JUDGMENT : PROTIK PRAKASH BANERJEE, J: FMAT 1077 of 2013 1. This is an appeal of an insurance company from an award dated March 4, 2012 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, 12th Court at Alipore, passed in M.A.C.C. No.184 of 2004 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for just compensation for the injury suffered by the victim, 1st respondent/cross objector (hereafter the victim, for short) resulting in loss of a limb. Though the victim had claimed a sum of Rs.35,42,500/- along with interest, the Tribunal was pleased to grant only Rs.12,00,517/- with simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of appearance of the insurance company in the proceedings before it, that is to say, December 2, 2004, on the basis of the amounts found to be payable. The insurance company contested the proceedings in the Tribunal on many grounds including an allegation that the accident was due to the negligence of the victim but could prove none of them. Hence the appeal by the insurance company, which challenged not only the quantum awarded, but also whether a part of the compensation awarded under the head ‘reimbursement of medical expenses’ amounted to grant of double benefit for the same accident. The cross-objection on the other hand is on the basis of quantum and also on count of interest – the date from which it was awarded and the rate. During the course of hearing of the appeal, however, the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court laying down the law in respect of the amounts to be awarded as just compensation in cases of amputation were fairly placed by both the parties. Since these negated the grounds taken by the appellant, relating to the quantum and the factors on which it was awarded, the appellant addressed the Court only on the second point, that is to say, “double benefit”. The said other grounds can be dealt with more profitably while dealing with the cross-objection, so perhaps it is best to proceed to the question of law, noting very briefly in passing the facts material to the decision of the appeal and the cross-objection. 2. I have gone through the records of the proceedings before the Tribunal, which were called for by the Court. 2. I have gone through the records of the proceedings before the Tribunal, which were called for by the Court. The position established on evidence which was not questioned by the parties is that on May 24, 2004 the victim/cross appellant, aged about 49 years then, was standing at the road-side in front of 17, Alipore Road. A bus bearing No. WB-25A/2637 (referred to hereinafter as the “offending vehicle”) owned by the 2nd respondent, being driven at a high speed and without blowing its horn or giving any signal, knocked the victim down. As a result, the victim sustained multiple bleeding injuries and was shifted to the Calcutta Medical Research Institute for treatment where he was admitted as an emergency patient, and ultimately the said “accident” resulted in amputation of his right leg from the portion just above the knee which was certified by a board of doctors to have caused him permanent disability to the extent of 80%. He had to make alternative arrangement so that he could walk and perform his duties. This included fitting of a wooden leg which naturally would require maintenance and replacement. It is clear that this would also require that he has special arrangement for transportation to and from any destination since he was not in a position, after the accident, to travel to and from his destination by public vehicles, as he was wont to, before the accident. The offending vehicle was insured by the insurance company/appellant. The victim did not get compensation either from the owner or the insurance company in respect of the third-party risk that the offending vehicle and its owner had been insured against, and hence he applied for just compensation. The owner/2nd respondent did not contest the case. The appellant duly obtained leave from the Tribunal to contest the proceeding. There were only two facts which the appellant could establish on evidence, which included the income tax returns of the victim, his salary sheets, the records tendered in evidence and duly proved, the admission by the victim and the evidence of his employer, the DW-1: first, that the victim was still in service after the accident and amputation and that he was earning more, and gets more as salary but that was by way of increment; and second, that the victim had already received a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-through his contractual Mediclaim policy. The appellant claimed that this ought to have been deducted from the amount granted under the heading “medical expenses” since otherwise, this would be double benefit for the same accident. Admittedly, the employer of the victim does not pay pension to its employees after superannuation. The story of negligence could not be proved, as I have referred to earlier, and of more moment is the fact that the Tribunal was categorically pleased to hold “The amount of money which has been received by the injured from Mediclaim will not be taken into consideration at the time of assessing the final amount of compensation.” 3. On the above basis, the Tribunal was pleased to award the compensation of Rs.12,00,517 (Twelve lakhs five hundred and seventeen rupees) on the following counts: 1. Pain and Suffering Rs.1,00,000/- 2. Medical Expenses Rs.3,75,517/- (proved on evidence). 3. Expenses for travelling, to and from office and other places Rs.2,75,000/- 4. Loss of expectation of life Rs.1,00,000/- 5. Future Medical expenses Rs.1,00,000/- 6. Charge for attendant Rs.50,000/- 7. Loss of Limb Rs.2,00,000/- 4. At first glance, the submission of Mr. Singh, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant/insurance company, that failure on the part of the Tribunal to deduct the sum received by the victim on account of his personal Mediclaim policy from the amount awarded under the heading medical expenses, for the same medical expenses for the same accident, amounts to giving double benefit for the same accident, appears to be attractive. 5. On the surface, there is the undeniable attraction of commonsense, an ingenuous appeal to the sense of fair play, which is inherent in every man, in such submission. Such an analogy has been immortalized by the stage and screen version of George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, adapted as “My Fair Lady”, for Broadway, by Alan Jay Lerner, where the character, Alfred P Dolittle, while expounding on the perils of “middle class morality” and the treatment meted out to the “undeserving poor”, sarcastically remarked “But my needs is as great as the most deserving widow’s that ever got money out of six different charities in one week for the death of the same husband.” [Copyright, © 1956 by Alan Jay Lerner and Frederick Lowe, first published as a Signet Book by the New American Library, by arrangement with Coward-McCann, Inc, on July 1958]. 6. Apart from the rhetoric, Mr. 6. Apart from the rhetoric, Mr. Singh brought into play, several decisions of various Hon'ble High Courts, and attempted to distinguish the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court against him, on question of double benefit. I propose to summarize the ratio of the decisions cited by him and enumerate them thereafter. 7. IN FAVOUR OF HIS CONTENTION: The Hon'ble High Courts of Delhi, Karnataka and Kerala, after considering the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have come to the conclusion that the insurance company is entitled to set off the amount that the victim has received for an accident from Mediclaim or medical insurance, by whatever name called, under a General Insurance Policy, as against the amount which is awarded to him under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In other words, Their Lordships of those Hon'ble High Courts have held that the insurer can successfully contend before the Tribunal that the amount paid to the victim under Mediclaim in case of an accident not resulting in death, ought to be deducted from the just compensation awarded for the same accident by the Tribunal. To do this, Their Lordships of the said Hon'ble High Courts have distinguished the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which, in case of life insurance contracts, have held that the amount cannot be so set off because amounts paid under a life insurance policy are paid under separate contractual liability quite distinct from the statutory liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The distinction has been made by Their Lordships of the said Hon'ble High Courts mainly on the ground that amounts are paid under a life insurance policy irrespective of whether the contingency – that is to say “death” – occurs or not, after a certain period, alongwith a bonus or extra amount assured by contract whereas in case of a general insurance contract such as “Mediclaim”, no amount is payable unless the contingency, being an accident, occurs, and because it is a settled principle of law, laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself, in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd—v—Patricia Jean Mahajan reported in AIR 2002 SC 2607 where it was held “From the above passage it is clear that the deductions are admissible from the amount of compensation in case the claimant receives the benefit as a consequence of injuries sustained, which otherwise he would not have been entitled to. It does not cover cases where the payment received is not dependent upon an injury sustained on meeting with an accident.” The purpose of insurance, it is trite, is only to place the party at the same level from where he suffered his downfall because of the occurrence of the contingency and not to enrich him twice. The judgments which Mr. Singh relied upon are now cited below: a. National Insurance Company—v—Akber Badsha reported in 2016 ACJ 807 (Kerala), (Division Bench). b. Mariamma James—v—Alphones Antony, reported in ILR (2017) 1 Kerala 663. (Division Bench). c. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.—v—Manish Gupta reported in (2014) I ACC 106 (Karnataka), (Division Bench). d. Udam Singh Sethi—v—Tamal Das in M.A.C. App No. 369 of 2006 decided by the Hon'ble High Court at Delhi sitting singly, on October 26, 2009 which was referred to with approval and followed in the case of Bajaj Allianze General Insurance Co. Ltd.—v— Ganpat Rai Sehgal and Others reported in 2013 ACJ 2366 (Del) and ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd.—v—Swatantrata Sharma and Others, reported in 2012 ACJ 1256 (Del). e. Other judgements of the learned Single Judges of the Hon'ble High Courts of Kerala and Karnataka following their respective Hon’ble Division Benches on the same point, which I do not cite since there is no use multiplying precedents which follow the law laid down by the Hon'ble Division Benches, as aforesaid. f. Reliance General Insurance Co. e. Other judgements of the learned Single Judges of the Hon'ble High Courts of Kerala and Karnataka following their respective Hon’ble Division Benches on the same point, which I do not cite since there is no use multiplying precedents which follow the law laid down by the Hon'ble Division Benches, as aforesaid. f. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd.—v—Shashi Sharma and Others, reported in AIR 2016 SC 4465 , equivalent to (2016) 9 SCC 627 . 8. AGAINST HIS CONTENTIONS: All these judgments cited by Mr. Singh in favour of his contentions, had to address the elephant in the room, being the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which were submitted by the victim to be at once against the contentions raised by Mr. Singh, while they were relied upon or distinguished in the cases cited by Mr. Singh in his favour. These are, briefly, as follows: a. Helen C. Rebello—v—Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Another reported in 1999 ACJ 10 (SC). b. United India Insurance Company Ltd—v—Patricia Jean Mahajan reported in AIR 2002 SC 2607 , equivalent to (2002) 6 SCC 281 . c. Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation—v— Priyank, reported in 2000 ACJ 701 (MP), Division Bench, relying upon the Full Bench decision in the case of Kashiram Mathur and Others—v—Sardar Rajendra Singh and Another reported in 1983 ACJ 152 (MP), in the case of life insurance. d. Relying upon the above, the Single Bench decision in the case of Vrajesh Navnital Desai—v—K. Bagyam and Another reported in 2006 ACJ 65 (Bombay). e. Judgments of learned Single Judges from Karnataka and Delhi which ran counter to respectively the Hon'ble Division Bench judgments of the Karnataka High Court and the judgments of the learned Single Judges of the Delhi High Court referred to in paragraph 7 above. Other Cases from other Hon'ble High Courts: 9.It is without doubt that when the Hon'ble Supreme Court has spoken, the cause is finished. Now that the authorities have been clearly ranged on both the sides, the war of authorities can only be resolved by first noticing what the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to decide in the above cases. Other Cases from other Hon'ble High Courts: 9.It is without doubt that when the Hon'ble Supreme Court has spoken, the cause is finished. Now that the authorities have been clearly ranged on both the sides, the war of authorities can only be resolved by first noticing what the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to decide in the above cases. a. The case of Helen C. Rebello (supra): This was a case where the Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with determining whether any amount could be deducted on the count of amount paid under a life insurance policy to the nominee or the legal heirs of the deceased whose death was caused owing to a motor accident, from the amount which was payable to him as just compensation due to accidental death, which liability was fixed by and took colour from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. After a masterly discussion on the common law principles including tortious liability on the subject, and the reported decisions, and the change in the legislations in India and their effect, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were pleased to hold, inter alia, as follows: - (i) Paragraph 34 of the ACJ: “So far as the general principle of estimating damages under the common law is concerned, it is settled that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death with the ‘pecuniary advantage’ which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that this Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of any other death” and again “In our considered opinion, the general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and the loss on account of the accidental death. Thus, under the present Act whatever pecuniary advantage is received by the claimant, form whatever source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on account of the accidental death and not other form of death. The Constitution of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal itself Under Section 110 is, as the Section states: ‘for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to…” This part of the judgment, which is a part of the ratio, is very clearly not merely on the question of death arising from an accident, but also expounds the welfare nature of the Act of 1988 even for compensation to be awarded in case of accidental injury. (ii) Again, at paragraph 35 of the ACJ, it has been further held as follows: - “Thus, it would not include that which claimant receives on account of other form of deaths, which he would have received even apart from accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have no correlation to the accidental death for which compensation is computed. Any amount received or receivable not only on account of the accidental death but that would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the 'pecuniary advantage', liable for deduction. However, where the employer insures his employee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received out of such insurance on the happening of such incidence may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our legislature has taken note of such contingency, through the proviso of Section 95. Under it, the liability of the insurer is excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out of, in the course of employment of an employee”. (iii) Paragraph 36: “This is based on the principle that the claimant for the happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the wisdom of legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant twice arising from the same transaction, viz., same accident. This, it is excluded thus, either through the wisdom of legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant twice arising from the same transaction, viz., same accident. It is significant to record here in both the sources, viz., either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is either statutory or through the security of the employer securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribution. How thus an amount earned out of one's labour or contribution towards one's wealth, savings, etc. either for himself or for his family, which such person knows, under the law, has to go to his heirs after his death either by succession or under a will could be said to be the 'pecuniary gain only on account of one's accidental death. This, of course, is a pecuniary gain but how this is equitable or could be balanced out of the amount to be received as compensation under the Motor Vehicle Act. There is no co-relation between the two amounts. Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract could be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract. Similarly, how an amount receivable under a statute has any co-relation with an amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to be on the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the contrary or any provisions of law” (iv) Paragraph 37 of the report at ACJ goes on to hold as follows: “Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event, viz., accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No co-relation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured, or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured, if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums, in the case of death insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contracts for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly, any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no co-relation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on similar and same plane having nexus inter se between them and not to which, there is no semblance of any co-relation. The insured (deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount has no co-relation to the compensation computed as against tortfeasor for his negligence on account of accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act, he receives without any contribution. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act, he receives without any contribution. As we have said the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual.” (v) In passing, I must note here, that the first two sentences of paragraph 36 of the report at ACJ apparently seem to indicate that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was deprecating the victim gaining twice from two sources for the same event – thereby supporting Mr. Singh’s rhetoric from the Broadway musical referred to in paragraph 5 of this judgment. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to go on and make it clear that an amount earned out of one’s own contribution cannot be said to be “pecuniary gain” only on account of the accident. After all, it is not the case that the employer paid the Mediclaim of the victim in this or any other case of third party risk. The victim took out a medical insurance as and by way of a general insurance contract by paying premium. It was his contribution. If he gets something out of his own contribution, for an accident, under an insurance policy he has taken out himself, can a statutory liability on a different insurer who has taken on the risk towards third parties due to an accident caused by the offending vehicle which he has insured, then claim deduction of the amount the victim got from a different insurer based on his own contributions? I most respectfully think not, going by the spirit of the opinion delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. I most respectfully think not, going by the spirit of the opinion delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. (vi) My above exegesis finds support from the concluding portion of paragraph 37 of the report at ACJ, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to put it in words far better than mine, to wit, “As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act, he receives without any contribution. As we have said the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual.” (vii) The position is made as clear as crystal by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 38 of the report at ACJ, where the manner of interpretation of the provisions of just compensation for an accident under the Act of 1988 and the proper interpretation of legislative intention have been laid down as law which binds me: - “As we have observed the whole scheme of the Act, in relation to the payment of compensation to the claimant, is a beneficial legislation, the intention of the legislature is made more clear by the change of language from what was in Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and what is brought Under Section 110-B of 1939 Act. This is also visible through the provision of Section 168(1) under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 92-A of 1939 Act which fixes the liability on the owner of the vehicle even on no fault. It provides where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident in spite of no fault of the owner of the vehicle, an amount of compensation fixed therein is payable to claimant by such owner of the vehicle. Section 92-B ensures that the claim for compensation Under Section 92-A is in addition to any other right to claim compensation in respect whereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. This clearly indicates the intention of the legislature which is conferring larger benefit to the claimant. Interpretation of such beneficial legislation is also well settled. This clearly indicates the intention of the legislature which is conferring larger benefit to the claimant. Interpretation of such beneficial legislation is also well settled. Whenever there be two possible interpretations in such statute then the one which sub-serves the object of legislation, viz., benefit to the subject should be accepted. In the present case, two interpretations have given of this statute, evidenced by two distinct sets of decisions of the various high courts. We have no hesitation to conclude that the set of decisions, which applied the principle of no deduction of the life insurance amount, should be accepted and the other set, which interpreted to deduct, is to be rejected. For all these considerations, we have no hesitation to hold that such High Courts were wrong in deducting the amount paid or payable under the life insurance by giving restricted meaning to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act basing mostly on the language of English statutes and not taking into consideration the changed language and intents of the legislature under various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939”. b. The case of Patricia Jean Mahajan (supra): Here, just compensation had been claimed by the legal heirs and dependents of a deceased. The deceased was admittedly killed as a result of injuries suffered due to an accident between a vehicle he was traveling in and a “troller”. Negligence of the lorry driver was established. Deduction had been allowed by the Tribunal on account of the amounts received by the legal heirs of the deceased, who were the claimants, on count of “social security benefits and personal life insurance” of the deceased. This was disallowed in appeal to the learned Single Judge and was reversed and deductions were allowed by the Hon'ble Division Bench at Delhi, whereafter the insurer of the offending “troller”. After noticing and interpreting Helen C Rebello (supra), on the point of deductions under the Act of 1988, Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were pleased to hold, inter alia, as follows at paragraph 35 of the report at SCC: - “Similarly, how an amount receivable under a statute has any correlation with an amount earned by an individual?” Again, at paragraph 38 of the report at SCC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe: - “36. We are in full agreement with the observations made in the case of Helen Rebello [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 ] that principle of balancing between losses and gains, by reason of death, to arrive at the amount of compensation is a general rule, but what is more important is that such receipts by the claimants must have some correlation with the accidental death by reason of which alone the claimants have received the amounts. We do not think it would be necessary for us to go into the question of distinction made between the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act and the Motor Vehicles Act. According to the decisions referred to in the earlier part of this judgment, it is clear that the amount on account of social security as may have been received must have a nexus or relation with the accidental injury or death, so far to be deductible from the amount of compensation. There must be some correlation between the amount received and the accidental death or it may be in the same sphere, absence (sic) the amount received shall not be deducted from the amount of compensation. Thus, the amount received on account of insurance policy of the deceased cannot be deducted from the amount of compensation though no doubt the receipt of the insurance amount is accelerated due to premature death of the insured. So far as other items in respect of which learned counsel for the Insurance Company has vehemently urged, for example some allowance paid to the children, and Mrs. Patricia Mahajan under the social security system, no correlation of those receipts with the accidental death has been shown much less established. Apart from the fact that contribution comes from different sources for constituting the fund out of which payment on account of social security system is made, one of the constituents of the fund is tax which is deducted from income for the purpose. We feel that the High Court has rightly disallowed any deduction on account of receipts under the insurance policy and other receipts under the social security system which the claimant would have also otherwise been entitled to receive irrespective of accidental death of Dr Mahajan. We feel that the High Court has rightly disallowed any deduction on account of receipts under the insurance policy and other receipts under the social security system which the claimant would have also otherwise been entitled to receive irrespective of accidental death of Dr Mahajan. If the proposition ‘receipts from whatever source’ is interpreted so widely that it may cover all the receipts, which may come into the hands of the claimants, in view of the mere death of the victim, it would only defeat the purpose of the Act providing for just compensation on account of accidental death. Such gains, maybe on account of savings or other investment etc. made by the deceased, would not go to the benefit of the wrongdoer and the claimant should not be left worse off, if he had never taken an insurance policy or had not made investments for future returns.” c. It will be very clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned, in the case of Patricia Jean Mahajan (supra), with a limited issue so far as deductions on count of payment due to the deceased or his family for social security and life insurance were concerned. Their Lordships therefore extracted those parts of the judgment in Helen C Rebello (supra) which pertained to death due to an accident and quoted the same and referred only to the same. However, their Lordships never departed from nor doubted the ratio in Helen C Rebello, which included the law laid down as to how provisions in the Act of 1988 ought to be interpreted and what was the legislative intent and more particularly, that no deductions were to be permitted when a contractual payment was made to the victim, for injury or death caused by accident under a contract of insurance that the victim had with some other insurer by reason of the premiums he had paid for it, from the award of compensation which the insurer of the offending vehicle was liable under the Act of 1988 to pay. These premiums were part of his own earning and paid by way of his contributions. In case of death, the award of compensation did not amount to double benefit, and in case of injury, the award of compensation was under a statutory liability towards third parties, and not a contractual liability to the victim by the insurer of the offending vehicle. In case of death, the award of compensation did not amount to double benefit, and in case of injury, the award of compensation was under a statutory liability towards third parties, and not a contractual liability to the victim by the insurer of the offending vehicle. At least, that is how I understand the judgment in the case of Jean Patricia Mahajan (supra), read together with Helen C Rebello (supra). 10. So far as the judgments which Mr. Singh cited in his favour are concerned, pertaining to the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble High Courts which allow such deduction, as briefly referred to in paragraph 7 of this judgment I must point out the following. These cases started and ended on a possible interpretation of the judgment in Rebello (supra) as noticed synoptically by Their Lordships in Patricia Jean Mahajan’s case (supra). The interpretation depends upon parts of paragraphs 37 and 36 reported in ACJ in the former case. Very briefly, these cases interpret the entire ratio of the judgment in Rebello (supra) without considering paragraph 38 of the report as if the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that only in cases of life insurance would deduction not be permissible, which ignores the rest of the ratio that makes it clear that even in case of accidental injury or death, the same principle applies and as if the test is whether the two sums paid are not for the same occurrence, that is to say, death, since in one case it is paid under a contract of life insurance and in the other case, even by efflux of time without death. The said other judgments have tried, therefore, to construe the said judgment in Rebello (supra) and Patricia Jean Mahajan (supra] as if the ratio is that “when we seek the principle of loss or gain, it has to be on the same plane having nexus inter se between them and not to which, there is no semblance of any correlation.” Taken out of context, it is possible that this would be an interpretation which would appeal to any court of law. However, in the instant case, I cannot lose sight of the principles which control the entire ratio – first, that the liability of an insurer of the offending vehicle to pay a third party compensation for injury or death caused in an accident by the offending vehicle, is statutory whereas the liability to pay a sum to the insured victim for such accidental death or injury, or for any other kind of death, is contractual, and second that the sum paid by the insurer of the victim (rather than the offending vehicle) in both cases is due to the premium paid by the victim from his own earnings. Once these important differences and similarities as I have extracted above are appreciated, it will appear, with the greatest of respect to the learned coordinate benches of the other Hon'ble Courts or the learned Single Benches of those Hon'ble Courts, that none of the judgments referred to in paragraph 7 and sub-paragraphs a, b, c, d, or e, lay down the law, in the teeth of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rebello (supra) as noticed by me above. 11. So far as the judgment in the case of Shashi Sharma (supra) referred to in paragraph 7f of this judgment is concerned, with the greatest respect to Mr. Singh, I do not think it applies to the present case. Why I think so, shall appear from what I say about the judgment. 12. The case of Shashi Sharma (supra) was on the basis of the facts of that case, which, though it arose ostensibly from a motor accident claim case, on which the shadow of the provisions of the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 loomed large. In that case, the said Rules of 2006 made special provisions for payment of ex gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds to the dependents of a deceased who died in harness. This included a claim for loss of salary and wages. An employee died out of injuries suffered by him in a motor accident. The dependents claimed “just compensation” in respect of the amount covered as a third party risk, before the jurisdictional tribunal for motor accident claim cases, under the provisions of the Act of 1988. This included a claim for loss of salary and wages. An employee died out of injuries suffered by him in a motor accident. The dependents claimed “just compensation” in respect of the amount covered as a third party risk, before the jurisdictional tribunal for motor accident claim cases, under the provisions of the Act of 1988. The claim was partly allowed, but deduction of the amount obtained by the claimant as dependents of the deceased, from the employer, under the said Rules of 2006 was also directed by the Tribunal. The claimants aggrieved thereby, appealed from the said award to the jurisdictional Hon'ble High Court, which was pleased to allow the appeal and disallow the deduction. Against the same, the insurer of the offending vehicle preferred an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while partly allowing the appeal laid down the ratio that though the Haryana Rules of 2006 come into play even if the government employee dies in harness even due to natural causes apart from an accident, still those Rules did not expressly enable the dependents of the deceased government employee to claim similar amount from the insurance company because of the accidental death of the deceased. On the contrary, a particular example was taken that if instead of death, an accident had occurred to the employee, which he survived, despite injury caused by the accident, then the employee would continue to earn his regular pay and allowances and in such a case the claim for compensation under the Act of 1988 for the third party risk due to injury caused by the accident would remain, but the employee could not claim the same “loss of salary and wages” or under the head of “pay and allowances” from either the insurer or from his employer, under the said Rules of 2006 because in that case a double payment for the same incident would occur. Yet, the Tribunal could still determine just compensation after excluding the amount receivable by the dependents under the said statutory rules towards the head “financial assistance equivalent to pay and other allowances” as last drawn by the deceased in the normal course. Yet, the Tribunal could still determine just compensation after excluding the amount receivable by the dependents under the said statutory rules towards the head “financial assistance equivalent to pay and other allowances” as last drawn by the deceased in the normal course. That which was not covered by the Rules of 2006 even under the head of loss of income, could still be pursued and obtained and as held by Their Lordships in paragraph 26 of the report in SCC, “Similarly, other benefits extended to the dependents of the deceased Government employee in terms of Sub-rule (2) to Sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 including family pension, Life Insurance, Provident Fund etc., that must remain unaffected and cannot be allowed to be deducted, which, any way would be paid to the dependents of the deceased Government employee, applying the principle expounded in Helen C. Rebello and Patricia Jean Mahajan's cases (supra)” 13. All that this decision decided was that if a benefit is available under a special statute or statutory rules – such as the Haryana Rules of 2006 – to the dependents of a deceased employee who died in harness, and not what was available to him under a contract with his own insurer in case of death or injury due to accident, then the same benefit cannot be claimed by him again as just compensation because the special Rules of 2006 did not allow it and to that extent deduction would be allowed, but whatever would be paid to the dependents or claimants any way, in terms of the principle laid down in Rebello (supra) could not be deducted. As I have shown above, on facts, this is not a case where the insurer of the offending vehicle has made out a case that the victim was entitled to or received any money under a special statute or special statutory rules which he was claiming again by way of just compensation. He was only seeking that the contractual amounts paid by his insurer because of the premiums he paid out of his own earning, were not deducted by the insurer of the offending vehicle under a statutory liability for third party risk from the just compensation payable to the third-party victim with which it had no contract and which it was its statutory duty to pay when determined by the Tribunal. Therefore, this decision can be distinguished both on facts as also in terms of the special Rules which governed the decision. 14. Thus, the seduction which first swayed me off my judicial feet, due to the persuasive skills of Mr. Singh could not survive the cold light of forensic analysis of the judgments he has relied upon and like most infatuations, this too ended. Once the matter is considered, apart from the rhetoric of the argument, it will be found that the analogy depends upon the payment being made as a charity and relates to death of a person. The precedents cited in favour of this position, on the other hand, go against the express ratio of Rebello (supra) interpreted both by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as by me, as above. The case of Shashi Sharma (supra) is on a different point and on different facts and can be distinguished. In none of the precedents of the Hon'ble High Courts relied upon by Mr. Singh, was the question of a contractual right created by payment of premium by the victim for an accident suffered by him against his insurer, as distinguished from a statutory duty imposed on the insurer of an offending vehicle due to third party risk imposed by statute, and whereunder payment was liable under statute to be made to someone other than with whom it had a contractual relationship, considered. Those cannot, therefore, with the greatest respect, be authorities for deciding the present case. A decision is only an authority for what it decides, and not what can be logically deduced from it, and this is well settled, among others, in the case of Quinn—v—Leathem reported in (1901) AC 495 : (1903) AER 1, which has been followed in India in several cases including Bhavnagar University—v—Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. and Others reported in AIR 2003 SC 511 and before that in Mafatlal Industries Ltd and Others—v—Union of India and Others reported in (1997) 5 SCC 536 . Therefore, the arguments advanced do not pertain to a right of getting just compensation, created by a statute, in favour of an innocent by-stander, who has been tragically robbed of the use of his right leg from just above the knee, by amputation, because of the accident, where the fault is squarely of the offending vehicle. Therefore, the arguments advanced do not pertain to a right of getting just compensation, created by a statute, in favour of an innocent by-stander, who has been tragically robbed of the use of his right leg from just above the knee, by amputation, because of the accident, where the fault is squarely of the offending vehicle. That statutory right was created as a liability of the owner of any vehicle, towards a third party since the owner of the offending vehicle chose to ply a vehicle on the public thoroughfare, where his duty to take care towards everyone else on the street is not in question. The duty from which the liability arises under statute, can be shown to have been duly discharged if contributory negligence could have been proved. Then that liability could have been mitigated or rebutted. When it has not been proved, this becomes an absolute statutory liability, whose risk the insurance company has assumed and on which it has been imposed, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It cannot wriggle out of its statutory liability by pleading a contractual benefit which the victim has, under a contract between the victim and its separate insurer, for which benefit it has been paying a premium. The liability of an insurer providing insurance through Mediclaim to the victim for the medical expenses incurred by him for an accident or hospitalization, subject to a limit and based on the premiums paid by the victim by bilateral contract between the victim and his insurer, is distinct, separate and wholly different from, and independent of the liability imposed on the appellant as the insurer of the offending vehicle and its owner from third party risks in case of accident, and is provided for, created and imposed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It is not contractual as far as the victim, a third party, is concerned. 15. So, the appeal fails and is dismissed, on the only ground urged. COT 14 of 2016 16. Coming now to the cross-objection of the victim, the Tribunal has been pleased to award only what I have set out in paragraph 3 of this judgment, without disbelieving the medical certificate which was issued by the Medical Board and proved in evidence by the victim. COT 14 of 2016 16. Coming now to the cross-objection of the victim, the Tribunal has been pleased to award only what I have set out in paragraph 3 of this judgment, without disbelieving the medical certificate which was issued by the Medical Board and proved in evidence by the victim. The reasons why the Tribunal did so, are apparent from the following findings in the award under challenge: - “From the Income Tax Returns and the salary sheets in respect of the injured which have been exhibited it is evident that the injured is in service and has been receiving salary. The injured himself has admitted the fact that he is still in service and his salary has been increased which has also been stated by DW—1, the senior Officer of the Ludlow Jute and Specialities Limited, the employer of the injured. This witness has further deposed that the salary of the injured has been enhanced by way of increment as such the injured is having increment also. The Officer of the employer company of the injured who has deposed has also stated that there is no pension benefit in the said company. So, the injured has not been affected monetarily very much barring his sufferings sustained due to the loss of his right leg which is the result of the said accident. In addition the injured has to spend money for medical treatment and he has also to spend money for his future treatment and prior to the accident while he used to go to his destination by public vehicle, after the said accident he is not in such a position so that he can avail public vehicle but now has to make special arrangements i.e., taxi to reach his destination. The amount of money which has been received by the injured from Mediclaim will not be taken into consideration at the time of assessing the amount of compensation.” 17. Since the victim admittedly did not lose his income or job but in fact his salary increased, after or due to the accident, I confirm part of the above findings as to there being no loss of income. Since the victim admittedly did not lose his income or job but in fact his salary increased, after or due to the accident, I confirm part of the above findings as to there being no loss of income. However, it will appear from the aforesaid that the Tribunal was pleased not to consider that under the head of non-pecuniary damages, the loss caused of the amenities, id est, loss of amenities such as the normal actions of walking, sitting or even performing the offices of privy, or at least the prejudice thereto due to such permanent disability, is distinct from the loss of expectation of life. At least that is what the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold in a plethora of cases of which I only quote two, to avoid multiplying the precedents, being the case of R.D. Hattangadi—v—Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1995) 1 SCC 551 and Kumari Kiran—v— Sajjan Singh reported in (2015) 1 SCC 539 . In the present case, an amount has been awarded only on the count of loss of expectation of life. The victim is certainly entitled to a separate sum for the loss of amenities, for an artificial foot supplied to him can never replace the flesh and blood limb which he had, and the amenities he enjoyed therewith, before the amputation from just above the knee. Though there is a separate amount awarded as in paragraph 3, of Rs.2 lakhs for the loss of the limb, I do not think this is enough, for, the loss of amenities will continue to plague the victim throughout his life. Again, under the head of pecuniary damages, the costs of replacement of the artificial foot, keeping in mind the industry standards for the average artificial foot without considering what the best prosthesis could cost and how the best prosthesis would reduce the cost of wear and tear and replacement, I think Rs.1 lakh is too low, considering that the victim was only 49 years old when the accident occurred in 2004 and now in excess of 13 years have already passed. So far as the quantum of interest is concerned, I find no reason why the Tribunal limited it to the date when the insurer entered appearance instead of the date when the application was filed by the claimant – the reason for the exercise of such discretion in such a manner is not apparent from the records of the case. I also find no reason why the rate of interest was kept at 6% (simple) per annum, when the publications of the Reserve Bank of India show, that for the relevant period of 2003—04, and 2004—05, as appears from https://m.rbi.org.in//scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=12765 was 10.25%, for long term deposits. 18. In view of the aforesaid, I would enhance the compensation and the rate of interest and the date from which it would be payable, in the manner which follows: 1. Pain and Suffering Rs.1,00,000/- 2. Reimbursement of Medical Expenses Rs.3,75,517/- 3. Expenses for travelling, to and from office and other places Rs.2,75,000/- 4. Loss of expectation of life Rs.1,00,000/- 5. Future Medical expenses Rs.2,00,000/- in place of Rs.1,00,000/- 6. Charge for attendant Rs.50,000/- 7. Loss of Limb Rs.2,00,000/- 8. Loss of Amenities Rs.1,00,000/- in place of Rs.50,000/- TOTAL Rs. 14,00,517/- in place of Rs.12,00,517/-. (Fourteen Lakh, Five Hundred and Seventeen Rupees in place of Twelve Lakh, Five Hundred and Seventeen Rupees] Rate of interest: Simple interest @ 8% per annum being the average of the prevalent rate of interest as appears from the site of the Reserve Bank of India for long term domestic (rupee) deposits and what was awarded by the Tribunal in the award. Date from when interest accrues: The date from when the application under Section 166 of the Act of 1988 was filed before the Tribunal by the victim being August 13, 2004 as appears from the claim petition and the order sheet which are part of the Lower Court Records called for and brought before this Court. 19. The cross-objection, therefore, succeeds to the above extent only and I therefore modify the award impugned to the extent mentioned in paragraph 18 above. The difference in the amount originally awarded and the amount thus enhanced by this Court shall be calculated as in paragraph 18 above. 19. The cross-objection, therefore, succeeds to the above extent only and I therefore modify the award impugned to the extent mentioned in paragraph 18 above. The difference in the amount originally awarded and the amount thus enhanced by this Court shall be calculated as in paragraph 18 above. The difference in the amount originally awarded and the amount thus enhanced by this court with change in the rate of interest @ 8% per annum from August 13, 2004 till the date of payment shall be calculated as in certified by the Registrar General and/or by his office, within a fortnight from the date of communication of this order to the Registrar General by the victim. Such calculation shall be made and communicated to both the appellant and the victim both directly and also through their respective learned Advocates-on-Record within seven days from the date of making of such application. The insurance company shall pay the difference as calculated above and the interest on the entire enhanced amount less the sum of Rs.6 lakh which was allowed by this Court to be withdrawn by the victim by the order dated November 30, 2017 passed in CAN 6609 of 2016. This payment shall be made by the appellant within 60 days from the date of the communication of the calculation to the appellant by the Registrar General. This balance deposit of Rs.6,00,517 out of the original deposit of Rs.12,00,517 as recorded to have been made in the order dated November 23, 2017, together with accrued interest, shall be released by the Registrar General in favour of the victim on an appropriate application, within a fortnight from the date of making of such application with a copy of the present order annexed to it. In default of the payment directed to be made by the appellant as above within the time mentioned above, the award shall be executable at once before the Tribunal. CONCLUSION: 20. Since an interesting point of law was raised by the appellant, right from the beginning, and since it took the above mammoth analysis to decide it, I do not think that the appeal was frivolous. So, the parties will bear their own costs. 21. Thus, the appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection allowed in part, as above. 22. CONCLUSION: 20. Since an interesting point of law was raised by the appellant, right from the beginning, and since it took the above mammoth analysis to decide it, I do not think that the appeal was frivolous. So, the parties will bear their own costs. 21. Thus, the appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection allowed in part, as above. 22. Having perused the judgment prepared by learned brother Banerjee, J., I cannot agree more with His Lordship that the appeal deserves to be dismissed and the cross-objection allowed. However, I wish to pen a few words of my own considering the importance of the issue that emerged for decision on the appeal in view of the argument of Mr. Singh, learned advocate for the appellant insurance company. 23. Based on the evidence that was adduced before the tribunal, there is no iota of doubt that the victim suffered personal injury. Since the claim application was one under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the victim was entitled in law to claim compensation in terms of Chapter XII thereof and the rules framed thereunder. Once a claim application is received by the jurisdictional tribunal, it is the duty of such tribunal to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just, having regard to Section 168 of the Act. This process would necessarily require an assessment of all damages for personal injury bearing in mind the scheme of the Act of 1988. It needs no reiteration that the whole object is to compensate the victim of a motor vehicular accident by placing him in the same position prior to the accident, to the extent money can. An accurate assessment of what would amount to just compensation may not be possible but it cannot be gainsaid that wherever the victim is not to be faulted for the accident and he has suffered because of wrong doing at the instance of one who was supposed to take reasonable care and caution while driving a motor vehicle on a public road, it is the duty of the tribunal to grant him compensation for his sufferings that is considered fair and reasonable. Regard being had to the facts of each case, a fair and reasonable sum has to be awarded as compensation. There is, perhaps, no dispute with regard to such proposition. 24. Regard being had to the facts of each case, a fair and reasonable sum has to be awarded as compensation. There is, perhaps, no dispute with regard to such proposition. 24. Here, the appellant insurance company urges that whatever money the victim received upon settlement of his Mediclaim policy, prior to the impugned award, should be deducted from the compensation determined to be payable to him under the head ‘reimbursement of medical expenses’. Let me now consider, on the basis of my own understanding of the law, how far such a claim is justified without being unduly troubled by the divergent opinions expressed by the different high courts of the country on the point. Decisions having been rendered either way, the view I propose to take would find some support from some of them. I place on record that there is no decision of the Supreme Court directly on the point and hence the slate is clean. 25. The Mediclaim policy bought by the victim from an insurer led to an insurance contract between the two and both bound themselves by the terms and conditions of such policy. The same envisaged an assured amount in favour of the victim upon a contingency of the nature covered by the policy happening, and thereby to indemnify the victim. The liability under the policy was purely contractual. It is common knowledge that unless premiums ~ either monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, half-yearly, annually or even one-time, as the case may be ~ are paid by the insured, the insurer would not in the first place settle his claim and indemnify the insured. Premiums must have been paid, resulting in the insurer settling the claim of the victim. The liability under the insurance contract, upon the accident happening, was discharged by the insurer. The contract between the parties, thus, worked itself out. It is this amount of money, i.e., Rs.1,50,000/-, which the insurer paid to the victim that has triggered the appellant insurance company to urge this Court to deduct such amount from the compensation awarded by the tribunal. 26. On the flip side, there is an insurance policy that was bought by the owner of the offending motor vehicle from the appellant insurance company in terms whereof the appellant insurance company agreed to indemnify the owner of any liability arising out of an accident involving the use of his insured motor vehicle. 26. On the flip side, there is an insurance policy that was bought by the owner of the offending motor vehicle from the appellant insurance company in terms whereof the appellant insurance company agreed to indemnify the owner of any liability arising out of an accident involving the use of his insured motor vehicle. This was obviously a statutory liability. 27. The argument of Mr. Singh was that compensation that is determined under Section 168 of the Act of 1988 should not be a bonanza for the victim and care must be exercised to ensure that the victim does not receive ‘double benefit’. True it is, the tribunals/high courts should guard against determination of just compensation which would amount to a bonanza for an accident victim or his family. But, at the same time, is it not the duty of the tribunals/high courts to determine just compensation in a manner that an insurance company, which is under a statutory liability to pay, does not escape the rigours of paying compensation and thus evade its obligation under the contract of insurance that exists between it and the owner of the offending vehicle? Should such an insurance company despite receiving premiums from the insured to indemnify him be allowed to achieve gains merely because the victim of the accident has received some money out of faithful discharge of contractual liability by another insurance company? The answers to the aforesaid questions cannot be in favour of the insurance company which is under a statutory liability to pay. One should not forget that what the victim gets from his Mediclaim policy is the return for making payment of premiums. It is the hard earned money that he puts in, in insurance business as premium, that is returned to him upon happening of an accident. The money received, thus, does not come free. In most cases, the accident and its aftermath are not only heart breaking for the victim but may also result in severe physical disability to him. To lead a paralysed life, is sometimes more painful than death itself. Such an accident victim may ask “why me”? The return that he receives from his insurer on the claim arising out of Mediclaim policy is consolation money, in the circumstances. To lead a paralysed life, is sometimes more painful than death itself. Such an accident victim may ask “why me”? The return that he receives from his insurer on the claim arising out of Mediclaim policy is consolation money, in the circumstances. To consider such return as a benefit received from other sources while determining compensation, to my mind, would be an approach of a narrow-mind, not intended in the best interests of the victim who might be left high and dry, battling for the rest of his life to survive only on the compensation money. I hold that any money received by an accident victim as return for money invested by him ought not to be comprehended as a benefit received and, therefore, question of the victim in this case being doubly benefitted does not and cannot arise. 28. Law is well settled that while determining compensation, the court must be liberal and not niggardly inasmuch as in a free country law must value life and limb on a generous scale [see: (1992) 2 SCC 567 : Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation]. It is also settled law that tribunals/high courts must take a reasonably compassionate view of things [see: (2010) 10 SCC 341 : Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.]. In the latter decision, it was also held that there is a distinction between compensation and damages. The expression compensation may include a claim for damages but compensation is more comprehensive. Normally damages are given for an injury which is suffered, whereas compensation stands on a slightly higher footing. It is given for the atonement of injury caused and the intention behind grant of compensation is to put back the injured party as far as possible in the same position, as if the injury has not taken place, by way of grant of pecuniary relief. Thus, in the matter of computation of compensation, the approach will be slightly more broad-based than what is done in the matter of assessment of damages. 29. Having regard to the dicta also, as aforesaid, the conclusion reached above can be sustained. 30. I, therefore, hold that the victim is entitled to the compensation determined by learned brother Banerjee, J.