JUDGMENT : PROTIK PRAKASH BANERJEE, J: 1. This is an appeal from the award dated April 30, 2014 passed by the learned Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal—cum—Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Raiganj in M.A.C. Case No. 132 of 2012. It was an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by the dependent legal representatives and legal heirs of the deceased victim of a motor accident. The claimants/respondents No.1, 2 and 3 are the dependent widow, the minor son and the mother, respectively of the deceased. The respondent No. 4 is the owner of the offending vehicle found by the learned tribunal to have registration No. W.G. L. 1616. 2. Even though the learned tribunal recorded in the judgment and award under appeal that the respondent owner, as opposite party No. 1 before it, had filed a written statement in the case, the record does not show any such written statement filed by the respondent No. 4 and there is also no order available in the order-sheet or the lower-court records, as would substantiate such recording. We proceed then, on the basis of the records that the respondent No. 4 did not file any written statement. 3. The case made out by the claimants/respondents by their application is at variance with the report of the accident being the first information report registered at the jurisdictional police station Chakulia, which too, under Section 166(4) of the Act of 1988, is to be treated as an application for compensation under the Act. 4. The said complaint registered as a First Information Report records very clearly that the victim was riding a “scooty” bearing police registration No. WB-74W/4417 and lost control when another “big vehicle” coming from the opposite side on NH 31, shone its headlights on the eyes of the said rider, and as a result the said rider of the scooty, fell on left side of the said highway, whereafter another car driving recklessly at great speed collided with him at great speed and drove over his feet and sped away. Though the complainant and other by-standers immediately rescued the victim and took steps to have him sent for treatment they came to know later on, that the said victim was Pulak Sikdar, since deceased, who was the Food Supply Inspector of Chakulia Block, aged about 35 years and that though he was afterwards taken for treatment to Siliguri, he died there. The FIR did not record the number of the offending vehicle. None of the eye-witnesses named in the charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was called as a witness by the claimants nor was any of the eyewitnesses subpoenaed by the appellant. 5. Interestingly, the claimants allege in their application that while the scooty was driving at a normal speed on the extreme left hand side of the road, the offending vehicle which they identified as “WGL 1616” was also proceeding towards the Kanki side “at a high and excessive speed in a negligent manner and due to high speed the driver lost his control over the vehicle and struck against him from behind at a great force as a result he fell down on the road with his scooty and the vehicle run over his leg and he also received head injury and also injuries all over the body. Soon after the accident he was taken to Kanki Health Centre and thereafter at N.B. Medical College Hospital for better treatment and he succumbed to his injuries there.” The claimants have further made out a case that the driver of the said WGL 1616 was driving at a fast speed and due to fast speed and careless driving the driver lost his control and went on extreme left side of the road and struck the scooty. 6. Even more interestingly, on behalf of the claimants the claimant No.1 (widow) has deposed as the PW 1, in paragraph 6 of her evidence on affidavit that she has “collected all the particulars of the offending vehicle from Chakulia Police Station and Kanki Police Station”. 7. Since the First Information Report does not identify the offending vehicle, it is logical in view of the above deposition, that the charge-sheet and other documents relied upon by the investigating officer would show how the police identified the vehicle. 8. 7. Since the First Information Report does not identify the offending vehicle, it is logical in view of the above deposition, that the charge-sheet and other documents relied upon by the investigating officer would show how the police identified the vehicle. 8. However, the charge-sheet, which formed a part of the lower court records and which we called for, shows that the investigating officer was unable to trace the vehicle until the respondent No. 4 himself came and surrendered the vehicle. That is how the police identified the vehicle. There does not appear to be any mention anywhere in the records about the vehicle showing any signs of damage or blood on it. The police accepted the version of the respondent No. 4 without question and thereby recorded the number W G L 1616 as the number of the offending vehicle. Thereafter, it appears that the driver of the offending vehicle obtained bail and the criminal case is pending. 9. The claimants on the face of their depositions have no personal knowledge as to which vehicle was the offending vehicle. Suggestions were put to the PW 1 (the widow) that she had manufactured the case in collusion with the owner of the said vehicle and further that the offending vehicle named by her did not cause the accident leading to the death of her husband. She denied it. The evidence that she adduced to implicate the said vehicle in the accident, was, to say the least, fortuitous and far from satisfactory. 10. To implicate the said vehicle, the claimants adduced the evidence of one Suman Kumar Das, as PW 2, who claims to be an eyewitness to the accident, though he is not named as a witness by the police in the charge-sheet. He expressly deposes that the offending vehicle “was proceeding towards Kanki side from Dalkhola side at a high speed and a negligent manner and due to high speed the driver lost his control and struck against Pulak Sikdar with his two wheeler from behind at a great force” and further that “due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of vehicle No. W.G.L. 1616 the accident took place”. 11. Very curiously, on cross examination, he admits facts which would have made it very difficult to believe him, had the appellant, as the contesting defendant/opposite party, done what the law required him to do. 11. Very curiously, on cross examination, he admits facts which would have made it very difficult to believe him, had the appellant, as the contesting defendant/opposite party, done what the law required him to do. For the sake of satisfying my judicial conscience, I must record the relevant part of his cross examination, as appears from the records: - “I am a contractor by occupation. I also run transport business. My vehicles i.e trackers run from Chakulia to Dalkhola regularly. The accident took place at Bastadangi on N.H.31. I am a resident of Chitora. Pullok Sikdar was Food Inspector and I used to meet him Block Development office for my official work like obtaining Ration Card etc. Food Inspector has no official relation with Block Development Office. I did not visit any police station in connection with the said accident case. I did not go to the hospital also in connection with the said accident case. I did not accompany Pullok Sikdar to hospital although he was well known to me. Not a fact that the said offending ambassador vehicle was not involved in the said accident case. I did not receive any summon from this court for deposing in connection with this case. Not a fact that I have deposed falsely before the court. Not a fact that I did not see the accident.” 12. It is quite another matter, that there is no logical reason why a contractor would go to visit a Food Supply Inspector at the Block Development Office for official work, when he himself admits that a Food Inspector has no official relation with the Block Development Office. He has not explained the suspicious circumstance that when people who did not even know the victim, but were eye-witnesses and bystanders played the good samaritan and took steps to get the victim treated, after accident, how and why the said PW 2 neither rushed to the place of occurrence to offer aid nor went to any hospital or health center in connection with the treatment of the victim, far less offer himself as a witness in the criminal case or complain to the police. 13. 13. The appellant in fact denied the involvement of the said vehicle (WGL 1616) in the accident by way of paragraph 6 of the written statement and also denied that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said vehicle by way of paragraph 7 thereof. 14. In line with the said pleadings, and from the discrepancies in the two versions of the application for compensation and the deemed application for compensation and the evidence on behalf of the claimants/respondents, the appellant took grounds No. IV, V and VI, categorically impugning the involvement of the said vehicle No. W.G.L. 1616 and further impeached by way of Ground VII and VIII about the credence placed by the learned tribunal on the testimony of PW 2 and his reliability. 15. The said Grounds are quoted below for convenience. “Ground IV: For that the Ld. Judge failed to appreciate that in connection with the concerned accident dated 20.12.2011, one FIR was lodged on 21.12.2011 wherein the number of offending vehicle was not mentioned, but subsequently, nearly two months after the accident on 18.02.2012, said Ambassador Car No. WGL/1616 was seized by the police authorities and in the ‘Final Report’ it was implicated as the offending vehicle. Ground V: For that the Ld. Judge failed to appreciate that the Car No. WGL/1616 never met with the accident and was subsequently implanted and/or implicated to gain an unlawful benefit from its insurer, and therefore its Insurance Company, being the Appellant hereinabove, should not be held responsible for paying the compensation at all. Ground VI: For that the Ld. Judge failed to appreciate that accident took place on 20.12.2011, and the FIR for the said accident lodged on the next date i.e. 21.12.2011, mentioned about an unknown offending vehicle, proved the fact that the said ‘Car No. WGL/1616’ was subsequently implicated as an afterthought to get the illegal benefit from its insurance company in a claim case, and therefore the Appellant Insurance Company had got no legal liability to pay any compensation to the claimants. Ground VII: For that the Ld. Ground VII: For that the Ld. Judge failed to appreciate that the evidence of the alleged eye witness (PW 2) to the accident was not trustworthy and should have been discarded, because the said eye witness admittedly – (a) did not lodge the First Information Report, (b) was never questioned by the Police Authorities about the accident and (c) in spite of being a prior acquaintance of the deceased, did not even take the injured victim to the Hospital. Ground VIII: For that the Ld. Judge failed to appreciate that no reliance can be placed on the oral testimony of the alleged eye witness (PW 2) to the accident, as there were contradictions between the statements contained in the FIR and the deposition of the said eye witness before the Ld. Judge, and therefore it was implied that the said eye witness was a tutored and interested witness." 16. However, it is here that the inexplicable omissions of the appellant erode its case of its very sub-stratum. The appellant never caused the respondent No. 4 /the driver of the said Ambassador car, bearing registration number WGL 1616 to be examined to ascertain whether the said vehicle or the said driver was indeed involved in the accident. It never put the case to PW 2 that the entire story had been manufactured by the claimants in collusion with PW 2 and the owner of the said vehicle. On behalf of the appellant it was not even suggested to PW 2 that the accident did not take place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said vehicle. It is not explained by the learned advocate appearing for the appellant why there were these strange omissions on the part of the appellant. 17. These omissions are fatal to the case attempted to be run in appeal by the appellant. The appellant in effect declined to avail itself of the opportunity to put its essential and material case in cross examination to the witnesses of the claimants/respondents concerned. It must therefore follow, because of the law laid down in the case of A.E.G. Carapiet—v—A.Y. Derderian reported in AIR 1961 Calcutta 359 at paragraph 10 of the report, that “he believed the testimony given could not be disputed at all”. It must therefore follow, because of the law laid down in the case of A.E.G. Carapiet—v—A.Y. Derderian reported in AIR 1961 Calcutta 359 at paragraph 10 of the report, that “he believed the testimony given could not be disputed at all”. It has been held by the said Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court, that “this is not merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at the trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual that is going to be made when the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. This much a counsel is bound to do when cross-examining that he must put to each of his opponent’s witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share.” In fact, the said precedent has been cited on behalf of the learned advocate for the claimants/respondents to this effect. 18. The same thing can be looked at from another way, which too has been argued on behalf of the claimants/respondents – the material witness for proving that the vehicle which was involved in the accident was WGL 1616 and that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the driver of WGL 1616 at a very fast speed, was PW 2. The appellant did not put his case to PW 2 that the accident was not caused by the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said vehicle. It did not thereafter lead any evidence or cause the driver of the vehicle to be examined. It therefore accepted that the said evidence of PW 2 could not be disputed. The testimony of PW 2 therefore could not be shaken, and on this aspect, an unreported decision of a co-ordinate Bench, in FMA No.3896 of 2015 [National Insurance Co. Ltd.—v—Smt. Runu Singh and Others], decided on April 4, 2017, which binds us, holds as follows, in respect of the vehicle that was involved in that case (WB 33A/0188): “The eyewitnesses, who adduced evidence on behalf of the claimants, also deposed that the vehicle bearing registration No. WB33A/0188 was the vehicle involved in the accident. Ltd.—v—Smt. Runu Singh and Others], decided on April 4, 2017, which binds us, holds as follows, in respect of the vehicle that was involved in that case (WB 33A/0188): “The eyewitnesses, who adduced evidence on behalf of the claimants, also deposed that the vehicle bearing registration No. WB33A/0188 was the vehicle involved in the accident. The cross-examination of such witnesses did not bring out anything different based on which the tribunal could have reached the finding that vehicle bearing registration no. WB 33A/0188 was not at all involved in the accident. In fact, the witnesses stood firm in their depositions that WB 33A/0188 was the vehicle which dashed the victim resulting in his tragic accidental death. We therefore, have no hesitation to hold that the tribunal was right in its approach and recorded an appropriate finding.” 19. In fact, in the present case too, the eyewitness stood firm, and therefore the learned tribunal cannot be faulted on its accepting the version put forward on behalf of the claimants as the established fact, on evidence. 20. In this connection, though that case related to a matrimonial dispute, the general rule which governs when a fact can be said to have been established, was laid down authoritatively in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane— v—Mrs. S. Dastane reported in AIR 1975 SC 1534 at paragraphs 24 and 25, to the effect, that: “24. the normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act, Section 3, a fact is said to be proved when the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A. prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies. Important issues like those which affect the status of parties demand a closer scrutiny than those like the loan on a promissory note: ‘the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue’ Per Dixon, J. in Wright v. Wright (1948) 77 C.L.R. 191 or as said by Lord Denning, ‘the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear’ Blyth v. Blyth [1966] 1 A.E.R. 534. But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged.” “25. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities. If the probabilities are so nicely balanced that a reasonable, not a vacillating, mind cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature”. 21. Applying the above principle, I have no hesitation in holding that the fact that the accident resulting in the death of the victim Pulak Sikdar, was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the Ambassador vehicle bearing the registration No. W.G.L. 1616 has been established as a fact and the learned tribunal was perfectly correct in holding it to be so. 22. 22. The claimants/respondents have relied upon the case of Kusum Lata and Others—v—Satbir and Others reported in AIR 2011 SC 1234 . However, this case can be distinguished on facts and cannot be relied upon as an authority for the proposition that a court is not justified in holding that the offending vehicle was not involved in the accident because of the failure of brother of a person, seeing his brother knocked down by a speeding vehicle, was suffering in pain and in need of a medical condition, that he is obviously under a traumatic condition or under such mental strain that it was not unnatural for him to take down the number of the offending vehicle and thus not mentioned in the FIR – simply because the FIR was not made by a person who even knew the victim leave alone being related to him by blood. 23. It is trite that a little difference in facts makes a lot of difference in the value of an authority as a precedent and a decision is only an authority for what it decides but not what can be logically deduced from it [as has been the law settled since Quinn—v—Leathem reported in (1901) AC 495 followed in India in a catena of decisions including Mafatlal Industries Ltd and Others—v—Union of India and Others reported in (1997) 5 SCC 536 ]. 24. The claimants/respondents have also relied upon the case of The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.—v—Mita Samanta and Others reported in (2010) 1 WBLR (Cal) 137, particularly paragraph 20 thereof, where a coordinate Bench of this Court has held that “It appears that the eyewitnesses of the incident have deposed that the truck in question had really stuck the victim while he was driving the motorcycle as a result he collided with the light post standing by the side of the road. We do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Das the Learned Advocate for the Appellant, that simply because in the F.I.R. there was no reference to the truck that statement is binding upon the claimants. The person who made the F.I.R. is not an eyewitness. After coming to know that his brother died, he reported to the police about the death due to the accident and it is the definite case of the claimant that the truck had run away immediately after the accident. The person who made the F.I.R. is not an eyewitness. After coming to know that his brother died, he reported to the police about the death due to the accident and it is the definite case of the claimant that the truck had run away immediately after the accident. In such circumstance, unless the owner of the truck or the driver thereof comes forward before the Court to defend themselves, the Tribunal was left with no other alternative but to accept the testimony of the eyewitnesses. We have gone through their depositions; there is nothing to disbelieve their versions.” (emphasis supplied). 25. For the same reason as stated above, this decision may not be an authority for the proposition that not mentioning the registration number of the offending vehicle in the FIR does not entitle the learned tribunal or Court to disbelieve that the vehicle implicated in the claim application was the offending vehicle. This is because in the facts of that case, the person lodging the First Information Report was not an eyewitness, whereas in the facts of the present case, the informant was an eyewitness. 26. Yet, at least it is an authority for the proposition that where the owner or the driver of the offending vehicle has not come forward to defend himself, the learned tribunal and therefore this Court, would have no alternative but to accept that it was the vehicle alleged in the claim application which is the offending vehicle. As already stated above, the owner/driver of W.G.L. 1616 did not come forward to defend itself and the insurer appellant did not discharge its duty to put its case that the accident resulting in the death of the victim was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the said vehicle to PW 2 and, therefore, the appellant cannot now be heard to say that it was not so caused. 27. In the circumstances as aforesaid, and the position of law as reviewed above, I have no hesitation in repelling the challenge to the award by the appellant on the only grounds urged at the hearing, being the said grounds No. IV, V, VI, VII and VIII of the Memorandum of Appeal, and uphold the findings of the learned tribunal in this regard. Since no other ground was urged by the appellant Insurer, the appeal fails. 28. Since no other ground was urged by the appellant Insurer, the appeal fails. 28. I cannot, however, part with the appeal without recording my disapproval of the way in which the case was handled by the appellant and its learned Advocates before the learned tribunal. This lackadaisical approach of not discharging the duty of the adversary during witness action and thereafter attempting to take the point as if it was available as a pure question of law not requiring any evidence to be established appears to be the usual practice of learned Advocates engaged by the National Insurance Co Ltd. and the said insurance company appears to be well satisfied with such negligent handling of its cases by its empaneled advocates in the learned tribunal. It is up to the insurance company to introspect why this is so. 29. Coming now to the cross-objection preferred by the claimants/respondents being COT No. 18 of 2015, it challenges the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned tribunal on the ground that it is not just, on the basis of authoritative precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as followed by coordinate Benches of this Court and also precedents of this Court. 30. The learned tribunal after taking the age of the victim to be 34 years at the time of death, applied the multiplier of 17 on the basis of the age group being above 30 years but not exceeding 35 years. On this basis it came to the amount of Rs.27,61,616. It awarded Rs.2000/- for funeral expenses, Rs.5000/- for loss of consortium to the widow of the deceased and thereby came to the sum of Rs. 27,63,616/-. 31. However, to arrive at this sum the Learned Tribunal took the salary to be Rs. 20, 306/- though the record shows that the gross salary of the deceased was Rs.20, 446/- from which he paid professional tax of Rs.130/- and group insurance of Rs.40/- and furthermore, the Learned Tribunal deducted 1/3rd as his personal expenses, though there were four dependents according to the claimants. The claimants’ dependency was assessed at Rs.1,62.448/-per annum. Again, the General Provident Fund Deduction of Rs. 17,406/-was not considered. The amount awarded as loss of consortium to the widow and the absence of any amount being awarded as future prospects were also impugned by the claimants. 32. The claimants’ dependency was assessed at Rs.1,62.448/-per annum. Again, the General Provident Fund Deduction of Rs. 17,406/-was not considered. The amount awarded as loss of consortium to the widow and the absence of any amount being awarded as future prospects were also impugned by the claimants. 32. The learned tribunal furthermore awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the case only if the insurance company defaulted in paying the compensation within 60 days from the date of the award. 33. The claimants impugn such calculation of compensation as unjust for the said causes. 34. At the outset I must record that no ground has been taken by the cross-objectors/claimants as to the correctness of the finding of the annual income of the deceased less taxes. Since the claimants have not impugned this finding of Rs.20,326/- despite preferring a cross-objection and in fact, this is also the amount stated in the claim application under Section 166 of the Act of 1988 this, therefore, cannot be reopened by us. 35. I find no reason to make any addition for the amount which was deducted for General Provident Fund since the said amount admittedly devolves upon the heirs of the deceased victim, and admittedly this used to be deducted from the income of the deceased and the legal representatives had no use of the said sum while the victim was alive and there is no loss suffered by the applicants on this count. Since the cross-objectors/claimants are the legal heirs as well as dependents of the deceased, they already inherit it in equal shares. They are not to be compensated for what they never lost, and compensation in a “Death Case” is not meant to be a bonanza or a windfall. Neither, do I find reason to depart from the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to award any additional sum for the pain and anguish the cross-objectors/claimants allege to have suffered for the death of the victim by reason of such accident. 36. I will take the question of awarding interest at the rate of 9% only on the event of default first. 37. Reliance was placed upon the case of Kohinur Begum—v—New India Assurance Co. 36. I will take the question of awarding interest at the rate of 9% only on the event of default first. 37. Reliance was placed upon the case of Kohinur Begum—v—New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Another, reported in AIR 2008 Calcutta 84, a Bench decision, for the proposition that it is not open to the tribunal in compensation cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to decide not to award interest from the date of the claimants applying for compensation without recording a finding that the hearing of the case was delayed for any fault of the claimants or to award a higher/penal rate of interest on default instead of the date of making the application. Bank rate of interest was taken as the general rule in the said judgment. 38. Reliance was also placed on the case of National Insurance Co Ltd.—v— Keshav Bahadur and Others reported 2004 (1) Supreme 749 for the proposition that there is no power under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the learned tribunal to retrospectively enhance interest for default in payment of compensation. 39. So far as the rate of interest is concerned, the claimants/cross-objectors have relied upon the case of Banya Sarkar—v—Sipra Guha Roy and Another reported in 1992 ACJ 572 (Cal) itself relying upon Jagbir Singh— v—General Manager, Punjab Roadways reported in 1987 ACJ 15 (SC) to contend that the rate of interest ought to have been 12 per cent per annum and that it should be paid on the compensation amount from the date of making the application for compensation. However, this reason was not rendered without any discussion on why 12 per cent was chosen. 40. On the other hand, Kohinur Begum (supra) had a detailed discussion on what ought to be the rate of interest which a proper exercise of discretion should arrive at, relying upon judgments of the Apex Court. It therefore is a precedent on the rate of interest which ought to be chosen. 41. The insurer has not been able to counter the said judgments which bind us. Nor has it been able to show from the records that the delay in disposal of the claim application was due to the cross-objectors/claimants. 42. It therefore is a precedent on the rate of interest which ought to be chosen. 41. The insurer has not been able to counter the said judgments which bind us. Nor has it been able to show from the records that the delay in disposal of the claim application was due to the cross-objectors/claimants. 42. In order to decide the question of the proper rate of interest, it would have been better if the parties had adduced evidence whether before the learned tribunal or with leave before us. Unfortunately, no such attempt was made. Hence judicial notice had to be taken of the rates of interest which were posted for various nationalized banks on the websites pertaining to financial matters sourcing their information from such nationalized banks or the Reserve Bank of India. It appears that the present bank rate is lower than simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum, and in some cases, lower than 7%, whereas in 2012, when the claim application was filed, it was between 8.5% and 9.5% per annum. The average seems to be 9% per annum as awarded by the learned tribunal. The rate may not, therefore, require to be interfered with, in view of the aforesaid position of law. It is a discretion exercised by the learned tribunal which can be justified by reasons which I have now supplied, as above. 43. At the same time, I am afraid that the direction for payment of interest in case of default cannot be sustained. While the rate of interest may be retained at 9% taking into account the fact that the Bank rate is lower than 9% at present, and was between 8.5% to 9.5% according to records available from the internet in respect of nationalized banks during 2012, 9% per annum being the average, it cannot be made applicable only in the event of default in payment by the insurer. Simple interest shall be paid on the compensation fixed hereinafter, at the rate of 9% per annum, from the date of making the application by the claimants. 44. The claimants have alleged that the number of dependents were four and therefore the deduction ought to have been one fourth for personal expenses and not one third. Simple interest shall be paid on the compensation fixed hereinafter, at the rate of 9% per annum, from the date of making the application by the claimants. 44. The claimants have alleged that the number of dependents were four and therefore the deduction ought to have been one fourth for personal expenses and not one third. However, even after going through the application under Section 166 several times, I find that there are only three applicants on whose behalf the claim was made, being the widow, son and mother of the deceased who alone appear to be the dependents. Therefore, the dependents are three in number. I find no reason to depart from the principle laid down in paragraph 30 of the decision in the case of Sarla Verma and Another—v—Delhi Transport Corporation and Another reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , as approved by paragraphs 41, 42 and 43.6 of the decision in the case of Reshma Kumari and Others—v—Madan Mohan and Another reported in (2013) 9 SCC 65 , and as approved by the Constitution Bench in paragraphs 41 and 43 of its decision in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd—v—Pranay Sethi and Others reported in (2017) SCC Online SC 1270. In view of the judgment of the larger bench, unless I find any such reason for departure, I will have to accept the deduction to be one third where the number of dependents is up to three. Hence the learned tribunal has not committed any error of fact or law in making a deduction of one third for personal expenses. The challenge to the award by way of the cross-objection on this count is thus repelled. 45. Again, as indicated above, the learned tribunal merely awarded Rs.5000/-for loss of consortium to the widow, Rs.2000/- for funeral expenses and nothing at all for future prospects whereas, applying the binding law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra) at paragraph 54, for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses the amounts awarded should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/-respectively which are to be revisited at the rate of 10% on each head every three years. 46. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/-respectively which are to be revisited at the rate of 10% on each head every three years. 46. Hence, since the application was made in 2012, an amount is to be awarded under the head of loss of estate and this should be Rs.15,000/-, and thus as on the date of judgment it ought to be Rs.18,150/-, the amount under the head of loss of consortium should be Rs.40,000/- and thus as on the date of judgment it ought to be Rs.48,400/-and similarly the amount under the head of funeral expenses ought to be Rs.18,150/- as on the date of judgment in 2018. I so direct and modify the award passed by the learned tribunal to that extent. 47. So far as future prospects are concerned, on which count nothing has been awarded by the learned tribunal, paragraph 46 of Pranay Sethi (supra) clearly holds “At this stage, we must immediately say that insofar as the aforesaid multiplicand/multiplier is concerned, it has to be accepted on the basis of income established by the legal representatives of the deceased. Future prospects are to be added to the sum on the percentage basis and “income” means actual income less than the tax paid. The multiplier has already been fixed in Sarla Verma which has been approved in Reshma Kumari with which we concur.” (emphasis supplied). 48. Paragraph 24 of the decision in Sarla Verma (supra) as approved by Reshma Kumari (supra) postulates clearly that “In view of the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words ‘actual salary’ should be read as ‘actual salary less tax’)” which is the part which applies to the case of the deceased victim, who was 34 years old, a permanent Government servant and in whose case, therefore, 50% of the actual salary is to be added; and 50% of the actual salary means 50% of the salary less tax, and the monthly salary has to be accepted as Rs. 20,306/-(see above), and thus annual salary is Rs.2,43,672/- and 50% of this comes to Rs.1,21,836/-. 20,306/-(see above), and thus annual salary is Rs.2,43,672/- and 50% of this comes to Rs.1,21,836/-. Therefore, the addition of this amount on account of future prospects comes to Rs.2,43,672/- plus Rs.1,21,836/-, a total of Rs.3,65,508/-. I therefore direct addition of the said 50% of the annual salary on count of future prospects for the purpose of the calculation of just compensation and direct that the award stands so modified. 49. Again, as held earlier, one third is to be deducted as personal expenses. So, the multiplicand comes to 2/3rd of Rs.3,65,508/-, which brings us to Rs.2,43,672/- once again. 50. Using the appropriate multiplier of 16, according to paragraph 42 of Sarla Verma (supra) and the table referred to therein, approved in Pranay Sethi (supra), instead of 17 as used by the learned tribunal, we come to the conclusion that the just compensation ought to be: Compensation Rs. 38,98,752/- Loss of Estate Rs. 18,150/- Loss of Consortium Rs. 48,400/- Funeral Expenses Rs. 18, 150/- Total Rs.39,83,652/- (Thirty-Nine Lakhs, Eighty-three thousand, Six hundred and Fifty-Two Rupees only) 51. This shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the claimant making the application for compensation under Section 166 till the date of payment and the insurance company shall be liable to pay the above sum, less that which has already been deposited on December 17, 2014 by OD Challan No.2363 before this Court as directed by the order dated November 14, 2014 within two months from date hereof, failing which the claimants shall be at liberty to put the award of the learned tribunal which is modified as hereinabove, into execution. The award impugned is modified to the extent as above. 52. The award money shall be paid in the following manner: a. One third of the award money together with the accrued interest till date of payment shall be paid by the insurer by Pay Order or Banker’s Cheque directly to the mother of the deceased, the Claimant/Applicant/Respondent No.3. The award impugned is modified to the extent as above. 52. The award money shall be paid in the following manner: a. One third of the award money together with the accrued interest till date of payment shall be paid by the insurer by Pay Order or Banker’s Cheque directly to the mother of the deceased, the Claimant/Applicant/Respondent No.3. b. The Insurer shall make payment of the remaining two thirds of the award money together with accrued interest till the date of payment by banker’s cheque/pay order favouring the Claimant/Applicant/Respondent No.1 but under a forwarding letter clearly mentioning that half of the amount so tendered is on account of the minor son of the victim, the Claimant/Applicant/Respondent No.2, which the mother shall keep in an interest bearing auto-renewable short term fixed deposit till the majority of the Claimant No.2, when the Bank shall be instructed to make over the said sum as accrued in the fixed deposit to the Applicant/Claimant/Respondent No.2. c. The Claimant No.3 shall be entitled to apply for withdrawal of one third of the amount deposited by the Insurer before this Court together with the accrued interest by making an appropriate application before the Learned Registrar General who shall, on such application being made, pass appropriate orders allowing the same within seven days from date of receiving such application. d. The Claimant No.1 shall be entitled to apply for withdrawal of one third of the amount deposited by the Insureer before this Court together with the accrued interest by making an appropriate application before the Learned Registrar General who shall, on such application being made, pass appropriate orders allowing the same within seven days from date of receiving such application. e. The Learned Registrar General shall keep deposited the balance one third of the amount already deposited before this Court by the Insurer in the name of the minor Applicant/Claimant No.2, in the same auto-renewable fixed deposit in a nationalized bank where it has been relying till now, till the said Claimant No.2 attains majority and duly applies for its withdrawal. 53. Therefore, the cross objection stands allowed in part, as indicated above and the appeal stands dismissed. 54. The statutory deposit made on December 19, 2014 by OD Challan No.1986, by the Insurance Company shall be paid to the Applicants/Claimants as consolidated costs of the appeal and the cross-objection. 53. Therefore, the cross objection stands allowed in part, as indicated above and the appeal stands dismissed. 54. The statutory deposit made on December 19, 2014 by OD Challan No.1986, by the Insurance Company shall be paid to the Applicants/Claimants as consolidated costs of the appeal and the cross-objection. It shall not be adjusted with the amount that the Insurance Company has been directed to pay under the Award as modified.