It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench has not declared the provisions of Article 323-A(2)(b) or Article 323-B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court has, in its judgment under appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal having been compared to like 'courts of first instance' and then proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative Tribunals having been held to be equivalent to court or Tribunals sub-ordinate to High Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course available to them was either to make a reference to High Court or to file a complaint under Sections 193, 219 and 228 of IPC as provided by Section 30 of the Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution the right to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against an order passed by the Tribunal punishing for contempt under Section 17 of the Act was defeated and on these twin grounds Section 17 of the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 , or L. Chandra Kumar, (1997) 3 SCC 261 or any other decision of this Court. The Constitution Bench has in so many words said that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 could not be taken away by conferring the same on any court or Tribunal and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the High Court now legislatively conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of High Court on specified matters, did not amount to assigning Tribunals a status of substitute for the High Court but such jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or supplementally on any Court or Tribunal which is not a concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more so in view of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (2)(b) of Article 323A specifically empowers the Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the power to punish for contempt, being conferred on Administrative Tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative sanctity there from. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact but the jurisdictional power and authority to hear and decide the matters covered by Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act having been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals the jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction of Tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by the High Court has now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose, firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the Tribunals are not "courts of record". While holding the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the Tribunal remains a Tribunal and so would be amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established rules of self-restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However any order or decision of Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific provision contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985..................” 19. The Supreme Court, in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, AIR 1997 SC 1125 has nowhere said that orders of Tribunals holding the contemnor guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subjected to judicial scrutiny of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, inspite of the remedy of a statutory appeal being available. The Supreme Court, in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, AIR 1997 SC 1125 has nowhere said that orders of Tribunals holding the contemnor guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subjected to judicial scrutiny of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, inspite of the remedy of a statutory appeal being available. The distinction between orders passed by Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14(1) of the 1985 Act and orders punishing for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of 1985 Act is this: as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the latter, a statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable, under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, only to the Supreme Court. [T. Sudhakar Prasad; R. Mohajan and others vs. Shefali Sengupta and others, (2012) 4 SCC 761 ] 20. That no appeal is maintainable against an order dropping proceeding for contempt, or in refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt, is apparent from sub section (1) of Section 19 (Mahboob S. Allibhoy). Where the Court declines to initiate proceedings for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt, and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not, therefore, fall within the opening words of Section 19 (l), and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. [Baradakanta Mishra vs. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra C.J. of the Orissa H.C., AIR 1974 SC 2255 ; Mahboob S. Allibhoy]. When the finding is that the alleged contemnor did not wilfully disobey the order, there is no order punishing the respondent for violation of the order; and, accordingly, an appeal under Section 19 would not lie. [J.S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar & others, AIR 1997 SC 113 ]. While an appeal would lie to the Supreme Court, against the order of the Tribunal exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, no appeal would lie against the order of the Tribunal refusing to exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 21. [J.S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar & others, AIR 1997 SC 113 ]. While an appeal would lie to the Supreme Court, against the order of the Tribunal exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, no appeal would lie against the order of the Tribunal refusing to exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 21. While it is clear that no appeal would lie against the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal refusing to punish the respondents/contemnors in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 17 of the 1985 Act (which confers on them the power of contempt akin to the High Court), the petitioners would contend that, since the power of judicial review exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act or Section 17 of the 1985 Act would not come in its way to set aside the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal refusing to punish the respondents/contemnors for contempt. 22. Subordination of Tribunals and Courts functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court can be either judicial or administrative or both. The power of superintendence exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is judicial superintendence and not administrative superintendence, such as the one which vests in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution over subordinate courts. In L. Chandra Kumar, the Constitution Bench did not agree with the suggestion that the Tribunals be made subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts within whose territorial jurisdiction they fall, as the Constitutional scheme does not require that all adjudicatory bodies, which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, should be subject to its supervisory jurisdiction, i.e. the supervision of the administrative functioning of the Tribunals. (T. Sudhakar Prasad) 23. Administrative Tribunals are alternative institutional mechanisms designed to be no less effective than the High Court, but, at the same time, not to negate the judicial review jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts. The Administrative Tribunals are not assigned a status equivalent to that of the High Court and, for the purpose of judicial review or judicial superintendence, they are subordinate to the High Court. High Courts are creatures of the Constitution, and their Judges hold constitutional office having been appointed under the Constitution. The Administrative Tribunals are not assigned a status equivalent to that of the High Court and, for the purpose of judicial review or judicial superintendence, they are subordinate to the High Court. High Courts are creatures of the Constitution, and their Judges hold constitutional office having been appointed under the Constitution. The Tribunals are creatures of statute and their members are statutorily appointed and hold a statutory office. [T. Sudhakar Prasad; State of Orissa vs. Bhagaban Sarangi, (1995) 1 SCC 399 ]. There is no anathema in the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction of the High Court and in that sense being supplemental or additional to the High Court, but at the same time not enjoying a status equivalent to the High Court, and also being subject to judicial review and judicial superintendence of the High Court. (T. Sudhakar Prasad). 24. While the powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are, no doubt, a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India (L. Chandra Kumar), and such a power cannot be negated or circumscribed even by a constitutional amendment let alone legislation -plenary or subordinate, the distinction between existence of the power and its exercise must be borne in mind. The mere existence of a power does not justify the exercise of the power. [Rattan Bai and another vs. Ram Dass and others, (2012) 3 SCC 248 ]. While the powers of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and the power of judicial superintendence conferred on it under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are, no doubt, extremely wide, its exercise is hedged by self imposed limitations. The High Court would not exercise its power of judicial review akin to that of an appellate Court to hear and adjudicate the writ petition on its merits. In the exercise of its powers of judicial review, the High Court would not substitute its views for that of the Administrative Tribunal to come to a different conclusion or to examine the order on its merits, and hold that the Administrative Tribunal had erred in not punishing the respondents-contemnors. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court would also not take upon itself the task of imposing punishment itself or to direct the Tribunal to do so. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court would also not take upon itself the task of imposing punishment itself or to direct the Tribunal to do so. 25. Ordinarily the High Court, in the exercise of its powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and its power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would not interfere with the order of the Tribunal, passed in the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction under Section 17 of the 1985 Act, discharging the contemnors after holding that no case of willful contempt was made out against the respondents. 26. Let us now examine the judgments on which reliance is placed on behalf of the petitioners. In Mahaveer Prasad Verma, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that once a notice has been issued by the Court or Tribunal, the subsequent transfer of an officer would not result in his being discharged from contempt. The present case is not one of discharge of the contemnor under the Contempt of Courts Act on the ground that he was transferred, but is as a consequence of the Tribunal holding that no case of willful contempt had been made out. Reliance placed by Sri Gyanant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, on Mahaveer Prasad Verma is therefore misplaced. 27. In its order in Sh. Chattarsal Sehrawat, the Delhi High Court held that if the alleged compliance order itself states and reflects that the order has not been complied with, the respondents cannot be directed to file an Original Application challenging the order passed in alleged compliance of the Court’s substantive order; and the substantive order of the Tribunal cannot be obliterated by an Office Memorandum requiring the applicants to challenge such an order. None of the statutory provisions referred to earlier in this order, were noticed by the Delhi High Court nor did the High Court take note of the fact that the jurisdiction, exercised by the Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1985 Act, is akin to the power exercised by the High Court to punish for contempt. 28. In Sh. None of the statutory provisions referred to earlier in this order, were noticed by the Delhi High Court nor did the High Court take note of the fact that the jurisdiction, exercised by the Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1985 Act, is akin to the power exercised by the High Court to punish for contempt. 28. In Sh. Chattarsal Sehrawat, the Delhi High Court had rejected the plea, urged on behalf of the Government of India, that the Court, exercising contempt jurisdiction, cannot go into the correctness of the implementation of the order passed by the Tribunal earlier. In examining this question, it is relevant to take note of the scope of inquiry by the Court/Tribunal exercising jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The contempt jurisdiction is exercised to uphold the majesty and dignity of Courts/Tribunals, [Murray & Co. vs. Ashok Kr. Newatia & another, 2000 (2) SCC 367 ; Mrityunjoy Das and another vs. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and others, (2001) 3 SCC 739 ], and the power to punish for Contempt, a powerful weapon in the hands of Law courts, must therefore be exercised with due care and caution, and in larger public interest. (Mrityunjoy Das). Contempt jurisdiction is exercised for the purpose of upholding the majesty of law and the dignity of Courts and Tribunals. Proceedings for contempt of court cannot be used for executing the decree/order of Courts/Tribunals. Availability of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt provides efficacy to functioning of the judicial forum and enables the enforcement of the orders on account of its deterrent effect on avoidance. (T. Sudhakar Prasad). The contempt jurisdiction is not to be exercised casually but only sparingly and in very deserving cases. It is appropriate to bear in mind the adage “It is good to have the power of a giant, but not good to use it always.” [Suresh Chandra Poddar vs. Dhani Ram & others, (2002) 1 SCC 766 ]. 29. As a proceeding, under the Contempt of Court Act, is quasi-criminal in nature, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding, and the violation should be established beyond reasonable doubt. [Mrityunjoy Das ; Chhotu Ram vs. Urvashi Gulati and another, (2001) 7 SCC 530 ]. 29. As a proceeding, under the Contempt of Court Act, is quasi-criminal in nature, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding, and the violation should be established beyond reasonable doubt. [Mrityunjoy Das ; Chhotu Ram vs. Urvashi Gulati and another, (2001) 7 SCC 530 ]. To bring the matter within the ambit of the Contempt of Courts Act, the case should not rest only on surmises and conjectures, and a clear case, of obstruction of the administration of justice by a party intentionally, must be made out. [Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307 ]. The order of the Court, violation of which is alleged, must therefore be clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, and defiance thereof must be apparent on the very face of the action with which a contemnor is charged. An interpretation of the terms of the Court’s order, in respect of which disobedience is alleged, would not be appropriate while dealing with a charge of contempt. Such a charge cannot be brought home by unravelling the true meaning of the Court’s order by a subsequent order when there is an apparent ambiguity or lack of clarity in the initial order. [T.C. Gupta vs. Bimal Kumar Dutta and others, (2014) 14 SCC 446 ]. 30. It would be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt, in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction, on mere probabilities. [V.G. Nigam and others vs. Kedar Nath Gupta and another, (1992) 4 SCC 697 ; Mrityunjoy Das ; Chhotu Ram]. Where there are two equally consistent possibilities open to the Court, it is not right to hold that the offence of contempt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. [Lord Denning in Bramblevale Ltd. Re, (1969) 3 All ER 1062; Mrityunjoy Das ; Chhotu Ram]. 31. As it is both the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation, it behoves the Court/Tribunal to act with circumspection making allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct, not explainable otherwise, is made out that the contemnor must be punished. Punishment under the law of Contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one’s duty and in defiance of authority. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct, not explainable otherwise, is made out that the contemnor must be punished. Punishment under the law of Contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one’s duty and in defiance of authority. To take action in an unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty for other measures, and is not to be encouraged. [Debabrata Bandopadhyay & others vs. The State of West Bengal & another, AIR 1969 SC 189 ; Kanwar Singh Saini]. 32. The court must satisfy itself that violation of the judgment is willful and intentional. Though, in a case of execution of a decree, the executing court may be bound to execute a decree whatever may be the consequences, in a contempt proceeding, the alleged contemnor may satisfy the court that disobedience has been under some compelling circumstances, and in that situation, no punishment can be awarded to him. [Niaz Mohammad & others vs. State of Haryana & others, (1994) 6 SCC 332 ; Bank of Baroda vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya & another, AIR 2004 SC 942 ; Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang & another, AIR 2006 SC 1883 ; and Kanwar Singh Saini]. 33. As noted hereinabove, the petitioner invoked the contempt jurisdiction of the Tribunal contending that the orders passed by the Director General, Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education dated 24.10.2016 and the Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change, Government of India dated 19.06.2017 are orders passed in willful and deliberate violation of the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 331/00039 of 2015 dated 05.05.2016. The validity of an order passed by the authorities concerned, in compliance with the order of the Administrative Tribunal, should ordinarily be subjected to challenge in independent legal proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal, and not by invoking its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In V. Kanakarajan vs. General Manager, South Eastern Railway and others, (1996) 10 SCC 102 , the Supreme Court observed: “………... In as much as the scope of the present appeal, which is directed against the dismissal of contempt application, is very limited, we are not inclined to go into other contentions raised by the appellant challenging the validity of certain related orders passed by the authorities. In as much as the scope of the present appeal, which is directed against the dismissal of contempt application, is very limited, we are not inclined to go into other contentions raised by the appellant challenging the validity of certain related orders passed by the authorities. As a matter of fact, the High Court by the judgment under appeal held as follows while rejecting the contempt application: “It was not directed by us that the question of promotion of the petitioner should be considered only on the basis of the confidential reports. It may be that the effect of the confidential reports being in favour of the petitioner, the respondents should have granted him promotion. But we are not considering the merits of the report of the competent authority in not recommending the promotion of the petitioner. We are also unable to consider whether the competent authority was justified in observing that the petitioner is not a suitable candidate for promotion as per rules. The remedy of the petitioner, in our opinion, lies not in an application for contempt but in a separate writ petition against the order that was communicated to him by the Chief Personnel Officer dated 18.05.1981. In the circumstances, we do not think that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for contempt against the respondents. The petitioner will, however, be at liberty to move against the said Order of the Chief Personnel Officer by writ application.” We are of the view that the High Court was right in declining to entertain the application for any contempt and reserving the right of the petitioner by separate proceedings to challenge the consequential orders passed by the authorities…….” (emphasis supplied) 34. In J.S. Parihar, the Supreme Court opined: “………..Once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the willful violation of the order. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the willful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act……..” (emphasis supplied) 35. Again, in Union of India & another vs. P.M. Rangaswami, (2007) 15 SCC 683 the Supreme Court observed: “...........On 14.12.2005, Review DPC through special request to UPSC was held as per the directions of Tribunal, Chennai Bench's order dated 21.9.2005. The Government issued a detailed speaking order on 30.12.2005 dealing with the representation of the respondent and informing him that his case has been considered in terms of the order of the Tribunal and that upon such consideration he has not been recommended for promotion to HAG. On 3.5.2006, the impugned order was passed by Tribunal holding the petitioner in contempt. There is no dispute that there was no challenge to the seniority list prior to 1997. Challenge to the change of date was not vis-à-vis Trehan and Nampoorthiry. So far as the entry to Grade IV is concerned, the applicant was junior to Trehan and Nampoorthiry. The challenge in the OA was not in respect of Trehan and Nampoorthiry. As noted, there was no grievance prior to 7.3.1997. It is to be noted that there was no direction for promotion and only for consideration. Therefore, the question of any automatic promotion does not arise. The Tribunal never held that the respondent was entitled to promotion notwithstanding losing seniority. It appears from the record that despite losing seniority respondent was considered for promotion to HAG on the basis of Tribunal's order. The parameters to be considered while deciding as to whether contempt has been committed has been considered by this Court in several cases. For example Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand and Ors.: AIR 2004 SC 4277 , Director of Education, Uttaranchal and Ors. The parameters to be considered while deciding as to whether contempt has been committed has been considered by this Court in several cases. For example Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand and Ors.: AIR 2004 SC 4277 , Director of Education, Uttaranchal and Ors. v. Ved Prakash Joshi and Ors.: 2005 Cri LJ 3731, Dilip Mitra v. Swadesh Chandra Bhadga, Chhoty Ram v. Urvashi Gulati and Anr. : 2001 Cri LJ 4204 and Suresh Chandra Poddar v. Dhani Ram and Ors. : (2002) ILLJ 822 SC. Above being the position, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that contempt had been committed. If the respondent has any grievance, it is open to him to assail the same in an appropriate proceeding................” (emphasis supplied) 36. In the light of the law declared in the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the validity of the order passed by the authorities, in compliance with the order of the Tribunal, should not, ordinarily, be permitted to be questioned in contempt proceedings, as the merits of the orders passed by the authorities cannot be examined in contempt proceedings initiated to punish the respondents for violation of the order of the Tribunal. 37. The only question which the Tribunal would be called upon to examine, in exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, is whether the contemnors have willfully and deliberately violated its orders and, if so, the nature of punishment to be imposed on them. In the exercise of such jurisdiction, the Tribunal would not examine the order passed by the authorities on merits. The only remedy available to the petitioner to question the validity of the order, passed in compliance of the order of the Tribunal, is to subject it to challenge in independent legal proceedings before the Tribunal, and not by invoking its contempt jurisdiction. 38. Reliance placed, on behalf of the petitioner, on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Agarwal is also of no avail. In Ashok Kumar Aggarwal the validity of an order placing an officer under suspension fell for consideration and the Supreme Court, relying on its earlier judgment in Hope Plantations Ltd., observed that, when proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment, and are estopped from questioning it. Observations of Courts must be read in its context, and not as statutes. Observations of Courts must be read in its context, and not as statutes. The aforesaid judgment has no bearing on the question whether exercise by the Administrative Tribunal, of its power to punish for contempt under Section 17 of the 1985 Act and in discharging the contemnor holding that no case of willful contempt has been made out, can be subjected to challenge before the High Court in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 39. The petitioner is not being asked to face the same litigation twice over. If the petitioner is of the view that the subsequent order passed by the authorities concerned is illegal, the remedy is to file a separate O.A. in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in V. Kanakarajan, J.S. Parihar and P.M. Rangaswami. In such cases neither can the contempt jurisdiction of the Tribunal be invoked, nor can the Tribunal be called upon to examine the validity of the order passed by the authorities concerned on its merits. 40. While the jurisdiction which this Court exercises under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is, no doubt, wide and its power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can always be exercised to render substantial justice, that would not mean that the High Court would take upon itself the task of examining whether the Tribunal was justified in discharging the respondents holding that no case of willful contempt had been made out. We see no reason, therefore, to entertain this writ petition. Suffice it to leave it open to the petitioners to question the orders dated 24.10.2016 and 19.06.2016 in independent legal proceedings before the Tribunal. 41. The writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.