ORDER : This petition, under Section 482/397/401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, has been filed by Sri Hare Krishna Medhi for quashing of the order, dated 9.10.2014, framing charge against the petitioner for the offences under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code read with Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in Special Case No. 1/2011 pending in the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 3. 2. The petitioner contends that one Nirmalendu Bhattacharya lodged an FIR with the Officer in Charge, CID Police Station, stating inter alia that the pay and allowance of 10th APBn were fraudulently withdrawn much in excess that that actual dues and that the petitioner was a co-conspirator in the alleged excess withdrawals. A charges heet has been laid against the petitioner along several others for the offences under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code read with Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and by the impugned order dated 9.10.2014 the learned trial Court also framed charges against the petitioner. The petitioner also submits that he was not discharging his duties as Drawing and Disbursing Officer rather; he was only empowered by the Commandant to sign on the bills. The principal ground taken by the petitioner is that a similarly situated officer, namely, Sri Randeep Kumar Baruah who was also the Second-in-Command of 10th Assam Police Battalion has not been prosecuted because prosecution sanction was declined in view of absence of prima facie materials. 3. The respondent No. 1, Central Bureau of Investigation, has submitted affidavit-in opposition contesting the averments made in the petition. The respondent No. 1 has reiterated the facts unearthed during investigation that the petitioner Sri Hare Krishna Medhi isthat he was the Second-in-Command of 10th Assam Police Battalion during the relevant period discharging his duties as public servant. It is further alleged that the petitioner as Drawing and Disbursing Officer entered into criminal conspiracy with other accused to misappropriate Govt. funds. 4. I have heard Mr. B.K. Mahajan, assisted by Mr. R. Ali, Mr. A. Choudhury, Mr. P.K. Das, Mr. N.J. Dutta, appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S.C. Keyal, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents/CBI. 5. It is further alleged that the petitioner as Drawing and Disbursing Officer entered into criminal conspiracy with other accused to misappropriate Govt. funds. 4. I have heard Mr. B.K. Mahajan, assisted by Mr. R. Ali, Mr. A. Choudhury, Mr. P.K. Das, Mr. N.J. Dutta, appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S.C. Keyal, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents/CBI. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 , on consideration of various authorities laid down the following principles with respect to standard required for framing of charge (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. 6. In the present case, the perusal of chargesheet, laid against the petitioner, reveals that not only bills have been drawn against fictitious persons under the signature of the petitioner but repeat withdrawals have also been made. For instance, in page no. 65 of the chargesheet (Page 85 of the Annexures) Bill No. 46 dated 27.05.2001 was drawn in the name of Manoj Roy, LDA, which is a fictitious identity. The petitioner, as alleged, during his tenure from 18.7.1999 to 12.8.2001, signed 10 numbers of fraudulent bills and facilitated excess drawal of Rs 54,851/- (gross) under the salary head of Commandant 10th APBn. 7. It may be pointed out that Investigating Agency has also seized all the relevant documents to justify the allegations made against the petitioner. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the case of L. Chandraiah vs. State of A.P, (2003) 12 SCC 670 and submits that the act of the petitioner may at the most amount to be a disciplinary misconduct but not an offence of criminal breach of trust. 9. I have gone through the judgment in L. Chandraiah (supra). The case relates to prosecution of a public servant for criminal breach of trust by signing on forged bills. 9. I have gone through the judgment in L. Chandraiah (supra). The case relates to prosecution of a public servant for criminal breach of trust by signing on forged bills. The reading of the said judgment will reveal that in that case a trial was conducted on the allegations of criminal breach of trust and no evidence was found to establish that the accused had put his signatures in the forged bills having knowledge of forgery. The case of L. Chandraiah (supra) is not applicable in the present case as the trial in the present case is yet to take place. 10. On the basis of the materials on record, against the petitioner, an opinion can easily be formed that the accused might have committed the offence. In view of the principles laid down in the case of Sajjan Kumar (supra), this standard is sufficient enough to frame the charge against the petitioner, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. 11. Now, coming to the scope of Inherent as well Revisional jurisdiction of High Court vis-à-vis framing of charges it would be proper to reproduce herein the principles laid down in the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has culled out several principles regarding the jurisdictional distinction in the two provisions Section 397 and Section 482. The principles are as follows; 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. Emphasis supplied 12. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. Emphasis supplied 12. In view of the materials on record against the petitioner and the legal principles, discussed above, I find no merit in this petition and accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 13. The interim order, dated 11-12-2014, staying further proceeding in the aforesaid Special Case No. 1/2011, is vacated. 14. A copy of this order be communicated to the learned Special Judge, CBI, Additional Court No. 3, Chandmari, Guwahati.