JUDGMENT S.N. PRASAD, J. - This writ petition is under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India wherein the order of dismissal dtd. 26th August, 2005 and Appellate order dtd. 4th January, 2007 are under challenge whereby and where under the petitioner has been dismissed from service. 2. The brief fact of the case of the petitioner is that he after joining his service as an officer of the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, in short NABARD, has started rendering his service from 25th July, 1985 as a Grade-A officer, while he was in service he was departmentally proceeded by serving a memorandum of charge dt. 19th February, 2004 alleging therein altogether three charges and accordingly the petitioner was asked to appear before the enquiry officer. The case of the petitioner is that before his appearance before the enquiry officer, he has refuted the allegations levelled against him but in one pretext or the other he has not been provided opportunity to defend himself before the enquiry officer and in his absence two of the charges out of 3 has been found to be proved by the enquiry officer, which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and thereafter order of dismissal has been passed. The petitioner has challenged the same before the appellate authority by raising all the points but the same has been rejected as has been informed to him vide communication dtd. 4th January, 2007, hence this writ petition has been filed. 3. The grounds taken by the petitioner in assailing the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority is that he has not been provided with adequate opportunity to defend himself in spite of time having been sought for and in one day the enquiry has been concluded. Further ground has been taken that the enquiry officer has given finding proving the charges which are not in the memorandum of charges, as such the enquiry officer has proceeded mechanically. The enquiry officer, while proving the charge has taken note of the fact that for availing loans from outside agencies permission from the National Bank was required but whether he has taken permission or not it has not been verified by the enquiry officer and if the petitioner would have been provided with an opportunity he would have brought to the notice of the enquiry officer this fact. So far as charge relating to non-submission of statement of liability, the same has also been found to be proved without appreciating the documents which have been exhibited. So far as the allegation related to charge No.3 which relates to avoiding to go for training on the plea of illness but in support of his stand, he has not submitted any medical certifcate, as such the enquiry officer has came to finding that there was predetermined plan by the petitioner to avoid attending the training programme, which according to the petitioner is absolutely incorrect in view of the fact that for getting leave on the ground of medical illness there is no requirement to produce any medical certificate, he further submits that the period of eave subsequently been regularized and the encashment of the said period has also been given to the petitioner, as such, the authorities while on the one hand has accepted the plea of leave during the said period but on the other hand has not considered the same and reached to the conclusion that he has avoided to go for training and for that he has taken ground of medical ailment, hence the action of the authority is contradictory. So far as charge No.4 is concerned which relates to failure of the petitioner to report to the new centre of posting, the same has also found to be proved, but according to the petitioner the basis of proof is not cogent to prove the said charge. He has taken the ground that the disciplinary authority has also not appreciated the entire aspect of the matter and mechanically accepted the finding of the enquiry officer and passed the order of dismissal from service. The order of dismissal has been passed by the Managing Director and the appeal has been filed before the Chairman but during the time when the appeal was preferred the incumbent holding the post of Managing Director has become the Chairman, as such the appeal was placed before the executive committee but the executive committee, without applying its mind, has rejected the appeal by observing that no fresh valid point has been made by the petitioner in support of his case, hence according to him, the appellate authority has not exercised his quasi judicial mind that too when the petitioner has not appeared before the enquiry officer. 4. While on the other hand, Mr. 4. While on the other hand, Mr. J.K. Tripathy, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for opposite party NABARD has raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition by taking the stand that the writ petition is not maintainable against NABARD since it is a corporate body established U/s.3 of the NABARD Act, 1981 and under Section 5 (1) of the said Act, general superintendence, direction and management of the NABARD has been vested upon the Board of Directors. According to the learned senior counsel writ petition will not lie against any service dispute. He further submits that the petitioner has been given ample opportunity to participate in the enquiry before the enquiry officer but he has avoided himself to appear before the enquiry officer and ultimately the enquiry officer has to issue fresh notice by publishing it in the daily newspaper but even on the date fixed he has not appeared on the plea that writ petition has been filed before this Court, as such it is not a case that the petitioner has not been given opportunity of hearing. He submits that the nature of allegation is very serious since the petitioner being holder of Group-A officer post, has flouted the decision of the higher authority which amounts to misconduct and thereafter the authorities have taken decision to initiate departmental proceeding in which the enquiry officer has found the charge proved against him which after being accepted by the disciplinary authority, the order of dismissal from service has been passed which has also been affirmed by the appellate authority in its appellate jurisdiction. He submits that since there is fact finding, as such this Court may not interfere assuming the power of appeal. 5. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties, their arguments, statements made by them in the pleading as also the judgment relied upon by them have been minutely examined by this Court. This Court after going across the pleading made by the parties has found that the writ petition is against the order passed by the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority whereby and where under the petitioner has been dismissed from service are under challenge. Admittedly the petitioner was working as a Grade-A officer in NABARD. 6. Learned Sr. This Court after going across the pleading made by the parties has found that the writ petition is against the order passed by the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority whereby and where under the petitioner has been dismissed from service are under challenge. Admittedly the petitioner was working as a Grade-A officer in NABARD. 6. Learned Sr. Counsel has raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition by submitting that since the petitioner is raising service dispute, the same will not come under Fundamental Rights, hence this writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. 7. Now the main concern for consideration before this Court is as to whether NABARD is a State or other authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. For better appreciation of the controversy it become necessary to look into the constitution of the body, purpose for which it has been created, manner of its function including mode of its mind. Article 12 of the Constitution of India provides an inclusive definition of the term ‘State’ by saying, in this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. The leading authority in this field is the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Hasia and others vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others, reported in (1981) I SCC 722 wherein Hon’ble Shri Justice P.N. Bhagawati, as he then was, explained that the Government in many of its ventures and public enterprises is resorting to more and more frequently to this resourceful legal contrivance as it has many practical advantages and at the same time does not involve the slightest diminution in its ownership and control of undertaking. In such cases, “the true owner is the State, the real operator is the State and the effective controller is the State and accountability for its actions to the community and to Parliament is of the State. In such cases, “the true owner is the State, the real operator is the State and the effective controller is the State and accountability for its actions to the community and to Parliament is of the State. It is undoubtedly true that the corporation is a distinct juristic entity with a corporate structure of its own and it carries on its functions on business principles with a certain amount of autonomy which is necessary as well a useful from the point of view of effective business management, but behind the formal ownership which is cast in the corporate mould, the reality is very much the deeply pervasive presence of the Government. It is really the Government which acts through the instrumentality or agency of the corporation and the juristic vell of corporate personality worn for the purpose of convenience of management and administration cannot be allowed to obliterate the true nature of the reality behind which is the Government. Now it is obvious that if a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional law as the Government itself, though in the eye of the law it would be a distinct and independent legal entity. If the Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional limitations, it must follow a fortiorari that the Government acting through the instrumentality of agency of a corporation should equally be subject to the same limitations. If such a corporation were to be free from the basic obligation to obey the fundamental rights, it would led to considerable erosion of the efficiency of the fundamental rights, for in that event the Government would be enable to override the fundamental rights by adopting the stratagem of carrying out its functions through the instrumentality or agency of a corporation, while retaining control over it. The fundamental rights would then be reduced to little more than an idle dream or a promise of unreality. Against the preliminary objection, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that NABARD is the creation of statute i.e. created under the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act, 1981, a 3-tier machinery is prescribed to achieve the object set out in the opening part of NABARD Act. Against the preliminary objection, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that NABARD is the creation of statute i.e. created under the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act, 1981, a 3-tier machinery is prescribed to achieve the object set out in the opening part of NABARD Act. The object is as under : “An act to establish a bank to be known as the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development for providing credit for the promotion of agriculture, small-scale industries, cottage and village industries, handicrafts and other rural crafts and other allied economic activities in rural areas with a view to promoting integrated rural development and securing prosperity of rural areas, and for matters connected therewith, or incidental thereto. (emphasis supplied) 6.1 The term State Cooperative Bank is defined in clause (u) of Section 2 of the NABARD Act. The definition reads as under State Cooperative Bank means the Principal Cooperative society in a state, the primary object of which is the financing of other Cooperative Societies in the State.” It is the legal position that the prerogative writ of mandamus confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The ‘public authority’ for them means everybody which is created by statute – and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporation, are all ‘public authorities’. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ ‘in the nature of mandamus’. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to any person or authority. It can be issued “for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose”. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to any person or authority. It can be issued “for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose”. Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as follows :- “Power of High Courts to issue certain, writs (1) Notwithstanding anything in Art. 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including (writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,) or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose”. The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12.Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “Any person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. In the case of Praga Tools Corporation vs. Shri C.A. Manual, reported in AIR 1969 SC 1306 it has been held that a mandamus can be issued against a person or body to carry out the duties placed on them by the Statutes even though they are not public officials or statutory body. It was further observed therein as follows : “It is, however, not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body. It was further observed therein as follows : “It is, however, not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body. A mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorising their undertakings. A mandamus would also lie against a company constituted by a statute for the purpose of fulfilling public responsibilities.” In the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mohotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows: “Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to “any person or authority”. The term ‘authority’ used in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12 which is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32.Article 226 confers powers on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party, no matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.” Thus it is clear that when a private body exercised its public duty even it is not a State the aggrieved has remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.” Thus it is clear that when a private body exercised its public duty even it is not a State the aggrieved has remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This Court has also gone through the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of International Airport Authority Case, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489 as also in Ajay Hasia and others vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and others (supra) and gathered the following summary from both the decisions: “(1). One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with Government character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor ... whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a state agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to Government functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) ‘Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor/supportive of this inference’ of the corporation being on instrumentality or agency of Government. Thus NABARD since creation of the statute of the year 1981, as such it will come under the fold of the State Government within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such amenable to the prerogative writ. Learned senior counsel has also raised objection that since prerogative writ is under Article 226 of the constitution of India is only for enforcement of the legislature conferred under Part-III, since according to him, certain matters since come under Part-III and IV of the precedence, hence writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be issued in the matter of service jurisprudence. This Court, after appreciating the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the opposite parties, is of the view that fundamental right has been conferred under Part-III of the Constitution, one of the fundamental rights is under Article 14 which speaks about equality before law. Article 14 speaks that the State shall not deny to any persons equality before the law or the equal protection of the law within the territory of India. Meaning of the equal protection is right to equal treatment in similar circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The petitioner herein having been appointed by virtue of an advertisement floated by NABARD which is directly under the control of Central Government and since he has been dismissed from service, according to the petitioner, the same is without providing opportunity of hearing as also the appellate authority has not appreciated the factual aspects at all, as such this Court has got jurisdiction to look into the matter under the power of judicial review by entertaining writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is under basic statute of the Constitution of India. In view thereof, according to my considered view, the writ petition will be maintainable, as such this writ petition is held to be maintainable before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. So far as merit of the case is concerned, admittedly four charges have been levelled, which are as follows :- 1. Availing loans from outside agencies without taking permission of National Bank and not liquidating the same. 2. Non-submission of statements on liability (secured and unsecured) and documentary evidence thereof. 3. Nomination of attending the training programme from 14-26 July, 2003 as advised vide RO’s letter No. 89 dtd. 26th May, 2003 and non-attendance of the programme by the CSO. 4. Failure of the CSO to report to the new centre of posting (Kerala Regional Office). 2. Non-submission of statements on liability (secured and unsecured) and documentary evidence thereof. 3. Nomination of attending the training programme from 14-26 July, 2003 as advised vide RO’s letter No. 89 dtd. 26th May, 2003 and non-attendance of the programme by the CSO. 4. Failure of the CSO to report to the new centre of posting (Kerala Regional Office). It is admitted position that the petitioner has not availed the opportunity to participate in the enquiry, however he has tried to justify that he has not been provided opportunity, however the opposite parties have come out with several documents in support of their argument that they have tried to ensure appearance of the petitioner and when the petitioner has not put his appearance, they have gone for paper publication and thereafter on the basis of the paper the petitioner has made correspondence to defer the enquiry but according to the petitioner the same has not been deferred and in one day the enquiry has been concluded, as such the allegation of mala fide has been alleged against the Management in proving the charge and inflicting punishment of dismissal from service. The petitioner has raised the issue of non-consideration of the plea with respect to the allegation proved against him. The petitioner has also assailed the order of appellate authority which according to him is mechanical and no quasi judicial mind has been applied by the appellate authority. This Court, after going through the Discipline and Appeal Rules governing the field, is of the view that right of appeal has been conferred under statute to the exercised by the petitioner and in view thereof he has preferred an appeal before the Chairman of the NABARD but he has only been communicated with a communication under Annexure-13 whereby and where under it has been communicated to him that the appeal has been rejected, save and except nothing has been brought on record even in the counter affidavit, however, it has been pointed out by the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the opposite parties that since the Managing Director who has passed the order of dismissal has become Chairman of the NABARD at the time of preferring appeal, hence memo of appeal has been decided to be placed before the executive committee and the executive committee has found that there is no fresh valid ground to interfere with the decision taken by the disciplinary authority. This Court has perused the said minutes of meeting as contained under Annexure-L which is the 92th meeting of the executive committee of NABARD held on 30th October, 2006 wherein it has been reflected as quoted herein below : “31. Introducing the Memorandum No.7 dated 21 September 2006, it was informed that Shri D.P.S. Mallick, Manager, was charged with the acts of misconduct vide charge sheet No.NB.HRMD-PPD/1045/Disc.BHU/2003-04 dated 19 February, 2004. 32. Further, the Charge Sheeted Officer (CSO) did not reply to the above mentioned charge sheet. In order to enquire into the charges it was decided to hold a domestic enquiry and accordingly, in terms of Rule 47 (4) of NABARD (Staff) Rules, 1982, the power to hold consequential enquiry with the exception of passing of the final orders was delegated vide Memorandum of Delegation dated 15 October 2004.The Enquiry Officer has stated in his report that the CSO was given two opportunities to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 16th December 2004, and 11 January 2005, and on both these occasions the CSO chose not to attend the enquiry. Considering the seriousness of misconduct committed by the CSO, the Competent Authority by virtue of Rule ;47 (1) (c) of NABARD (Staff) Rules, 1982 ordered that Shri D.P.S. Mallick, Manager be dismissed from the service of the Bank. The CSO submitted an appeal dated 26 August 2006 against the orders of the Competent Authority. A brief history of the case against Shri D.P.S. Mallick and gist of the appeal together with analysis thereof were placed before the Executive Committee for its consideration. 33. As the Chairman-then MD – had passed the orders as Competent Authority he disassociated himself from the discussions and Shri Surampudi Sivakumar Chaired the discussion. The Executive Committee noted that the disciplinary proceedings had been completed as per the rules and the due procedures had been followed. 33. As the Chairman-then MD – had passed the orders as Competent Authority he disassociated himself from the discussions and Shri Surampudi Sivakumar Chaired the discussion. The Executive Committee noted that the disciplinary proceedings had been completed as per the rules and the due procedures had been followed. As no fresh valid points had been made by Shri Mallick in support of his case the Executive Committee agreed with the final orders passed by the Competent Authority and decided to reject the appeal preferred by him. 34/ After discussion, the Executive Committee took on record the Managing Director’s Memorandum No.7 dated 21 September 2006 on Domestic Enquiry: Shri D.P.S. Mallick, Manager (Dismissed) : Appeal.” There is no dispute about the fact that without any reason the order will be said to be nullity in the eye of law, reference in this regard may be made to the judgments rendered in the case of Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. Vrs. Union of India and another, reported in (1976) 2 SCC 981 wherein at paragraph 6 their Lordships have held as follows : “6. Xxxxx it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair land proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. xxxxxxxx’ Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment rendered in the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vrs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 . In the case of Krishna Swami Vrs. Union of India and others, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 605 wherein at paragraph 46 their Lordships have held as follows : “46. The question then is the scope of judicial review of the admission of the motion by the Speaker. Arts. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594 . In the case of Krishna Swami Vrs. Union of India and others, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 605 wherein at paragraph 46 their Lordships have held as follows : “46. The question then is the scope of judicial review of the admission of the motion by the Speaker. Arts. 32,131 to 136 entrust in express terms judicial review to the Supreme Court, in particular. Art. 32 as the ultimate repository and guardian of the rights and liberties of the people. The constitution is the fundamental law of the land. It limits, as its touchstone, the powers and functions of the organs of the State, viz. The Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The Constitution also demarcated and delineated the powers and functions of these organs which implies that each organ would maintain a delicate balance with self-imposed restrictions for smooth functioning of the parliamentary democracy to establish an egalitarian social order under rule of law. Judicial review thus is an incident of and flows from the Constitution to securing and protecting the welfare of the people as effectively as it may, according justice – social, economic and political in all the institutions of national life. Court is the living voice of the Constitution which stands against any winds that blow as a haven of refuge to those who might otherwise suffer due to their helplessness, inability, non-conromity, handicaps, exploitation, victims of prejudice or public excitement etc. The paramount duty of the Court is to protect their rights and translate the glorious and dynamic contents of the Directive Principles and the fundamental rights as a living law, making them meaningful to all manner of people.” Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. Vrs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and Another, reported in AIR 1994 SC 2696 , Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vrs. Chand Behari Kapoor and others, reported in AIR 1998 SC 3104 and Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vrs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and others, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 240 . Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and Another, reported in AIR 1994 SC 2696 , Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vrs. Chand Behari Kapoor and others, reported in AIR 1998 SC 3104 and Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vrs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and others, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 240 . Thus it is evident from the ratio laid down therein that without any reason the order will be said to be nullity in the eye of law and further it will be said to be in violation of the principle of natural justice. 9. So far as the appellate order is concerned, it is true that an Appellate/Regional Authority is not required to give detail reasoning for agreement or confirming the order but in the interest of justice the delinquent officer is entitled to know the mind of the Appellate/Regional Authority, as such some reason must be there in the order of appeal or revision, reference in this regard may be made to the judgments rendered in the case of Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and Others Vrs. Madhusudan Rao, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 469 wherein at paragraph 19 their Lordships have held as follows : “19. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also having regard to the detailed manner in which the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal had dealt with the matter, including the explanation given regarding the disbursement of the money received by the respondent, we see no reason to differ with the view taken by the Administrative Tribunal and endorsed by the High Court. No doubt, the Divisional Forest Officer dealt with the matter in detail, but it was also the duty of the appellate authority to give at least some reasons for rejecting the appeal preferred by the respondent. A similar duty was cast on the revisional authority being the highest authority in the Department of Forests in the State. Unfortunately, even the revisional authority has merely indicated that the decision of the Divisional Forest Officer had been examined by the Conservator of Forests, Khammam wherein the charge of misappropriation was clearly proved. A similar duty was cast on the revisional authority being the highest authority in the Department of Forests in the State. Unfortunately, even the revisional authority has merely indicated that the decision of the Divisional Forest Officer had been examined by the Conservator of Forests, Khammam wherein the charge of misappropriation was clearly proved. He too did not consider the defence case as made out by the respondent herein and simply endorsed the punishment of dismissal though reducing it to removal from service.” It is evident from Annexure-1 that no reasoning has been assigned by the appellate authority, as such it has got bearing with the issue since it is a case of dismissal of the petitioner from service who has not participated in the enquiry, and since he has raised so many issues before the appellate authority, he was required to look into the matter minutely for just and proper decision of the case but that committee has failed to do so, as would be evident from the quoted part which is the extract of the 92nd meeting of the executive committee held on 30th October, 2006. Accordingly this Court is of the view that the appellate authority has not exercised its quasi judicial mind in proper manner, hence this Court, without making any observation on the legality and propriety of the order passed by the disciplinary authority, is remitting the matter back before the competent appellate authority by quashing the appellate order to decide the appeal afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner within reasonable period, preferably within eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Accordingly the writ petition stands disposed of. Petition disposed of.